Regent Taxi & Transport Co. v. La Congrégation des Petits Frères de Marie

Regent Taxi & Transport Co. v. La Congrégation des Petits Frères de Marie
Collection
Supreme Court Judgments
Date
1929-11-04
Report
[1929] SCR 650
Judges
Anglin, Francis Alexander; Mignault, Pierre-Basile; Rinfret, Thibaudeau; Lamont, John Henderson; Smith, Robert
On appeal from
Quebec
Subjects
Torts
Decision Content
Supreme Court of Canada
Regent Taxi & Transport Co. v. La Congrégation des Petits Frères de Marie, [1929] S.C.R. 650
Date: 1929-11-04
Regent Taxi & Transport Company (Defendant) Appellant;
and
La Congregation Des Petits Freres De Marie, Dits Freres Maristes (Plaintiff) Respondent.
1929: May 17, 20; 1929: November 4.
Present: Anglin C.J.C. and Mignault, Rinfret, Lamont and Smith JJ.
ON APPEAL FROM THE COURT OF KING’S BENCH, APPEAL SIDE, PROVINCE OF QUEBEC
Negligence—Accident—Bodily injuries—Member of religious community injured—Loss of services—Disbursements—Right of action in damages by the community against negligent party—Whether right of action is limited to the “immediate victim”—Action de in rem verso—Quantum of damages—Prescription—Arts. 1053, 1056, 1074, 1075, 2261 (2), 2262 (2) C.C.
The respondent, a Montreal religious community, sued the appellant company to recover damages alleged to have been sustained by the community, as the result of one of its members, Brother Henri-Gabriel, being injured while travelling in an omnibus belonging to the appellant. The action was brought more than a year, but within two years, after the time of the accident. The claim consisted of $4,780 for expenses incurred by the community in medical and hospital care; of $118 for the value of clothing, etc., destroyed in the accident, alleged to be the property of the community; and of $10,000 for damages due to the loss of services of the injured brother. The trial judge assessed the respondent’s damages at $4,000, of which $2,236.90 was allowed for out-of-pocket expenses, and the balance on account of the claim for other damages; and this decision was affirmed by the appellate court. It was also found by the trial judge and unanimously upheld on appeal that the injury was attributable to fault and negligence of an employee of the appellant for which it was responsible; and no appeal was taken to this court against that finding. The questions arising on this appeal are, (a) whether the respondent has, or ever had, the right of action which it asserts; and, (b) whether its claim is barred in whole or in part by the limitation provision of par. 2 of art. 2262 C.C.
Held, (affirming in part the decision of the Court of King’s Bench (Q.O.R. 46 K.B. 96)), that the respondent has a right of action against the appellant company, but that it is entitled to recover only the sum of $2,236.90 for the expenses incurred by it as a result of the injuries sustained by the member of the community. Mignault and Rinfret JJ. dissenting.
Held, also, Mignault and Rinfret JJ. dissenting, that the plaintiff was within the purview of the word “another” (“autrui”) as used in article 1053 C.C., and therefore entitled to maintain this action. Article 1053 C.C. confers on every person, who suffers injury directly attributable to the fault of a third person as its legal cause, the right to recover from the latter the damages sustained. The suggestion that the right of recovery under that article should be restricted to the “immediate victim” of the tort involves a departure from the golden rule of legal interpretation (Beal, Legal Interpretation, 3rd ed., p. 80) by refusing to the word “another” (“autrui”) in article 1053 C.C. its ordinary meaning; and such interpretation would be highly dangerous and would result in the rejection of meritorious claims. Moreover, it is not necessary so to restrict the scope of article 1053 C.C. in order to give full operation to the terms of article 1056 C.C., as nothing in this latter article suggests an intent to narrow the scope of article 1053 C.C., save “where the person injured * * * dies in consequence” and the claim is for “damages occasioned by such death.”
Held, also, that the respondent’s action is not prescribed. The action is “for damages resulting from * * * (a) quasi-offence” and is prescribed by two years only (article 2261 (2) C.C.), and is not one for “bodily injuries” prescribed by one year (article 2262 (2) C.C.). Mignault and Rinfret JJ. not expressing any opinion.
Per Anglin C.J.C. and Smith J.—The provisions of article 1056 C.C. may not be necessary to support the actions for which it provides; but their presence cannot justify narrowing the purview of the clear terms in which article 1053 C.C. is couched, except so far as may be necessary to exclude from it the special cases for which article 1056 C.C. provides. The respondent is entitled to be adequately compensated on the footing of loss of benefits reasonably to be expected from a continuance of the services of the injured member. The appeal should be dismissed with costs. Per Mignault and Rinfret JJ. (dissenting).—The respondent had no status to bring the action, which should have been dismissed by the trial judge. Article 1056 C.C., together with article 1053 C.C., covers the whole ground of liability in cases of bodily injuries and both articles must be construed together. Article 1053 C.C. establishes the foundation upon which such liability will rest, and article 1056 C.C. enacts in what circumstances and in favour of what persons the liability will exist. Therefore, it follows that the word “autrui” (“another”) in article 1053 C.C. connotes “la partie contre qui le délit ou quasi-délit a été commis” (“the person injured by the commission of an offence or a quasi-offence”) contained in article 1056 C.C.; and that person cannot be any other than the “immediate victim.” In the province of Quebec, in cases of bodily injuries caused by fault, the right of action belongs solely to the “immediate victim” during his lifetime and, after his death, exclusively to the persons enumerated in article 1056 C.C.
Per Mignault and Rinfret JJ. (dissenting).—The respondent might have had a right to recover the amount of expenses incurred by it for medical and hospital care, by means of the action de in rem verso; but, as such, it would be prescribed by the expiry of one year under article 2262 (2) C.C. Anglin C.J.C. and Smith J. dubitantibus.
Per Lamont J.—The respondent cannot succeed as to its claim for loss of services. To be entitled to maintain such an action, a legal right to such services, and the loss thereof, must be established. The contractual relation of master and servant did not subsist between the respondent and the injured brother and, upon the evidence, neither the brother nor the Congregation ever considered they were creating any legal relationship between them. Therefore, the fault of the appellant company did not deprive the respondent of the brother’s services, to which it had no legal right. Anglin C.J.C. and Smith J. contra.
APPEAL from the decision of the Court of King’s Bench, appeal side, province of Quebec[1], affirming the judgment of the trial judge, Surveyer J., and maintaining the respondent’s action in damages for $4,000.
The material facts of the case and the questions at issue are fully stated in the above head-note and in the judgments now reported.
A. Geoffrion K.C. and L. Faribault K.C. for the appellant.
J. Cartier for the respondent.
Anglin C.J.C—The plaintiff (respondent) is a religious community incorporated by statute of the province of Quebec (50 Vic, c. 29) and possesses, as an incident of its corporate entity, the capacity to sue and be sued (s. 4). The defendant (appellant) is a common carrier engaged in the business of furnishing transportation for passengers by taxicab and omnibus. Brother Henri-Gabriel, a member of the plaintiff community, sustained serious injury, while travelling in an omnibus of the defendant, on the 14th of August, 1923.
It was found by the trial judge, and unanimously affirmed by the Court of King’s Bench[2], that the injury sustained by Brother Henri-Gabriel was attributable to fault and negligence of an employee of the defendant for which it was responsible; and against that finding no appeal has been taken here.
The present action was brought to recover damages sustained by the community in consequence of Brother Henri-Gabriel being so injured. The claim consists of three parts: first, the sum of $4,780 expended by the community in medical and hospital care for the injured brother and in providing him with such necessaries as spectacles, etc.; second, the sum of $118 for the value of clothing and other personal effects, the property of the community, destroyed in the accident; and, third, the sum of $10,000 for other actual damages due to loss of services of Brother Henri-Gabriel, etc.
The learned trial judge (Surveyer J.) assessed the plaintiffs damages at $4,000, of which amount the sum of $2,236.90 was allowed for out-of-pocket expenses, admittedly incurred by the plaintiff as a necessary result of the injuries sustained by Brother Gabriel, and the balance on account of the claim for other actual damages.
This judgment was confirmed by the Court of King’s Bench2, although two members of that court, Mr. Justice Greenshields and Mr. Justice Cousineau (ad hoc), would have reduced the recovery—the latter to the sum of $2,236.90 allowed for out-of-pocket expenses, to which Mr. Justice Greenshields would, however, add the sum of $900 to cover an expenditure of the respondent in replacing Brother Henri-Gabriel on its teaching staff.
Two questions arise on the present appeal, viz., (1) whether the plaintiff has, or ever had, the right of action which it asserts; and (2) whether its claim is barred in whole or in part by the limitation provision of paragraph (2) of article 2262 of the Civil Code, which reads as follows:
The following actions are prescribed by one year:
* * *
(2) for bodily injuries, saving the special provisions contained in article 1056 and cases regulated by special laws.
The plaintiff being endowed, as a body corporate, with the capacity to sue, the question on the first branch of the appeal is whether it has a right of action to recover the damages it now claims.
Articles 1053 and 1054 C.C. read as follows:
1053. Every person capable of discerning night from wrong is responsible for the damage caused by his fault to another, whether by positive act, imprudence, neglect or want of skill.
1054. He is responsible not only for the damage caused by his own fault, but also for that caused by the fault of persons under his control.
