First Nations Child and Family Caring Society of Canada et al. v. Attorney General of Canada (for the Minister of Indian and Northern Affairs Canada)

First Nations Child and Family Caring Society of Canada et al. v. Attorney General of Canada (for the Minister of Indian and Northern Affairs Canada)
Collection
Canadian Human Rights Tribunal
Date
2016-01-26
Neutral citation
2016 CHRT 2
File number(s)
T1340/7008
Decision-maker(s)
Marchildon, Sophie; Lustig, Edward P.
Decision type
Decision
Grounds
National or Ethnic Origin
Race
Decision Content
Canadian Human Rights Tribunal
Tribunal canadien des droits de la personne
Citation: 2016 CHRT
2
Date:
January 26, 2016
File No.:
T1340/7008
Between:
First Nations Child and Family Caring Society of Canada
- and -
Assembly of First Nations
Complainants
- and -
Canadian Human Rights Commission
Commission
- and -
Attorney General of Canada
(Representing the Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Development Canada)
Respondent
- and -
Chiefs of Ontario
- and -
Amnesty International
Interested Parties
Decision
Members: Sophie Marchildon and Edward Lustig
Table of Contents
I.Acknowledgement 1
II.Complaint and background 1
III.Parties 3
IV.The hearing, disclosure and admissibility of documents 4
V.Analysis 6
A.AANDC is involved in the provision of child and family services to First Nations on reserves and in the Yukon 8
i.Meaning of “service” under section 5 of the CHRA 8
ii.Evidence indicating AANDC provides a “service” 9
a.Jurisdiction of the CHRA over the activities of AANDC 10
b.Funding can constitute a service 11
c.The “assistance” or “benefit” provided by AANDC 13
d.First Nations children and families are extended the “assistance” or “benefit” by AANDC 18
e.Section 91(24) of the Constitution Act, 1867 24
f.The Crown’s fiduciary relationship with Aboriginal peoples 28
iii.Summary of findings 35
B.First Nations are adversely impacted by the services provided by AANDC and, in some cases, denied services as a result of AANDC’s involvement 37
i.General child welfare principles 37
ii.The allocation of funding for First Nations child and family services 39
a.The FNCFS Program 39
b.Reports on the FNCFS Program 48
c.1965 Agreement in Ontario 76
d.Other provincial/territorial agreements 85
iii.AANDC’s position on the evidence 87
a.The relevance and reliability of the studies on the FNCFS Program 87
b.The choices of FNCFS Agencies and additional funding provided 107
c.Comparator evidence 112
iv.Best interest of the child and Jordan’s Principle 122
v.Summary of findings 138
C.Race and/or national or ethnic origin is a factor in the adverse impacts or denials 142
i.Substantive equality 143
ii.Impact of the Residential Schools system 145
a.History of Residential Schools 145
b.Transformation of Residential Schools into an aspect of the child welfare system 148
c.Intergenerational trauma of Residential Schools 148
iii.Canada’s international commitments to children and Indigenous peoples 152
VI.Complaint substantiated 160
VII.Order 164
A.Findings of discrimination 165
B.Cease the discriminatory practice and take measures to redress and prevent it 166
C.Compensation 168
D.Costs for obstruction of process 170
E.Retention of jurisdiction 170
VIII.Annex: exhibit references 172
À la douce mémoire de Réjean Bélanger
In loving memory of Réjean Bélanger
I. Acknowledgement
[1] This decision concerns children. More precisely, it is about how the past and current child welfare practices in First Nations communities on reserves, across Canada, have impacted and continue to impact First Nations children, their families and their communities.
[2] These proceedings included extensive evidence on the history of Indian Residential Schools and the experiences of those who attended or were affected by them. The Tribunal also heard heartfelt testimony from someone who attended and was directly impacted by attending a residential school. At the outset of these reasons, the Panel Members (the Panel) believe it important to acknowledge the suffering of all residential school survivors, their families and communities. We recognize the courage of those who have spoken about their experiences over the years and before this Tribunal. We also wish to honour the memory and lives of the many children who died, and all who were harmed, while attending these schools, along with their families and communities. We wish healing and recognition for all Aboriginal peoples across Canada for the individual and collective trauma endured as a result of the Indian Residential Schools system.
