Dickie v. The Queen

Dickie v. The Queen
Court (s) Database
Tax Court of Canada Judgments
Date
2012-07-10
Neutral citation
2012 TCC 242
File numbers
2008-2808(IT)G
Judges and Taxing Officers
Frank J. Pizzitelli
Subjects
Income Tax Act
Decision Content
Docket: 2008-2808(IT)G
BETWEEN:
REYNOLD DICKIE,
Appellant,
and
HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN,
Respondent.
____________________________________________________________________
Appeal heard on May 28, 29 and 30, 2012,
at Vancouver, British Columbia.
Before: The Honourable Justice F.J. Pizzitelli
Appearances:
Counsel for the Appellant:
Sarah D. Hansen and Robert Janes
Counsel for the Respondent:
Nadine Taylor Pickering
____________________________________________________________________
JUDGMENT
The appeal from the reassessment made under the Income Tax Act for the 2003 taxation year is allowed, and the reassessment dated June 2, 2008, is vacated.
Costs are awarded to the Appellant. The parties are invited to file written submissions as to costs within 30 days if any of them feel a standard costs award should not stand.
Signed at Ottawa, Canada, this 10th day of July 2012.
“F.J. Pizzitelli”
Pizzitelli J.
Citation: 2012 TCC 242
Date: 20120710
Docket: 2008-2808(IT)G
BETWEEN:
REYNOLD DICKIE,
Appellant,
and
HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN,
Respondent.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
Pizzitelli J.
[1] The Appellant, a status Indian, operated a proprietorship from a location on the Fort Nelson Indian Reserve #2 (the “Reserve”), of which he was a member and resident of, under the name Deer River Ventures in 2003 which carried on the business of essentially clearing and slashing timber and brush for oil and gas companies based off reserve to enable the latter to conduct seismic surveys in search of minerals and oil and gas or permit pipelines (the “Business”). The Appellant was reassessed to include his business income as taxable income. The main issue to be decided in this case is whether the business income from the Appellant’s Business was exempt from income tax in 2003 as being personal property situated on a reserve within the meaning of paragraph 87(1)(b) of the Indian Act (the “Act”) and hence exempt from taxation under paragraph 81(1)(a) of the Income Tax Act (“ITA”). If it is found the Appellant’s business income was not so exempt, then the Court must determine whether the Appellant was entitled to deduct all or any portion of the sum of $161,000 as a management fee allocated to his spouse during the 2003 year.
[2] The relevant provisions of the Act and ITA are as follows.
[3] Paragraph 87 of the Act reads as follows:
87(1) Notwithstanding any other Act of Parliament or any Act of the legislature of a province, but subject to section 83 and section 5 of the First Nations Fiscal and Statistical Management Act, the following property is exempt from taxation:
(a) the interest of an Indian or a band in reserve lands or surrendered lands; and
(b) the personal property of an Indian or a band situated on a reserve.
(2) No Indian or band is subject to taxation in respect of the ownership, occupation, possession or use of any property mentioned in paragraph (1)(a) or (b) or is otherwise subject to taxation in respect of any such property.
(3) No succession duty, inheritance tax or estate duty is payable on the death of any Indian in respect of any property mentioned in paragraphs (1)(a) or (b) or the succession thereto if the property passes to an Indian, nor shall any such property be taken into account in determining the duty payable under the Dominion Succession Duty Act, chapter 89 of the Revised Statutes of Canada, 1952, or the tax payable under the Estate Tax Act, chapter E-9 of the Revised Statutes of Canada, 1970, on or in respect of other property passing to an Indian.
[4] Paragraph 81 of the ITA reads as follows:
81(1) There shall not be included in computing the income of a taxpayer for a taxation year,
(a) statutory exemptions [including Indians] - an amount that is declared to be exempt from income tax by any other enactment of Parliament, other than an amount received or receivable by an individual that is exempt by virtue of a provision contained in a tax convention or agreement with another country that has the force of law in Canada; . . .