Is the present plaintiff, under the circumstances in evidence, within the purview of the word “another” (“autrui”) as used in article 1053 C.C.? Such is the issue on this branch of the appeal.
A plaintiff has a right of action for all damages sustained by him against any person guilty of fault which caused such damages. (S. 1924.1.160; Zach., vol. 4 (Massé et Verge, 1858) nos. 625-7; Canadian Pacific Railway Co. v. Robinson)[3]. Article 1053 C.C. says so in terms so explicit that to deny the existence of such a right as that set up in the present action involves placing a restriction upon the prima facie generality of the language in which it is couched (8 De Lorimier, Bib., C.C., pp. 203-14), and which formulates the common law theretofore existing. Ravary v. Grand Trunk Ry. Co.[4].
The only alternative view suggested is that the right of recovery under art. 1053 C.C. should be restricted to “the immediate victim” of the tort of the defendant. (I use the phrase “immediate victim” for lack of a better—M. Demogue (Obligations, t. 4, no. 528) refers to “la victime matérielle”). Indeed, there can be no logical half-way position between so restricting the application of the article and admitting that, standing alone, it confers on every person, who suffers injury directly attributable to the fault of a third person as its legal cause, the right to recover from the latter the damages sustained. It must not be forgotten that on the principle enunciated in arts. 1053-4-5 C.C. depends practically the whole law of tort in Quebec, covering alike wrongs against person, property, honour and reputation, article 1053 C.C. embodying the general common law of the province on this subject. Articles 1054 and 1055 C.C. provide for vicarious responsibility, cover particular cases and create certain liabilities conditionally defeasible. Quebec L.H. & P. Co. v. Vandry[5]. Accordingly, to narrow the prima facie scope of art. 1053 C.C. is highly dangerous and would necessarily result in most meritorious claims being rejected; many a wrong would be without a remedy. To those who urge the danger and inconvenience in multiplicity of actions and other evils which might result from giving to the word “another” (“autrui”) in art. 1053 C.C. its ordinary and unrestricted meaning, I reply, adapting the words of Lord Sumner in Vandry’s case[6].
To all this the plain words of the article, if they are plain as their Lordships conceive them to be, are a sufficient answer. In enacting the Code the Legislature may have foreseen cases of the kind now in question many years before any of them arose * * * The positive words of the article stand and must have effect.
See, too, Fuz-Herm. III, Cod. Civ. Ann., arts. 1382-3, no. 694 (infra). The courts may be trusted to discourage un-meritorious claims.
As Sir François Langelier says, in his well known work on the Civil Law of Quebec, vol. III, at p. 468,
Pour qu’un délit ou un quasi-délit donne lieu à une action en dommages, il n’est pas nécessaire que ces dommages (sic) soient causés à la personne même qui les réclame: il suffit que la conséquence en rejaillisse sur elle, alors que le délit ou le quasi-délit a porté sur une autre. C’est ainsi, par exemple, qu’une compagnie d’assurance a une action en dommages contre l’auteur de l’incendie d’une propriété qu’elle avait assurée. Le mari a une action en dommages pour les dommages causés à sa femme. Le père a une action en dommages pour les dommages causés à ses enfants. Il a même été décidé, il y a une trentaine d’années, par la Cour de Cassation, que les parents même collatéraux de quelqu’un qui est décédé ont une action en dommages contre ceux qui ont attaqué sa mémoire. Mgr. Dupanloup, le célèbre évêque d’Orléans, fut condamné à payer des dommages à la famille de Mgr. Rousseau, un de ses prédécesseurs décédé depuis longtemps, parce qu’il avait outragé sa mémoire.
En un mot, pour que celui qui n’a pas souffert directement de la faute d’un autre ait une action en dommages, il suffit qu’il ait eu un intérêt actuel, moral ou matériel, à ce que cette faute ne soit pas commise. Mignault, in his work, “Droit Civil Canadien,” vol. 5, at pp. 333-4, says:
Quiconque, par sa faute, cause un dommage à autrui, est obligé de le réparer. * * * La faute est tout ce qui blesse injustement le droit d’autrui. Elle peut, donc, consister dans une action ou dans une omission d’action. La faute est un délit lorsque l’agent du dommage Ta causé avec intention; un quasi-délit, dans le cas contraire. * * * Le quasi-délit est l’acte volontaire et illicite d’une personne qui, par imprudence ou négligence, cause du dommage à autrui.
The present action is founded on a quasi-délit.
An instance of the broad application of art. 1053 C.C. occurs in the judgment of Mathieu J., in Larrivé v. La-pierre[7], in an action by a father to recover damages personally sustained by him because of an injury to his son. We find, at pp. 4, 5, the following considérants:
Considérant que, par l’article 1053 du Code Civil, toute personne capable de discerner le bien du mal est responsable du dommage causé par sa faute à autrui, soit par son fait, soit par son imprudence, négligence ou inhabilité et que, par l’article 1054, elle est responsable non seulement du dommage qu’elle cause par sa faute, mais encore de celui causé par les choses qu’elle a sous sa garde;
Considérant que Je demandeur allègue, dans sa déclaration, que l’accident dont il est question a eu lieu par la faute du défendeur, qui se serait servi dans sa manufacture d’une machine impropre à l’usage duquel il l’employait;
Considérant que le demandeur allègue que, par suite de cet accident, il est privé du salaire de son fils qui le faisait vivre, et qu’il éprouve des dommages directs au montant de deux cents piastres;
Considérant que les dommages-intérêts doivent comprendre, non seulement la réparation du préjudice éprouvé par la partie lésée, mais aussi celui que souffre la famille, lorsque le fait dommageable rejaillit sur elle, et que tous ceux auxquels le fait a causé un dommage sont admis à réclamer;
Considérant que de demandeur allègue qu’il a éprouvé un préjudice personnel de l’accident arrivé à son enfant qui l’a empêché de travailler, et qu’il est ainsi privé du bénéfice qu’il retirait du travail de son dit enfant;
Considérant qu’entre le père et le fils, il y a obligation, de la part de ce dernier, de fournir des aliments au premier, et que, tant en raison de cette obligation, qu’en raison des circonstances particulières alléguées dans la déclaration, et, spécialement du fait qu’il vivait du salaire de son fils, cet accident lui a causé un préjudice réel.
Again, in Sheehan v. Bank of Ottawa[8], reversed on another ground[9], although the judgment should probably have been rested on art. 1056 C.C., a similar right under art. 1053 C.C. was recognized for a father whose son had been shot by a young man to whom the bank had negligently entrusted a revolver. Fault causing damage entails delictual responsibility; without fault, actual or presumed (except in the case of damage caused by things under defendant’s care), such responsibility does not exist: Allard v. Frigon[10]. In both the above instances the right of recovery under art. 1053 C.C., was not restricted to “the immediate victim” of the defendant’s fault.
Moreover, with the utmost respect for those who think that the words “to another” (“à autrui”) of art. 1053, C.C., should be construed as embracing only “the person injured” (la partie contre qui le délit ou quasi-délit a été commis), i.e., “the immediate victim” of a tort of the defendant, to the exclusion of others who also suffer damages directly attributable to such tort (e.g. the master who loses the benefit of the services of his injured employee, (Demogue, Obligations, t. 4, no. 530)—the husband, separate as to property, whose affections have been outraged by the ravishment of his wife), this suggested restriction on the purview of these words involves a departure from the golden rule of legal construction, applicable to all writings, that
the grammatical and ordinary sense of the words is to be adhered to, unless that would lead to some absurdity, or some repugnance or inconsistency with the rest of the instrument, in which case (that) sense may be modified so as to avoid that absurdity, and inconsistency, but no further (Beal, Legal Interpretation, 3rd ed., p. 80).
The words “to another” (“à autrui”) of art. 1053 C.C. are clear and present no ambiguity.
But, it is said, the decision of the Privy Council in the Vandry case[11], and Article 1018 C.C., applicable by analogy, require us to read art. 1056 C.C. with art. 1053 C.C., and it is urged that, in order to give to art. 1056 C.C. some operation, the scope of the words under discussion in art. 1053 C.C. should be so restricted as to cover only “the immediate victim” of the tort—at least where the claim arises out of bodily injuries. I shall proceed at once to consider the argument based on the presence of art. 1056 in the Civil Code, as it was practically the sole ground urged for the restriction of the purview of art. 1053 C.C. and the rejection of all the French authorities which give to the word “autrui” its prima facie meaning, the Code Napoléon containing no provision corresponding to art. 1056 C.C. No doubt, “the plainest words may be controlled by a reference to the context” (Beal, Ibid., pp. 83, 84); noscuntur a sociis; but not only must the words to be so controlled be consistent with the suggested limitation, Garbutt v. Durham Joint Committee[12], but
you must have the context even more plain, or at least as plain * * * as the words to be controlled
Bentley v. Rotherham and Kimberworth Local Board[13], These principles of legal interpretation, being founded on common sense, apply equally under the civil and the common law systems. (De Chassat, Interprétation des Lois, (1822) pp. 100, 205 et seq.; Langelier, Droit Civ., vol. 1, pp. 20, 22 and 91; art. 12 C.C.