II. Complaint and background
[3] Child welfare services, or child and family services, are services designed to protect children and encourage family stability. The main aim of these services is to safeguard children from abuse and neglect (see Annex, ex. 1 s.v. “child welfare”). Hence the best interest of the child is a paramount principle in the provision of these services and is a principle recognized in international and Canadian law. This principle is meant to guide and inform decisions that impact all children, including First Nations children.
[4] Each province and territory has its own child and family services legislation and standards and provides those services within its jurisdiction. However, the provision of child and family services to First Nations on reserves and in the Yukon is unique and is the subject of this decision.
[5] At issue are the activities of Indian and Northern Affairs Canada (INAC), known at the time of the hearing as Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development Canada (AANDC), in managing the First Nations Child and Family Services Program (the FNCFS Program), its corresponding funding formulas and a handful of other related provincial and territorial agreements that provide for child and family services to First Nations living on reserve and in the Yukon Territory. Pursuant to the FNCFS Program and other agreements, child and family services are provided to First Nations on-reserve and in the Yukon by First Nations Child and Family Services Agencies (FNCFS Agencies) or by the province/territory in which the community is located. In either situation, the child and family services legislation of the province/territory in which the First Nation is located applies. AANDC funds the child and family services provided to First Nations by FNCFS Agencies or the province/territory.
[6] Pursuant to section 5 of the Canadian Human Rights Act (the CHRA), the Complainants, the First Nations Child and Family Caring Society of Canada (the Caring Society) and the Assembly of First Nations (the AFN), allege AANDC discriminates in providing child and family services to First Nations on reserve and in the Yukon, on the basis of race and/or national or ethnic origin, by providing inequitable and insufficient funding for those services (the Complaint). On October 14, 2008, the Canadian Human Rights Commission (the Commission) referred the Complaint to this Tribunal for an inquiry.
[7] In a decision dated March 14, 2011 (2011 CHRT 4), the Tribunal granted a motion brought by AANDC for the dismissal of the Complaint on the ground that the issues raised were beyond the Tribunal’s jurisdiction (the jurisdictional motion). That decision was subsequently the subject of an application for judicial review before the Federal Court of Canada.
[8] On April 18, 2012, the Federal Court rendered its decision, Canada (Human Rights Commission) v. Canada (Attorney General), 2012 FC 445 (Caring Society FC), setting aside the Tribunal’s decision on the jurisdictional motion. The Federal Court remitted the matter to a differently constituted panel of the Tribunal for redetermination in accordance with its reasons. The Respondent’s appeal of that decision was dismissed by the Federal Court of Appeal in Canada (Attorney General) v. Canadian Human Rights Commission, 2013 FCA 75 (Caring Society FCA).
[9] A new panel, composed of Sophie Marchildon, as Panel Chairperson, and members Réjean Bélanger and Edward Lustig, was appointed to re-determine this matter (see 2012 CHRT 16). It dismissed the Respondent’s motion to have the jurisdictional motion re-heard, and ruled the Complaint would be dealt with on its merits (see 2012 CHRT 17).
[10] The Complaint was subsequently amended to add allegations of retaliation (see 2012 CHRT 24). In early June 2015, the Panel found the allegations of retaliation to be substantiated in part (see 2015 CHRT 14).
[11] The present decision deals with the merits of the Complaint. During deliberations our friend and colleague, Tribunal Member Réjean Bélanger, passed away. Despite his valued contributions to the hearing and consideration of this matter, he sadly was not able to see the final result of his work. While this decision is signed on behalf of the remaining Members of the Panel, we dedicate it in his honour and memory.
III. Parties
[12] The Caring Society is a non-profit organization committed to research, policy development and advocacy on behalf of First Nations agencies that serve the well-being of children, youth and families. The AFN is a national advocacy organization that works on behalf of over 600 First Nations on issues such as Treaty and Aboriginal rights, education, housing, health, child welfare and social development. The Commission, in appearing before the Tribunal at a hearing, represents the public interest (see section 51 of the CHRA). AANDC is the federal government department primarily responsible for meeting the Government of Canada’s obligations and commitments to Aboriginal peoples.
