Administrative Law · Administrative Law

CA — Administrative Law — Quiz 1

Judicial review of administrative action — standard of review, procedural fairness, and reasonableness.

7 questions · 12 min

1.
A federal tribunal decides a statutory interpretation question that goes to the scope of its own enabling legislation — specifically, whether a certain category of worker falls within the tribunal's jurisdiction. The legislation contains no standard of review privative clause and no statutory right of appeal. Applying Vavilov, what standard of review should a Federal Court apply? Ms. Patel is a gig-economy courier who files a complaint before a labour adjudicator under a federal statute. The adjudicator interprets the word 'employee' in the statute to include gig workers and proceeds to hear the complaint. The employer seeks judicial review, arguing the adjudicator exceeded its jurisdiction by misinterpreting 'employee.'
2.
A federal corrections officer is dismissed after an internal discipline process. He was given 48 hours to respond in writing to the allegations against him but was never told the identity of the witnesses whose statements formed the basis of the charges, nor given an opportunity to cross-examine them. The officer seeks judicial review for breach of procedural fairness. Which of the following best describes how a court should approach the procedural fairness question? Assume that the Baker factors apply and that the officer's livelihood and reputation are squarely at stake.
3.
A federal employee is dismissed without cause under a 'at pleasure' provision in a federal statute. She argues the dismissal violates procedural fairness because she received no notice, no reasons, and no opportunity to respond. The government argues that 'at pleasure' employment historically conveyed unfettered dismissal power. Which principle, established by the Supreme Court of Canada, most directly governs whether she is owed procedural fairness? Assume the relevant statute is the Canada Labour Code and that Wilson v. Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd., 2016 SCC 29 is directly on point.
4.
After a successful judicial review, the Federal Court finds that a visa officer's refusal of a permanent resident application was unreasonable under Vavilov because the officer failed to grapple with a key piece of evidence. The applicant asks the Court to substitute its own decision granting the visa rather than returning the matter to the officer. Under what circumstances may a reviewing court substitute its own decision rather than remit? Apply the principles from Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v Vavilov (2019).
5.
A federally regulated employee files an unjust dismissal complaint. The adjudicator appointed under the Canada Labour Code finds in the employee's favour and orders reinstatement with full back pay. The employer applies for judicial review, arguing the adjudicator's remedy was unreasonable because the adjudicator provided no reasons for awarding back pay rather than damages in lieu of reinstatement. Under Vavilov, which statement best describes the reviewability of the adjudicator's remedy? Assume there is no privative clause and no statutory appeal in this case.
6.
An applicant for Canadian citizenship is refused on the grounds that she did not meet the residency requirement. The citizenship officer's written decision states only: 'After reviewing your file, I am not satisfied that you meet the residency requirement under s. 5(1)(c) of the Citizenship Act.' No further explanation is provided. The applicant had submitted detailed evidence of her residency. On judicial review, what is the most likely outcome and why? Apply the Vavilov framework on the adequacy of reasons.
7.
A federal regulatory tribunal issues a decision on a matter involving both a constitutional question (whether a provision of the enabling statute violates s. 2(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms) and a question of statutory interpretation of its home statute. The applicant seeks judicial review of both aspects of the decision. What standards of review apply to each issue? Apply Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v Vavilov (2019).