A difference between the two authentic versions of the text of art. 1056 C.C.—the words “ascendant and descendant relations” of the English version (which would include grand-parents and grand-children) being translated in the French text “père, mère et enfants”—is not here material. (See s. 6 of c. 78 of Con. Stats. (1859) of Canada; and Bonin v. The King[14]. There is nothing in art. 1056 C.C. that suggests an intent to narrow the scope of art. 1053 except “where the person injured * * * dies in consequence” and the claim is for “damages occasioned by such death”; and the chief purpose of art. 1056 may well have been to preclude such claims, which would often be preferred on flimsy grounds, by persons other than those designated in art. 1056 C.C., who might otherwise regard them as within the purview of art. 1053 C.C. Hunter v. Gingras[15]. Given that effect, art. 1056 C.C. has a distinct and useful office; and, so treating it, there is no infraction of the provision of the golden rule, that the grammatical and ordinary sense of plain and unambiguous terms is not to be modified to a greater extent than is necessary to avoid absurdity, repugnance or inconsistency. Notwithstanding any apparent violence to logic in excluding claims by persons other than those named in art. 1056 C.C., when the immediate victim of the tort dies, for damages occasioned by his death, while allowing all who sustain direct loss to claim, if the immediate victim survives, there is not here such inconsistency, repugnance or absurdity as requires the courts to deny their plain meaning and effect to the words of article 1053 C.C., Abley v. Dale[16].
Moreover, it seems to me not improbable, although article 1056 C.C. differs in some important respects from Lord Campbell’s Act of 1846 (Miller v. Grand Trunk Ry. Co.)[17], that its predecessor, viz., chapter 6 of the Statutes of Canada (1847), 10-11 Vic. (c. 78 of the Con. Stats, of Can., 1859), was imported into the law of Quebec from the English Statute (Robinson v. Canadian Pacific Railway Co.[18]), either in order to forestall defences based on the maxim “actio personalis moritur cum persona” or, rather, on the quaint (Lord Sumner outlined its history in Admiralty Commissioners v. S.S. “Amerika,”[19]), and, in the view of ardent civilians, probably the crude, if not semi-barbarous, doctrine of the English common law (See observations of Farwell, L.J., in Jackson v. Watson[20])—ex morte hominis non oritur actio; Baker v. Bolton[21]; Admiralty Commissioners v. S.S. “Amerika”[22], which might be invoked by some defendant to an action within the scope of that article, or to assimilate in this particular the law of Upper and of Lower Canada, Canadian Pacific Ry. Co. v. Robinson[23]. In English law, as clearly appears in the two English cases last cited, damages sustained by the plaintiff before the death of the immediate victim are recoverable, although his death in consequence of the injury should subsequently ensue. The actions for which it provides art. 1056 C.C. itself expressly styles “independent” (a) i.e., personal (Miller v. Grand Trunk Ry. Co.17), and without effect, whether by way of assistance or of defeasance, on other rights of action (except actions by persons other than those named in art. 1056 C.C. “for damages occasioned by such death,” which its terms no doubt preclude), the maxim “expressio unius est exclusio
(a) The French translation (Preface to Civil Code—1867—by Thomas McCord, one of the secretaries of the Codifying Commission, pp. VIII and IX) of the last paragraph of art. 1056 C.C. is glaringly inaccurate and misleading. alterius” being applicable and the words of art. 1056 C.C. “all damages” being given due effect. To support the actions for which it provides article 1056 C.C. may have been unnecessary; and we are not unfamiliar with otiose provisions in legislation. The presence of such a provision, whether introduced per incuriam or ex majore cautela, cannot, I think, justify cutting down the purview of the clear terms in which article 1053 C.C. is couched, except so far as may be necessary to exclude from it the special cases for which article 1056 C.C. provides. (Art. 2613 C.C.) Had the legislature intended to exclude from the application of art. 1053 C.C. other cases so plainly within its ex facie purview, as is that at bar, a more direct method would assuredly have been found to effectuate that purpose.
The suggestion that, because the damages claimed could not reasonably have been foreseen by the defendant, they cannot be recovered, seems to indicate a confusion of the bearing of such considerations on the determination of the question of the existence of negligence or fault on the part of the defendant, where they may often be of moment, with their application to the measure of compensation, where, responsibility having been admitted or established, they are quite immaterial. Here the negligence or fault of the defendant and its responsibility to those thereby injured, who are within the scope of art. 1053 C.C., is no longer in question. Merely as illustrative of this view reference may be permissible to the very recent judgment of the Appellate Division (Ontario) in Harding v. Edwards et al[24], and to an English case therein discussed:. In re Polemis and Furness, Withy & Co.[25], since the decision in which, says Mr. Justice Middleton, at p. 105 of the report of the Ontario case:
That which had been in earlier cases indicated as exonerating the defendant from liability, that the damage was too remote because it could not reasonably have been anticipated as a consequence of the wrongful act done, can no longer be urged as a defence. The causal connection in the Polemis case25 was clearly shewn, but the damnum would not have resulted had there not been a most extraordinary and unforeseeable concurrence of contributing factors. None of these factors in that case was the conscious intervention of a third party. The court adopted as the basis of its decision what had been said by Lord Summer in the case of Weld-Blundell v. Stephens[26]: What a defendant ought to have contemplated as a reasonable man is material when the question is whether or not he was guilty of negligence. * * * This, however, goes to culpability, not to compensation; and by Sir Samuel Evans in H. M. S. London[27]: The court is not concerned in the present case with any inquiry as to the chain of causes resulting in the creation of a legal liability from which such damages as the law allows would flow. The tortious act—i.e. the negligence of the defendants which imposes upon them a liability in law for damages—is admitted. This gets rid at once of an element which requires consideration in a chain of causation in testing the question of legal liability, namelly, the foresight or anticipation of the reasonable man. * * * When it has been once determined that there is evidence of negligence, the person guilty of it is equally liable for the consequences, whether he could have foreseen them or not.
I would refer to an earlier decision of Lord Sumner, when he was Lord Justice Hamilton, in Latham v. R. Johnson & Nephew, Ltd.,[28] where he says, at p. 413: “Children acting in the wantonness of infancy and adults acting on the impulse of personal peril may be and often are only links in a chain of causation extending from such initial negligence to the subsequent injury. No doubt each intervener is a causa sine qua non, but unless the intervention is a fresh, independent cause, the person guilty of the original negligence will still be the effective cause.
See too Great Lakes SS. Co. v. Maple Leaf Milling Co.[29].
While judgments resting on English law are not authoritative in determining Quebec cases of which the decision rests upon the principles of the civil law, there would seem to be no good ground for excluding from consideration in a Quebec case the reasoning on which rest the conclusions reached in England and in Ontario, respectively, in the two decisions cited. Moreover the Court of Review expressed the like opinion in 1916 in Makkinge v. Robitaille[30]—a case of liability ex contractu. So, too, while arrêts of the French courts are not binding authority in our courts (Maclaren v. Att. Gen. for Quebec[31]; McArthur v. Dominion Cartridge Co.[32], nevertheless they are entitled to the most respectful consideration at our hands where, as here, the texts of law which they expound (art. 1382-1383 C.N.) are substantially the same as, and are the prototypes (1st Report of the Codification Commissioners, (1865) vol. 1, p. 16) of that of the Civil Code of Quebec (art. 1053 C.C.), Shawinigan Carbide Co. v. Doucet[33], per Fitzpatrick, C.J.; Quebec L., H. & P. Co. v. Vandry[34]. That, excluding such contingencies as Brother Henri-Gaibriel’s premature death or abandonment of his religious vocation, the plaintiff had a reasonable expectation, amounting to a moral certitude, that it would enjoy the full benefit of his services during the two years immediately following his injury, admits of no doubt; and that such expectation of gain or advantage (whether the legal character of the relationship borne by the injured brother to the respondent should be regarded as that of an employee or as that of an associé (Rev. Trim., 1902, p. 904, n. 44) ) having been unlawfully interfered with by the act of the defendant (Beullac, C. C. P. Ann., art. 77, nos. 5 and 15), suffices to create the interest requisite to give a status to sue (art. 77 C.C.P.) for damages caused by such harmful interference, is, I think, in the Civil Law equally clear. Contra spoliatorem omnia praesumuntur.
Any difficulty that might be suggested because of the fact that the plaintiff is a religious congregation is fully met by the statutory incorporation of the Quebec community to which Brother Henri-Gabriel belonged. (See Fuzier-Herman, Rep., vbo. Comm. Relig., nos. 119, 234). The contract, or arrangement, under which he became a member of the community and undertook to place his services entirely at its disposal in return for the obligation on its part to maintain him and provide him with all necessaries, etc., gave to the plaintiff an interest in his health and welfare sufficient to justify its claim for damages occasioned by inability on his part to render to it the services stipulated for caused by fault of the defendant. (Ibid., 190 bis, 191). Indeed that right seems to be a necessary correlative of the civil responsibility of religious communities for delicts or quasi-delicts of one of their members “dans l’exercise des fonctions auxquelles elles l’ont préposé.” (Ibid., no. 460).
