CA — Evidence (AI set 1)

All cards in this deck

What is the principled approach to hearsay admissibility in Canada?

Hearsay is presumptively inadmissible but may be admitted if the proponent establishes necessity and threshold reliability on a balance of probabilities. The court conducts a voir dire to assess these twin criteria: R v Khelawon, [2006] 2 SCR 787.

R v Khelawon — what does 'threshold reliability' require?

Threshold reliability may be established either by showing adequate substitutes for testing the evidence (procedural reliability) or by circumstances guaranteeing its truth (substantive reliability). The ultimate question is whether the evidence has sufficient indicia of reliability to be considered by the trier of fact: R v Khelawon, [2006] 2 SCR 787.

R v Mohan (1994) — what are the four criteria for admitting expert evidence?

Expert evidence is admissible only if it is (1) relevant, (2) necessary to assist the trier of fact, (3) not subject to any exclusionary rule, and (4) given by a properly qualified expert. Each criterion must be satisfied: R v Mohan, [1994] 2 SCR 9.

What is the confessions rule in Canadian criminal law?

A statement made by an accused to a person in authority is inadmissible unless the Crown proves beyond a reasonable doubt that it was made voluntarily — free from threats, promises, oppression, or other improper inducements undermining the accused's operating mind. The rule is rooted in the common law and preserved under the Charter.

What is the basic relevance standard for admissibility of evidence in Canada?

Evidence is relevant if it has some tendency, as a matter of logic and human experience, to make the existence of a fact in issue more or less probable than it would be without the evidence. Relevance alone is necessary but not sufficient — the probative value must not be substantially outweighed by prejudicial effect: R v Mohan, [1994] 2 SCR 9.

What does 'necessity' mean in the principled approach to hearsay?

Necessity is not limited to situations where the original declarant is unavailable; it is satisfied where requiring the original testimony would be unreasonable or the evidence is not available in an equivalent form. Necessity is assessed in a flexible, case-by-case manner: R v Khelawon, [2006] 2 SCR 787.

R v F (WJ) (1999) — what principle governs similar fact evidence?

Similar fact evidence is presumptively inadmissible because of its prejudicial effect; it may be admitted only when its probative value — assessed by such factors as striking similarity and absence of collusion — outweighs its prejudicial effect. The trial judge must conduct a cost-benefit balancing exercise: R v F (WJ), [1999] 3 SCR 569.

What is the 'necessity' criterion for expert evidence under Mohan?

Expert evidence is 'necessary' when it provides information or an inference that is likely to be outside the ordinary knowledge and experience of the trier of fact, going beyond mere helpfulness. Evidence that merely provides an opinion on an ultimate issue the jury can resolve without assistance may be excluded: R v Mohan, [1994] 2 SCR 9.

R v Khelawon — what is the 'ultimate reliability' analysis at the admissibility stage?

Under the principled approach, the trial judge conducts only a threshold reliability assessment at the admissibility stage, not a final determination of truth; ultimate reliability is left to the trier of fact when weighing the evidence. R v Khelawon [2006] 2 SCR 787 confirms this two-stage structure and warns against usurping the trier of fact's role.

Under Mohan, what role does the 'properly qualified expert' requirement play in excluding expert evidence?

Even if the proposed opinion evidence is relevant and necessary, it must be given by a witness with sufficient training, experience, or education in the field; failure on this criterion is an independent ground to exclude. R v Mohan [1994] 2 SCR 9 lists proper qualification as the fourth admissibility criterion alongside relevance, necessity, and absence of an exclusionary rule.

Under the principled approach to hearsay, how is 'threshold reliability' established?

Threshold reliability can be established either through (1) procedural reliability — circumstances surrounding the making of the statement (e.g., oath, opportunity to cross-examine) — or (2) substantive reliability — inherent trustworthiness based on corroborating evidence or other indicators. R v Khelawon [2006] 2 SCR 787 clarifies that both pathways focus on whether the jury can fairly assess the statement's truth.

What does 'materiality' add to the relevance inquiry in Canadian evidence law?

Evidence is relevant if it has a tendency to make a fact in issue more or less probable; materiality asks whether that fact in issue actually matters to the outcome of the proceeding. Together, relevance and materiality form the basic admissibility threshold before other exclusionary rules are applied, as reflected in the general common-law framework endorsed in R v Mohan [1994] 2 SCR 9.

R v Mohan — what is the 'novel science' concern, and how does it affect the reliability criterion?

Where expert evidence rests on a novel or contested scientific theory, courts apply heightened scrutiny to ensure the underlying science is sufficiently reliable before admitting the opinion; mere novelty does not disqualify the evidence, but the proponent must establish that the theory has gained meaningful acceptance or has been otherwise validated. R v Mohan [1994] 2 SCR 9 identifies this as part of the relevance/reliability analysis at the gatekeeping stage.

What is 'necessity' in the principled approach to hearsay, and when is it satisfied?

Necessity requires that the original declarant's evidence be unavailable in an equivalent oral form, whether because the declarant is deceased, ill, outside Canada, or cannot be located despite reasonable efforts. R v Khelawon [2006] 2 SCR 787 confirms that necessity is interpreted broadly to mean the original, better evidence is practically unavailable, not merely inconvenient to obtain.

What is the 'confirmation by other evidence' rule regarding confessions, and does it still apply in Canada?

At common law, a confession required confirmation by independent evidence before it could ground a conviction (the corroboration rule). In Canada, no corroboration is strictly required; admissibility turns on the confessions rule — the Crown must prove beyond a reasonable doubt the statement was voluntary (not made under fear of prejudice or hope of advantage): see R v Ibrahim (1914, adopted in Canadian law) and codified protections under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, s. 7.

R v F (WJ) (1999) — what prejudice must a trial judge guard against when admitting similar fact evidence?

In R v F (WJ) [1999] 3 SCR 569, the Supreme Court held that when similar fact evidence is admitted, the trial judge must guard against both reasoning prejudice (the jury using the evidence as pure propensity reasoning unconnected to the issue) and moral prejudice (the jury convicting because the accused is a bad person). The probative value must clearly outweigh both forms of prejudice.