Questions & answers

1. A federal tribunal decides a statutory interpretation question that goes to the scope of its own enabling legislation — specifically, whether a certain category of worker falls within the tribunal's jurisdiction. The legislation contains no standard of review privative clause and no statutory right of appeal. Applying Vavilov, what standard of review should a Federal Court apply? Ms. Patel is a gig-economy courier who files a complaint before a labour adjudicator under a federal statute. The adjudicator interprets the word 'employee' in the statute to include gig workers and proceeds to hear the complaint. The employer seeks judicial review, arguing the adjudicator exceeded its jurisdiction by misinterpreting 'employee.'
Answer: Reasonableness, because Vavilov establishes a strong presumption of reasonableness review for all questions decided by administrative decision-makers, including statutory interpretation within their home statute.
In Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v Vavilov (2019), the Supreme Court of Canada fundamentally restructured the standard of review framework. The Court held that there is a strong, rebuttable presumption that all questions decided by administrative decision-makers are reviewed on reasonableness. The correctness exceptions are narrow and closed: constitutional questions, questions of general law of central importance to the legal system, questions regarding jurisdictional boundaries between two or more administrative bodies, and where a statutory appeal mechanism applies. Critically, Vavilov explicitly rejected the pre-Dunsmuir concept of 'jurisdictional questions' as a distinct category triggering correctness review — it abolished the jurisdiction/non-jurisdiction distinction from Dunsmuir. An adjudicator interpreting the definition of 'employee' in its home statute is exactly the kind of question reviewed on reasonableness. Option A is wrong because Vavilov abolished 'jurisdiction' as a free-standing correctness category. Option C is wrong because the presence or absence of a privative clause is no longer the dominant factor — Vavilov moved away from this approach. Option D incorrectly adds a specialized-expertise qualifier that no longer gates the presumption of reasonableness. Option E is wrong because Vavilov explicitly overruled the jurisdictional line of reasoning from Dunsmuir.
2. A federal corrections officer is dismissed after an internal discipline process. He was given 48 hours to respond in writing to the allegations against him but was never told the identity of the witnesses whose statements formed the basis of the charges, nor given an opportunity to cross-examine them. The officer seeks judicial review for breach of procedural fairness. Which of the following best describes how a court should approach the procedural fairness question? Assume that the Baker factors apply and that the officer's livelihood and reputation are squarely at stake.
Answer: The reviewing court should assess procedural fairness on a correctness standard, asking whether the procedure followed met the requirements of fairness given all relevant circumstances, including the Baker factors.
Procedural fairness is not reviewed under either reasonableness or correctness in the Vavilov sense — it is assessed by asking whether the procedure was fair in all the circumstances: Baker v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) (1999). As confirmed in Vavilov itself, the standard of review analysis applies to the merits of an administrative decision, not to procedural fairness. Courts ask whether the level of procedural fairness provided was adequate given the Baker factors: (1) nature of the decision and the process followed; (2) statutory scheme; (3) importance of the decision to the person; (4) legitimate expectations; and (5) the tribunal's choice of procedures. Given that the officer's livelihood and reputation are at stake (high Baker factor 3), and that the witnesses' identities were withheld and no cross-examination was permitted, the procedure is likely inadequate. Option A is wrong — procedural fairness is not reviewed on reasonableness as a deferential standard. Option C is wrong — Vavilov does not govern procedural fairness analysis. Option D incorrectly limits correctness-like review to legitimate expectation cases. Option E is wrong — there is no 'proportionality' threshold for procedural fairness intervention; the question is simply whether the procedure was fair.
3. A federal employee is dismissed without cause under a 'at pleasure' provision in a federal statute. She argues the dismissal violates procedural fairness because she received no notice, no reasons, and no opportunity to respond. The government argues that 'at pleasure' employment historically conveyed unfettered dismissal power. Which principle, established by the Supreme Court of Canada, most directly governs whether she is owed procedural fairness? Assume the relevant statute is the Canada Labour Code and that Wilson v. Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd., 2016 SCC 29 is directly on point.
Answer: Wilson v. Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd., 2016 SCC 29 held that the Canada Labour Code's unjust dismissal provisions apply to federally regulated employees and cannot be avoided through a no-cause termination — but this concerns substantive rights, not procedural fairness owed by administrative adjudicators.
Wilson v. Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd., 2016 SCC 29 is the leading authority on dismissal of federal employees under the Canada Labour Code. The Supreme Court held that a federally regulated employer cannot rely on 'without cause' dismissal to circumvent the unjust dismissal provisions in the Code (ss. 240–246). The Court held that offering severance pay instead of reinstatement cannot substitute for the adjudicative remedies available under the Code. This is a ruling about the substantive right of employees not to be unjustly dismissed — not about the procedural fairness owed by administrative adjudicators as such. Option D correctly identifies what Wilson actually decided. Options A, C, and E misstate the law — the at-pleasure doctrine has been significantly curtailed in the federally regulated sector by the Code. Option B is also wrong: the employment relationship with a federal Crown employer can attract administrative law duties of fairness, though Wilson is specifically about statutory rights under the Code rather than the common law duty of fairness. Option D is the most accurate and precise statement of what the case stands for and why it governs the scenario.
4. After a successful judicial review, the Federal Court finds that a visa officer's refusal of a permanent resident application was unreasonable under Vavilov because the officer failed to grapple with a key piece of evidence. The applicant asks the Court to substitute its own decision granting the visa rather than returning the matter to the officer. Under what circumstances may a reviewing court substitute its own decision rather than remit? Apply the principles from Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v Vavilov (2019).
Answer: Only where there is one reasonable outcome available on the record, making remittal a useless exercise — i.e., where the outcome is inevitably dictated by the legal and factual constraints.