That a plaintiff, holding towards another, who is injured by the fault of a third party, relations such as those which his community had with Brother Henri-Gabriel, has a cause of action against such third party for damages sustained by him through the fault of such third party seems to be very clearly the opinion of leading French text-writers. In 20 Laurent, no. 534, we read:
La loi donne l’action pour lie dommage causé, donc à tous ceux qui sont (lésés par le fait dommageable. Ce principe résulte de la généralité des termes de l’article 1382; il est consacré par la jurisprudence. La cour de cassation Ta formulé dans les termes suivants, à l’occasion de la mort instantanée d’une personne par suite d’un accident de chemin de fer: "Le fait dommageable ouvre une action en dommages-intérêts au profit de toute personne qui a souffert un préjudice direct résultant de ce fait” (Rejet, 21 juillet 1869., D. 72, 5, 386, n. 1.)
Huc thus states the same principle in vol. 8, at no. 420:
Selon la formule die la cour de cessation: “Le fait dommageable ouvre une action en dommages-intérêts au profit de toute personne qui a souffert un préjudice direct résultant de ce fait” (Cass. 21 juillet 1869, D. 72, 5, 386, n. 1), qu’elle soit ou non héritière de la victime. (Alger, 23 mai 1892, S. 94, 2, 62.)
In 2 Planiol, 9e éd., at no. 890, we read:
Quand la faute est dommageable, elle produit à la charge de son auteur une obligation d’indemniser la victime. Cette obligation de payer des dommages-intérêts est, en matière civile, la sanction nécessaire de toutes les obligations légales, aussi bien que de toutes les obligations conventionnelles. La faute est donc un fait productif d’une obligation nouvelle.
and, at no. 892:
Toute personne lésée par la faute a le droit d’être indemnisée. Il doit donc y avoir en principe autant d’indemnités distinctes qu’il y a de personnes lésées: toutefois, cela n’est pas toujours nécessaire.
See also, 1 Sourdat, Responsabilité, nos. 103, 659, 690, 691, 692.
Commenting on articles 1382 and 1383 C.N., Larombière, in his Treatise on Obligations (1857), vol. V, at no. 36 (p. 713), says:
Quant au droit qui appartient à la partie lésée, de poursuivre la réparation du dommage qui lui a été causé, l’action qui en résulte existe également en sa faveur, soit que le délit ou quasi-délit lui ait fait éprouver un dommage matériel ou un tort moral, d’une manière directe ou indirecte. Mais elle doit, dans tous les cas, commencer par établir que ce dommage existe, et qu’il existe par la faute de l’auteur du fait.
Lorsqu’elle a été directement et individuellement atteinte dans sa fortune, sa personne, sa considération et son honneur, la réalité du préjudice est plus manifestement sensible et plus aisément appréciable. Mais il n’en est plus moins vrai qu’elle peut être indirectement lésée dans les biens, dans la personne d’un tiers, et éprouver le contrecoup des atteintes portées aux droits de ce dernier. Il suffit alors que le délit ou quasi-délit ait été la cause d’un dommage quelconque à son égard, sans qu’elle s’y soit elle-même volontairement et imprudemment exposée, pour qu’elle ait une action personnelle en réparation.
See also no. 27 and Domat’s Œuvres Complètes (1830), vol. I, p. 480, no. 1; p. 483, no. 10.
As to what is “indirect” damage not recoverable, see 43 Rev. Crit. de Leg. (1914), pp. 229 et seq. and S. 1911, 1, 545. It is damage of which the fault (fait) of the defendant has been merely the occasion, not the cause. The jurisprudence fully supports the views thus expressed by “the authors,” and is by no means wholly modern. To quote a few reports of decisions, selected from many: In Ragon v. Chanfrault[35], we read:
L’action civile en réparation d’un crime ou délit appartient à tous ceux qui, directement ou indirectement, en ont souffert un préjudice réel; il n’est pas nécessaire pour que leur action soit recevable, que des obligations naturelles et légales les rattachent à la victime.
Nos. 441-2, Pandectes Belges (1889), vol. 32, vbo. Domm.-Ints., read as follows:
441. La loi donne l’action en dommages-intérêts à tous ceux qui sont lésés par le fait dommageable. Ce principe résulte des termes mêmes de l’art. 1382, et il a été consacré par la jurisprudence.
442. Un intérêt quelconque ne suffit pas, toutefois: il faut que le dommage soit personnel à la personne qui se prétend lésée, c’est-à-dire il faut qu’elle soit atteinte dans des droits ou des intérêts individuels.
In no, 1010, Sirey, Codes Ann. (Civ.), vol. 3, arts. 1382-3, we find:
Décidé, dans le même sens, que s’il ne suffit pas pour autoriser une action civile en dommages-intérêts qu’il soit justifié d’un lien de parenté ou d’affection entre la victime d’un crime ou d’un délit et ceux qui réclament réparation, il n’est pas non plus nécessaire que des obligations naturelles et légales les rattachent l’un à l’autre; il suffit qu’il y ait préjudice réel pour donner droit à réparation. * * * (Bourges, 16 déc. 1872, S. 74, 2, 71.)
In S. 1894. 2. 22, we have a decision of the Court of Appeal at Lyons indicating that it is of slight importance in the case of a claim by a brother or sister that there did not exist on the part of the injured person any alimentary obligation towards the plaintiffs.
Again, in Pandectes Belges, 1881, vol. 5, vbo., Act. Civ., at no. 51, we read:
Bien que le dommage éprouvé doive être personnel au demandeur, il n’est pas nécessaire que l’infraction ait été dirigée contre lui-même; il suffit que, en frappant directement d’autres personnes, elle ait porté en même temps atteinte à son honneur ou à sa fortune.
See Chemins de fer de l’Est c. Lucioni[36]. Demolombe says (vol. 31 (1882), par. 675), at p. 579:
Une seule question se pose: ce demandeur, en responsabilité civile, a-t-il éprouvé un dommage résultant du délit ou du quasi-délit, imputable au défendeur? Si l’on répond affirmativement, cela suffit; or, l’assooié privé de son associé, le chef peut-être et l’âme de l’entreprise commune, peut avoir éprouvé un dommage considérable; donc, il a droit à une réparation.
Finally, from Fuzier-Herman, III Cod. Civ. Ann., arts. 1382-3, nos. 686 et seq., I take the following summary: 686. L’action en dommages-intérêts appartient à toute personne qui, soit directement, soit indirectement, éprouve un préjudice à raison du délit ou du quasi-délit connais par le défendeur Aubry et Rau, t. 4, p. 74$; n° 445; Reuter, Cours de législ. crim., t. 2, p. 444; Huc, t. 8 n° 420; Laurent, t. 20, n° 534; Larombière, sur les arts, 1382-3, n° 36; Demolombe, t. 31, nos 673 et seq.
686 bis. Comme l’action en dommages-intérêts appartient à ceux qui indirectement éprouvent un préjudice, il faut admettre que la compagnie d’assurances qui, à la suite de meurtre d’un assuré, a dû verser à ses héritiers le montant de l’assurance stipulée en cas de décès, est en droit de réclamer des dommages-intérêts à l’assassin, à raison du préjudice que lui a fait éprouver le paiement prématuré de l’assurance. Cour d’ass., Jura, 28 juin 1884, S. 85, 2, 219.
686 ter. De même, l’assureur qui a indemnisé l’assuré des suites de l’incendie a une action en dommages-intérêts contre l’auteur de l’incendie pour le préjudice qu’il lui a causé en donnant lieu par son fait à l’exercice de l’action de l’assuré contre l’assureur. Cass. 22 déc. 1852, S. 53, 1, 109.
688. L’action en réparation du préjudice causé par un accident (spécialement par un accident suivi de mort) n’appartient donc pas seulement à la victime de l’accident ou à ses héritiers, mais encore à quiconque, héritier ou non de la victime, se trouve directement lésé par les conséquences de l’accident. Alger, 23 mai, 1892 (S. 94, 2, 62; D. 94, 2, 47).
694. Vainement l’auteur de l’accident objecterait qu’il pourrait être ainsi exposé à l’infini à des actions successives de la part de tous ceux qui, à titre quelconque, tiraient avantage de la vie ou du travail de la victime; l’action en responsabilité n’est ouverte qu’à celui qui prouve l’existence d’un dommage, et à la condition de justifier d’un préjudice personnel et direct. Alger, 23 mai 1892, précité.
695. Le bénéfice des réparations peut être ainsi étendu même à des parents à l’égard desquels n’existe pas l’obligation de se fournir réciproquement des aliments. Cass. 20 févr. 1863 (S. 63, 1, 321.)
699. En résumé, l’action civile en dommages-intérêts pour réparation d’un crime ou délit, appartient à tous ceux qui, directement ou indirectement, en ont souffert un préjudice réel, sans qu’il soit nécessaire que des obligations naturelles et légales les rattachent à la victime. Bourges, 16 déc. 1872 (S. 74, 2, 71), 706. Au surplus, si tout individu peut réclamer la réparation du préjudice à lui causé par la faute d’un tiers, soit à ce dernier, soit aux personnes sur lesquelles pèse une responsabilité légale, il faut qu’il justifie de l’existence actuelle et certaine de ce préjudice. Et c’est au juge du fond à apprécier en fiait si cette justification a été ou non rapportée. Cass. 15 avr. 1890 (S. 90, 1, 501).
See too Demogue “Obligations,” t. 4, nos. 528, 530-1-3-5-7.
