Kearns and McMurchy Inc. v. Canada

Kearns and McMurchy Inc. v. Canada
Court (s) Database
Federal Court Decisions
Date
2003-06-30
Neutral citation
2003 FCT 814
File numbers
T-670-99
Decision Content
Date: 20030630
Docket: T-670-99
Citation: 2003 FCT 814
BETWEEN:
KEARNS and McMURCHY INC.
Plaintiff
- and -
HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN IN RIGHT OF THE GOVERNMENT OF CANADA
CHARLES LOWRIE and LESLIE STEWART
Defendants
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
ARONOVITCH, P.:
[1] In January 1999, following inspection, Customs Canada detained certain machine gun parts, from a shipment of five cartons of firearms and accessories, being imported into Canada by Kearns & McMurchy. The inspection was carried out by customs officer Charles Lowrie. The "Form K26" Notice of Detention, that later issued, was signed by his colleague Leslie Stewart.
[2] The plaintiff's claim sounds in tort. It is alleged on behalf of the importer, that Lowrie and Stewart acted unlawfully, and without authority, willfully detaining goods they knew not to be prohibited thereby converting these to their own use. Their actions, according to the plaintiff, essentially constitutes a theft of the gun parts valued at roughly $12, 000.
[3] This action raises two issues. The first, is as to whether the plaintiff has any recourse other than pursuant to the Customs Act, R.S. 1985, c. 1 (2nd Supp.) (the "Act"), that the Crown argues is the exclusive remedy available to Kearns & McMurchy in the circumstances. If the plaintiff is not barred from bringing this action, the second matter for consideration is as to whether the plaintiff has proven the necessary elements of the tort of conversion.
[4] The following facts are not disputed. Peter Kearns, is the owner of the plaintiff enterprise, and is licenced to sell and repair firearms in the City of Edmonton. In December, 1999 he ordered the following items through J. Mantons Co. Ltd ("Mantons"):
7.92 mm Browning 1919A4 LMG plus spare barrel & accessories;
7.92 mm MG 42/M53 LMG & tripod, spares & accessories;
7.92 mm MG42 LMG;
5.56 mm Ultimax LMG;
9 mm British L84A1 Silence Sterling & Mag;
5.56 mm SAR80 Rifle.
[5] The invoice from Mantons, lists the above weapons as deactivated, for instance, as follows:
"Deactivated Browning 1919A4LMG + spare barrels and accessories".
[6] Charles Lowrie, first inspected the shipment of guns on January 12, 1999. In the first carton, along with a deactivated Browning which passed inspection, he found some spare barrels that were not deactivated. In another carton, he found parts that were similarly not deactivated, accompanying a MG 53/MG 42 Light Machine Gun ("LMG") that was itself deactivated, and therefore passed inspection.
[7] Lowrie sent one spare MG 53/MG 42 barrel, and one bolt to RCMP Constable Scott D. Kashuba, for testing. By memorandum dated January 14, 1999, Constable Kashuba confirmed that the barrel and bolt were indeed not deactivated. They had been fitted to, and had functioned on a working MG42 machine gun.
[8] Customs inspector Lowrie completed his examination of the shipment on January 14, 1999. Not having found other such items, he removed from the shipment the barrels and bolts which he took not to have been in any way deactivated. He provided Leslie Stewart with an inventory of the parts, namely, a total of 13 barrels, five tube cases that held the barrels, and two bolts. Stewart, in turn, completed and signed a Form K26, Notice of Detention, to the attention of the plaintiff, with the following express reason for the detention:
"all goods were declared as being deactivated to Canadian Standards... items listed above are not deactivated...items are therefore prohibited."
[9] The Notice of Detention was accompanied by a covering letter in the following terms, explaining the basis of the retention, and providing the alternatives available to the plaintiff to either abandon the held goods or, to contest the tariff classification which resulted in the detention:
"Importer: Kearns & McMurchy Inc.
10585 115 Street
Edmonton, AB
T5H 3K4
Re: K26 # 702K26LR006
Dear Sir:
The attached Notice fo Detention, number 702K26LR006, accounts for goods held by this office which are deemed prohibited based on the following regulations: the Criminal Code and Tariff Item 9898.00.00.00. As a result of this tariff classification you have three options to choose from the disposal of the goods.[emphasis added]
Your first option is to provide documentation showing that you are authorized / designated by the Attorney General of Alberta under Section 105(1)(a)(b) of the Criminal Code to import prohibited weapons.
