First Nations Child & Family Caring Society of Canada et al. v. Attorney General of Canada (for the Minister of Indian and Northern Affairs Canada)

First Nations Child & Family Caring Society of Canada et al. v. Attorney General of Canada (for the Minister of Indian and Northern Affairs Canada)
Collection
Canadian Human Rights Tribunal
Date
2015-06-05
Neutral citation
2015 CHRT 14
File number(s)
T1340/7008
Decision-maker(s)
Marchildon, Sophie; Bélanger, Réjean; Lustig, Edward P.
Decision type
Decision
Decision status
Final
Grounds
National or Ethnic Origin
Race
Decision Content
Canadian Human Rights Tribunal
Tribunal canadien des droits de la personne
Citation: 2015 CHRT
14
Date:
June 5, 2015
File No.:
T1340/7008
Between:
First Nations Child and Family Caring Society of Canada
- and-
Assembly of First Nations
Complainants
- and -
Canadian Human Rights Commission
Commission
- and -
Attorney General of Canada
(Representing the Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Development Canada)
Respondent
- and -
Chiefs of Ontario
- and -
Amnesty International
Interested Parties
Decision
Members:
Sophie Marchildon ,
Réjean Bélanger ,
Edward P. Lustig
Table of Contents
I.Context 1
II.The Law on Retaliation 2
A.Overview of the Relevant Case Law 2
III.The Retaliation Complaint 11
A.The British Columbia Working Group 12
(i)Parties’ positions 14
(ii)Analysis 15
B.Chiefs of Ontario Meeting at the Minister’s Office 16
(i)Parties’ Positions 18
(ii)Analysis 20
C.Monitoring of Dr. Blackstock’s Public Appearances 21
(i)Parties’ Positions 22
(ii)Analysis 23
D.Monitoring of Facebook Pages 25
(i)Parties’ Positions 27
(ii)Analysis 29
E.Access to Dr. Blackstock’s Indian Registration Record 31
(i)Parties’ Positions 34
(ii)Analysis 35
IV.Decision and Remedy 41
I. Context
[1] The Complainants, the First Nations Child and Family Caring Society of Canada (Caring Society) and the Assembly of First Nations (AFN), have filed a human rights Complaint (the Complaint) against the Respondent, Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development Canada (AANDC), formerly known as Indian and Northern Affairs Canada (INAC), alleging that the inequitable funding of child welfare services on First Nations reserves amounts to discrimination on the basis of race and national ethnic origin, contrary to section 5 of the Canadian Human Rights Act, RCS 1985, c. H-6 (the CHRA or the Act). The Complaint was referred to the Canadian Human Rights Tribunal (the Tribunal) by the Canadian Human Rights Commission (the Commission) on October 14, 2008 and, on November 3, 2008, the Commission requested that the Tribunal institute an inquiry into the Complaint.
[2] On December 22, 2009, Dr. Cindy Blackstock, on behalf of the Caring Society, served a notice of motion to amend the Complaint to include allegations of retaliation, contrary to section 14.1 of the Act (the motion to amend the Complaint). The Tribunal granted the motion in a ruling dated October 16, 2012 (2012 CHRT 24), finding that the allegations of retaliation emanated from the same factual matrix as the initial Complaint and that the fair administration of justice supported granting the amendment rather than creating an artificial separation of the allegations in multiple proceedings. The Tribunal held a hearing on the allegations of retaliation on February 28, 2013, March 1, 2013, July 15, 16, 17, 19, 22 and 24, 2013 and August 7, 2013, in Ottawa. For the purposes of the present decision, Dr. Blackstock’s name will be used when reffering to events involving herself and the Caring Society will be referenced as the Complainant. The evidence heard during this hearing, along with the parties’ subsequent written submissions, inform the present decision.
II. The Law on Retaliation
A. Overview of the Relevant Case Law
[3] Section 14.1 of the CHRA provides that it is a discriminatory practice for a person against whom a complaint has been filed, or any person acting on their behalf, to retaliate or threaten retaliation against the individual who filed the complaint or the alleged victim.