[5] Paragraph 81(1)(a) of the ITA effectively excludes from the computation of a taxpayer’s income, any amount that is declared to be exempt from income tax by any other enactment of Parliament, such as the Act.
[6] I would propose to deal with the issue of the applicability of the above mentioned Act exemption to the Appellant’s business income first, as its applicability may render the second issue redundant.
[7] The facts surrounding the first issue, of the applicability of the above mentioned Act exemption are generally not in dispute. The Appellant, a status Indian, was a member of and lived on the Reserve in 2003. The Appellant’s home contained the office of the Business and the Appellant also had a shop building for the Business next to his house on the same property as well as stored his equipment, including Bobcat machinery in his home yard. There is no dispute that the Appellant’s administrative centre for the business was his home address on the Reserve. The Appellant received mail for the business at his home office, had computers and other business equipment for the Business stationed and operating on behalf of the Business from that location, received inquiries by phone or email or personal visits by potential workers who wished to work for the Business there, conducted orientation for projects for work crews from his home office and held safety meetings there (in addition to those held on site) before crews departed for specific work sites, negotiated the majority of his contracts there or received requests to tender for work there, completed the tender packages and forwarded the tender bids from that location, received the vast majority of payment for services at such location through the mail and paid bills from there and that is the location where his spouse, L.D., also a status Indian from a Vancouver Island Band, resided and performed her duties as the bookkeeper, office manager and safety coordinator of the Business, basically performing the role of the Appellant’s “right-hand man”. The evidence is overwhelming that the Appellant’s home on the Reserve was the head office and administrative centre of the Business.
[8] While the Appellant clearly negotiated and received accepted contracts for work from the Reserve location, it is clear that 99% of the work was conducted off Reserve, within an 80-kilometre radius of the Reserve. In 2003, the Appellant had over 140 workers engaged for his Business and had revenue of approximately $3.4 million. The Appellant testified he hired mainly aboriginal workers, 16 in all from the Reserve, and others from Reserves in other parts of British Columbia, Alberta, Saskatchewan and even as far away as Newfoundland and Labrador. In all, the evidence is that approximately 105 of the 140 workers were aboriginal workers.
[9] The Appellant testified that the Business would bid on between 20 to 25 tenders a year and was usually successful 20% of the time, hence was awarded four to five contract bids a year. He also testified a small portion of the work of the Business was from small job requests but that the great majority of the Appellant’s Business revenue was from the larger bid contracts. The evidence is clear that all of the clients of the Business, generally oil and gas exploration or distribution companies, were not located or based on the Reserve and in fact most were based in Calgary, Alberta, the place of their office. The Appellant also testified that in 2003 the Business was a competitive one, evidenced also by the fact he was only successful on 20% of his bids.
[10] Although the requirements of the clients of the Business differed, the larger clients would often send out pre-qualifying questionnaires to various competitors of and to the Business, if interested have them enter into a general master services agreement which set out general terms and conditions, including warranties for work and indemnity clauses for improper performance, and then seek bids on tenders let out and award the contract. Entering into a master services agreement with a client did not guarantee any work but served more of acting as standard contract terms for those contractors it pre-qualified, if a job was awarded. Once a contract was entered into, the Appellant would assemble the required crew by generally phoning from his Reserve office to engage workers who were on his list generally and of course put together the necessary equipment and tools needed to do the job, often renting additional equipment needs from an equipment rental business in Fort Nelson, off reserve.
[11] Workers received orientation before leaving for a job as a crew, usually from the Reserve offices, and each worker was required to have the necessary safety training certification, licences to drive a vehicle and operate the necessary tools. In general, the workers hired were already trained and qualified to perform the duties required to fell trees and clear the land. Once on site, the workers appear to be supervised by foremen of the Appellant who worked on site, one for every twelve men and who acted as liaisons with the office as well as ensured safety protocols were followed. The client also provided project managers or supervisors on site to supervise the project.
