CA — Charter of Rights & Freedoms (AI set 1)

All cards in this deck

R v Oakes (1986) — what two-stage test governs s.1 Charter justification?

The government must show (1) a pressing and substantial objective, and (2) proportionality: rational connection, minimal impairment, and proportionality of effects between the limit's benefits and its severity. Failure at any stage means the limit is not saved: R v Oakes [1986] 1 SCR 103.

R v Big M Drug Mart (1985) — what does s.2(a) protect, and what is the core principle?

Section 2(a) guarantees freedom of conscience and religion, protecting both the freedom to hold religious beliefs and to manifest them. The state cannot coerce individuals to act contrary to their religious beliefs or impose conformity with a particular religion: R v Big M Drug Mart Ltd [1985] 1 SCR 295.

Hunter v Southam Inc (1984) — what constitutional standard governs searches under s.8?

Section 8 protects a reasonable expectation of privacy; a valid search generally requires prior authorization by a neutral and impartial arbiter on reasonable and probable grounds. Warrantless searches are presumptively unreasonable: Hunter v Southam Inc [1984] 2 SCR 145.

Reference re BC Motor Vehicle Act (1985) — can s.7 'principles of fundamental justice' be purely procedural?

No. The Supreme Court held that principles of fundamental justice under s.7 include substantive guarantees, not merely procedural ones; absolute liability combined with imprisonment violates s.7 because it punishes the morally innocent: Reference re BC Motor Vehicle Act [1985] 2 SCR 486.

Carter v Canada (Attorney General) (2015) — which s.7 principles did the absolute prohibition on assisted dying violate?

The Criminal Code prohibition on physician-assisted dying violated s.7 because it deprived competent adults with grievous irremediable conditions of life, liberty, and security in a manner that was arbitrary and grossly disproportionate; the violation was not saved by s.1: Carter v Canada (Attorney General) 2015 SCC 5.

Canada (Attorney General) v. Power (2024) — can individuals claim s.24(1) damages against the Crown for unconstitutional legislation?

Yes. The Supreme Court held that s.24(1) of the Charter can ground a private law damages remedy against the government for loss caused by unconstitutional legislation where such damages would be just and appropriate; legislative immunity does not categorically bar such claims: Canada (AG) v Power 2024 SCC 26.

Vriend v Alberta (1998) — how does s.32 Charter application extend to legislative omissions?

The Charter applies to government action including under-inclusive legislation; the Court read sexual orientation into the Alberta Individual's Rights Protection Act to remedy discriminatory exclusion, confirming that legislative omissions can constitute government action subject to Charter scrutiny: Vriend v Alberta [1998] 1 SCR 493.

Baron v. Canada (1993) — does a mandatory search warrant for tax documents under federal statute satisfy s.8?

The Supreme Court held that a statutory provision compelling the issuance of a search warrant without allowing the authorizing judge any discretion to refuse violated s.8, because prior authorisation requires genuine judicial discretion to assess whether the constitutional standard is met: Baron v Canada [1993] 1 SCR 416.

R v Oakes (1986) — what is the 'proportionality' branch of the Oakes test?

Under s.1, once a pressing and substantial objective is shown, the government must prove: (1) rational connection between means and objective; (2) minimal impairment of the right; and (3) proportionality between the limit's effects and the objective's importance. R v Oakes [1986] 1 SCR 103.

Ontario (AG) v Fraser (2011) — what is the s.2(d) freedom of association minimum guarantee?

Section 2(d) protects employees' right to associate to make collective representations to their employer and to have those representations considered in good faith; it does not guarantee a particular collective bargaining model. Ontario (Attorney General) v Fraser, 2011 SCC 20.

Hunter v Southam (1984) — what prior-authorization requirement flows from s.8?

Section 8 presumptively requires a warrant issued by a neutral and detached arbiter on the basis of reasonable and probable grounds before a search is conducted; warrantless searches are prima facie unreasonable. Hunter v Southam Inc [1984] 2 SCR 145.