Your second option is to abandon the goods to the Crown by signing the Abandonment Certificate on the attached Non-Monetary General Receipt and returning it to this office within 40 days of the date of this letter. Abandoned weapons are disposed or by this Department in
Canada Customs
M6-10303 Jasper Avenue
Edmonton, Alberta
T5J 4H
ATTN: Leslie Stuart
Your third option is to appeal the classification of the goods as prohibited weapon(s). You can do this by completing the Adjustment Request documents, of which 3 copies are enclosed or by writing a letter to the Regional Weapons Specialist at the Customs Assessment Division (403) 231-4190 indicating that you request a re-determination of the goods. Please forward all copies of the completed document to the Customs Assessment Division at the address listed below. You have ninety days from the date of this letter to request a re-determination of the classification of the goods under Section 60(1)(a) of the Customs Act. Failure to request a re-determination within the 90 days will result in forfeiture of the goods. [emphasis added]
Customs Assessment Division
320-220 - 4th Avenue SE
Calgary, Alberta
T2G OL1
Please ensure that you keep track of the time limits for the option you choose:
1. Abandonment - you have 40 days from the date of this letter to abandon the goods.
2. Re-determination - you have 90 days from the date of this letter to request a re-determination of the classification of the goods.
Please note: prohibited weapons CANNOT be exported under Section 95(1) of the Criminal Code - you must choose abandonment or re-determination of the classification of the goods.
If you have any questions please the number listed below."
[10] It is not disputed that the plaintiff did not appeal or ask for a re-determination of the classification of the parts as prohibited weapons.
Preliminary motion
[11] As a preliminary matter, the Crown having given notice in that regard, sought at the beginning of the trial to exclude exhibit "E" to the plaintiff's affidavit, being the "Marstar Catalogue".
[12] The Crown objected on the grounds that the document was not produced as part of the documentary discovery in the action but rather, had been produced on the eve of trial without a proper opportunity to the defendants to review or reply to the document. Plaintiff's counsel admitted having only recently received the document from his client and did not object to the application. The exhibit was ordered to be struck and thereby excluded from the plaintiff's evidence.
The Evidence at Trial
[13] The plaintiff's evidence-in-chief consists of that of Messrs. Kearns and Alder. Glen Adler is an acting Regional Intelligence Officer with Canada Customs. He was not cross-examined at trial. His affidavit, which stands uncontroverted, attests to the following. Alder is aware of a prior instance when Lowrie seized parts of the plaintiff's shipment and sent it for testing by the RCMP. On that occasion, he had written to the Manager of Customs Border Service Intelligence Division in Calgary to the effect that it appeared to Alder, that based on the regulations, a firearms dealer could import prohibited firearms or parts pursuant to the "grandfathering" sections of the Criminal Code. Alder points out that he has had occasion to discuss his interpretation of Canada Customs Notices N-198 and N-177 with Lowrie. He concludes his statement by indicating that upon hearing that Kearns & McMurchy had received a business firearm licence to import prohibited firearms for deactivation, he advised Field Support, in Ottawa, of this fact.
[14] Indeed Kearns, describes his business as that of selling, repairing and deactivating firearms, including the importation of firearm parts for the purpose of deactivating these, and selling them with deactivated firearms for souvenirs, replicas, and display models. He says Kearns & McMurchy held a valid firearms licence, in December 1998 that is no longer in his possession. At one time, Kearns & McMurchy did possess a firearms licence that allowed it to import prohibited firearms and parts for the purpose of deactivating and selling them as replicas and souvenirs. That particular licence, issued to Kearns & McMurchy, on March 31, 1999. It was thereafter revoked, to be replaced on April 16, 1999, by a licence issued by the Chief Firearms Officer of Alberta, in terms that Kearns says are identical to his 1998 licence. The licence issued on April 16, 1999, states explicitly, that it does not authorize the importation of prohibited firearms.