That the interest of the present plaintiff depends upon its relation, contractual or other, with the injured person, it is said presents a difficulty. But, apparently, all that it is required to prove, under art. 1053 C.C., is that, as the result of an interference with that relation attributable in law to fault of the defendant, it has sustained damage, which it becomes the duty of the jury (or of the judge discharging its functions) to assess. I find it impossible to distinguish in principle from the case at bar that of Cedar Shingles Co. v. Comp. d’Ass. de Rimouski[37], cited by Greenshields, J., where, not as the result of any subrogation, but solely because it was held to be directly within art. 1053 C.C., the loss sustained by a fire insurance company, obliged by contract to indemnify the owner of the property destroyed, was held to give it a right of action against the defendant, a third party, who was responsible for the fire.
L’assureur qui a payé le montant de l’assurance à l’assuré, a, pour se faire rembourser, contre l’auteur du sinistre, le recours en dommages de l’art. 1053 C.C.
So reads the fifth paragraph of the head-note to the report of that case.
Bossé, J., delivering the judgment of the court, after stating that the claim of the plaintiff was based on art. 1053 C.C., and depended upon the soundness of its contention that, having been obliged to pay because of the fault of the defendant, the latter was bound to reimburse it, said, at p. 382:
Cette doctrine a été acceptée par (Pardessus, vol. 2, n° 595, cité par les codificateurs sous l’art. 2584, et Pardessus rapporte, dans ce sens, un arrêt de la cour de cassation du 18 décembre 1827, D. 28, 1, 63. Depuis lors, Ruben de Couder, n° 252, 252 (sic) et DuHail, n° 176, cités par Dalloz, ont adopté cette opinion, et elle a été sanctionnée par la cour de cassation dans l’affaire de La Prudence, D. 53, 1, 93, et par la cour d’Appel de Chambéry, dans l’affaire de la Compagnie L’Europe, D. 82, 2, 238.
See, also, Alauzet, “Assurances,” vol. 2, pp. 388-9.
This decision of the Quebec court finds full support in French and Belgian jurisprudence of long standing. In D. 1882. 2. 238, mentioned by Bossé, J., the following notable paragraph occurs in the report of Compagnie L’Europe c. Gruffart et al.
Attendu, en effet, que les dispositions des arts. 1382 et 1383 sont aussi générales dans leurs termes qu’étendues dans leur application; qu’elles ne font aucune distinction ni aucune réserve et constituent en quelque sorte un droit commun, applicable à tous les citoyens, quelles que soient leur situation, ou leurs entreprises particulières:—Que, dès lors, il n’y a aucune raison d’exclure une compagnie d’assurances de ce droit commun et de la cantonner exclusivement dans ses droits respectifs avec ses assurés, en l’excluant des droits et actions qui peuvent lui compéter personnellement à l’égard des tiers.
See, also, D. 1853. 1. 93; D. 1859. 1. 429; D. 1872. 1. 293; D. (J. du R.) 1828.1. 62-3; D. Rep. de Leg., Supp. 15, vbo. “Responsabilité,” nos. 215-6, 218, 220; Lyon-Caen et Renault, Tr. de Dr. Comm., vol. 6, nos. 1312 et seq.
Modem French jurisprudence, however, denies a right of action under arts. 1382-3 C.N. to a life or accident insurance company against a wrong-doer who has killed or injured the assured and thus subjected the company to immediate liability on its contract. It has been suggested that the fact that such insurance is not by way of indemnity distinguishes it from fire insurance and takes the case out of the operation of arts. 1382-3 C.N. See L’Abeille c. May,[38]; Juris-Classeur Civ., arts. 1382-3, Délits et quasi-délits, Div. Al, no. 138; Phoenix Assur. Co. c. Chemin de fer du Midi[39]; S. 1903. 2. 257n., 259; S. 1911. 2. 171; Gaz. des Trib., 1913. 1. 182. Compare Merchants’ and Employers’ Guarantee & Accident Co. v. Blanchard (Rev.)[40]; Merchants’ and Employers’ Guarantee & Accident Co. v. Brunet (Rev.)[41]; Lloyd’s Plate Glass Ins. Co. v. Pacaud[42]; Animals’ Insurance Co. v. Montreal Tramways Co. (Rev.)[43]; and Motor Union Ins. Co. v. Sacks et al[44]. Recovery by life or accident insurance companies against third parties, who, by their fault, have injured the assured, thus entailing liability on such companies, is made in modern cases to depend on the presence in the contracts of insurance of a clause which can be treated as a cession by the assured to the company of his ultimate rights. See La Mutuelle Générale Française c. Antoniotti[45]. Whether there is a sufficient logical basis for this distinction (Lefort, “L’Assurance sur La Vie, vol. 2, pp. 5-20) does not presently concern us; and it may be that the view expressed by Martineau, J., against recovery under art. 1053 C.C., was, in the Blanchard case40, correct in principle, although his deductions from the judgment of the Privy Council, delivered by Baron Parke, in Quebec Fire Insurance Co. v. Molson[46], seem quite unwarranted. But the right of a fire insurance company to recover under article 1053 C.C. from a third party whose fault occasioned the loss for which, under its contract, it has been obliged to indemnify its assured, seems to be well recognized in the jurisprudence of the province of Quebec. Stemus decisis. In principle there can be no distinction for the purpose of art. 1053 C.C. between the position, quoad the third party tort-feasor, of the fire insurance company and that of the master whose loss is caused by the defendant having tortiously injured his servant, or that of a religious community similarly damnified by an injury inflicted upon one of its members. In each case alike, the plaintiff must shew (a) fault of the defendant; (b) that such fault was in law the cause of the damage for which it seeks to recover; and (c) that such damage was actually suffered by it.
The existence of the relation between the respondent and Brother Henri-Gabriel is in no sense the equivalent of a novus actus interveneins such as would break the causal connection between the appellant’s fault and the injury sustained by the respondent from it. That relation was, at the most, a causa sine qua non, or condition of the defendant having damnified the respondent. It was the occasion, not the cause of its being injured. 43 Rev. Crit. de Lég. (1914), pp. 230-1.
Moreover, while in cases of responsibility for breach of contract the degree of fault, and foreknowledge of the probability of its affecting the plaintiff adversely, intent and even motive may be material (Art. 1074 C.C. et seq.), comparative slightness of the fault shewn affords no answer even in mitigation of damages, nor can the absence of foreknowledge, intent or motive be invoked to support a defence based on remoteness of damage in cases of quasi-délit entirely independent of any breach of contract by the defendant; Ortenberg’s case (infra) affords an illustration. See also Loranger v. Dominion Transport Co.[47]; Leclerc v. Montreal[48]. As the slightest degree of fault or negligence (culpa levissima) (S. 1927. 1. 201; S. 1924. 1. 105) suffices to entail liability in cases of quasi-délit, so the damage must, as far as practicable, be assessed in such cases under the civil law at a figure adequate to give complete compensation to the injured plaintiff. Juris-Class. Civ., art. 1382-3, Délits et quasi-délits, Div. A 1, nos. 2, 8.
The presence in the Civil Code of arts. 1074-5, which impose explicit limitations on the measure of damages recoverable for breach of contract, sharply contrasts with the utter absence of any such textual restriction in cases where délits or quasi-délits form the basis of action under art. 1053 C.C. In cases of contractual obligation the presumed intention of the parties affords the basis for restricting or extending the damages to what they may reasonably be supposed to have contemplated. See Jackson v. Watson[49]; and Griffiths v. Harwood[50]. In the ordinary case of a délit or quasi-délit causing damage, there is no such ground for thus confining or restricting the recovery against the wrong-doer. There can, therefore, be no justification for the application by analogy of restrictions, similar to those imposed by articles 1074-5 C.C., to cases of délits or quasi-délits. The very suggestion seems to me heretical. But see 1 Sourdat, Responsabilité, nos. 105, 107. In 5 Larambière (1357), arts. 1382-3, nos. 26 and 37, we read:
Les dommages et intérêts dus pour la réparation d’un délit ou d’un quasi-délit ne doivent néanmoins comprendre, pour la perte éprouvée ou le gain manqué, que ce qui en est une suite immédiate et directe. Mais, comme il n’est intervenu aucune convention, ils ne doivent pas être limités à ce que l’auteur du fait a pu prévoir au moment où il l’a commis, alors même qu’il n’y aurait pas eu de sa part dol, malice et dessein de nuire.
La responsabilité civile comprend l’obligation de réparer totalement le dommage causé. * * *
Il est indifférent au point de vue du droit civil (says Zachariæ (Massé et Vergé, vol. 4, p. 16)) que le dommage ait été causé sciemment ou par négligence: la négligence la plus légère suffit pour motiver une action en dommages et intérêts, arg. art. 1388. (See also foot-note n° 4, ibid.).
This is well pointed out in Juris-Classeur Civil, arts. 1382-3, div. A, nos. 3 and 4.
Perhaps the best known, if not the only kind of tort in respect of which lack of foreknowledge of the interest of the plaintiff, actual or reasonably possible, may be invoked as a defence is that of inducing a person to act in contravention of the contractual rights of another. Quinn v. Leatham[51]. A., who, in ignorance of the obligations of a servant to B., induces him (the servant) to undertake a service inconsistent therewith, merely exercises his own right and commits no fault. Therefore the case is not within article 1053 C.C. But intent to defeat the rights of the former employer, importing malice, may render such conduct actionable. Girard v. Wayagamack Pulp & Paper Co.[52]. Compare Pruneau v. Fortin[53], a case where the defendant exercised his legal right, not in order to injure the plaintiff, but to advance what he conceived to be his own interest. English law admits this departure from the usual rule, that where there is question of actionable responsibility for tort (délit or quasi-délit) the motive and intent of the tort-feasor are immaterial. An act which does not amount to a legal injury cannot be actionable because done with bad intent. Allen v. Flood[54].