[12] The Appellant, through his spouse’s duties, arranged to shop for and supply the workers with any personal goods or commissaries they required and requested while on work sites, the cost of which was deducted from their pay. Any such goods were generally delivered by the Appellant’s foremen or expediters to the workers. Workers were paid twice a month, based on hours worked each day, which were tracked by the Client Supervisor and as well as the Business and remitted daily, and the Business sent invoices to its clients as per the contract terms.
[13] Payment by clients in 2003 was overwhelming by the mailing of payment by cheque through the mail addressed to the Appellant’s Reserve office, with only two clients paying by direct deposit to the Appellant’s CIBC bank account in Fort Nelson, British Columbia, in that year accounting for only about $97,000 of the Business’ $3.4 million revenue or just less than 0.3% of the revenue.
Position of the Parties
[14] The Appellant takes the position that the facts are to be evaluated from his perspective as a businessman operating a business from a Reserve and not from the perspective of his workers or where their work is performed and accordingly his business income which is his property is situated on a Reserve and hence qualifies for the exemption under paragraph 87(1)(b) of the Act. The Respondent takes the position that the situs of the business income is the location where the activities to earn it occur, and basically argues that since almost all the Appellant’s work projects are located off the Reserve, the situs is off reserve.
The Law
[15] There is no dispute that business income of the Appellant is intangible property that is personal property of an Indian.
[16] There is also no dispute between the parties that the test in determining whether income is personal property of an Indian situated on a reserve is the “Connecting Factors Test” enunciated by the Supreme Court of Canada in Williams v. Canada, [1992] 1 S.C.R. 877 and confirmed recently by the Supreme Court of Canada in the cases of Bastien Estate v. Canada, 2011 SCC 38, [2011] 2 S.C.R. 710 and Dubé v. Canada, 2011 SCC 39, [2011] 2 S.C.R. 764.
[17] As Cromwell J. confirmed in paragraph 2 of Bastien Estate, the test is a two‑step analyses:
[2] . . . First, one identifies potentially relevant factors tending to connect the property to a location and then determines what weight they should be given in identifying the location of the property in light of three considerations: the purpose of the exemption from taxation, the type of property and the nature of the taxation of that property. . . .
[18] Cromwell J. stated in paragraph 15 of Bastien Estate:
[15] The phrase “on a reserve” refers throughout the Act to the property being within the boundaries of the reserve. However, different legal tests are used to determine whether various types of property are so situated for the particular purposes. . . . An important point, however, is that regardless of the type of property or the difficulty of ascribing to it a location, the objective must always be to implement the statutory language, and that requires keeping the focus on whether the property is situated on a reserve.
[19] Before determining which factors are relevant to connecting or not connecting the property to the location in question, in this case the Reserve, mention must be made of the three considerations that apply in determining the weight of such factors; namely the purpose of the exemption, the type of property and the nature of the taxation of that property.
The Purpose of the Exemption
[20] Cromwell J. discussed in detail the purpose of the exemption in Bastien Estate in paragraphs 20 to 30 and his concerns over the manner historical jurisprudence has allowed it to evolve; imputing purpose outside the clear wording of section 87 of the Act. In paragraphs 21 and 22, he quoted La Forest J. in Mitchell v Peguis Indian Band, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 85:
[21] . . . With respect to the exemption from taxation, he observed that it serves to “guard against the possibility that one branch of government, through the imposition of taxes, could erode the full measure of the benefits given by that branch of government entrusted with the supervision of Indian affairs” (p.130). He summed up his discussion of the purpose of the provisions by noting that since the Royal Proclamation of 1763, R.S.C 1985, App. II, No. 1, “the Crown has always acknowledged that it is honour-bound to shield Indians from any efforts by non-natives to dispossess Indians of the property which they hold qua Indians”. He added an important qualification: the purpose of the exemptions is to preserve property reserved for their use, “not to remedy the economically disadvantaged position of Indians by ensuring that [they could] acquire, hold and deal with property in the commercial mainstream on different terms than their fellow citizens”: p.131. . . .