[15] Both Lowrie and Stewart were extensively cross-examined regarding their roles in the detention of the goods at issue. Lowrie was questioned regarding discussions he may have had with Adler about a "loophole", that on a certain interpretation of Customs Notices N-198 and N-177, may have allowed the importation of non-deactivated parts. He was minutely questioned by reference to the provisions of these notices, and various memoranda, in particular Memorandum D-19-13-2 (the "D" memorandum), issued by the department in relation to the importation of offensive weapons. Lowrie was asked whether he had followed the prescriptions of the various guidelines. Lowrie admitted he had not checked the applicable Order in Council to ensure that the parts were indeed prohibited or forwarded the parts to a regional weapons specialist. He was adamant however, that he had impounded the goods on proper grounds, having reference to what he took to be the only applicable regulation at the time, namely Tariff Item 9898.00.00, that I will refer to, from time to time, as "9898".
[16] During cross-examination, Lowrie repeated numerous times that the reason for the detention was that the waybill described the arms as deactivated, when in fact, they were not. The line of questioning eventually turned to whether the true reason for the detention was that the parts were misdescribed rather than prohibited. After some skirmishing as to whether the goods could be said to be "misdescribed"or, as Lowrie first offered,"misdeclared", Lowrie remained steadfast that the grounds of the detention of the parts was that they were not deactivated, and were accordingly prohibited under 9898. The detention was not based on "misdescription," which as Lowrie explained, for customs purposes, has a distinctive meaning as for example, a declaration of goods as televisions when they are in fact cars.
[17] Leslie Stewart is also a customs officer. Asked what authority she had to sign and issue the K26 Detention Notice, she responded that she had signed it on his behalf as inspector Lowrie who was conducting an inspection out of the office, when it was urgent to get the notice into the mail.
[18] The questions to Stewart were in the same vein as those posed to Lowrie. Stewart's responses were similar in that she maintained throughout that the basis of the detention was properly stated in the notice as being the lack of deactivation. Stewart did accept that N-198 which was put to her on cross-examination stated that 9898 was unchanged from its predecessor 9965, and conceded that according to paragraph 16 of N-177, which was made in reference to 9965, the parts were not prohibited pursuant to the Criminal Code. Asked why the letter she sent to the plaintiff sated the guns to be prohibited pursuant to the Criminal Code, she answered that she was "operating with form letters" and that she had used the letter because it adequately sated the appeal provisions open to the plaintiff. She conceded however that, given the reference to the Criminal Code in the cover letter, the plaintiff might not have understood the true basis for the detention.
Analysis and Conclusion
[19] The defendant argues primarily, that the plaintiff is precluded from commencing this action, as Kearns & McMurchy did not avail itself of the appeal mechanism under the Customs Act, that is a complete code and the exclusive remedy of the plaintiff in the circumstances. In any event says the Crown, the plaintiff's action must fail as the plaintiff has not proven the necessary elements of the tort of conversion. For the following reasons, I agree on both accounts.
[20] I will first review the events surrounding the detention, its aftermath, and the regulatory context in which the detention was effected.
[21] In the course of his inspection, inspector Lowrie, reviewed the Mantons invoice, and understood this to be a shipment of deactivated weapons and parts. Some explanation of the term "deactivated" is appropriate at this juncture. As I understand it, a deactivated firearm, is one that essentially, by virtue of the removal of certain parts, has been rendered inoperable such that it cannot fire ammunition. Deactivated weapons are not working firearms, and therefore do not engage a firearm tariff classification of any type, and may be freely imported into Canada providing they comply with certain deactivation standards (Interim Procedures for Importation of Deactivated Firearms; Exhibit 16 Part II).
[22] Having found parts that were not in any way deactivated, Lowrie had some tested by the RCMP. They were found to fit and work with a prohibited automatic weapon. He accordingly detained the parts as prohibited under item 9898 of the Customs Tariff, that was in force in January 1999.
Section 136 of the Customs Tariff, S.C. 1997, c. 36 reads as follows:
136. (1) The importation of goods of tariff item no. 9897.00.00, 9898.00.00 or 9899.00.00 is prohibited.
(2) Subsection 10(1) does not apply in respect of goods referred to in subsection (1)
136. (1) L'importation des marchandises des nos tarifaires 9897.00.00, 9898.00.00 ou 9899.00.00 est interdite.
(2) Le paragraphe 10(1) ne s'applique pas aux marchandises visées au paragraphe (1).