Vavilov (2019) confirms that the ordinary remedy on a successful judicial review is to remit the matter to the decision-maker for reconsideration, not for the court to substitute its own decision. The exception is narrow: a court may substitute its own decision only where there is a single reasonable outcome that is inevitable on the facts and law — i.e., where remittal would be 'pointless' or a 'mere formality' because the decision-maker would have no choice but to reach the same result. This preserves the institutional role of the administrative decision-maker and respects the legislature's choice to vest decision-making in the tribunal. Option A is incorrect — hardship and delay, while potentially relevant to timing, do not justify substitution under Vavilov. Option B is wrong — the power to remit or substitute flows from the Federal Courts Act and common law, not just from express statutory grants. Option D is wrong — disagreement with reasoning alone does not permit substitution; even where reasoning is flawed, remittal is the default. Option E is wrong — consent of parties cannot expand the court's jurisdiction to substitute.
5. A federally regulated employee files an unjust dismissal complaint. The adjudicator appointed under the Canada Labour Code finds in the employee's favour and orders reinstatement with full back pay. The employer applies for judicial review, arguing the adjudicator's remedy was unreasonable because the adjudicator provided no reasons for awarding back pay rather than damages in lieu of reinstatement. Under Vavilov, which statement best describes the reviewability of the adjudicator's remedy? Assume there is no privative clause and no statutory appeal in this case.
Answer: Under Vavilov, reasonableness review applies. An adjudicator's reasoned exercise of remedial discretion must be justified, transparent, and intelligible. A complete failure to explain the reasoning behind a significant aspect of the remedy — such as choosing back pay over damages in lieu — may render the decision unreasonable.
Under Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v Vavilov (2019), reasonableness review applies to all questions decided by an administrative decision-maker unless a correctness exception is triggered (none applies here). Reasonableness requires that the decision be justified, transparent, and intelligible and that the outcome fall within the range of acceptable outcomes defensible in fact and law. This obligation extends to remedial choices. Where an adjudicator makes a significant remedial order — here, ordering reinstatement with full back pay — without providing reasons for the choice of back pay over the alternative of damages in lieu, a reviewing court may find the decision unreasonable because the reasoning is not transparent or intelligible on an important point. Wilson v. Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd., 2016 SCC 29 confirms that reinstatement is the primary remedy under the Code, which contextualizes why back pay accompanying reinstatement is defensible — but reasons still matter. Option A is wrong — Vavilov requires justification even for discretionary choices. Option B is wrong — remedial discretion under a home statute is reviewed on reasonableness, not correctness. Option D is wrong — the absence of a privative clause no longer triggers a lower level of deference under Vavilov; the presumption of reasonableness applies regardless. Option E is wrong — remedial orders from administrative adjudicators are plainly subject to judicial review.
6. An applicant for Canadian citizenship is refused on the grounds that she did not meet the residency requirement. The citizenship officer's written decision states only: 'After reviewing your file, I am not satisfied that you meet the residency requirement under s. 5(1)(c) of the Citizenship Act.' No further explanation is provided. The applicant had submitted detailed evidence of her residency. On judicial review, what is the most likely outcome and why? Apply the Vavilov framework on the adequacy of reasons.
Answer: The decision is unreasonable because it fails to engage with the applicant's evidence and provides no basis for the conclusion — the reasons do not allow the applicant or a reviewing court to understand why the residency requirement was not met.
Vavilov (2019) is emphatic that reasons are the primary mechanism by which administrative decision-makers demonstrate that their decision is reasonable. The Court held that reasons must be read holistically but must be sufficient to allow the affected party and a reviewing court to understand why the decision was reached. Where reasons fail to engage with key evidence, fail to address the central issues, or are so bare as to provide no real explanation for the outcome, the decision will be unreasonable for lack of adequate justification, transparency, and intelligibility. A one-line boilerplate refusal that does not grapple with the applicant's detailed residency evidence is paradigmatically inadequate under Vavilov. Option A is incorrect — Baker (1999) established that there is a duty to provide reasons in significant immigration and citizenship decisions. Option C is wrong — the test is objective: does the decision, on its face, demonstrate engagement with the evidence? The applicant need not prove the officer ignored the evidence. Option D is wrong — Vavilov rejects the idea that mere brevity insulates reasons from review; the content must be sufficient. Option E is wrong — citizenship determinations do not fall into the narrow Vavilov correctness categories.
7. A federal regulatory tribunal issues a decision on a matter involving both a constitutional question (whether a provision of the enabling statute violates s. 2(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms) and a question of statutory interpretation of its home statute. The applicant seeks judicial review of both aspects of the decision. What standards of review apply to each issue? Apply Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v Vavilov (2019).
Answer: The constitutional question (Charter s. 2(b)) is reviewed on correctness; the statutory interpretation question is reviewed on reasonableness.
Vavilov (2019) explicitly preserved correctness review for a closed list of categories, one of which is constitutional questions — including questions about whether a statutory provision violates the Charter. The Court reasoned that constitutional questions must be decided correctly and consistently across the legal system; deference to administrative decision-makers on such questions would be inappropriate given the supremacy of the Constitution. By contrast, questions of statutory interpretation of the decision-maker's home statute fall squarely within the presumption of reasonableness review. The decision-maker has relative expertise in its home statute, and the legislature has entrusted interpretation to it. Thus, the bifurcated approach in Option C is exactly right. Option A is wrong — the Vavilov correctness carve-out for constitutional questions is clear. Option B is wrong — not all aspects of a decision involving constitutional issues are reviewed on correctness; only the constitutional question itself. Option D is wrong — whether the tribunal has express constitutional jurisdiction affects whether it can decide the question at all, but once it does, correctness applies regardless. Option E overstates the scope — only the constitutional question, not the entire decision, attracts correctness.

