Standard of Review and Reasonableness After Vavilov

Standard of review

Vavilov establishes a presumption that reasonableness is the standard of review whenever a court reviews the merits of an administrative decision. The presumption is rebutted only where the legislature signals otherwise — a legislated standard or a statutory appeal mechanism, which attracts the appellate standards (correctness for questions of law; palpable and overriding error for fact and mixed questions) — or where the rule of law demands correctness: constitutional questions, general questions of law of central importance to the legal system as a whole, and jurisdictional boundaries between administrative bodies. None applies. The Act gives no right of appeal, and the Committee's reading of s 14(2) of its home statute is an ordinary question of statutory interpretation. Vavilov abolished the old "true questions of jurisdiction" category, so the argument that the Committee misconceived its own powers does not convert this into correctness review. Reasonableness governs.

Reasonableness review

A reasonable decision bears the hallmarks of justification, transparency and intelligibility, and is justified in relation to the legal and factual constraints bearing on it (Vavilov). Review starts with the reasons given. Two flaws make this refusal unreasonable.

First, the Committee's assertion that it had "no discretion" cannot be reconciled with the statute. Section 14(2) is permissive ("may refuse") and contains an express proviso for failures caused by circumstances beyond the member's control. Vavilov treats the governing statutory scheme as the most salient constraint: a decision-maker need not perform formalistic interpretation, but it cannot adopt a reading the text cannot bear. Reading the proviso out of existence is a failure to operate within the statutory scheme, not a permissible interpretive choice.

Second, the reasons are not responsive. Priya's central submission — documented medical leave, with credits completed shortly after the deadline — is never mentioned. Vavilov requires the decision-maker to grapple meaningfully with key issues and central arguments; silence on a decisive point permits the inference that it was never considered. Because the decision strips Priya of her livelihood, the principle of responsive justification heightens the obligation: the reasons must reflect the stakes. The College may counter that reasons need not be perfect and that a court can read them in light of the record. True, but Vavilov forbids a court from supplying reasons that "could have been" given on an issue the decision-maker never confronted, and this record shows no engagement at all. Brevity alone would not be fatal; brevity that conceals a misreading of the statute and ignores the dispositive evidence is.

Procedural fairness

Fairness is assessed by the court directly, not through a standard-of-review lens. The Baker factors calibrate its content: the decision is adjudicative in character; the scheme makes it final, with no appeal; the importance to Priya is very high; the College's choice of procedure deserves some respect; and the published Guideline — members "will ordinarily be offered an opportunity to address the Committee in person" — grounds a legitimate expectation. In Canadian law a legitimate expectation can enhance procedural protections, though it cannot dictate the substantive outcome. Baker confirms an oral hearing is not always required and written submissions can suffice; the College will say the issues were documentary. But where the regulator's own published practice promised an in-person opportunity, the stakes were severe, and the written process demonstrably failed to engage her explanation, refusing even to consider a meeting likely fell below the fairness owed.

Remedy

Where a decision is unreasonable, Vavilov makes quashing and remitting for reconsideration, with the court's reasons, the default. Substituting the court's own outcome or declining to remit is exceptional, reserved for cases where a particular result is inevitable and remittal would serve no useful purpose. Here the proviso calls for a discretionary, fact-driven assessment the Committee has never performed, so remittal — preferably to a differently constituted panel, with a direction to consider the s 14(2) proviso, the medical evidence, and the in-person opportunity contemplated by the Guideline — is the likely order.

Conclusion

Reasonableness applies; the refusal is unreasonable for misreading s 14(2) and ignoring the central evidence; the denial of any in-person opportunity likely breached Baker fairness; the court will quash and remit.