[13] Additionally, two organizations were granted “Interested Party” status for these proceedings: Amnesty International and the Chiefs of Ontario (COO). Amnesty International is an international non-governmental organization committed to the advancement of human rights across the globe. It was granted interested party status to assist the Tribunal in understanding the relevance of Canada’s international human rights obligations to the Complaint. The COO is a non-profit organization representing the 133 First Nations in the Province of Ontario. It was granted interested party status to speak to the particularities of on-reserve child welfare services in Ontario.
IV. The hearing, disclosure and admissibility of documents
[14] The hearing of the Complaint spanned 72 days from February 2013 to October 2014. Throughout the hearing, documentary disclosure and the admissibility of certain documents as evidence became an issue.
[15] All arguably relevant documents were not disclosed prior to the commencement of the hearing. Despite agreeing to complete its disclosure prior to the start of the hearing, and subsequently confirming that it had, AANDC knew of the existence of a number of arguably relevant documents in the summer of 2012 and yet failed to disclose them prior to the hearing. Only after the completion of an Access to Information Act request made by the Caring Society, and shortly before the third week of hearings, did AANDC inform the parties and the Tribunal of the existence of over 50,000 additional documents and an unspecified number of emails, which were potentially relevant to the Complaint, but had yet to be disclosed. As a result, the Tribunal vacated hearing dates in June 2013, re-arranged the proceedings to hear the allegations of retaliation in July and August 2013, and, following a deadline for AANDC to complete its disclosure by August 31, 2013, resumed the hearing on the merits on dates from August 2013 to January 2014 (see 2013 CHRT 16).
[16] Following the disclosure of over 100,000 additional documents by AANDC, the hearing resumed. However, AANDC did not complete the disclosure of all arguably relevant documents until August 2014 due to an objection under section 37(1) of the Canada Evidence Act. Specifically, certain documents were characterized as being subject to Cabinet confidence privilege. All the parties agreed to have the Clerk of the Privy Council review the documents to determine if the privilege applied. This review process was completed fairly quickly once the Clerk was provided with the documents.
[17] An issue arose as to how the 100,000 additional documents could be admitted into evidence. The Caring Society requested an order that any additionally disclosed documents upon which it wished to rely be admitted as evidence for the truth of their contents, regardless of whether or not the author or recipient of the document was called as a witness, and whether or not they were put to any other witness. For reasons outlined in 2014 CHRT 2, the Panel ruled as follows:
a. Rule 9(4) of the Tribunal’s Rules of Procedure will continue to apply. As such, documents will continue to be admitted into evidence, on a case-by case basis, once they are introduced during the hearing and accepted by the Panel;
b. There will be no need to call witnesses for the sole purpose of authenticating documentary evidence. Any issues raised relating to authentication will be considered by the Panel at the weighing stage;
c. For the purposes of Rule 9(4), a document has not been fully “introduced” at the hearing until counsel or a witness for the party tendering it has indicated:
i. which portions of the document are being relied upon; and
ii. how these portions of the document relate to an issue in the case.
d. Should a party wish to rely on evidence during its final argument that was not introduced according to the procedure above (either prior to or subsequent to this order), appropriate curative measures may be taken by the Panel, and in particular, the opposing party may be allotted additional time to adequately prepare a response, including calling additional witnesses and bringing forward additional documentary evidence, in accordance with the principles of procedural fairness. This may result in an adjournment of the proceedings.
[18] Following the completion of the hearing, further issues arose as to which documents ought to form part of the record before the Tribunal. AANDC raised concerns regarding the admissibility of documents relied on by counsel for the Complainants and Commission, but not referred to orally during the hearing. In 2015 CHRT 1, the Panel ordered:
Documents listed in Appendix B of the Commission’s December 1, 2014 letter (including Documents Referred to Only in Final Written Submissions (which were Adopted Orally) found at page 9) will be considered as forming part of the evidentiary record. The Respondent will be granted an opportunity to respond to the Complainant’s documents listed in Appendix B and supporting submissions with the exception of tab-66. Should the Respondent decide to benefit from this opportunity, the Respondent is to advise the parties and the Tribunal of its intention and form of response by no later than January 21, 2015, following which the Respondent will have until February 4, 2015 to file its response.
