R v Daviault

Daviault, a chronic alcoholic, was charged with sexual assault while extremely intoxicated. The SCC held that extreme intoxication akin to automatism was a defence to general-intent crimes despite the prior Leary rule excluding intoxication. Parliament responded with the original s.33.1 (1995), struck in R v Brown (2022), and replaced by Bill C-28 (2022).

Daviault, an alcoholic, drank extensively before assaulting an elderly woman. He claimed total memory loss; an expert testified he was in a state akin to automatism.

Is extreme intoxication akin to automatism a defence to general-intent crimes?

Yes — when proven on a balance of probabilities by the accused.

Where the accused proves extreme intoxication akin to automatism on a balance of probabilities, the Charter requires the defence be available even for general-intent crimes. The Leary rule (intoxication unavailable for general-intent crimes) violates ss.7 and 11(d) at the extreme end.

Cory J held that conviction without voluntariness or fault offends the principles of fundamental justice. The reverse onus on the accused was a balanced solution to the practical concern about widespread reliance on intoxication.

Provoked Parliament to enact the original s.33.1 in 1995 — barring the defence. R v Brown (2022) struck down s.33.1; Parliament replaced it (Bill C-28). The doctrinal arc is foundational for any modern Canadian intoxication-defence analysis.

R v Daviault, [1994] 3 SCR 63, 1994 CanLII 61 (SCC).

Lamer CJ, La Forest J, L'Heureux-Dubé J, Sopinka J, Gonthier J, Cory J, McLachlin J, Iacobucci J, Major J