R v Lifchus

Lifchus sets out the model jury charge on reasonable doubt. The standard is closer to absolute certainty than to a balance of probabilities; it is not based on sympathy or prejudice; it is logically connected to the evidence or absence of evidence.

Lifchus, a stockbroker, was convicted of fraud. The trial judge instructed the jury that "reasonable doubt" carries its ordinary meaning. Defence appealed.

How should "reasonable doubt" be explained to a jury?

New trial ordered. The ordinary-meaning instruction was insufficient.

The jury must be instructed that the burden remains on the Crown throughout; that the standard is much closer to absolute certainty than to proof on a balance of probabilities; that doubt must be based on reason and common sense, logically connected to the evidence or absence of evidence; that proof beyond a reasonable doubt does not require proof to an absolute certainty or proof beyond any doubt; and that the jury may not convict if merely thinking the accused is "probably" or "likely" guilty.

Cory J held that the term "reasonable doubt" has a specific meaning in law that is not coextensive with its ordinary usage. Without proper instruction, jurors may apply the civil balance-of-probabilities standard or, conversely, demand certainty. The model charge guards against both errors.

Required reading for every Canadian trial judge. The model charge anchors all reasonable-doubt instructions. Lifchus + W(D) together form the spine of jury instruction on burden of proof.

R v Lifchus, [1997] 3 SCR 320, 1997 CanLII 319 (SCC).

Lamer CJ, La Forest J, L'Heureux-Dubé J, Sopinka J, Gonthier J, Cory J, McLachlin J, Iacobucci J, Major J