[4] As is the case with other discrimination complaints, the onus of establishing retaliation first rests on the complainant who must demonstrate a prima facie case. That is, the complainant must provide evidence which, if believed, is complete and sufficient to justify a verdict that the respondent retaliated against him or her (see Ont. Human Rights Comm. v. Simpsons-Sears, [1985] 2 SCR 536, at para. 28 [O’Malley]). Where a complaint is based on a prohibited ground of discrimination, complainants are required to show that they have a charateristic protected from discrimination under the CHRA, that they experienced an adverse impact and that the protected characteristic was a factor in the adverse impact (see Moore v. British Columbia (Education), 2012 SCC 61, at para. 33).
[5] Retaliation complaints, however, are not founded on a prohibited ground of dicrimination. Rather, it is a complainant’s previous human rights complaint that is substituted for the prohibited ground of discrimination. Therefore, to establish a prima facie case of retaliation, complainants are required to show that they previously filed a human rights complaint under the CHRA, that they experienced an adverse impact following the filing of their complaint and that the human rights complaint was a factor in the adverse impact. That said, there is some debate in the Tribunal’s jurisprudence as to how a complainant can establish that their human rights complaint was a factor in the adverse impact suffered.
[6] In Virk v. Bell Canada (2005 CHRT 2 [Virk]), the Tribunal stated: “[r]etaliation implies some form of willful conduct meant to harm or hurt the person who filed a human rights complaint for having filed the complaint” (Virk, at para. 156). According to this view, a complainant must show that the alleged retaliator knew of the existence of the complaint, acted in an inopportune way and that its actions were motivated by the filing of the complaint (see Virk, at para. 158). In some Tribunal cases, Virk has been interpreted as requiring the complainant to prove an intention to retaliate (see for example Malec, Malec, Kaltush, Ishpatao, Tettaut, Malec, Mestépapéo, Kaltush v. Conseil des Montagnais de Natashquan, 2010 CHRT 2; and Cassidy v. Canada Post Corporation & Raj Thambirajah, 2012 CHRT 29).
[7] Another approach was outlined in Entrop v. Imperial Oil Ltd. (No. 7), (1995), 23 C.H.R.R. D/213; aff'd (1998) O.A.C. 188 (Div. Ct.); varied on other grounds (2000), 50 O.R. 3(d) 18 (C.A.); and adopted by the Tribunal in Wong v. Royal Bank of Canada, 2001 CanLII 8499 (CHRT) [Wong]. Under this approach, to prove retaliation there only need be a link between the alleged act of retaliation and the enforcement of the complainant’s rights under the CHRA. While intent to retaliate would obviously establish this link, the complainant’s “reasonable perception” that the act is retaliatory could also establish this link.
[8] In applying the Wong approach, the reasonableness of the complainant’s perception is measured so as not to hold the respondent accountable for unreasonable anxiety or undue reaction by the complainant (see Wong, at para. 219). In this regard, where there is a history of conflict between the complainant and the respondent, it can be difficult to discern the reasonableness of the complainant’s perception of retliation. To assist in this analysis, in Bressette v. Kettle and Stony Point First Nation Band Council, 2004 CHRT 40, at paras. 48-61 [Bressette], the Tribunal adopted an approach whereby it first determined whether it could accept, on a prima facie basis, that the human rights complaint was at least one of the factors influencing the alleged differential treatment. If a prima facie case is established, then the respondent is asked to provide a reasonable explanation for the treatment.
[9] Similar to Virk, some provincial human rights Tribunals and Commissions require proof of intent, whether by direct evidence or by inference, to substantiate a retaliation complaint (see Walsh v. Mobil Oil Canada, 2008 ABCA 268; and Noble v. York University, 2010 HRTO 878). Others follow the Entrop, Wong and Bressette approach, relying on a complainant’s reasonable perception of retaliation (see Bissonnette v. School District No. 62 and Frizzell, 2006 BCHRT 447),or simply a connection between the human rights complaint and a subsequent adverse treatment (see Commission des droits de la personne et des droits de la jeunesse c. Ville de Nicolet, 2001 CanLII 88 (QC TDP)).
[10] The parties in this case have each argued that the Tribunal ought to prefer one of these two approaches. The Complainant suggests that the Wong approach currently prevails and that it is unnecessary for the Complainant to prove specific intent on the part of the Respondent; rather, the Complainant must show that Dr. Blackstock reasonably perceived the Respondent’s conduct to be in retaliation to the human rights Complaint. The Respondent, on the other hand, submits that, as stated by the Tribunal in Virk and Cassidy, there must be a conscious aspect to retaliation and that the Complainant must demonstrate that the Respondent knew of the Complaint and responded to it negatively by way of reprisal or other punitive conduct. However, both the Complainant and the Respondent argue that regardless of the approach the Tribunal adopts, the evidence of the present case supports their respective positions.