R v Morgentaler (1988) — how did the SCC apply s.7 to abortion restrictions?

The Criminal Code's therapeutic abortion committee procedure violated s.7 because it imposed state-caused delays and risks to a woman's physical security of the person in a manner inconsistent with the principles of fundamental justice. R v Morgentaler [1988] 1 SCR 30.

Canada (AG) v Power (2024) — what is the test for s.24(1) Charter damages against the Crown?

Charter damages under s.24(1) are available against the Crown where: (1) a Charter right was infringed; (2) damages are an appropriate and just remedy considering whether they would fulfil the purposes of compensation, vindication, or deterrence; and (3) no countervailing factors negate the award. Canada (Attorney General) v Power, 2024 SCC 26.

Ontario (AG) v G (2019) — what is a 'suspended declaration of invalidity' under s.52?

Where legislation is struck down under s.52(1) as inconsistent with the Charter, a court may suspend the declaration of invalidity for a period to allow the legislature to remedy the defect, particularly where immediate invalidity would cause harm or a legal vacuum. Ontario (Attorney General) v G, 2019 SCC 36.

R v Big M Drug Mart (1985) — can a law with an unconstitutional purpose be saved under s.1?

A law whose purpose infringes a guaranteed right cannot be saved by s.1; an unconstitutional purpose is fatal because s.1 can only justify limits on rights, not laws whose very object is to abridge them. R v Big M Drug Mart Ltd [1985] 1 SCR 295.

R v Oakes (1986) — what is the s.1 'pressing and substantial objective' threshold?

The government must first show the law's objective is pressing and substantial before proportionality is even assessed. In Oakes, the SCC held that trivial or discordant objectives cannot justify Charter limits, making a sufficiently important objective a mandatory gateway under s.1 of the Charter.

Carter v Canada (AG) (2015) — how does s.7 'gross disproportionality' differ from overbreadth?

Overbreadth asks whether a law catches conduct with no connection to the law's purpose, while gross disproportionality asks whether the law's effects on the individual are so severe as to be entirely disproportionate to the state's objective. The SCC in Carter v Canada (AG) 2015 SCC 5 found the absolute ban on assisted dying grossly disproportionate and overbroad, both being independent principles of fundamental justice under s.7.

Andrews v Law Society of BC (1989) — what is the 'similarly situated' test and why did the SCC reject it for s.15?

The SCC in Andrews v Law Society of British Columbia [1989] 1 SCR 143 rejected the formal 'similarly situated' comparator approach as inadequate because it can perpetuate existing disadvantage. Instead, s.15 requires substantive equality, examining whether a law draws a distinction based on an enumerated or analogous ground that creates a disadvantage by perpetuating prejudice or stereotyping.

R v Morgentaler (1988) — which branch of s.7 did the abortion procedure requirements violate?

The SCC in R v Morgentaler [1988] 1 SCR 30 struck down the Criminal Code's therapeutic abortion committee requirements as a violation of women's security of the person under s.7, finding that the resulting delays and unequal access caused serious psychological and physical harm that was not in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice.

Canada (AG) v Power (2024) — what principle limits s.24(1) damages for unconstitutional legislation?

The SCC in Canada (Attorney General) v Power 2024 SCC 26 confirmed that s.24(1) Charter damages against the Crown for unconstitutional legislation are available in principle, but courts must apply a functional justification analysis — assessing whether damages would serve the purposes of compensation, deterrence, or vindication — and Crown immunity defences do not automatically bar such claims.

Ontario (AG) v G (2019) — when will a court read in rather than strike down an unconstitutional provision?

The SCC in Ontario (AG) v G 2019 SCC 36 held that reading in is appropriate where striking down would be a worse outcome for those the Charter protects, and where the court can be confident the legislature would have preferred the extended law to no law at all. Reading in and suspended declarations of invalidity under s.52 are complementary remedial tools calibrated to minimise democratic harm.