[22] However, La Forest J. was careful to emphasize that even with respect to purely commercial arrangements, the protections from taxation and seizure always apply to property situated on a reserve. . . .
[21] Cromwell J. made it clear that the expression “Indian qua Indian” referred to by La Forest J. and Gonthier J. in Williams does not mean one can import into the purpose of the legislation “an effort to preserve the traditional way of life in Indian communities” or consider as a relevant factor “whether the investment income benefits the traditional Native way of life”. While Cromwell J. found that he did not read the judgments in Mitchell or Williams “as departing from a focus on the location of the property in question when applying the tax exemption”, he also found that neither decision mandated an approach that assessed what is in fact, to use the parlance of the Appellant here, the “Indianness” of the activity. In paragraph 27 of Bastien Estate, Cromwell J. stated:
[27] . . . A purposive interpretation goes too far if it substitutes for the inquiry into the location of the property mandated by the statute an assessment of what does or does not constitute an “Indian” way of life on a reserve. . . .
[22] And in paragraph 28 stated:
[28] . . ., a purposive interpretation of the exemption does not require that the evolution of that way of life should be impeded. Rather, the comments in both Mitchell and Williams in relation to the protection of property which Indians hold qua Indians should be read in relation to the need to establish a connection between the property and the reserve such that it may be said that the property is situated there for the purposes of the Indian Act. While the relationship between property and life on the reserve may in some cases be a factor tending to strengthen or weaken the connection between the property and the reserve, the availability of the exemption does not depend on whether the property is integral to the life of the reserve or to the preservation of the traditional Indian way of life. . . .
[23] Likewise Cromwell J. cautioned against elevating considerations of whether the economic activity was in the “commercial mainstream” as a factor of determinative weight in determining the situs of investment income, which he felt was done in Recalma v. Canada, 98 DTC 6238 (F.C.A.) and other decisions of the lower courts, as “problematic” as he stated in paragraph 56 :
[56] . . . because it might be taken as setting up a false opposition between “commercial mainstream” activities and activities on a reserve. Linden J.A. in Folster was alive to this danger when he observed that the use of the term “commercial mainstream” might “… imply, incorrectly, that trade and commerce is somehow foreign to First Nations” (para. 14, note 27). He was also careful to observe in Recalma that the “commercial mainstream” consideration was not a separate test for the determination of the situs of investment property, but an “aid” to be taken into consideration in the analysis of the question (para. 9). Notwithstanding this wise counsel, the “commercial mainstream” consideration has sometimes become a determinative test. . . .
[24] Cromwell J. reiterated in paragraph 54 that La Forest J. in Mitchell, while noting
[54] . . . that the purpose of the legislation is not to permit Indians to “acquire, hold and deal with property in the commercial mainstream on different terms than their fellow citizens”: . . . was clear that, even if an Indian acquired an asset through a purely commercial business agreement with a private concern, the exemption would nonetheless apply if the asset were situated on the reserve. . . . it must be remembered that the protections of ss. 87 and 89 will always apply to property situated on a reserve”: p. 139.
[25] What is abundantly clear from the Supreme Court of Canada decision in Bastien Estate is that the mere fact a status Indian engages in business that would normally be considered in the “commercial mainstream” does not per se preclude the ensuing business income from being situated on a Reserve. The question to be answered is not whether the business activity is normally considered in the commercial mainstream nor whether it is traditionally Indian, but whether it is property situated on a reserve. I do not read such decision to say however that the type or nature of the business is not relevant to the discussion nor, depending on the type of income involved, consideration of the “commercial mainstream” will never be a relevant consideration, only that the approach cannot be to make such consideration itself the determinative test as such approach would in fact result in the substituting itself for the issue that must be determined; namely, the situs of the property.