Questions & answers

1. A federal tribunal decides a statutory interpretation question that goes to the scope of its own enabling legislation — specifically, whether a certain category of worker falls within the tribunal's jurisdiction. The legislation contains no standard of review privative clause and no statutory right of appeal. Applying Vavilov, what standard of review should a Federal Court apply? Ms. Patel is a gig-economy courier who files a complaint before a labour adjudicator under a federal statute. The adjudicator interprets the word 'employee' in the statute to include gig workers and proceeds to hear the complaint. The employer seeks judicial review, arguing the adjudicator exceeded its jurisdiction by misinterpreting 'employee.'

Answer: Reasonableness, because Vavilov establishes a strong presumption of reasonableness review for all questions decided by administrative decision-makers, including statutory interpretation within their home statute.

In Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v Vavilov (2019), the Supreme Court of Canada fundamentally restructured the standard of review framework. The Court held that there is a strong, rebuttable presumption that all questions decided by administrative decision-makers are reviewed on reasonableness. The correctness exceptions are narrow and closed: constitutional questions, questions of general law of central importance to the legal system, questions regarding jurisdictional boundaries between two or more administrative bodies, and where a statutory appeal mechanism applies. Critically, Vavilov explicitly rejected the pre-Dunsmuir concept of 'jurisdictional questions' as a distinct category triggering correctness review — it abolished the jurisdiction/non-jurisdiction distinction from Dunsmuir. An adjudicator interpreting the definition of 'employee' in its home statute is exactly the kind of question reviewed on reasonableness. Option A is wrong because Vavilov abolished 'jurisdiction' as a free-standing correctness category. Option C is wrong because the presence or absence of a privative clause is no longer the dominant factor — Vavilov moved away from this approach. Option D incorrectly adds a specialized-expertise qualifier that no longer gates the presumption of reasonableness. Option E is wrong because Vavilov explicitly overruled the jurisdictional line of reasoning from Dunsmuir.

2. A federal corrections officer is dismissed after an internal discipline process. He was given 48 hours to respond in writing to the allegations against him but was never told the identity of the witnesses whose statements formed the basis of the charges, nor given an opportunity to cross-examine them. The officer seeks judicial review for breach of procedural fairness. Which of the following best describes how a court should approach the procedural fairness question? Assume that the Baker factors apply and that the officer's livelihood and reputation are squarely at stake.

Answer: The reviewing court should assess procedural fairness on a correctness standard, asking whether the procedure followed met the requirements of fairness given all relevant circumstances, including the Baker factors.