[11] In our view, the Wong and Bressette approach is the correct approach to analyzing complaints of retaliation. To require intent in order to establish retaliation places a higher burden to substantiate this discriminatory practice than any of the other ones outlined in the CHRA. This is not consistent with an interpretation of the CHRA or human rights legislation in general.
[12] The basic rule of statutory interpretation is that “the words of an Act are to be read in their entire context, in their grammatical and ordinary sense harmoniously with the scheme of the Act, the object of the Act, and the intention of Parliament” (Elmer Driedger, Construction of Statutes, 2nd ed. (Toronto: Butterworths, 1983), at p. 87; see also Rizzo & Rizzo Shoes Ltd. (Re), [1998] 1 SCR 27, at para. 21).
[13] The special nature of human rights legislation is also taken into account in its interpretation:
Human rights legislation is intended to give rise, amongst other things, to individual rights of vital importance, rights capable of enforcement, in the final analysis, in a court of law. I recognize that in the construction of such legislation the words of the Act must be given their plain meaning, but it is equally important that the rights enunciated be given their full recognition and effect. We should not search for ways and means to minimize those rights and to enfeeble their proper impact. Although it may seem commonplace, it may be wise to remind ourselves of the statutory guidance given by the federal Interpretation Act which asserts that statutes are deemed to be remedial and are thus to be given such fair, large and liberal interpretation as will best ensure that their objects are attained.
(CN v. Canada (Canadian Human Rights Commission), [1987] 1 SCR 1114, at p. 1134)
Similarly, in B. v. Ontario (Human Rights Commission), 2002 SCC 66, at para. 44, the Supreme Court reiterated:
More generally, this Court has repeatedly reiterated the view that human rights legislation has a unique quasi-constitutional nature and ought to be interpreted in a liberal and purposive manner in order to advance the broad policy considerations underlying it: see, for example, Gould v. Yukon Order of Pioneers, [1996] 1 S.C.R. 571, at para. 120; University of British Columbia v. Berg, [1993] 2 S.C.R. 353, at p. 370; Robichaud v. Canada (Treasury Board), [1987] 2 S.C.R. 84, at pp. 89-90; Insurance Corp. of British Columbia v. Heerspink, [1982] 2 S.C.R. 145, at pp. 157-58.
(B. v. Ontario (Human Rights Commission), 2002 SCC 66, at para. 44)
[14] To retaliate is to “respond to an injury, insult, assault, etc. in likemanner” (Canadian Oxford Dictionnary, 2d ed., s.v. “retaliate”). In French, the word “représailles” means “[r]endre le mal pour le mal” (Le Petit Robert 2013, s.v. “représailles”). While the grammatical or ordinary sense of the words “retaliate” or “représailles” assist in understanding the basic action at issue, these defintions are not totally transferrable to the scheme, object and intention of the CHRA.
[15] First, applying the above definitions literally in the context of the CHRA would amount to characterizing a human rights complaint as something that is wrong (injury, insult, assault, mal). This obviously does not fit with the purpose of the CHRA:
2. The purpose of this Act is to extend the laws in Canada to give effect…to the principle that all individuals should have an opportunity equal with other individuals to make for themselves the lives that they are able and wish to have and to have their needs accommodated, consistent with their duties and obligations as members of society, without being hindered in or prevented from doing so by discriminatory practices…
In filing complaints of discriminatory practices to protect this purpose, the public is exercising its “fundamental” or “quasi-constitutional” rights (see Battlefords and District Co-operative Ltd. v. Gibbs, [1996] 3 SCR 566, at p. 577). These rights, “…and the values it endeavours to buttress and protect, are, save their constitutional laws, more important than all other” (Insurance Corporation of British Columbia v. Heerspink, [1982] 2 SCR 145, at p.158). Therefore, the filing of complaints to protect human rights should not be viewed as a wrong, but as something noble, safe and fair.