Type of Property and Nature of Taxation
[26] There is no dispute between the parties that it is the business income of the Appellant that is the type of property in question and that such property is taxed on the basis of “profits” as contemplated by subsection 9(1) of the ITA which reads:
9(1) Subject to this Part, a taxpayer’s income for a taxation year from a business or property is the taxpayer’s profit from that business or property for the year.
[27] It is trite to state that various elements factor into the determination of “profit”; namely, revenue as well as all the component expenses a taxpayer is entitled to deduct that were incurred for the purposes of gaining or producing income as contemplated by paragraph 18(1)(a) of the ITA. I mention this now because, as will become obvious later, the parties have couched some of their arguments based on the relative weighing of the Appellant’s revenues and expenses relative to each other.
Step One - Factors to Consider
[28] In identifying what relevant factors are to be considered that may connect or not connect the business income to the Reserve, there appears to have been three decisions dealing with business income rendered by the Courts since the decision in Bastien Estate; all dealing with business income from fishing activities; namely two decisions of the Federal Court of Appeal in Canada v. Robertson, 2012 FCA 94, [2012] F.C.J. No. 358 (QL) and Ballantyne v. Canada, 2012 FCA 95, [2012] F.C.J. No. 359 (QL) heard at the same time and for which leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada has been filed, and the Tax Court of Canada decision in McDonald v. Canada, 2011 TCC 437, 2011 DTC 1314, which have all discussed relevant factors often under different headings. The decision of the Tax Court in McDonald was released two months after the Supreme Court of Canada’s decisions in Bastien Estate and Dubé, while the Federal Court of Appeal decisions were released six months after McDonald.
[29] In short, the cases generally described and analysed the factors described in the Federal Court of Appeal’s decision in Southwind v. Canada, [1998] 1 C.T.C 265 (FCA). In paragraph 36 of McDonald, V. Miller J. described the factors indentified in Southwind as being appropriate:
36 Some of the relevant factors which connect business income to a location were identified in Southwind v. Canada. I will discuss these same factors in the present case while, at the same time, addressing the concerns noted by the SCC in the Estate of Rolland Bastien with respect to the term ‘commercial mainstream’. Those factors are (1) the type of business and the location of the business activities; (2) the location of the customers (debtors) of the business and where payment was made; (3) the residence of the business owners; (4) where decisions affecting the business are made; (5) place where the books for the business are kept; (6) nature of the work and the commercial mainstream.
[30] Although the factors set out in Southwind were used to structure the analyses in McDonald, the judgments in Robertson and Ballantyne were not structured as such but did address each of the potentially relevant factors from Southwind. In Robertson and Ballantyne, the first two factors in Southwind were analysed under the heading “location of business activities” but were nonetheless addressed. Likewise, in argument, the parties have identified factors which in some instances divide the elements of the factors in Southwind into more numerous factors. Accordingly, I propose to analyse the Southwind factors identified in McDonald in the same order as a good starting point, cognizant of course that there may be other relevant factors to consider which will be discussed under the category of “other factors” and as required by the two-step process identified in Bastien Estate above, give weight to them having regard to the appropriate considerations.
Step Two - Analyses of Relevant Factors and Weight
1. Type of Business and Location of Business Activities
[31] While the parties have identified this category as two different factors, I propose to discuss them under the same heading as I consider them too interrelated in the case at hand to separate them.
[32] The business has been previously described as that of clear-cutting trees and brush for predominantly the oil and gas industry to facilitate seismic testing and pipelines. The nature of the business is in my view analogous to that of a construction contractor or demolition contractor in that the business involves undertaking projects located outside its offices or headquarters on which it must generally bid on a competitive basis with its competitors located off reserve. It is in a sense a nomadic business where the business is expected to provide its services to different sites on a project-by-project basis. Its head office and administrative centre is located on Reserve but it predominantly engages the services of its operational employees off Reserve without having any physical or permanent type base at any of those sites. The administrative employees of the business are on the other hand located almost exclusively on the Reserve and these include the services of the Appellant himself as owner and manager as well as his “right-hand man”, his spouse, who is the bookkeeper, safety coordinator and financial and administrative manager in almost every sense of the word.