Procedural fairness is not reviewed under either reasonableness or correctness in the Vavilov sense — it is assessed by asking whether the procedure was fair in all the circumstances: Baker v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) (1999). As confirmed in Vavilov itself, the standard of review analysis applies to the merits of an administrative decision, not to procedural fairness. Courts ask whether the level of procedural fairness provided was adequate given the Baker factors: (1) nature of the decision and the process followed; (2) statutory scheme; (3) importance of the decision to the person; (4) legitimate expectations; and (5) the tribunal's choice of procedures. Given that the officer's livelihood and reputation are at stake (high Baker factor 3), and that the witnesses' identities were withheld and no cross-examination was permitted, the procedure is likely inadequate. Option A is wrong — procedural fairness is not reviewed on reasonableness as a deferential standard. Option C is wrong — Vavilov does not govern procedural fairness analysis. Option D incorrectly limits correctness-like review to legitimate expectation cases. Option E is wrong — there is no 'proportionality' threshold for procedural fairness intervention; the question is simply whether the procedure was fair.

3. A federal employee is dismissed without cause under a 'at pleasure' provision in a federal statute. She argues the dismissal violates procedural fairness because she received no notice, no reasons, and no opportunity to respond. The government argues that 'at pleasure' employment historically conveyed unfettered dismissal power. Which principle, established by the Supreme Court of Canada, most directly governs whether she is owed procedural fairness? Assume the relevant statute is the Canada Labour Code and that Wilson v. Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd., 2016 SCC 29 is directly on point.

Answer: Wilson v. Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd., 2016 SCC 29 held that the Canada Labour Code's unjust dismissal provisions apply to federally regulated employees and cannot be avoided through a no-cause termination — but this concerns substantive rights, not procedural fairness owed by administrative adjudicators.

Wilson v. Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd., 2016 SCC 29 is the leading authority on dismissal of federal employees under the Canada Labour Code. The Supreme Court held that a federally regulated employer cannot rely on 'without cause' dismissal to circumvent the unjust dismissal provisions in the Code (ss. 240–246). The Court held that offering severance pay instead of reinstatement cannot substitute for the adjudicative remedies available under the Code. This is a ruling about the substantive right of employees not to be unjustly dismissed — not about the procedural fairness owed by administrative adjudicators as such. Option D correctly identifies what Wilson actually decided. Options A, C, and E misstate the law — the at-pleasure doctrine has been significantly curtailed in the federally regulated sector by the Code. Option B is also wrong: the employment relationship with a federal Crown employer can attract administrative law duties of fairness, though Wilson is specifically about statutory rights under the Code rather than the common law duty of fairness. Option D is the most accurate and precise statement of what the case stands for and why it governs the scenario.

4. After a successful judicial review, the Federal Court finds that a visa officer's refusal of a permanent resident application was unreasonable under Vavilov because the officer failed to grapple with a key piece of evidence. The applicant asks the Court to substitute its own decision granting the visa rather than returning the matter to the officer. Under what circumstances may a reviewing court substitute its own decision rather than remit? Apply the principles from Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v Vavilov (2019).

Answer: Only where there is one reasonable outcome available on the record, making remittal a useless exercise — i.e., where the outcome is inevitably dictated by the legal and factual constraints.

Vavilov (2019) confirms that the ordinary remedy on a successful judicial review is to remit the matter to the decision-maker for reconsideration, not for the court to substitute its own decision. The exception is narrow: a court may substitute its own decision only where there is a single reasonable outcome that is inevitable on the facts and law — i.e., where remittal would be 'pointless' or a 'mere formality' because the decision-maker would have no choice but to reach the same result. This preserves the institutional role of the administrative decision-maker and respects the legislature's choice to vest decision-making in the tribunal. Option A is incorrect — hardship and delay, while potentially relevant to timing, do not justify substitution under Vavilov. Option B is wrong — the power to remit or substitute flows from the Federal Courts Act and common law, not just from express statutory grants. Option D is wrong — disagreement with reasoning alone does not permit substitution; even where reasoning is flawed, remittal is the default. Option E is wrong — consent of parties cannot expand the court's jurisdiction to substitute.

5. A federally regulated employee files an unjust dismissal complaint. The adjudicator appointed under the Canada Labour Code finds in the employee's favour and orders reinstatement with full back pay. The employer applies for judicial review, arguing the adjudicator's remedy was unreasonable because the adjudicator provided no reasons for awarding back pay rather than damages in lieu of reinstatement. Under Vavilov, which statement best describes the reviewability of the adjudicator's remedy? Assume there is no privative clause and no statutory appeal in this case.