[19] In response to the Panel’s order, AANDC provided written representations with respect to the documents at issue. According to AANDC, the Panel should place little, if any, weight on those documents in determining the merits of the Complaint. It also provided a chart summarizing its position on each of the documents.
[20] AANDC’s submissions on the documents subject to the Panel’s order in 2015 CHRT 1, along with its other submissions regarding the weight to ascribe to the evidence in this matter, have been taken into consideration by the Panel, together with the submissions of the other parties, in making the findings that follow.
V. Analysis
[21] As mentioned above, the present Complaint alleges the provision of child and family services in on-reserve First Nations communities and in the Yukon is discriminatory. Namely that there is inequitable and insufficient funding for those services by AANDC. In this regard, the Complainants have the burden of proof of establishing a prima facie case of discrimination. A prima facie case is “...one which covers the allegations made and which, if they are believed, is complete and sufficient to justify a verdict in the complainant’s favour in the absence of an answer from the respondent” (see Ont. Human Rights Comm. v. Simpsons-Sears, 1985 CanLII 18 (SCC) at para. 28).
[22] In the context of this Complaint, under section 5 of the CHRA, the Complainants must demonstrate (1) that First Nations have a characteristic or characteristics protected from discrimination; (2) that they are denied services, or adversely impacted by the provision of services, by AANDC; and, (3) that the protected characteristic or characteristics are a factor in the adverse impact or denial (see Moore v. British Columbia (Education), 2012 SCC 61 at para. 33 [Moore]).
[23] The first element is relatively simple in this case: race and national or ethnic origin are prohibited grounds of discrimination under section 3 of the CHRA. There was no dispute that First Nations possess these characteristics.
[24] The second element requires the Complainants to establish that AANDC is actually involved in the provision of a “service” as contemplated by section 5 of the CHRA; and, if so, to demonstrate that First Nations are denied services or adversely impacted by AANDC’s involvement in the provision of those services.
[25] For the third element, the Complainants have to establish a connection between elements one and two. A “causal connection” is not required as there may be many different reasons for a respondent’s acts. That is, it is not necessary that a prohibited ground or grounds be the sole reason for the actions in issue for a complaint to succeed. It is sufficient that a prohibited ground or grounds be one of the factors in the actions in issue (see Holden v. Canadian National Railway Co., (1991) 14 C.H.R.R. D/12 (F.C.A.) at para. 7; and, Quebec (Commission des droits de la personne et des droits de la jeunesse) v. Bombardier Inc. (Bombardier Aerospace Training Center), 2015 SCC 39 at paras. 44-52 [Bombardier]).
[26] In this regard, it should be kept in mind that discrimination is not usually practiced overtly or even intentionally. Consequently, direct evidence of discrimination or proof of intent is not required to establish a discriminatory practice under the CHRA (see Basi v. Canadian National Railway, 1988 CanLII 108 (CHRT); and; Bombardier at paras. 40-41).
[27] In response to the Complaint, AANDC led its own evidence and arguments to refute the Complainants’ claim of discrimination. It did not raise a statutory exception under sections 15 or 16 of the CHRA. Therefore, the Tribunal’s task is to consider all the evidence and argument presented by the parties to determine if the Complainants have proven the three elements of a discriminatory practice on a balance of probabilities (see Bombardier at paras. 56 and 64; see also Peel Law Association v. Pieters, 2013 ONCA 396 at paras. 80-90).
[28] It is through this lens, and with these principles in mind, that the Panel examined the evidence and arguments advanced by the parties in this case. For the reasons that follow, the Panel finds AANDC is involved in the provision of child and family services to First Nations on reserves and in the Yukon; that First Nations are adversely impacted by the provision of those services by AANDC, and, in some cases, denied those services as a result of AANDC’s involvement; and; that race and/or national or ethnic origin are a factor in those adverse impacts or denial.