[33] At this point, it is useful to note that the Appellant takes the position that the business activities of the Appellant should be seen from the perspective of the Appellant’s duties, who, without doubt, based on the evidence, provides his managerial duties almost exclusively on Reserve. The Respondent, on the other hand, takes the position that the business activities of the Appellant are not the provision of workers or human resources per se but the provision of clear-cutting services which occurs very predominantly off Reserve under contracts for which it is liable to indemnify the party for whom it performs work for damages if it fails to perform its clear-cutting obligations properly. The Respondent argues that 99% of the Appellant’s $3.4 million revenue is obtained from projects conducted off Reserve within a 20,000-kilometre area which it obtained in an open bidding process in competition with mainstream competitors. The Respondent states that the Appellant deployed almost all its labour and equipment on such off-reserve projects on which its employees, both Indian and non-Indian, provided services to off‑reserve oil and gas companies using equipment, the majority of which, based on measure of value, was rented from off-reserve equipment providers.
[34] In essence, the Appellant asks the Court to focus on the situs of the management of the business while the Respondent asks the Court to focus on the situs of the labour activities of the business. In my view, both parties are too narrow in their outlook. All the relevant components of the business must be evaluated in the quest to determine the location of its business activities having regard to the nature of the business. This approach is consistent with both the nature of the nomadic business I have described above as well as the manner of taxation of the property which is by taxing the profits as described above. The Supreme Court of Canada recognized the multiplicity of components which make up a business in Stewart v. Canada, 2002 SCC 46, [2002] 2 S.C.R. 645, at paragraph 38, referring to a quote from the case of Erichsen v. Last (1881), 4 T.C. 422, at page 423:
I do not think there is any principle of law which lays down what carrying on a trade is. There are a multiple of incidents which together make the carrying on [of]a trade, but know of no one distinguishing incident which makes a practice a carrying on of trade, and another practice not a carrying on of trade. If I may use the expression, it is a compound fact made up of a variety of incidents.
[35] Likewise, in Robertson, the Federal Court of Appeal acknowledged that a proper analysis of the location of the business income requires considering all components of the business. In that case, the Court looked to both the physical activities of the Appellant’s business (catching fish which occurred mainly off reserve as well as the business activities (selling fish which was to an on-reserve Co-op)) and found as a whole that the location of the business activities favoured an on-reserve result, particularly since that Appellant sold his catch to an entity located on reserve while his physical activities of catching fish were at best a weak connection to the reserve since they were predominantly caught off reserve notwithstanding that the boats departed from an on-reserve location.
[36] In the case at hand, there is no question that the employees other than the administrative or managerial staff, conducted most of their activities off Reserve on the different projects the business contracted to do. The evidence is that 99% of the $3.4 million business revenue was earned in relation to such off-reserve projects and that the vast majority of his $2.8 million in expenses were incurred off Reserve; namely approximately $1.22 million in wages, $575,000 in subcontract fees and $350,000 in equipment rental fees and other expenses outlined in the Appellant’s financial statements. On this basis, the Respondent suggests that the management activities of the Appellant are but ancillary to the main thrust of its labour intensive business and could be done either off Reserve or on Reserve.
[37] With respect to the Respondent, it seems to me that to simply focus on the above sales and expense items is to ignore both the nature of the business and the other components of the business. Firstly, the nature of the business is nomadic in the sense already explained. The Appellant performs its contractual obligations from a labour perspective, as the Respondent has suggested, off Reserve because that is where the work is. This is the case for both Indian and non-Indian owned businesses competing for this work and accordingly by its very nature, the location of the activities cannot by itself be determinative of the situs of the business income. This was acknowledged in McDonald at paragraph 43 by V. Miller J.:
43 The only fishing activity that occurred on the Reserve was the mending of gear and the loading of the Vessels for fishing. The location of most of the fishing activities was not on the Reserve nor was it in the inshore area close to the Reserve. However, this factor alone cannot be determinative of the issue. As Bowie J. remarked in Walkus v. R.,15 ‘the work could only be done away from the Reserve, because that is where the fish are.’