The provisions of 9898 are in turn, attached as Appendix I. The tariff item is best summarized as follows, in the current and up-to-date version of the "D" memorandum, made in aid of the administration of 9898:
"All components or parts designed exclusively for use in the manufacture of or assembly into an automatic firearm are considered to be prohibited goods for the purpose of tariff item 9898.00.00. The components and parts may be imported, but only under certain conditions (e.g., with a prohibited weapons licence)." [emphasis added]
[23] The plaintiff urges that Lowrie, wrongly assumed on reading the invoice, that not only the weapons, but the parts as well were being described as deactivated, when on a clear reading of the invoice deactivated was meant to describe only the weapons. I find the point without consequence, as the evidence bears out that the parts were not deactivated, and without a specific licence to permit their importation, were prohibited goods.
[24] As to the licence, I accept that Kearns & McMurchy had some form of licence at the time of the detention. I conclude on the evidence however, that it did not authorize the plaintiff to import prohibited weapons or parts. The brief interval during which the plaintiff was specifically licenced to do so, was subsequent to the events at issue. The licence that temporarily authorized Kearns & McMurchy to import prohibited arms was issued after the date of the detention. When subsequently revoked, it was replaced by one, that we are told, is identical to the one the plaintiff operated under at the critical time. As we have seen, that replacement licence explicitly excludes the importation of prohibited weapons and parts.
[25] The nub of the plaintiff's complaint, the basis of this action, is the classification of the parts as prohibited weapons. It is essentially that classification that Kearns & McMurchy impugns, and challenges. Beginning with Consumers Glass Co. v. Canada (1990), 107 N.R. 156 (F.C.A.) ("Consumers Glass"), this Court, in such circumstances, has consistently maintained the primacy of the Customs Act, as the importer's complete avenue of redness in challenging an improper classification of goods, and any duties that it may attract.
[26] In Consumers Glass, an error in classification resulted in the payment of half a million dollars of duties, over a period of four years, on goods that were exempt from duty. When the error was discovered, the importer, Consumers Glass, applied for a re-determination using the appeal procedure under the Customs Act. It was refunded part of the duties. The remainder was disallowed because it was paid over a period that was outside the statutory period of appeal for that classification. The importer then commenced an action for unjust enrichment to recover the remainder of the duties.
[27] The Federal Court of Appeal considered the scheme of the Act, and in particular, the then section 46, of the statute, that stipulated a classification to be "final and conclusive" save only for a statutory appeal. In setting aside the decision of the trial judge, the Court of Appeal construed section 46 as follows:
"[5] The trial judge held that s. 46, which he considered as creating an "administrative scheme" for the recovery of custom duties paid by mistake, did not restrict or limit the respondent's common law right to claim restitution on the basis of unjust enrichment. Counsel for the respondent invoked, in support of that view, the well-known principle that, in the absence of clear and unambiguous language, statutes are not to be construed as limiting or abrogating common law rights.
[6] We do not agree with that opinion. In our view, the judgment of the Trial Division must be set aside. Contrary to what it held, s. 46 of the Customs Act did not merely add a new administrative remedy to the existing common law remedies.
[7] ... Section 46 prescribed the procedure to be followed for the redetermination of the tariff classification or appraisal of goods that had been wrongly classified or appraised at the time of their entry; it also set time-limits within which those redeterminations might be made. Section 46(1) stated clearly that the tariff classification and appraisal made at the time of the entry were "final and conclusive" if they were not modified in accordance with those rules. If, therefore, as in this case, the tariff classification made at the time of the entry of imported goods had not been modified within the time-limit prescribed, that tariff classification, whether correct or incorrect, became final and conclusive. ..." [emphasis added]
[28] The Customs Act, provides an appeal process set out in sections 57 through 68 of the Act, attached for reference as Appendix II. While section 46, referred to in Consumers Glass is overtaken, I take subsection 58(3) of the Act to be essentially the equivalent of the privative clause at issue in that case, and to the same effect, namely, that of precluding the review of a determination of the classification of goods other than by the process specifically provided for under the Act.
Section 58(3) says:
58(3) A determination made under this section is not subject to be restrained, prohibited, removed, set aside or otherwise dealt with except to the extent and in the manner provided by sections 59 to 61.
58(3) La détermination faite en vertu du présent article n'est susceptible de restriction, d'interdiction, d'annulation, de rejet ou de toute autre forme d'intervention que dans la mesure et selon les modalités prévues aux articles 59 à 61.