A. AANDC is involved in the provision of child and family services to First Nations on reserves and in the Yukon
i. Meaning of “service” under section 5 of the CHRA
[29] Section 5 of the CHRA provides:
5. It is a discriminatory practice in the provision of goods, services, facilities or accommodation customarily available to the general public
(a) to deny, or to deny access to, any such good, service, facility or accommodation to any individual, or
(b) to differentiate adversely in relation to any individual,
on a prohibited ground of discrimination.
[30] Pursuant to the wording of this section, the Complainants must establish that the actions complained of are “…in the provision of…services…customarily available to the general public”. The first part of this analysis involves determining what constitutes the “service” based on the facts before the Tribunal (see Gould v. Yukon Order of Pioneers, 1996 CanLII 231 (SCC) per La Forest J. at para. 68 [Gould]). In other words, what is the “benefit” or “assistance” being held out (see Watkin v. Canada (Attorney General), 2008 FCA 170 at para. 31 [Watkin]; and, Gould per La Forest J. at para. 55). In making this determination, “[r]egard must be had to the particular actions which are said to give rise to the alleged discrimination in order to determine if they are “services” (see Watkin at para. 33). In this respect, it may be useful to inquire whether the benefit or assistance is the essential nature of the activity (see Canada (Canadian Human Rights Commission) v. Pankiw, 2010 FC 555 at para. 42).
[31] The next step requires a determination of whether the service creates a public relationship between the service provider and the service user. The fact that actions are undertaken by a public body for the public good is not determinative. In fact, no one factor is determinative. Rather, in ascertaining whether a service creates a public relationship, the Tribunal must examine all relevant factors in a contextual manner (see Gould per La Forest J. at para. 68; and, Watkin at paras. 32-33). As part of this determination, the Tribunal must decide what constitutes the “public” to which the service is being offered. A public is defined in relational as opposed to quantitative terms. That is, the public to which the service is being offered does not need to be the entire public. Rather, clients of a particular service could be a very large or very small segment of the “public” (see University of British Columbia v. Berg, [1993] 2 SCR 353 at pp. 374-388; and, Gould per La Forest J. at para. 68). A public relationship is created where this “public” is extended a “service” by the service provider (see Gould per La Forest J. at para. 55).
ii. Evidence indicating AANDC provides a “service”
[32] Both the Commission and the Caring Society characterize the FNCFS Program, its corresponding funding formulas and the related provincial/territorial agreements as a service provided by AANDC to First Nations children and families on reserves and in the Yukon.
[33] On the other hand, AANDC submits that its role in the provision of child and family services to First Nations is strictly limited to funding and being accountable for the spending of those funds. According to AANDC, funding does not constitute a “service”. Furthermore, AANDC argues the funding it provides is not “customarily available to the general public”. Rather, it is provided on a government to government; or, government to agency basis.
[34] In AANDC’s view, the benefit held out as a service is the provincially mandated child welfare services provided to First Nations by the FNCFS Agencies or the provinces/territory. AANDC does not exert control over the services and programs provided. Rather, decisions as to which services to provide, how they will be provided and whether the delivery is in compliance with statutory and regulatory requirements rests with the agencies and the provinces/territory. In this regard, AANDC relies on NIL/TU,O Child and Family Services Society v. B.C. Government and Service Employees' Union, 2010 SCC 45 (NIL/TU,O), to argue that child welfare services are a matter within provincial jurisdiction and that it only became involved in First Nations child and family services as a matter of social policy under its spending power. According to AANDC, its funding does not change the provincial/territorial nature of child and family services.
[35] As explained in the following pages, the Panel finds AANDC is involved in the provision of child and family services to First Nations on reserves across Canada and in the Yukon. Specifically, AANDC offers the benefit or assistance of funding to “ensure”, “arrange”, “support” and/or “make available” child and family services to First Nations on reserves and in the Yukon. With specific regard to the FNCFS Program, the objective is to ensure the delivery of culturally appropriate child and family services, in the best interest of the child, in accordance with the legislation and standards of the reference province/territory, and provided in a reasonably comparable manner to those provided to other provincial/territorial residents in similar circumstances and within FNCFS Program authorities. This benefit or assistance is held out as a service by AANDC and provided to First Nations in the context of a public relationship.
a. Jurisdiction of the CHRA over the activities of AANDC
[36] With regard to the NIL/TU,O decision, the question in that case was whether the labour relations of a FNCFS Agency should be regulated under provincial or federal jurisdiction. Labour relations are presumptively a provincial matter. In this regard, the Supreme Court found the NIL/TU,O Agency was a child welfare agency regulated by the province in all aspects. Neither the fact that it received federal funding, the Aboriginal identity of its clients and employees, nor its mandate to provide culturally appropriate services to Aboriginal clients, displaced the operating presumption that labour relations are provincially regulated.