[38] To accept the position of the Respondent on this factor would be inconsistent with the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in Bastien Estate where Cromwell J. made it clear that the state of jurisprudence supports the fact that aboriginals are not limited to activities considered traditionally Indian nor prohibited from operating in the commercial mainstream in order to qualify for the section 87 Indian Act exemption.
[39] Secondly, on the facts of this case, there is strong evidence that the managerial activities of the business are much more than merely incidental to the business. The Appellant negotiated his contracts from the Reserve office, completed pre-qualifying questionnaires for the potential customers in order to qualify for the bidding process with them, undertook marketing activities such as meeting with prospective clients at band-arranged “meet and greets” and prepared and kept updated a business portfolio for such potential customers there, received employee inquiries and the qualifying material from prospective employees at the Reserve and kept lists as well as arranged to assemble and hire employees for each project from the Reserve. When the nature of the business is performing contracts obtained on a competitive bid process, it must be acknowledged that a great deal of effort is expended in bringing in the work or “sales” through this process and I am satisfied most if not all of such efforts occurred on the Reserve. This, of course, is in addition to the general administrative duties of paying employees from the Reserve, bookkeeping, filing payroll, workers’ compensation and other returns and the myriad of administrative duties otherwise performed on Reserve. The nature of this business is such that the management services and duties of the Appellant’s business are far more than merely incidental to the labour component and are in fact an essential and significant part of its business operations.
[40] Moreover, from the perspective of the labour activities themselves, the evidence is that the hiring and firing of employees occurred on the Reserve, the employees assembled at the Reserve offices before being transported on site and received training and orientation for each project there. The Business provided foremen who followed the workers to job sites and provided liaison between the Reserve office and the workers on site as well as some supervision. The needs of over 140 employees off site were satisfied by the office on Reserve via the supply of personal provisions or commissaries which were requested by the employees and arranged through the office and transported to the site and the employees were paid by cheques or payments issued from the Reserve office. These factors connect the employees while situated off site to the on-Reserve office and its sphere of influence. This is not the case of a single independent contractor or small operation working exclusively off site as was the case in Southwind where a single proprietor himself worked as a logger off site exclusively for one off-reserve company to earn $42,000. The Appellant’s operation employed over 140 employees with a cumulative wage base in excess of $1.2 million which helped the Appellant earn over $3.4 million in gross revenues from multiple customers and profits of approximately $600,000 in one year; all the more remarkable when one considers the remote location in which the business operates.
[41] The Appellant owned and supplied bobcat machinery and equipment to the sites as well as rented equipment from off-reserve equipment renters. In fact, the financial statements of the Appellant for 2003 show that its capital assets cost approximately $0.5 million of which $200,000 was for brush cutter equipment in addition to over $100,000 in vehicle investments. In addition, the equipment was stored on the Reserve site and the Appellant’s work shop to effect repairs was located on the Reserve site, both of which form part of the Appellant’s capital investment in land and buildings identified in its financial statements. In this context, the fact the Appellant rents other needed equipment from off-site equipment renters seems inconsequential, particularly when no evidence was tendered suggesting what industry norms would be for comparison purposes.
[42] Accordingly, having regard to the above analysis of the labour, management and capital components of the business, I am of the view that the labour activities and capital components are undeterminative of the issue having regard to the nature of the business while the management component is highly indicative of setting the situs of the business activities on Reserve.