[16] Second, while the definitions of the words retaliate and représailles imply some sort of conscious, intentional action on the part of the person retaliating, the same can also be said about the action of discriminating. In English, to discriminate means to “make a distinction, esp. unjustly and on the basis of race, age, sex, etc.” (Canadian Oxford Dictionnary, 2d ed., s.v. “discriminate”). In French, “discrimination” means “[t]raitement inégal et défavorable appliqué à certaines personnes (notamment en raison de leur origine, leur sexe, leur age, leurs croyances religieuses…) (Le Petit Robert 2013, s.v. “discrimination”). Despite these definitions of the action of discriminating, when the nature and purpose of human rights legislation is taken into account, the Supreme Court of Canada has found that proof of intent is not needed in order to substantiate a discrimination claim.
[17] In Robichaud v. Canada (Treasury Board), 1987 CanLII 73 (SCC), at para. 9 [Robichaud], the Supreme Court noted that the CHRA “…seeks “to give effect” to the principle of equal opportunity for individuals by eradicating discrimination.” That is, the CHRA is primarily aimed at eliminating discrimination, not punishing those who discrirmnate. In this regard, the Supreme Court went on to state:
Since the Act is essentially concerned with the removal of discrimination, as opposed to punishing anti‑social behaviour, it follows that the motives or intention of those who discriminate are not central to its concerns. Rather, the Act is directed to redressing socially undesirable conditions quite apart from the reasons for their existence.
(Robichaud, at para. 10)
[18] Similarly, in O’Malley, at paragraph 14, the Supreme Court stated:
To take the narrower view and hold that intent is a required element of discrimination under the Code would seem to me to place a virtually insuperable barrier in the way of a complainant seeking a remedy. It would be extremely difficult in most circumstances to prove motive, and motive would be easy to cloak in the formation of rules which, though imposing equal standards, could create, as in Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971), injustice and discrimination by the equal treatment of those who are unequal (Dennis v. United States, 339 U.S. 162 (1950), at p. 184). Furthermore, as I have endeavoured to show, we are dealing here with consequences of conduct rather than with punishment for misbehaviour. In other words, we are considering what are essentially civil remedies. The proof of intent, a necessary requirement in our approach to criminal and punitive legislation, should not be a governing factor in construing human rights legislation aimed at the elimination of discrimination. It is my view that the courts below were in error in finding an intent to discriminate to be a necessary element of proof.
[19] Pursuant to Robichaud and O’Malley, intent is not a necessary element of proof to establish a discriminatory practice under the CHRA. In this regard, we note the CHRA does not differentiate between discriminatory practices, including retaliation at section 14.1:
4. A discriminatory practice, as described in sections 5 to 14.1, may be the subject of a complaint under Part III and anyone found to be engaging or to have engaged in a discriminatory practice may be made subject to an order as provided in section 53.
39. For the purposes of this Part, a “discriminatory practice” means any practice that is a discriminatory practice within the meaning of sections 5 to 14.1.
[20] There is also no requirement of intent specifically mentioned in section 14.1:
14.1 It is a discriminatory practice for a person against whom a complaint has been filed under Part III, or any person acting on their behalf, to retaliate or threaten retaliation against the individual who filed the complaint or the alleged victim.
[21] The concept of intent only arises in the CHRA when a complaint has been substantiated, as something to consider in making an order under section 53:
53. (3) In addition to any order under subsection (2), the member or panel may order the person to pay such compensation not exceeding twenty thousand dollars to the victim as the member or panel may determine if the member or panel finds that the person is engaging or has engaged in the discriminatory practice wilfully or recklessly.
[22] The analysis adopted by Tribunal members under 53(3) and the corresponding awards or lack thereof may be indicative of this higher threshold present in the requirement of intent.
The Federal Court has interpreted this section as being a “…punitive provision intended to provide a deterrent and discourage those who deliberately discriminate” (Canada (Attorney General) v. Johnstone, 2013 FC 113, at para. 155, aff’d 2014 FCA 110 [Johnstone FC]). A finding of wilfulness requires “…the discriminatory act and the infringement of the person’s rights under the Act is intentional” (Johnstone FC, at para. 155). Recklessness involves “…acts that disregard or show indifference for the consequences such that the conduct is done wantonly or heedlessly” (Johnstone FC, at para. 155). The Tribunal has not often made awards in the higher range of this section, which may be indicative of the application of the requirement for intent. Interestingly, in Bressette, the Tribunal substantiated the retaliation complaint, but it did not award any amount under section 53(3) of the CHRA.
