Sample JD Exam Questions with Model Answers

Section 7. The dismissal engages liberty (employment is not, on its own, a s.7 liberty interest — see Blencoe — but loss of livelihood combined with health implications may engage security of the person). The first task is to identify whether s.7 is engaged at all. If yes, proceed to PFJs.

The most likely PFJ argument is overbreadth: the Act captures employees with contraindications who could not safely receive the vaccine — conduct unrelated to the legislative purpose of preventing transmission. Apply Bedford: the law must connect to its objective; sweeping in unrelated conduct violates s.7.

Section 1. Pandemic protection is pressing and substantial. Rational connection: requiring vaccination is rationally linked to preventing transmission. Minimal impairment fails: a medical-exemption regime is a less rights-restrictive means achieving the objective.

Section 15. The Act distinguishes between vaccinated and unvaccinated, but this is not an enumerated/analogous ground. The disability ground may be implicated indirectly because medically exempt employees are disproportionately those with disabilities (adverse impact, Withler). If so, the s.15(1) infringement is parallel to s.7. Andrews substantive equality.

Remedy. Under s.52(1), the appropriate remedy is reading-in a medical-exemption clause, following Vriend — the legislative purpose is best served by extending protection.

Detention. Was the accused detained? Grant (2009): detention occurs where the state suspends liberty by significant physical or psychological restraint. Stopping in an alley, asking pointed questions, and patting down — viewed objectively from the reasonable person in the accused''s position — is a detention.

Lawful detention? Mann (2004): investigative detention requires reasonable suspicion of a clear nexus to a recent or ongoing offence. Reasonable suspicion requires articulable, objective grounds. The 911 call is suggestive but the accused does not match the description. Five minutes after the call, walking briskly from the alley — borderline. Decisive considerations include description match and context.

Pat-down. Mann permits a protective pat-down for officer safety where reasonable suspicion supports the detention. The pat-down here was incidental to investigative detention. Officer safety reasonable on these facts (alleged weapon).

Reaching in. Mann limits the search to identifying weapons. A glass pipe is plainly not a weapon. Reaching in exceeds the safety-pat-down authority. Section 8 breach.

Section 24(2). Grant three-factor: (1) seriousness — the breach is in the middle range; not flagrant but exceeds bounds; (2) impact on the accused — significant privacy intrusion at the pat-down moment; (3) society''s interest — possession is a less serious offence; reliable physical evidence. Likely exclusion.

If detention was unlawful from the outset (no reasonable suspicion), the breach compounds and exclusion is even more likely.

Builder. Apply Donoghue v Stevenson / Anns/Cooper. Foreseeability: harm to the ultimate occupant of an apartment from a defective alarm is reasonably foreseeable. Proximity: the manufacturer-occupant relationship has been recognised since Donoghue; the builder owes a duty to occupants of the building. Stage 2: no residual policy considerations negate the duty (no indeterminate liability — limited to occupants of this building). Duty established. Standard of care: was installation negligent? Compliance with code is evidence but not conclusive.

Municipality. Apply Cooper v Hobart. Foreseeability of harm from a negligent inspection: yes. Proximity: more contested. The municipality''s duty is generally owed to the public, not to individual occupants — Cooper itself is the leading authority denying proximity to investors against the BC Registrar. However, Just v BC (1989) and Ingles v Tutkaluk Construction suggest municipal inspections can give rise to a private-law duty where the inspection scheme creates expectations of reliance. Stage 2: indeterminate liability and conflict with public function may negate the duty. Outcome: more likely no duty than yes; if duty exists, the standard is reasonable inspection in the circumstances, and 12 years of intervening time may negate causation.

Causation. Snell v Farrell: causation by common-sense inference from totality of evidence. Resurfice/Clements: but-for governs.

Bhasin organising principle of good faith. Bhasin v Hrynew (2014) recognises good faith as an organising principle of Canadian contract law and identifies the duty of honest performance — a contracting party may not lie or knowingly mislead the other about matters directly linked to performance.

Callow extension to termination. CM Callow Inc v Zollinger (2020) extended honest performance to the exercise of contractual rights, including termination. The duty is not a duty to disclose intent to terminate — but a duty not to actively mislead.