[37] The present case raises human rights issues in the context of AANDC’s activities. As opposed to labour relations matters, human rights matters are not presumptively provincial. The CHRA applies to “…matters coming within the legislative authority of Parliament” (see CHRA at s. 2). While the activities of FNCFS Agencies and provincial governments may well be within provincial jurisdiction for labour relations purposes, this does not have any bearing on the Tribunal’s jurisdiction over AANDC’s activities in this case.
[38] The Complaint is filed against, and is focused upon, the activities of AANDC. AANDC is a federal government department created by Parliament through the Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development Act. Its mandate is derived from a number of federal statutes, including the Indian Act. Therefore, any actions taken by AANDC come within the legislative authority of Parliament and could be subject to the CHRA.
[39] The issue in this case is not whether AANDC’s activities fall outside the jurisdiction of the CHRA because they do not come within the legislative authority of Parliament. Rather, it is whether the CHRA applies to AANDC’s activities because its actions are in the provision of a service. The fact that other actors, including provincial actors, may be involved in the provision of the service is not determinative and does not necessarily shield AANDC from human rights scrutiny (see for example Eldridge v. British Columbia (Attorney General), [1997] 3 SCR 624 [Eldridge]). As mentioned above, it is for the Tribunal to consider all relevant factors to determine the nature and extent of AANDC’s involvement and whether that involvement rises to the status of a “service” under section 5 of the CHRA.
b. Funding can constitute a service
[40] Similarly, even if AANDC’s role in the child and family welfare of First Nations is limited to funding, there is nothing in the CHRA that excludes funding from the purview of section 5. That is, funding can constitute a service if the facts and evidence of the case indicate that the funding is a benefit or assistance offered to the public pursuant to the criteria outlined above.
[41] A similar argument to the one advanced by AANDC was rejected by the British Columbia Human Rights Tribunal in Bitonti et al. v. College of Physicians & Surgeons of British Columbia et al., (1999) 36 CHRR D/263 (BCHRT) (Bitonti). Among other things, the complainants in that case argued that the allocation of funding provided by the Ministry of Health did not provide foreign medical school graduates with a real opportunity to obtain internships. The Ministry of Health responded that the expenditure of funds by the provincial government was a legislative act that was immune from the Tribunal’s review. While the BCHRT ultimately found there was no service relationship between the Ministry of Health and the complainants, at paragraph 315 it was not prepared to accept the Ministry’s argument regarding immunity for funding:
Carried to its extreme, that position would mean, for example, that if the Ministry of Health provided funding for internships but stipulated that it would only pay male interns, that conduct would be immune from review. I am not prepared to go that far.
[42] Similarly, in Kelso v. The Queen, [1981] 1 SCR 199 at page 207 (Kelso), the Supreme Court stated (emphasis added):
No one is challenging the general right of the Government to allocate resources and manpower as it sees fit. But this right is not unlimited. It must be exercised according to law. The government’s right to allocate resources cannot override a statute such as the Canadian Human Rights Act.
[43] Indeed, the Supreme Court has confirmed the quasi-constitutional nature of the CHRA on many occasions (see for example Robichaud v. Canada (Treasury Board), [1987] 2 SCR 84 at pp. 89-90 (Robichaud); Canada (House of Commons) v. Vaid, 2005 SCC 30 at para. 81 (Vaid); and, Canada (Canadian Human Rights Commission) v. Canada (Attorney General), 2011 SCC 53 at para. 62 [Mowat]). It expresses fundamental values and pursues fundamental goals for our society, such as the fundamental Canadian value of equality (see s. 2 of the CHRA; see also Mowat at para. 33; and, Canada (Attorney General) v. Mossop, [1993] 1 SCR 554 at p. 615, per Justice L’Heureux-Dubé). Therefore, the CHRA is to be interpreted in a broad, liberal, and purposive manner befitting of this special status (see Mowat at para. 62).