[23] Furthermore, the Federal Court of Appeal recently stated: “[t]here should be no hierarchies of human rights” (Canada (Attorney General) v. Johnstone, 2014 FCA 110, at para. 81 [Johnstone FCA]). In determing that the prohibited ground of family status should not entail a higher threshold for a finding of prima facie discrimination than for the other prohibited grounds set out in the CHRA, the Court stated:
We agree that the test that should apply to a finding of prima facie discrimination on the prohibited ground of family status should be substantially the same as that which applies to the other enumerated grounds of discrimination.
(Johnstone FCA, at para. 81)
[24] The same reasoning can be applied to section 14.1 of the CHRA. While retaliation does not entail the application of a prohibited ground of discrimination, it employs a complaint of discrimination in its place. Pursuant to Johnstone FCA, the prima facie test for section 14.1 should be substantially the same as those for the other discriminatory practices. As mentioned above, none of the other discriminatory practices require a complainant to establish intent.
[25] This interpretation is also consistent with the important policy considerations underlying section 14.1. A prohibition on retaliation for having filed a complaint safeguards the integrity of the CHRA complaint process by providing protection for complainants who may be hesitant to exercise their rights under the CHRA for fear of reprisal. It also provides an assurance that, if reprisal is taken against them as a result of the filing of a complaint, redress will be provided. This section may also serve to deter those who might retaliate.
[26] Requiring intent to establish retaliation may defeat the purposes of section 14.1, because, as the Tribunal has stated many times: “[d]iscrimination is not a practise which one would expect to see displayed overtly” (Basi v. Canadian National Railway, 1988 CanLII 108 (CHRT)). Therefore, a requirement to establish intent would make it very hard to ever substantiate a retaliation complaint.
[27] In fact, prior to the inclusion of section 14.1, retaliation was only covered under sections 59 and 60 of CHRA. Those sections make it a summary conviction offence to threaten, intimidate or discriminate against an individual because they have made a complaint under the CHRA. Prior to the adoption of section 14.1 in 1998, there had been few retaliation prosecutions, and those launched had generally been unsucessful. That was because it was difficult to meet the criminal requirements needed to secure a conviction in those cases: proof beyond a reasonable doubt that action was taken against a complainant with the intent to force the abandonment of his or her human rights complaint. As a result, Parliament decided the anti-discrimination system created by the CHRA would be better suited than the criminal courts to deal with retaliation cases (see Parliament of Canada, Legislative Summary-298E, Bill S-5: An Act to Amend the Canada Evidence Act, the Criminal Code, and the Canadian Human Rights Act by Nancy Holmes (Law and Governance Division, 1998), at C3, online: Parliament of Canada http://www.parl.gc.ca/About/Parliament/LegislativeSummaries/bills_ls.asp?lang=E&ls=S5&Parl=36&Ses=1).
[28] For these reasons, we do not believe a complainant should be required to show proof of intent to substantiate a retaliation claim under the CHRA. In our view, the central purpose of the CHRA is “…to eradicate anti-social conditions without regard to the motives or intention of those who cause them” (Robichaud, at para. 11). To require a complainant to prove intent in order to substantiate a retaliation complaint minimizes the protection against retaliation under the CHRA and enfeebles the proper impact of having included section 14.1 in the CHRA.
[29] That said, while a complainant does not have to prove intent to substantiate a retaliation complaint, he or she must still present sufficient evidence to justify that his or her human rights complaint was a factor in any alleged adverse treatment he or she received from a respondent following the filing of his or her complaint, whether based on a reasonable perception thereof or otherwise. In this regard, we note that a prima facie case does not require a party to adduce any particular type of evidence. Rather, in each case, it is a question of mixed fact and law whether the evidence adduced is sufficient to establish a prima facie case of retaliation (see Canada (Canadian Human Rights Commission) v. Canada (Attorney General), 2005 FCA 154, at para. 27). If sufficient evidence is presented to establish a prima facie case of retaliation, it is then the Tribunal’s role to consider the complainant’s evidence, alongside any evidence presented by the respondent, to determine whether it is more probable than not that retaliation has occurred.
[30] It is with this in mind that we now turn to examine the facts specific to the present case.