[29] Sections 59 to 61 of the Act then provide for determinations, or re-determinations, to be made within the department, ultimately by the Deputy Minister. An appeal lies from the Deputy Minister to the Canadian International Trade Tribunal and thence to the Federal Court of Appeal. At each level, the statute reiterates the privative clause in the same terms as stated above, precluding review except as provided by the statute. Thus, for example at subsection 67(3) we find a prohibition of review, in terms that reiterate to those of subsection 58(3):
67(3) On an appeal under subsection (1), the Canadian International Trade Tribunal may make such order, finding or declaration as the nature of the matter may require, and an order, finding or declaration made under this section is not subject to review or to be restrained, prohibited, removed, set aside or otherwise dealt with except to the extent and in the manner provided by section 68.
67(3) Le Tribunal canadien du commerce extérieur peut statuer sur l'appel prévu au paragraphe (1), selon la nature de l'espèce, par ordonnance, constatation ou déclaration, celles-ci n'étant susceptibles de recours, de restriction, d'interdiction, d'annulation, de rejet ou de toute autre forme d'intervention que dans la mesure et selon les modalités prévues à l'article 68.
[30] More recently in Neles Controls Ltd. v. Canada ("Neles"), 2002 FCA 107, leave to appeal to S.C.C. refused, [2002] S.C.C.A. No. 207, in circumstances that are analogous to the case at bar, Neles Controls the importer, did not follow the appeal provisions under the Customs Act and instead brought an action for unjust enrichment. Having considered the statutory scheme of redness under the Act, the Federal Court of Appeal concluded that the Act occupies the whole field of relief available to an importer whose goods are subject to customs duties:
"In my view, Dawson J. correctly concluded that recourse to common law or equitable relief is precluded by a comprehensive statutory scheme for relief...
...Accordingly, in my analysis, this is a clear indication of Parliament's intention that sections 75 to 79 and 100 of the Customs Tariff occupy the whole field in terms of the relief available to an importer whose goods are subject to customs duties. A different conclusion may be warranted in situations where the legislation is silent, where its terms cannot apply, or where a gap in relief is apparent, but that is not the case here." [emphasis added]
[31] In the instant case, the statutory scheme, is applicable to the precise matter at issue. It is comprehensive, with complete recourse available to the plaintiff under the statute without any apparent gap in relief. The provisions of the Act, and in particular the repetition of privative clauses at each level leave no doubt of the intention of Parliament that the recourse under the Act be the whole and exclusive remedy of the importer as regards an improper classification of goods. There being none of the exceptional circumstances noted by the Court of Appeal in Neles, I find, as in that case, that the statutory scheme is exhaustive of the redness available to Kearns & McMurchy in the circumstances of this case, and precludes the within action for damages.
[32] I have considered the plaintiff's argument that this action is not barred, on the basis that subsection 106(1) of the Act (reproduced at Appendix II), clearly contemplates actions against customs officers and employees.
[33] Indeed, one can conceive that an action may lie thereunder against a customs officer for acts such as theft, or possibly damage to goods, not however, for an improper classification, which is what is essentially at issue here, and is otherwise expressly provided for under the Act. Moreover, subsection 106 (3), in my view, reinforces the primacy of the statutory scheme even in that circumstance. It permits an automatic stay of the proceeding brought under 106, "arising out of the same facts", pending final determination of the proceeding under the Act.
[34] While I am satisfied that the matter should end here, I will go on to consider the plaintiff's allegations of wrongful, tortious conduct on the part of the customs officers, for had I not found the action barred, I would in any case have dismissed it on account of the plaintiff's failure to make out a case of conversion.
[35] Indeed the chief element necessary to found a cause of action for conversion is a wrongful act, one that is meant to deprive an individual of the rightful title to his or her property. In Fridman, The Law of Torts in Canada,, 2nd ed. (Carswell, 2002) at page 139, the author says this, in respect of the acts necessary to found an action for conversion.
"A wrongful act is essential.30 The mere fact of possession will not suffice.31 There must be evidence from which it can be inferred, if not unquestionably shown, that the defendant purported to deny the plaintiff's title, whether expressly or by implication from what he has done.32 Hence if the defendant had no intention to deprive the plaintiff of the benefit of his property, no conversion will be committed.33 One obvious way in which denial of title can be established is if the defendant has sold, or otherwise disposed of the plaintiff's goods, without his having any personal or derived right to do so.34 Another is by proof that the defendant has misappropriated the plaintiff's goods in his own use."