[44] Conversely, any exemption from its provisions must be clearly stated (see Vaid at para. 81). Again, there is no indication in the CHRA or otherwise that Parliament intended to exclude funding from scrutiny under the Act, subject of course to the funding being determined to be a service. In line with Kelso, where the Government of Canada is involved in the provision of a service, including where the service involves the allocation of funding, that service and the way resources are allocated pursuant to that service must respect human rights principles.
[45] Therefore, the Panel dismisses the argument that funding cannot constitute a “service” within the meaning of section 5 of the CHRA. In any event, as will be examined in the following pages, the evidence in this case indicates the essential nature of the “assistance” or “benefit” offered by AANDC for the provision of child and family services on First Nations reserves is something more than funding.
c. The “assistance” or “benefit” provided by AANDC
[46] AANDC’s FNCFS Program applies to FNCFS Agencies in all provinces and the Yukon Territory, except Ontario. In Ontario, AANDC has a cost-sharing agreement with the province for the provision of child and family services on First Nations reserves. AANDC also has agreements with the provinces of Alberta and British Columbia to provide child and family services to certain First Nations reserves. A similar agreement is also in place with the Yukon Territory. The provision of child and family services to First Nations in the Northwest Territories and Nunavut were not the subject of this Complaint.
[47] The FNCFS Program were developed to address concerns over the lack of child and family services provided by the provinces to First Nations reserves. Traditionally, assistance to First Nations children and their families was provided informally, by custom, within the network of their extended family. However, over time, this informal assistance became insufficient to meet the needs of children and families living on First Nations reserves.
[48] The Joint Committees of the Senate and the House of Commons in 1946-1948 and again in 1959-1961 urged provinces to increase their involvement in providing services to First Nations people in order to fill in the gaps resulting from disruptions to traditional patterns of community care. However, provincial governments were reluctant to provide those services for financial concerns and given federal jurisdiction over “Indians, and lands reserved for Indians” under section 91(24) of the Constitution Act, 1867. This led to disparity in the quantity and quality of services provided to First Nations children and families on reserve from province to province, where some provinces only provided services if they were compensated by the federal government or only in life-and-death situations (see Annex, ex. 2 at p. 39 [the NPR]).
[49] In 1965, Canada entered into the agreement with the Province of Ontario to enable social services, including child and family services, to be extended to First Nations children and families on reserve. Other provinces entered into bilateral agreements whereby AANDC would reimburse them for the delivery of child and family services (see Annex, ex. 3 at ss. 1.1.2 - 1.1.3 [2005 FNCFS National Program Manual]).
[50] In the 1970’s and early 1980’s, concerns began being raised over the child and family services being provided to First Nations by the provinces. Namely, the services were minimal, not culturally appropriate and there were an alarming number of First Nations children being removed from their communities. This started a move towards the creation of community-specific FNCFS Agencies. AANDC funded these agencies through ad hoc arrangements, but authorities for doing so were unclear and funding was inconsistent (see the NPR at p. 24).
[51] In 1986, AANDC put a moratorium on the ad hoc arrangements for the development of FNCFS Agencies. This moratorium remained in place until 1990 when AANDC implemented the FNCFS Program (see 2005 FNCFS National Program Manual at s. 1.1.6; and, the NPR at p. 24).
[52] At section 1.3 of the 2005 FNCFS National Program Manual, the objective and principles of the FNCFS Program are outlined and include:
1.3.2 The primary objective of the FNCFS program is to support culturally appropriate child and family services for Indian children and families resident on reserve or Ordinarily Resident On Reserve, in the best interest of the child, in accordance with the legislation and standards of the reference province.
[…]
1.3.4 FNCFS will be managed and operated by provincially mandated First Nations organizations (Recipients), which provide services to First Nations children and families Ordinarily Resident On Reserve. FNCFS Recipients will manage the program in accordance with provincial or territorial legislation and standards. INAC will provide funding in accordance with its authorities.