An interesting observation upon the juridical basis of the two notable decisions of the House of Lords above cited, from the point of view of the civilian, may be found in Gérard’s work “Les Torts ou Délits Civils en Droit Anglais,” at pp. 426 et seq. Most of the discussion in the French cases (S. 1925. 1. 249) and in the works of the French text-writers, however, bears upon the much-debated question whether, when the victim of an accident caused by the defendant’s fault has a claim against him for breach of contract, he may, either concurrently or alternatively, prefer a claim based on quasi-délit under arts. 1382-3 C.N. See Robillard v. Wand[55]. There is, of course, no such aspect of the case at bar. That is common ground.
Another case illustrative of the wide scope of art. 1053 C.C. is Ortenberg v. Plamondon[56], where, at p. 388, Mr. Justice Cross, holding the defendant liable to the plaintiff for damages for slander in the course of a public lecture, although it would seem certain that reference to the plaintiff had not been intended by the lecturer, said:
The respondent pleaded that the statements made in his lecture were true, but he has failed to prove the ground of defence. He is in the position of having maliciously caused damage to the appellant. It is merely a case of applying the article 1053 C.C.
The plaintiff’s right of action to recover on its claim for $118 for loss of its own property, which Brother Gabriel had with him when injured, admits of no question. Although this item is not specifically mentioned in the judgment, it was probably taken into account by the learned trial judge in fixing the damages at $4,000. The plaintiff’s recovery of the portion of its claim for out-of-pocket expenses ($2,236.90), as fixed by the trial judge, can be supported, in the opinion of the majority of the learned judges of the Court of King’s Bench, upon another and distinct basis, suggested by Mr. Justice Greenshields, viz., that the negligence of the defendant being proved to have been the cause of the injuries of Brother Henri-Gabriel, it incurred an obligation to furnish to him all care necessary to alleviate his sufferings, and, as far as possible, to bring about his recovery, or at least to pay for such care.
Payment may be made by any person, although he may be a stranger to the obligation (Art. 1:141 C.C.).
He whose business has been well managed is bound to fulfil the obligations that the person acting for him has contracted in his name, to indemnify him for all the personal liabilities which he has assured, and to reimburse him for all necessary or useful expenses. (Article 1046 C.C.)
The expenses incurred by the plaintiff for doctor’s bills, and hospital care, etc., for Brother Henri-Gabriel may well be regarded as outlay made by it in the discharge of an obligation of the defendant and for its benefit. On similar grounds, in Paquin v. Grand Trunk Rly. Co. (1896)[57], cited by Greenshields, J., the defendant railway company was held liable to the plaintiff, who had rendered medical services to persons injured in an accident caused by its negligence, although such services had not been requested or sanctioned by anyone authorized on its behalf. Reference may also be made to the authorities cited by Larue, J., at p. 338; and to La Cité de St. Hyacinthe v. Brault[58]. Subject to the question of the application of art. 2262 (2) C.C., the right of the plaintiff to maintain an action on the basis de in rem verso for the sum of $2,236.90 would seem to be reasonably clear.
As to the amount of the total damages, assessed at $4,000, even if the practice of this court permitted a revision thereof, I agree with Mr. Justice Cannon that
La privation des services du Frère Gabriel a certainement causé des dommages et des embarras à la communauté dont il faisait partie,
and with Mr. Justice Bernier that the amount allowed for actual damages beyond the out-of-pocket expenses, viz., $1,767.10, was “not exorbitant—bien loin de là.” Reference may again be made to 5 Larombière, Obligations, 1857, arts. 1382-3, no. 26 (p. 704) quoted above; to Fuz.-Herman, III Code Civ. Ann. Arts. 1382-3, nos. 699, 688; and to Juris-Class. Civ., Arts. 1382-3, Délits et quasi-délits, Div. A. 1; nos. 2 and 8.
The accident to Brother Henri-Gabriel happened on the 14th of August, 1923. The present action was begun on the 8th of August, 1925. More than one year and less than two years had elapsed in the interval.
The defendant, claiming that this is an action “for bodily injuries” within art. 2262 (2) C.C. above quoted, asserts that it is prescribed. The plaintiff, on the other hand, argues that the action falls within art. 2261 (2), by which actions
for damages resulting from offences or quasi-offences, whenever other provisions do not apply * * * are prescribed by two years,
and contends that the action was begun in time and is not prescribed.
These provisions of the Civil Code are found in section 5 of chapter 6, of Tit. XIX, that section being headed, “Of certain short prescriptions.”
In the province of Quebec, as in France, the general rule is that
all things, Tights and actions, the prescription of which is not otherwise regulated by law, are prescribed by thirty years. (Art. 2242 C.C.; Cf. Art. 2262 C.N.)
These short prescriptions are exceptions to this general rule and, as is pointed out in 32 Laurent, at no. 373, they are subject to the principles which govern all exceptions: “on ne peut pas les étendre, même par voie d’analogie.” Baudry-Lacantinerie Droit Civil (De la prescription), vol. 28 no. 24, citing Cass. 26 juin 1859, S. 59. 1. 858), says:
Ainsi que l’a jugé la cour de cassation: les lois qui établissent des prescriptions ou des déchéances sont de droit étroit et ne peuvent pas être étendues par analogie d’un cas à un autre.
An illustration of the application of this rule is to be found in 32 Laurent, no. 377, where it is pointed out that, although “la loi sur l’impôt fonder de 3 frimaire, an VII (Art. 149)” establishes a special prescription of three years in favour of contributaries, that prescription does not apply to a third person who has paid the impost for the debtor, and the author gives as a reason that the action is entirely different:
le tiers qui paye pour le contribuable a l’action de mandat, de gestion d’affaires, ou au moins l’action de in rem verso. Cette action n’a rien de commun avec la loi de l’an VII: c’est une action ordinaire qui se prescrit d’après le droit commun par trente ans. And he makes reference to a decision of the Court of Cassation of 15th March, 1841, reported in Dalloz, Rep., vbo. Prescription, no. 1046 1° and to Pasicrisie (1829), p. 342. The author proceeds:
Il en est de même die toutes les autres prescriptions: on doit les limiter strictement aux cas pour lesquels elles ont été établies: en dehors de ces cas, elles n’ont plus de raison d’être. Les intérêts se prescrivent par cinq ans entre le créancier et le débiteur; si un tiers avance les deniers, il aura une action ordinaire de trente ans, parce que, à son égard, il n’y a pas une dette d’intérêts, il y a une dette ordinaire.
In volume IX of Mr. Justice Mignault’s work “Droit Civil Canadien,” at p. 518, we find the statement:
la prescription courte est une prescription d’exception; elle n’existe que lorsqu’elle a été expressement décrétée par le législateur.
That the limitation of one year imposed by art. 2262 (2) C.C. applies to all actions by a person who has sustained bodily injury to recover damages therefor, or for the consequences thereof, and that such prescriptive period runs from the date when the injury was suffered admits of no doubt in view of the decision of this court in City of Montreal v. McGee[59]; by which the decision in Caron v. Abbott[60], cited by Dorion J., was impliedly overruled. See Versailles v. Dominion Cotton Co.[61].
But an action brought, as is that now before us, not by the person who has suffered bodily harm, but by someone else who has sustained damages distinct from his by reason of the fault of the defendant, although such damages be a consequence of the bodily injuries, is certainly not the same action which the person so injured might himself have brought. For instance, in it the plaintiff can recover nothing for the pain and suffering which the injuries caused to the victim, but is strictly limited to such damages as he can prove he has himself actually sustained. The cause of action before us is not “for (the) bodily injuries” suffered by Brother Henri-Gabriel as the immediate result of the fault, by him “actionable per se;” it is rather for the loss sustained by the community owing to the expense to which it was put and to its having been deprived of the services of one of its members through the fault of the defendant; per quod only is such fault actionable by it. Robert Mary’s case[62]. Its cause of action for damages other than out-of-pocket expenses would have been the same had the defendant illegally detained Brother Henri-Gabriel for the period in question, or had it wrongfully induced him to absent himself from the community. In each case alike the plaintiff would claim for “damages caused (to it) by (the) fault” of the defendant (Art. 1053 C.C.), or by that of “persons under its control” (Art. 1054 C.C.).