[36] The plaintiff makes much of the alleged transgressions of Lowrie and Stewart in disregarding their own process and directives (these being the various customs notices and memoranda), thus willfully and knowingly detaining goods which it is alleged they knew were not prohibited.
[37] To begin, the customs notices and the "D" memoranda are not regulations. These have no binding force and effect. They are meant as guidelines in aid of the application of elements of the Customs Tariff and are addressed to the public, as well as to customs officers. Even as such, with the exception of a "D" memorandum in force at the applicable time, the documents relied on by the plaintiff are dated, overtaken, and have no bearing in the circumstances of this case. Most notably, N-177 is dated January 1997. It is explicitly made in reference to tariff code 9965, the predecessor twice removed of 9898. Notice N-198, which is dated January 1998, was put to the witnesses to try to establish that tariff item 9898 was the same as 9965, which in turn, is referenced in N-177. N-198 does indeed state that nothing had changed in the wording of 9898, but that reference is to 9898 as it stood in January 1998, and not as it read once amended effective December 1, 1998. Similarly the "D" memorandum put to the witnesses was dated March 19, 1993. It also refers to tariff code 9965, that as I have explained, was a predecessor twice removed of the tariff item in force at the time of the detention of the goods at issue. None of the cross-examination of the witnesses with respect to these documents avails the plaintiff.
[38] Any possible loopholes in the legislation in respect of working machine gun parts have not been proven by the plaintiff. More importantly, they are raised in the context of a past legislative scheme, now overtaken. The current scheme does not require reference to prohibited parts listed by Order in Council, it expressly incorporates prohibited weapons and parts as follows:
"Firearms, prohibited weapons, restricted weapons, prohibited devices, prohibited ammunition"(all being defined terms under the Criminal Code). "and components or part designated exclusively for use in the manufacture or assembly in to automatic firearms".
[39] The plaintiff stressed the provisions of the "D" memorandum now in force, that provides that officers have to be satisfied that the weapon is designed "exclusively" for use in an automatic weapon. The plaintiff says the RCMP report is not conclusive in that regard as one cannot conclude from Constable Kashuba's report that the parts could only work on an automatic weapon.
[40] On that point, it is not the plaintiff, but rather the defendant that must make proof that these parts are not designed for exclusive use with automatic weapons. The catalogue struck from the Kearns affidavit, may have been the plaintiff's evidence to that effect, but would likely not have been sufficient in any case. That fact could only have been proven by expert testimony. In any event, the point constitutes a challenge to the classification of the parts as prohibited, a challenge which I have said would have been appropriately been made in the context of an appeal under the Act.
[41] In sum, I find no evidence of either wrongful acts or intention on the part of Lowrie or Stewart. It cannot be maintained that the two customs officers detained the parts knowing they were not prohibited. The parts were not deactivated and as such were indeed prohibited under the then applicable regulation. There is no basis to conclude that Lowrie and Stewart exercised their duties other than within the bounds of their authority, and in accordance with the applicable legislation. Indeed, the egregious conduct of the customs officers that the plaintiff argues the Court ought not to countenance, boils down to the doubts expressed by Stewart about the propriety of the letter she signed to accompany the Notice of Detention. That confusion in turn was engendered by Stewart essentially being asked to opine as to the effect and application of guidelines, that are out of date and have no relevance to the facts of this case. It does not justify, and I find regrettable, Stewart's apparent lack of clarity and understanding of the forms she uses and habitually issues. That is not however a basis to impeach the process engaged by the officers or the correspondence sent to the plaintiff.
[42] Indeed, the facts bear out that the letter as well as the notice are clear, correct and appropriate to the circumstances. The cover letter correctly sets out the basis for the detention namely, its classification as prohibited under tariff item 9898. The appropriate options are then provided, as to the importer's entitlement and means for objecting to that classification. If Kearns & McMurchy chose not to appeal, it was certainly not that it did not have proper notice or comprehend the basis of the detention.
[43] For the above reasons I conclude that the action must be dismissed.
"Roza Aronovitch"
Prothonotary
Signed this 30th day
of June 2003
APPENDIX"I"
to the
Reasons for Judgment dated June 30, 2003
rendered by Madam Prothonotary Aronovitch
in
KEARNS and McMURCHY INC.
v.
HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN IN RIGHT OF THE GOVERNMENT OF CANADA
CHARLES LOWRIE and LESLIE STEWART
T-670-99
Customs Tariff,SOR/98-577
Regulations Amending the List of Tariff provisions set out in the Schedule to the Customs Tariff
1. The description of goods of tariff item No. 9898.00.00 in the List of Tariff Provisions set out in the schedule to the Customs Tariff is replaced by the following:
Firearms, prohibited weapons, restricted weapons, prohibited ammunition and components or parts designed exclusively for use in the manufacture of or assembly into automatic firearms, in this tariff item referred to as prohibited goods, but does not include the following:(a) prohibited goods imported by
(i) a public officer in the course of the public officer's duties or employment, or
(ii) an individual on behalf of an under the authority of a police force, the Canadian Forces, a visiting force or a department of the Government of Canada or of a province;
(b) prohibited goods imported by a business that holds a licence authorizing it to acquire and possess those goods, or prohibited goods that are being shipped in transit through Canada by a business that does not carry on business in Canada;
(c) prohibited goods, or any class of prohibited goods, that, under regulations made by the Governor in Council, are exempted from the provisions of this tariff item;
(d) any weapon that, under subsection 84(3) of the Criminal Code, is deemed not to be a firearm;
(e) any firearm, other than a restricted firearm or a prohibited firearm, imported by
(i) a non-resident,
(ii) an individual who holds a licence to acquire and possess that kind of firearm, who is a resident of Canada and who acquired the firearm outside Canada, or
(iii) an individual who is a resident of Canada and who did not acquire the firearm outside Canada;
(f) any restricted firearm imported by
(i) a non-resident who holds an authorization to transport,
(ii) an individual who holds a licence to acquire and possess that kind of firearm and an authorization to transport, who is a resident of Canada and who acquired the firearm outside Canada, or
(iii) an individual who is a resident of Canada, who holds an authorization to transport and who did not acquire the firearm outside Canada;
(g) any prohibited firearm, imported by an individual who is a resident of Canada, who holds an authorization to transport and who did not acquired th firearm outside Canada;
(h) arms, ammunition, implements or munitions of war, army, naval or air stores and any articles deemed capable of being converted into any such things or made useful in the production of any such things, imported with a permit issued under section 8 of the Export and Import Permits Act;
(i) arms, military stores, munitions of war and other goods eligible for entry under tariff item No. 9810.00.00 or 9811.00.00; and
(j) arms, military stores, munitions of war, or classes thereof, that under regulations, made by the Governor in Council, are exempted from the provisions of this tariff item.
For the purposes of this tariff item,
(a) "firearms" and "weapon" have the same meaning as in section 2 of the Criminal Code;
(b) "automatic firearm", 'licence", "prohibited ammunition", "prohibited device", "prohibited firearm", prohibited weapon, restricted firearm and " restricted weapon" have the same meanings as in subsection 84(1) of the Criminal Code;
(c) "public officer" has the same meaning as in subsection 117.07(2) of the Criminal Code;
(d) "authorization to transport", "business", "carrier" and "non-resident" have the same meanings as in subsection 2(1) of the Firearms Act; and
(e) "visiting force" has the same meaning as in section 2 of the Visiting Forces Act.
2. These Regulations come into force on December 1, 1998.
Tarif des douanes, DORS/198-577
Règlement modifiant la liste des dipositions tarifaires de l'annexe du tarif des douanes
1. La Dénomination des marchandises du no tarifaire 9898.00.00 de la liste des dispositions tarifaires de l'annexe du Tarif des douanes est remplacée; par ce qui suit:
Armes à feu, armes prohibées, armes à autorisation restreinte, dispositifs prohibés, munitions prohibées et éléments ou pièces conçus exclusivement pour être utilisés dans la fabrication ou l'assemblage d'armes automatiques, désignés comme « marchandises prohibées » au présent numéro tarifaire, sauf;
a) les marchandises prohibées importées:
(i) soit par un fonctionnaire public dans le cadre de ses fonctions,
(ii) soit par un particulier pour le compte et sous les ordres d'une force policière, des Forces canadiennes, des forces étrangères présentes au Canada ou d'un ministère fédéral ou provincial;
b) les marchandises prohibées importées par une entreprise titulaire d'un permis l'autorisant à acquérir et à posséder de telles marchandises,ou les marchandises prohibées expédiées en transit à travers le Canada par une entreprise qui n'exerce pas d'activités au Canada;
c) les marchandises prohibées ou catégories de marchandises prohibées qui, conformément aux règlements pris par le gouverneur en conseil, sont exemptées des dispositions du présent numéro tarifaire;
d) les armes qui, conformément au paragraphe 84(3) du Code criminel, sont réputées ne pas être des armes à feux;
e) les armes à feu, autres que les armes à feu à autorisation restreinte et les armes à feu prohibées, importées;
(i) soit par un non-résident;
(ii) soit par un particulier qui est titulaire d'un permis d'acquisition et de possession d'une telle arme, qui est résident canadien et qui a acquis une telle arme à l'étranger.