1.3.5 The child and family services offered by FNCFS on reserve are to be culturally relevant and comparable, but not necessarily identical, to those offered by the reference province or territory to residents living off reserve in similar circumstances.
1.3.6 Protecting children from neglect and abuse is the main objective of child and family services. FNCFS also provide services that increase the ability and capacity of First Nations families to remain together and to support the needs of First Nations children in their parental homes and communities.
1.3.7 First Nation agencies and other Recipients will ensure that all persons Ordinarily Resident On Reserve and within their Catchment Area receive a full range of child and family services reasonably comparable to those provided off reserve by the reference province or territory. Funding will be provided in accordance with INAC authorities.
[53] In 2012, following the filing of the Complaint, the wording of the objective of the FNCFS Program was modified, but is still similarly described as follows:
1.1 Objective
The FNCFS program provides funding to assist in ensuring the safety and well-being of First Nations children ordinarily resident on reserve by supporting culturally appropriate prevention and protection services for First Nations children and families.
These services are to be provided in accordance with the legislation and standards of the province or territory of residence and in a manner that is reasonably comparable to those available to other provincial residents in similar circumstances within Program Authorities.
(see Annex, ex. 4 at p. 30 [2012 National Social Programs Manual])
[54] The other provincial and territorial agreements for the provision of child and family services in First Nations communities have a similar purpose to the FNCFS Program. In Ontario, the Memorandum of Agreement Respecting Welfare Programs for Indians (see Annex, ex. 5 [the 1965 Agreement]), at page 1, provides:
WHEREAS the 1963 Federal-Provincial Conference, in charting desirable long-range objectives and policies applicable to the Indian people, determined that the principal objective was the provision of provincial services and programs to Indians on the basis that needs in Indian Communities should be met according to standards applicable in other communities;
AND WHEREAS Canada and Ontario in working towards this objective desire to make available to the Indians in the Province the full range of provincial welfare programs;
[55] In Alberta, the Arrangement for the Funding and Administration of Social Services (see Annex, ex. 6 [the Alberta Reform Agreement]) at page 1 states:
WHEREAS:
Canada continues to have a special relationship with and interest in the Indian people of Canada arising from history, treaties, statutes and the Constitution;
Canada and Alberta recognize and agree that this arrangement will not prejudice the treaty rights of Indian people, nor alter any obligations of Canada to Indian people pursuant to treaties, statutes and the Constitution, including any rights protected by section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982, nor affect any self-government rights that may be negotiated in future constitutional negotiations;
Canada and Alberta recognize that Indians and Indian Families should be provided with Social Services which take into account their cultures, values, languages and experiences;
Canada and Alberta are desirous of developing an arrangement in respect of the funding and administration for Social Services which would be applicable to Indians in the Province of Alberta; and
Canada and Alberta acknowledge that Indians have aspirations towards self-government and both therefore wish to support the establishment, management, and delivery by Indians and Indian organizations of child and family services and other community-based Social Services for Indians in Alberta.
[56] At section 3 of the Alberta Reform Agreement, Canada’s role is described as:
3. Canada will by this arrangement and in accordance with Appendix II:
(a) arrange for the delivery of Social Services comparable to those provided by Alberta to other residents of the Province directly or through negotiated agreements with Indian Bands, Indian agencies, Indian organizations, or with Alberta, to persons ordinarily residing on a Reserve; and
(b) fund Social Services for Indians and Indian Families ordinarily residing on a Reserve comparable to those provided by Alberta to other residents of the Province; and in particular, reimburse Alberta for those Social Services which Alberta delivers to Indians and Indian Families ordinarily residing on a Reserve.
[57] In British Columbia, the Service Agreement Regarding the Funding of Child Protection Services of First Nations Children Ordinarily Resident on Reserve (see Annex, ex. 7 [the BC Service Agreement]), which in 2012 replaced a previous memorandum of understanding between the two parties (see Annex, ex. 8 [the BC MOU]), provides:
1.0 Vision
Governments working together in British Columbia to ensure that First Nation children, youth and their families live in strong, healthy familie