[43] At this point, I should also like to address the arguments of the Appellant that the proximity of the work sites to the Reserve and the preference of the customers in awarding contracts to aboriginals suggest a connection to siting the business on the Reserve. In my opinion, the evidence shows that the Appellant operated his business within an 80-kilometre radius of the Reserve which comprises an area consisting of approximately 20,000 square kilometres. The Appellant indicated that his family and other members of his Reserve enjoy rights to hunt and trap on property outside the Reserve as a Treaty No. 8 Band. Treaty No.8, a copy of which was submitted into evidence, clearly granted rights to the signatory Indian Bands “. . .to pursue their usual vocations of hunting, trapping and fishing throughout the tract surrendered . . . saving and excepting such tracts as may be required or taken up from time to time for settlement, mining, lumbering, trading or other purposes.” In fact, the Appellant’s family retains the rights to operate trap lines within a 120-square kilometre area of land outside the Reserve within such tract of land initially surrendered by Treaty No. 8.
[44] While the Appellant has testified he originally got into the business due to inquiries made of his father that were relayed to him from an oil and gas company that concerned clearing work over the trap line area, there is no evidence that in 2003 or even beforehand that the Appellant’s business entered into any contract to clear land over the trap line area. The evidence is that the Appellant and his competitors bid for contracts to clear trees and brush over the 20,000-square kilometre area, including over areas in which other members of his band or other bands have trapping rights. As indicated, under the provisions of Treaty No. 8, the existence of trapping rights is subject to the use of those lands for “settlement, mining, lumbering, trading or other purposes” so do not prohibit the business activities of the Appellant’s customers. In any event, the evidence is that those trapping lines became uneconomical and were not used in 2003 hence would have been for practical purposes unaffected by any mining or oil and gas activities, regardless of any obligation that may have existed by agreement with the Province of British Columbia or any other party to require consultation with the Band before undertaking any activity thereon.
[45] The only evidence of any services provided by the Appellant to the Reserve itself was that of one contract awarded to him from the Band valued at $30,000 in the 2003 year.
[46] Based on this evidence, I cannot find that the large area of 20,000 square kilometres in which the Appellant undertook contract work can be said to be in close proximity or contiguous to the Reserve such that it can be considered “on reserve”. The facts here only remotely connect the Reserve to the wider non‑reserve area, unlike those in the case of Amos v. Canada, 99 DTC 5333 (F.C.A.), where the Reserve surrendered part of its lands by way of lease to a pulp mill that employed the Appellants in that case and that located the mill partly on the leased Reserve lands and partly on lands the mill owned contiguous to the leased lands.
[47] Likewise, I cannot agree with the Appellant that many of his clients through their written policy statements, grant preference to aboriginal businesses and thus lead to a conclusion the Appellant obtains his work as a result of his Indian status or residence on the Reserve or rights to a trapping area, thus creating a connection between the Reserve and the business activities of the Appellant. In the Aboriginal Guideline statement issued by EnCana, the Appellant’s largest customer, it is clear that although it “encourage(s) aboriginal communities to develop business opportunities” with EnCana, that EnCana awards contracts to “both qualified Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal businesses . . . on a competitive basis. . .” Similar sentiments were expressed in the policy statements of other customers submitted into evidence. Notwithstanding as well that the Fort Nelson First Nation has a written policy that commits the Band Council to “. . . insist that oil and gas companies give initial full consideration to our member contractors” and to “Advocacy” on their behalf, the said Band Policy acknowledges that “Companies have the sole discretion to grant contracts to any contractor that meets its requirements.” While the Band Policy clearly suggests a preference for its own member contractors, it is clear that such preference can only lead to a member receiving a contract on the Reserve, as in any other case the decision is that of the customer.
[48] Accordingly, I can find only a very weak argument for connecting the Business to the Reserve on basis of proximity or policy of any party save to contracts on the Reserve itself, especially having regard to the nature of the business.
2. Location of Customers and Where Payment Made
[49] There is no doubt in my mind that all but one of the Appellant’s customers in 2003 was based off Reserve, such customers being made up of oil and gas exploration companies predominantly based in the Calgary, Alberta vicinity where their head office was. The Appellant tak