This leads us to a brief consideration of the precise terms in which art. 2262 (2) C.C. is couched. In the first place, the words “for bodily injuries” of the English version are very inaptly rendered in the French version by the words “pour injures corporelles,” the meaning of the latter as intended, no doubt, being “pour lésions ou blessures corporelles.” While not of present importance, it is, perhaps, not out of place here to suggest legislative action in regard to the French versions of articles 2262 (2) C.C. and of article 1056 C.C. above referred to. What, however, is of moment at present is the contrast between the language of art. 2261 (2) C.C. “for damages resulting from offences or quasi-offences” (“pour dommages résultant de délits et quasi-délits”) and the terms of art. 2262 (2) “for bodily injuries.” The latter paragraph is grouped with no. (1) “for slander or libel” (“pour injures verbales ou écrites”) and no. (3) “for wages of domestic or farm servants” (“pour gages des domestiques de maison ou de ferme”) and no. (4) “for hotel or boarding-house charges” (“pour dépenses d’hotellerie ou de pension”). This context seems to make the contrast between art. 2262 (2) and art. 2261 (2) even more significant, the words “damages resulting from” being introduced into the latter (art. 2261 (2)) although other provisions of the same article, nos. (1) and (3), read: (1) “for seduction and lying-in expenses” (“pour séduction et frais de gésine”) and (3) “for wages of workmen, etc.” (pour salaires des employés, etc.”). There can be no justification in my opinion for reading art. 2262 (2) C.C. as if its terms were “for damages resulting from bodily injuries.” To do so would involve a distinct extension of its application. In introducing into the Code art. 2262 (2) C.C. (See Codifiers’ 4th Report, p. 194, no. 103a), the legislature probably had in mind only the right of action of the person suffering such injuries (“the immediate victim”), who alone can sue to recover for them. Had it intended to cover by the very short prescription of one year, which art. 2262 (2) C.C. enacts, all actions for “damages resulting from, or arising out of” bodily injuries, having before it the language of art. 2261 (2) C.C., it is scarcely possible that terms similar to those therein employed would not have been used. The statement of Lacoste, C.J., in Griffith v. Harwood[63],
Article 2202 * * * rend prescriptible par un an tout dommage résultant de lésions corporelles.
is obiter, and is, no doubt inadvertently, too broad—in fact distinctly broader than the authority cited justifies, viz., Canadian Pacific Ry. Co. v. Robinson[64]. There the question was as to the effect of art. 2262 (2) C.C. on the right of recovery of “the immediate victim,” as it was in the later case of City of Montreal v. McGee[65],
The plaintiff does not seek to affect the defendant by its understanding with Brother Henri-Gabriel. It complains that the defendant has unlawfully deprived it of the benefit which it would otherwise have derived from its arrangement with its member and, for the damage thus done to it, it seeks compensation. Compare S. 1925. 1. 249n, refusing to apply art. 433 C. Comm., limiting actions by railway passengers, to an action brought by a mother for the death of her son, who was killed while a passenger.
I agree with the following considérant of Mr. Justice Surveyer:
Considérant cependant que la demanderesse ne poursuit pas pour le frère Henri-Gabriel et en son lieu et place, mais qu’elle réclame un droit qui lui est personnel, et qui est distinct de celui qu’avait le frère Henri-Gabriel; que ce droit ne résulte pas des injures corporelles subies par ce dernier, mais des dépenses auxquelles la demanderesse a été contrainte et des dommages qui lui ont été causés par la privation des services du dit frère Henri-Gabriel.
The prescription of one year imposed by art. 2262 (2) C.C. could only apply by analogy, or by implication from its mention of art. 1056 C.C. For such a case as that now before us this prescription has not been “expressément décrétée par la législature.” A fortiori is this so in so far as the claim for out-of-pocket expenses incurred by the plaintiff on account of Brother Henri-Gabriel’s injuries is concerned, if that claim be regarded, not as based on art. 1053 C.C., but as resting on art. 1046 C.C.; whether, if the action be regarded as de in rem verso, the prescription of art. 2262 (2) C.C. applies, I find it unnecessary to determine. My learned brothers Mignault and Rinfret think it does; and from their considered opinion on this point I am not at present prepared to dissent. But see 32 Laurent, no. 377 (supra). Of course, to the claim for destruction of clothing and personal effects, the property of the plaintiffs, art. 2262 (2) C.C. can have no application. As to this latter item of the plaintiff’s demand, it is, in my opinion, beyond question that art. 2261 (2) C.C. applies. Indeed, I am of the opinion not only that the entire cause of action, so far as it rests on arts. 1053-4 C.C., is maintainable, but that it falls within art. 2261 (2) C.C. rather than within art. 2262 (2) C.C.
I, accordingly, accept the following considérants of Mr. Justice Surveyer:
Considérant que l’action qui compétait au frère Henri-Gabriel était une action pour injures corporelles (bodily injuries), prescriptibles par un an (C.C., art. 2262, par. 2);
Considérant, cependant, que la demanderesse ne poursuit pas pour le frère Henri-Gabriell et en son lieu et place, mais qu’elle réclame un droit qui lui est personnel, et qui est distinct de celui qu’avait le frère Henri-Gabriel; que ce droit ne résulte pas des injures corporelles subies par ce dernier, mais des dépenses auxquelles la demanderesse a été contrainte et des dommages qui lui ont été causés par la privation des services dudit frère Henri-Gabriel;
Considérant que la demanderesse cherche la réparation civile d’un quasi-délit qui lui cause un préjudice réel et lui fait éprouver un dommage positif et matériel;
Considérant que l’accident arrivé au frère Henri-Gabriel s’est produit le 14 août 1923, et que la demande a été signifiée le 8 août 1925, par conséquent dans les deux ans du quasi-délit (C.C. art. 2261).
For the foregoing reasons, which are substantially the same as those of the learned trial judge and of Green-shields, J., I would affirm the judgment a quo and would dismiss the appeal with costs.
Mignault, J. (dissenting).—L’appel est d’un jugement de la cour du Banc du Roi[66], confirmant à l’unanimité le jugement de la cour supérieure, Surveyer, J. Il n’y a eu différence d’opinion que quant au montant de la condamnation. La compagnie appelante exploite des automobiles de louage (taxis) ainsi que des autobus, pour le transport des voyageurs, surtout dans la région de Montréal. Elle existe en vertu de lettres patentes de la province de Québec.
La congrégation intimée est une congrégation religieuse d’hommes, qui a été constituée civilement par une loi de la province de Québec de 1887, 50 Vict., c. 29. Cette loi lui permet de s’agréger des membres, et d’adopter des règlements non incompatibles aux lois de cette province. Elle a plusieurs maisons dans la province de Québec où elle se voue à l’enseignement. Ses membres prononcent des vœux perpétuels de pauvreté, de chasteté et d’obéissance, mais il n’est pas question de ces vœux dans la loi constitutive de l’intimée. Les frères maristes ont des maisons ailleurs que dans la province de Québec, et notamment à New-York. L’Acte 50 Vict., c. 29, se borne naturellement aux établissements que les frères maristes ont faits ou feront en cette province.
Le frère Henri-Gabriel, dont il sera question plus loin, était membre de cette congrégation lors de l’accident qui a donné lieu au procès, et il enseignait à la maison des frères maristes à Iberville, province de Québec. Il avait prononcé des vœux perpétuels, et aussi ce qu’on appelle des vœux de stabilité, dont l’objet est d’obliger le religieux (en conscience, bien entendu) à demeurer membre de la congrégation pendant toute sa vie.
Au mois d’août 1923, les frères maristes établis à New-York, et qui ne font pas partie de la corporation établie par la loi 50 Vict., c. 29 (il n’appert pas s’ils ont obtenu une constitution civile de l’Etat de New-York), avaient un campement d’été pour leurs élèves sur l’île Lamothe, dans l’Etat du Vermont, près de Rouses Point, New-York, et à une cinquantaine de milles de Montréal. Ils avaient organisé une excursion pour les enfants de leur camp jusqu’à Montréal, et avaient contracté avec la compagnie appelante pour transporter les enfants et les frères qui les accompagnaient à travers cette dernière ville, et de là à Rouses Point. L’appelante leur fournit deux autobus avec chauffeurs, contenant chacun une vingtaine de personnes. Le contrat de transport n’était donc pas entre l’intimée et l’appelante, mais entre cette dernière et des frères maristes qui ne faisaient pas partie de la corporation intimée. Il s’ensuit qu’aucune question de responsabilité contractuelle ou de faute contractuelle ne peut se soulever entre l’intimée et l’appelante.
L’excursion se fit le 14 août 1923. L’appelante avait promené les excursionnistes dans la cité de Montréal, et vers la fin de l’après-midi elle les ramenait dans la direction de Rouses Point. Le frère Henri-Gabriel était du voyage, probablement sur l’invitation des frères maristes de New-York, et il prit place sur la première banquette d’une des voitures. Entre lui et l’appelante, pas plus qu’entre l’intimée et l’appelante, il n’y avait aucun contrat de transport.
Pendant le trajet entre Montréal et Rouses Point, la voiture où se trouvait le frère Henri-Gabriel fit arrêt à Saint-Philippe de Laprairie pour prendre de la gazoline. Le chauffeur en demanda cinq gallons à un garage au bord de la route. Il avait cependant mal calculé la quantité de gazoline qui pouvait entrer dans le réservoir placé sous les premières banquettes. Il s’en répandit donc dans la voiture, et la présence d’un tuyau surchauffé de la machine causa un incendie. Le frère Henri-Gabriel fut très grièvement brûlé, et il est hors de question que ses brûlures furent causées par la faute du chauffeur de la voiture, faute dont l’appelante était civilement responsable. Il avait donc une action de ce chef contre l’appelante, et il me paraît clair qu’on n’aurait pu invoquer comme fin de non-recevoir contre cette action son vœu de pauvreté, ni son consentement, qui en découlait, que tous ses biens fussent la propriété de la congrégation dont il faisait partie.