III. The Retaliation Complaint
[31] The Complainant argues that prior to the filing of the 2007 human rights Complaint against the Respondent, Dr. Blackstock and the Caring Society had strong collaborative ties with the Respondent. Following the 2000 National Policy Review, which examined the funding formula used by the Government of Canada to fund First Nations child and family services on reserve (known as Directive 20-1), the Respondent commissioned the Caring Society to engage a team of experts to identify at least three funding formula alternatives for First Nations child and family service agencies. The Complainant argues that in the course of this research and the resulting three reports (known as the Wen:De Reports), the parties worked in a concerted manner. However, once the Complaint was filed, there was a noticeable shift in the Respondent’s attitude towards the Complainant, which the Complainant argues was unquestionably motivated by the human rights Complaint.
[32] The Respondent, for its part, recognizes that AANDC engages many organizations, like the Caring Society, and experts for their expertise in the field of child welfare funding on Indian Reserves in Canada. In fact, AANDC also engages provincial governments and numerous international organizations on related issues. While the Respondent and the Caring Society admittedly possessed a working relationship for a number of years, this relationship changed in 2006, upon the completion of the Wen:De report and its presentation. However, this change in the relationship pre-dates the filing of the Complaint. The Respondent takes the position that Dr. Blackstock’s perception that the Respondent retaliated against her as a result of her filing of her human rights Complaint is unfounded and unreasonable.
[33] The Retaliation Complaint is grounded in a series of specific incidents where it is alleged the Respondent took actions of a retaliatory nature. Dr. Blackstock, on behalf of the Caring Society (Complainant), alleges that the following incidents occurred due to her filing of the Complaint: (A.) she was not hired by the Respondent as a casual employee on a working group, despite her qualifications (The British Columbia Working Group); (B.) she was excluded from a meeting with the Minister and the Chiefs of Ontario (Chiefs of Ontario Meeting at the Minister’s Office); (C.) the Respondent monitored her public appearances (Monitoring of Complainant’s Public Appearances); (D.) the Respondent monitored the Caring Society’s and “I am a Witness” campaign Facebook pages as well as her personal Facebook page (Monitoring of Facebook Pages); and (E.) the Respondent inappropriately accessed her Indian Registrar Record on two occasions (Access to the Complainant’s Indian Registrar Record).
[34] The present decision will examine each of these alleged incidents in turn.
A. The British Columbia Working Group
[35] In 2008, the Respondent formed a Working Group in British Columbia with First Nations organizations to develop and implement a new Enhanced Funding Formula for the province for the funding of First Nations child welfare services. The Working Group grew out of the Partnership Table, a group comprised of representatives from B.C. First Nations agencies, B.C. Ministry for Children representatives and Federal representatives from the AANDC B.C. Region, which met approximately four times a year.
[36] At one of the Partnership Table meetings, an AANDC official from the Alberta Child and Family Services office presented Alberta’s funding model, which was described as a renovated Directive 20-1 formula. Following these discussions, the group decided that they would use the Alberta funding model as the basis for a “made-in-B.C.” approach, which would be tailored to meet the needs of B.C. First Nations and reflect requirements of B.C. legislation.
[37] This led to the formation of the Working Group, a tripartite process which was composed of representatives from the B.C. First Nations agencies, the B.C. provincial government and from AANDC Headquarters. The AANDC Child and Family Services B.C. Regional office provided funding to hire a casual employee to manage the process and help develop the document that the Working Group would produce. This employee was to attend the meetings, prepare drafts, manage the input of the Working Group members, write briefing notes to AANDC senior management and develop communications pieces for the use of the agencies so as to enable them to explain the model to their various Chiefs, councils and communities.
[38] During one of the Working Group’s preliminary meetings, Mary Teegee, from the Carrier Sekani Family Services in Prince George, B.C., suggested to the Working Group that Dr. Blackstock should be retained for this position, in light of her background and expertise in the area of child welfare in B.C.. Linda Stiller, who at the time managed the AANDC Child and Family program in the B.C. region, rejected the idea, allegedly because Dr. Blackstock had been openly quite critical of the new Alberta funding model which B.C. was planning on following. The Working Group chose instead to hire someone named Jeffrey Lyons, who had previously worked in the AANDC Manitoba Region as a social worker and had been involved in the national review of Directive 20-1 as an AANDC Headquarters representative.
[39] The Working Group continued to meet over a period of nine to twelve months to establish the B.C. funding model and prepared a document entitled “Enhanced Prevention Services Model for B.C. Advisory and Steering Committee workshop.” According to Ms. Stiller, the BC funding model was approved by the members of the Partnership Table, as well as by the Board of Directors of all the B.C. child welfare agencies, but was never adopted by the Federal Government.