Application. Acme had formed an intention to terminate. Continuing to express enthusiasm about long-term plans, knowing Beta would rely, is active misleading — exactly the Callow fact pattern. The 60-day notice period was proper, but the misleading conduct in the lead-up breached the duty of honest performance.

Damages. Hadley v Baxendale / Honda v Keays — losses arising naturally from the breach OR within both parties'' contemplation. The investment in additional production capacity is reasonably foreseeable: it is the type of harm caused by being misled into believing the contract would continue. Reliance and lost-opportunity measures are in play. Sattva (2014) governs interpretation.

Limits. Bhasin/Callow do not require disclosure or impose fiduciary duty. Acme could have stayed silent and given clean notice without breach. The breach lies in the active misleading.

BC has the Family Law Act 2011 (FLA). Critically, since 2013, BC''s FLA extends division-of-property regimes to spouses including those in marriage-like relationships of at least two years. So Y likely has a statutory claim. Identify FLA framework first.

If FLA does not apply (e.g. shorter cohabitation in another province): turn to unjust enrichment. Pettkus v Becker three-element test: enrichment (X enriched by Y''s domestic labour); corresponding deprivation (Y foregoes career, no asset accumulation); absence of juristic reason (no contractual or statutory basis for the contributions).

Joint family venture. Kerr v Baranow (2011) framework: where the elements of unjust enrichment are met and the parties engaged in a joint family venture, the appropriate remedy is a monetary award proportionate to contributions to wealth accumulation, calculated on a value-survived basis. Indicia of joint family venture: mutual effort, economic integration, actual intent, priority of the family. All present here.

Constructive trust. Reserved for cases where monetary remedy is inadequate and contribution is linked to specific property. Possible for the family home if Y can show direct contribution; less likely for diffuse domestic labour.

Conclusion. Y has strong claims under either FLA (if applicable) or Pettkus/Kerr. Quantum based on value-survived percentage of accumulated wealth.

Standard of review. Vavilov (2019) presumes reasonableness for administrative decisions. The five correctness categories: legislative direction, statutory rights of appeal, constitutional questions, general questions of law of central importance, jurisdictional boundaries. None obviously applies here. Reasonableness governs.

Reasoned-decision requirement. Vavilov substantially strengthened the requirement for reasons. The court examines the actual reasons — not hypothesised ones — and asks whether the decision is justified, transparent, and intelligible.

Application. Two paragraphs without analysis is highly likely to be unreasonable: the decision-maker has not engaged with the central submissions, has not connected facts to law, and has not addressed the statutory criteria. Vavilov directs that the burden of justification rises with the importance of the decision to the affected — citizenship is highly important.

Procedural fairness. Baker (1999) five factors. Citizenship decisions: (1) judicial-style decision; (2) discretionary statutory scheme; (3) high importance to applicant; (4) legitimate expectations from program guidance; (5) procedural choices set by ministerial guidelines. High end of the fairness spectrum. Reasons required.

Remedy. Quash the decision and remit for redetermination by a different decision-maker, with directions on the standard of analysis required.

Haida Nation framework (2004). The Crown''s duty to consult is triggered when (1) the Crown has actual or constructive knowledge of a potential Aboriginal right or title; AND (2) the Crown contemplates conduct that may adversely affect the right.

Application. Both elements met: the First Nation has formally asserted title (Crown has knowledge); the exploration permit is conduct that may adversely affect the asserted title.

Scope of the duty. Haida spectrum: from notice + information sharing (weak claim, low impact) to deep consultation and accommodation (strong claim, severe impact). Here the asserted title is significant; exploration impact may be substantial. Toward the deeper end of the spectrum.

Procedural delegation. Under Haida, the Crown may delegate procedural aspects of consultation to project proponents, but the constitutional obligation remains with the Crown.

Beyond consultation if title is later proven. Should title be declared (Tsilhqot''in-style), the Crown''s fiduciary obligation generally requires consent for substantial infringement. Failing consent, the Crown must justify on a Sparrow analysis: compelling and substantial public objective, consistent with the honour of the Crown, with proportionality.

Practical remedy. Quash the permit; require deep consultation and accommodation. Mikisew Cree (2005) confirms duty extends to treaty rights as well.