Le frère Henri-Gabriel ne fit jamais de réclamation contre l’appelante à raison de l’accident dont il avait été victime. L’intimée l’avait fait soigner, et elle paya tous les frais des traitements médicaux et chirurgicaux qu’on dut lui donner. Elle en réclame maintenant le coût à l’appelante et elle demande en sus une indemnité pour privation des services du frère blessé, ainsi que pour les frais de son entretien alors qu’il était dans l’impossibilité de travailler. Elle base son droit d’action sur la faute délictuelle dont elle tient l’appelante responsable. Le premier juge lui accorda $2,236.90 pour frais médicaux et autres dépenses, et $1,763.10 pour la privation des services du blessé. La cour du Banc du Roi[67] confirma ce jugement, mais deux des juges (Greenshields J. et Cousineau J. ad hoc) auraient restreint l’indemnité au premier item, sauf que le juge Greenshields, après une nouvelle étude du dossier, ajoute qu’il aurait été disposé à donner à l’intimée $900 qu’elle avait payés à un remplaçant du frère Henri-Gabriel.
La défense de l’appelante doit maintenant nous occuper. Elle oppose deux moyens à l’action: 1o L’intimée n’a pas le droit d’action qu’elle prétend exercer; 2° cette action, étant pour “injures corporelles”, est éteinte, vu qu’elle n’a été intentée que le 7 août 1925 et signifiée le lendemain, près de deux ans après l’accident (art. 2262 C.C.). Si le deuxième moyen est bien fondé, le premier importe peu. Cependant, il paraît difficile de les séparer, et il me semble plus avantageux de les étudier ensemble.
En effet, sur cette question de prescription, tout dépend du fondement juridique de l’action. Si nous étions en présence de la violation d’un contrat, c’est-à-dire de la faute contractuelle, je crois que l’article 2262 C.C., que l’appelante invoque, serait sans application. Mais j’ai dit qu’il n’y a pas eu de contrat entre les parties en litige. Le frère blessé n’a rien payé pour son passage et l’intimée n’a rien déboursé pour son transport. Il n’en est pas moins certain qu’on ne peut se prononcer sur la question de prescription que lorsqu’on sera fixé sur la nature du recours que peut exercer l’intimée dans les circonstances dévoilées par la preuve.
D’autre part, l’action qui compétait au frère Henri-Gabriel—la cour supérieure le reconnaît expressément—était une action pour “injures corporelles” prescriptible par un an. Et c’est parce que le savant juge de première instance était d’avis que l’action qui appartenait à l’intimée avait une autre base juridique qu’il a écarté le plaidoyer de prescription.
Considérant (dit-il) que la demanderesse ne poursuit pas pour le frère Henri-Gabriel et en son lieu et place (elle n’aurait pu le faire, art. 81, code de procédure civile), mais qu’elle réclame un droit qui lui est personnel, et qui est distinct de celui qu’avait le frère Henri-Gabriel; que ce droit ne résulte pas des injures corporelles subies par ce dernier, mais des dépenses auxquelles la demanderesse a été contrainte et des dommages qui lui ont été causés par la privation des services dudit frère Henri-Gabriel. Et le savant juge ajoute, donnant à l’article 1053 C.C. une extension qu’il convient de discuter à fond, “que toute personne lésée par une faute doit être indemnisée; qu’il y a en principe autant d’indemnités distinctes qu’il y a de personnes lésées (j’omets les autorités citées par le savant juge); que Demolombe (vol. 31, n° 675, p. 579) approuve un arrêt qui a reconnu la réclamation d’un associé pour la mort de son associé, réclamation qui serait repoussée par notre article 1056 C.C., qui est d’origine anglaise, et qui fait exception pour les cas de décès, aux principes de notre droit en matière de responsabilité.”
Avant de citer nos textes de loi, je suis bien prêt à reconnaître que la jurisprudence française moderne a donné aux articles 1382 et 1383 du Code Napoléon une extension absolue, et qui est bien telle que la représente le savant juge. Ainsi, quoique le Code Napoléon n’ait pas une disposition semblable à notre article 1056 C.C., la jurisprudence reconnaît l’existence d’un droit d’action au profit de toute personne qui souffre un préjudice à cause du décès d’un individu qui meurt des suites d’un délit ou quasi-délit. Ce sont les enfants, le conjoint par mariage, et même un tiers, comme dans le cas typique que mentionne Demolombe, qui avait fait un contrat de société avec le défunt.
Il est digne de remarque que notre code expose toute la loi de la responsabilité civile dans quatre articles d’une rédaction nécessairement générale, dont le dernier, l’article 1056 C.C. est, dit-on, d’origine anglaise. Je vais citer le premier et le dernier de ces quatre articles, qui suffisent pour la discussion de la question de principe, très importante, assurément, dont il s’agit en cette cause.
Art. 1053. Toute personne capable de discerner le bien du mal, est responsable du dommage causé par sa faute à autrui, soit par son fait, soit par imprudence, négligence ou inhabileté.
Art. 1066. Dans tous les cas où la partie contre qui le délit ou quasi-délit a été commis décède en conséquence, sans avoir obtenu indemnité ou satisfaction, son conjoint, ses père, mère et enfants ont, pendant l’année seulement à compter du décès, droit de poursuivre celui qui en est l’auteur ou ses représentants, pour les dommages-intérêts résultant de tel décès.
Au cas de duel’, cette section peut se porter de la même manière non seulement contre l’auteur immédiat du décès, mais aussi contre tous ceux qui ont pris part au duel soit comme seconds, soit comme témoins.
En tout cas il ne peut être porté qu’une seule et même action pour tous ceux qui ont droit à l’indemnité et le jugement fixe la proportion de chacun dans l’indemnité. Ces poursuites sont indépendantes de celles dont les parties peuvent être passibles au criminel, et sans préjudice à ces dernières.
Il s’agit en cette cause de la responsabilité qui incombe à l’appelante à raison d’un quasi-délit commis par elle, et qui a infligé des “injures corporelles” au frère Henri-Gabriel; c’est là le fait générateur du dommage qu’invoque l’intimée. L’article 1056 C.C. ne peut s’appliquer que lorsque
la partie contre qui le délit ou quasi-délit a été commis décède en conséquence.
Il n’est question là encore que d’ “injures corporelles”. L’article 1053 C.C., il est évident, envisage les délits et quasi-délits de tout genre, et non pas seulement ceux qui occasionnent des injures de cette sorte. Cependant, en interprétant cet article, je ne veux pas sortir de l’espèce que nous avons devant nous, et tout ce que j’en dirai se bornera au cas où le délit ou quasi-délit a causé de ces injures. J’envisage donc une espèce qui entre, ou qui peut entrer, si la mort s’ensuit, dans le cadre et de l’article 1053 C.C. et de l’article 1056 C.C.
Envisageant maintenant l’article 1053 C.C., je puis dire qu’il ne diffère guère des articles 1382 et 1383 du Code Napoléon. C’est le fait “qui cause à autrui un dommage”, pour me servir de l’expression du code français, qui engendre la responsabilité de celui par la faute duquel il arrive.
On peut admettre que l’expression “autrui”, si elle n’est pas restreinte par le contexte (et si on ne doit pas la regarder comme étant équivoque, surtout dans un texte législatif, et partant comme se plaçant dans la catégorie des expressions que l’interprète doit restreindre plutôt qu’étendre), est d’une portée très générale. Elle comprendrait, suivant la prétention de l’intimée, non seulement “la partie contre qui le délit ou quasi-délit a été commis” (c’est l’expression qu’emploie l’article 1056 C.C.), mais aussi toute personne qui souffre, je pourrais dire par ricochet, un préjudice comme conséquence du dommage éprouvé par cette partie elle-même.
Sauf à discuter plus loin les arrêts que cite l’intimée, la jurisprudence de la province de Québec n’a jamais donné une telle extension à l’article 1053 C.C. Le principe qui me paraît dominer en matière de dommages-intérêts, c’est que seuls les dommages directs, à l’exclusion des dommages indirects ou éloignés, peuvent faire la base d’une action en justice. Le code en a une disposition expresse quand il s’agit de l’inexécution des obligations. Dans le cas même où l’inexécution de l’obligation résulte du dol du débiteur, les dommages-intérêts ne comprennent que ce qui est une suite immédiate et directe de cette inexécution (art. 1075 C.C.). Si le débiteur a agi sans dol—c’est le cas du quasi-délit qui est un dommage causé illégalement, mais sans intention de nuire—il n’est tenu que des dommages qui ont été prévus et qu’on a pu prévoir (art. 1074 C.C.). Il est vrai qu’il s’agit là surtout, mais non pas uniquement, cependant, de l’inexécution d’une obligation contractuelle, mais il n’y a pas plus de raison d’accorder des dommages indirects ou éloignés, surtout à des tiers, lorsque l’obligation découle d’un délit ou quasi-délit, que lorsqu’elle provient d’un contrat.
Sur ce point j’accepte pleinement le principe que le juge Mathieu a formulé dans la cause de Kimball v. City of Montreal[68], savoir, que pour pouvoir se plaindre d’un quasi-délit, il ne suffit pas que le fait imputé ait été l’une des causes premières et éloignées du dommage, mais il est nécessaire que ce fait ait lui-même déterminé directement le dommag