Answer: Under Vavilov, reasonableness review applies. An adjudicator's reasoned exercise of remedial discretion must be justified, transparent, and intelligible. A complete failure to explain the reasoning behind a significant aspect of the remedy — such as choosing back pay over damages in lieu — may render the decision unreasonable.

Under Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v Vavilov (2019), reasonableness review applies to all questions decided by an administrative decision-maker unless a correctness exception is triggered (none applies here). Reasonableness requires that the decision be justified, transparent, and intelligible and that the outcome fall within the range of acceptable outcomes defensible in fact and law. This obligation extends to remedial choices. Where an adjudicator makes a significant remedial order — here, ordering reinstatement with full back pay — without providing reasons for the choice of back pay over the alternative of damages in lieu, a reviewing court may find the decision unreasonable because the reasoning is not transparent or intelligible on an important point. Wilson v. Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd., 2016 SCC 29 confirms that reinstatement is the primary remedy under the Code, which contextualizes why back pay accompanying reinstatement is defensible — but reasons still matter. Option A is wrong — Vavilov requires justification even for discretionary choices. Option B is wrong — remedial discretion under a home statute is reviewed on reasonableness, not correctness. Option D is wrong — the absence of a privative clause no longer triggers a lower level of deference under Vavilov; the presumption of reasonableness applies regardless. Option E is wrong — remedial orders from administrative adjudicators are plainly subject to judicial review.

6. An applicant for Canadian citizenship is refused on the grounds that she did not meet the residency requirement. The citizenship officer's written decision states only: 'After reviewing your file, I am not satisfied that you meet the residency requirement under s. 5(1)(c) of the Citizenship Act.' No further explanation is provided. The applicant had submitted detailed evidence of her residency. On judicial review, what is the most likely outcome and why? Apply the Vavilov framework on the adequacy of reasons.

Answer: The decision is unreasonable because it fails to engage with the applicant's evidence and provides no basis for the conclusion — the reasons do not allow the applicant or a reviewing court to understand why the residency requirement was not met.

Vavilov (2019) is emphatic that reasons are the primary mechanism by which administrative decision-makers demonstrate that their decision is reasonable. The Court held that reasons must be read holistically but must be sufficient to allow the affected party and a reviewing court to understand why the decision was reached. Where reasons fail to engage with key evidence, fail to address the central issues, or are so bare as to provide no real explanation for the outcome, the decision will be unreasonable for lack of adequate justification, transparency, and intelligibility. A one-line boilerplate refusal that does not grapple with the applicant's detailed residency evidence is paradigmatically inadequate under Vavilov. Option A is incorrect — Baker (1999) established that there is a duty to provide reasons in significant immigration and citizenship decisions. Option C is wrong — the test is objective: does the decision, on its face, demonstrate engagement with the evidence? The applicant need not prove the officer ignored the evidence. Option D is wrong — Vavilov rejects the idea that mere brevity insulates reasons from review; the content must be sufficient. Option E is wrong — citizenship determinations do not fall into the narrow Vavilov correctness categories.

7. A federal regulatory tribunal issues a decision on a matter involving both a constitutional question (whether a provision of the enabling statute violates s. 2(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms) and a question of statutory interpretation of its home statute. The applicant seeks judicial review of both aspects of the decision. What standards of review apply to each issue? Apply Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v Vavilov (2019).

Answer: The constitutional question (Charter s. 2(b)) is reviewed on correctness; the statutory interpretation question is reviewed on reasonableness.

Vavilov (2019) explicitly preserved correctness review for a closed list of categories, one of which is constitutional questions — including questions about whether a statutory provision violates the Charter. The Court reasoned that constitutional questions must be decided correctly and consistently across the legal system; deference to administrative decision-makers on such questions would be inappropriate given the supremacy of the Constitution. By contrast, questions of statutory interpretation of the decision-maker's home statute fall squarely within the presumption of reasonableness review. The decision-maker has relative expertise in its home statute, and the legislature has entrusted interpretation to it. Thus, the bifurcated approach in Option C is exactly right. Option A is wrong — the Vavilov correctness carve-out for constitutional questions is clear. Option B is wrong — not all aspects of a decision involving constitutional issues are reviewed on correctness; only the constitutional question itself. Option D is wrong — whether the tribunal has express constitutional jurisdiction affects whether it can decide the question at all, but once it does, correctness applies regardless. Option E overstates the scope — only the constitutional question, not the entire decision, attracts correctness.