(i) Parties’ positions
[40] The Complainant argues that the Respondent’s opposition to the Working Group retaining Dr. Blackstock as a consultant was grounded in the filing of the Complaint. Dr. Blackstock testified that Mary Teegee informed her that, in addition to refusing to hire for the consultant position, the Working Group had taken the view that they would not have discussions if Dr. Blackstock participated.
[41] In the Complainant’s view, the explanation given by Linda Stiller, the Respondent’s witness, for the refusal to hire Dr. Blackstock, namely that she had been critical of the new Alberta funding model, is pretextual. Ms. Stiller admitted that she did not know Dr. Blackstock’s specific criticisms and did not contact her to discuss her views on the Alberta funding model; the views that the Complainant argues are also supported by the Auditor General of Canada’s 2008 report. Ms. Stiller also acknowledged that the Complaint was regularly discussed in her meetings with AANDC National Headquarters. Combined with the fact that the consultant hired by the Working Group was from out of province and lacked Dr. Blackstock’s credentials and specific knowledge of B.C., the Complainant argues that the decision not to hire Dr. Blackstock, whose expertise in child welfare in B.C. is well known and respected, was based on her filing of the Complaint.
[42] The Respondent argues that its witness, Ms. Stiller, provided a clear explanation as to why Dr. Blackstock was not considered an appropriate choice for the casual employee position with the Working Group. The employee hired was to “hold the pen” for the Working Group and undertake the drafting of the group’s work, as well as provide internal support and develop communication documents explaining the chosen model to Chiefs, councils and communities. The B.C. Working Group had planned to use the Alberta model as a basis for its own B.C. approach and tailor it to meet the needs of the B.C. First Nations and reflect the requirements of the provincial legislation. Given the Complainant’s vocal and public criticisms of the Alberta model and her view that the Wen:De approach would have been more appropriate, Ms. Stiller testified that she felt the Dr. Blackstock would have a conflict of interest as she did not support the model which was to constitute the foundation of the Working Group’s approach. Ms. Stiller testified that contrary to the Dr. Blackstock contentions, Mr. Lyons possessed specific knowledge of B.C. and had worked on several contracts for the B.C. provincial ministry as well as for a number of B.C. First Nations agencies.
[43] The Respondent argues that the decision to hire Mr. Lyons instead of the Dr. Blackstock was not retaliatory and that Dr. Blackstock’s perception in this regard is not reasonable. While Ms. Stiller acknowledged that she was aware of Dr. Blackstock’s and the Complainant’s human rights Complaint, she expressed that this was not a relevant factor in her decision.
(ii) Analysis
[44] Dr. Blackstock has an undeniable expertise in the area of focus of the Working Group. Combined with the fact that these events occurred soon after the filing of her human rights Complaint, the Tribunal finds that in the absence of an explanation by the Respondent, the Complainant has provided sufficient evidence to demonstrate that the Respondent’s objection to hiring Dr. Blackstock for the position was retaliatory. As such, on a prima facie basis, the Complainant has demonstrated that Dr. Blackstock was adversely differentiated in this regard.
[45] However, the Respondent has provided an explanation for this differentiation. Respondent witness Linda Stiller was credible and the Tribunal accepts her evidence that she did not prevent the Dr. Blackstock from attending the Working Group meetings generally, but objected to hiring her to help develop the document that the Working Group was to produce.
[46] The Tribunal also accepts the explanation provided for this objection, namely that Dr. Blackstock’s publicly expressed negative views with regard to the Alberta child welfare funding model were in direct conflict with the objective that the Working Group was trying to achieve. Dr. Blackstock was supportive of the Wen:De report, which advocates for a large investment of funds across the country, whereas according to Ms. Stiller’s evidence, the Alberta model worked with the provinces’ current levels of spending and attempted to improve the delivery of services by the on-reserve agencies to the level of the province with these existing funds.
[47] It is reasonable, in a hiring decision such as this one, for the Respondent to refuse to hire an individual that has previously expressed views indicating the presence of a conflict of interest with the work that would be undertaken. We found nothing in this evidence which could indicate that the Respondent’s explanation is pretextual. While it is true that Ms. Stiller mentioned that, at the time, she may have been aware of the existence of the Complaint, she also pointed out that, as a regional manager, she had no involvement in these types of matters. The Tribunal finds that, in light of the credibility of the explanation provided for the adverse differentiation, Ms. Stiller’s awareness of the Complaint alone is insufficient to conclude that it was a factor in her decision.