(iii) soit par un particulier qui est résident canadien et qui n'a pas acquis une telle arme à l'étranger;
f) les armes à feu à autorisation restreinte importées:
(i) soit par un non-résident qui est titulaire d'une autorisation de transport,
(ii) soit par un particulier qui est titulaire d'un permis d'acquisition et de possession d'une telle arme et d'une autorisation de transport, qui est résident canadien et qui a acquis une telle arme à l'étranger,
(iii) soit par un particulier qui est résident canadien, qui est titulaire d'une autorisation de transport et qui n'a pas acquis une telle arme à l'étranger;
g) les armes à feu prohibées importées par un particulier qui est résident canadien, qui est titulaire d'une autorisation de transport et qui n'a pas acquis une telle arme à l'étranger;
h) les armes, les munitions, le matériel ou les armements de guerre, les fournitures de l'armée, de la marine ou de l'aviation, ni tout ce qui est susceptible d'être transformé en de tels articles ou peut servir à leur fabrication, importés sous le couvert d'un permis délivré en vertu de l'article 8 de la Loi sur les licences d'exportation et d'importation;
i) les armes, les fournitures militaires, les munitions de guerre ou les autres biens admissibles d'après les nos tarifaires 9810.00.00 ou 9811.00.00;
j) les armes, les fournitures militaires, les munitions de guerre ou toute catégorie de ces articles, exemptés des dispositions du présent numéro tarifaire conformément aux règlements pris par le gouverneur en conseil.
Pour l'application du présent numéro tarifaire:
a) « arme » et « arme à feu » s'entendent au sens de l'article 2 du Code criminel;
b) « arme à autorisation restreinte » , « arme à feu à autorisation restreinte » , « arme à feu prohibée » , « arme automatique » , « arme prohibée » , « dispositif prohibé » , « munitions prohibées » et « permis » s'entendent au sens du paragraph 84(1) du Code criminel;
c) « fonctionnaire public » s'entend au sens du paragraphe 117.07(2) du Code criminel;
d) « autorisation de transport » , « entreprise » , « non-résident » et « transporteur » s'entendent au sens du paragraphe 2(1) de la Loi sur les armes à feu;
e) « forces étrangères présentes au Canada » s'entend au sens de l'article 2 de la Loi sur les forces étrangères présentes au Canada.
2. Le présent règlement entre en vigueur le 1er décembre 1998.
APPENDIX"II"
to the
Reasons for Judgment dated June 30, 2003
rendered by Madam Prothonotary Aronovitch
in
KEARNS and McMURCHY INC.
v.
HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN IN RIGHT OF THE GOVERNMENT OF CANADA
CHARLES LOWRIE and LESLIE STEWART
T-670-99
Customs Act
R.S. 1985, c. 1 (2nd Supp.)
57.1 For the purposes of sections 58 to 70,
(a) the origin of imported goods is to be determined in accordance with section 16 of the Customs Tariff and the regulations under that section;
(b) the tariff classification of imported goods is to be determined in accordance with section 10 of the Customs Tariff, unless otherwise provided in that Act; and
(c) the value for duty of imported goods is to be determined in accordance with sections 47 to 55 of this Act and section 87 of the Customs Tariff. 58.(1) Any officer, or any officer within a class of officers, designated by the Minister for the purposes of this section, may determine the origin, tariff classification and value for duty of imported goods at or before the time they are accounted for under subsection 32(1), (3) or (5).
(2) If the origin, tariff classification and value for duty of imported goods are not determined under subsection (1), the origin, tariff classification and value for duty of the goods are deemed to be determined, for the purposes of this Act, to be as declared by the person accounting for the goods in the form prescribed under paragraph 32(1)(a). That determination is