[48] For these reasons, the Tribunal finds that this particular series of events does not demonstrate that the Respondent retaliated against the Complainant.
B. Chiefs of Ontario Meeting at the Minister’s Office
[49] On December 9, 2009, Dr. Blackstock was invited by the Chiefs of Ontario to attend a meeting with David McArthur, a special assistant to the Honourable Chuck Strahl, Minister of AANDC (at the time known as INAC). The meeting was convened on short notice, as many of the Chiefs were in Ottawa to attend a meeting with the AFN. The goal of the meeting was to discuss issues surrounding child welfare policy and funding in Ontario and was scheduled to take place in the offices of the Minister in Gatineau, Quebec. Dr. Blackstock testified that Grand Chief Randall Phillips, from the Allied Iroquois and Algonquin Nation, invited her to attend, in light of her expertise in this area. She was one of several individuals who had been invited by the Chiefs of Ontario to attend the meeting as a technical aid.
[50] Upon arrival at the Minister’s office building, Dr. Blackstock, along with the 10 to 14 other individuals accompanying Grand Chief Phillips, proceeded through security and took the elevator to the floor of the Minister’s office. There, they sat and waited in the reception area, outside of the meeting room. Mr. McArthur appeared and following a brief discussion with Grand Chief Phillips regarding the number of delegates, proceeded to allow the delegates to enter the meeting room one by one, greeting them individually as they went in.
[51] When it was Dr. Blackstock’s turn to enter the room, Mr. McArthur asked her to identify herself. When she did, he blocked access to the room, stating “[w]ell, we’ll meet with you at another time, …I understand that you have a number of issues, and we’ll meet with you at another time” (see StenoTran Services Inc.’s transcript of February 28, 2013, vol. 4, at p. 16, lines 8-11). Dr. Blackstock clarified that she was not there to discuss the Complaint and that she was attending the meeting as a technical advisor for the Chiefs of Ontario.
[52] Grand Chief Phillips intervened in support of Dr. Blackstock confirming her role as a technical advisor. After some back and forth between them, Mr. McArthur said to Grand Chief Phillips: “‘Chief’, he said, ‘[i]f she comes in, there’s no meeting. It’s as simple as that’” (see StenoTran Services Inc.’s transcript of July 15, 2013, vol. 13, at page 80, lines 19-20). Grand Chief Phillips therefore yielded to Mr. McArthur’s request and entered the meeting room, leaving Dr. Blackstock in the waiting area. As the meeting started, she remained there alone for 10 to 15 minutes, under the watch of a security guard. Dr. Blackstock testified she left before the meeting concluded. Grand Chief Phillips and Mr. McArthur both testified that, in the end, the meeting had been fruitful for both parties.
[53] Following the meeting, in a letter dated December 15, 2009, Dr. Blackstock wrote to Minister Strahl requesting an explanation for her exclusion from the meeting. She added that “[t]he only reasonable explanation is that I am involved in the filing of a Human Rights complaint against INAC” (see StenoTran Services Inc.’s transcript of July 17, 2013, vol. 15, at page 66, lines 7-11). She received a letter in response on January 29, 2010, signed by Laurie Throness, Minister Strahl’s Chief of Staff. The letter explained that Dr. Blackstock was excluded from the meeting as she was not originally listed as one of the participants and that the Minister’s office had a practice of obtaining briefings prior to any meetings, something which had not been done for Dr. Blackstock. The letter stated that, as a result, Mr. McArthur felt that meeting with her at that time would not have been appropriate. Mr. Throness reminded Dr. Blackstock that Mr. McArthur had expressed that he was, however, willing to meet with her on a separate occasion and reiterated this offer in the letter. Dr. Blackstock never availed herself of this offer.
(i) Parties’ Positions
[54] The Complainant argues that Dr. Blackstock’s exclusion from the meeting was based on her filing of the Complaint and constitutes retaliation. As Grand Chief Phillips testified, Dr. Blackstock was present as a technical aid to him, in light of her knowledge on statistics and funding levels and both he and Dr. Blackstock clearly indicated to Mr. McArthur that she was not there to discuss the Complaint.
[55] The Complainant rejects the Respondent’s explanation for excluding Dr. Blackstock, which is that she was not on the list of invitees and because Mr. McArthur had not received a prior briefing on her. Dr