Pysz v New Ireland Assurance Company PLC

THE HIGH COURT [2026] IEHC 165 Record No: 2024/2466 BETWEEN THOMAS PYSZ PLAINTIFF AND NEW IRELAND ASSURANCE COMPANY PLC DEFENDANT Judgment of Ms. Justice Emily Egan delivered on the 16th day of March, 2026 1. The plaintiff brings proceedings claiming damages for mis-selling of a financial product and negligence on the part of the defendant, New Ireland Assurance Company Plc (“New Ireland”). The financial product in question was a group pension scheme, specifically, a Personal Retirement Savings Account (“PRSA”). The plaintiff had brought a previous complaint of mis-selling of the PRSA to the Financial Services and Pensions Ombudsman (FSPO), which the FSPO rejected. 2. New Ireland brings an application to strike out the present litigation on the grounds it discloses no reasonable cause of action or in the alternative constitutes an abuse of process. It contends that when, as here, the FSPO had dealt with a complaint such as this, a disappointed complainant may not issue fresh proceedings on essentially the same grounds. 2 3. This application was heard in the common law 1 motion list on a Monday. The plaintiff, who is not legally represented, has requested this court rule on the matter in writing, which I now do. Chronology Purchase of PRSA 4. The plaintiff’s statement of claim, delivered on 29 May 2024 pleads as follows: On 5 January 2009, the plaintiff started work with the US Embassy in Dublin. He met with a representative of New Ireland on foot of which he decided to take out a life insurance policy (which is not in issue here) and to join the group pension scheme. The plaintiff pleads that he asked the New Ireland representative whether it would be possible to transfer the PRSA to another EU country if he moved there and was told that this could be done extremely easily and quickly. Request to transfer PRSA 5. In 2018, the plaintiff asked New Ireland to transfer his PRSA to a pension provider in Poland (“the Polish pension provider”). New Ireland furnished the plaintiff with certain forms for him to complete and asked him to supply certain documentation. The plaintiff maintains that New Ireland delayed in responding to this application to transfer his PRSA. He states that he contacted New Ireland in September 2018 to complain about the delay in processing his application and was informed, in October 2018, that it could take up to 18 months to complete the transfer. The plaintiff pleads that he would never have purchased this PRSA if he had known this at the outset. The plaintiff pleads that almost 18 months later, on 2 August 2019, he received an email from New Ireland informing him that the transfer of his PRSA could not in fact take place at that time. The plaintiff maintains that contrary to what was initially 3 promised, New Ireland never had any intention of transferring his PRSA. He therefore accuses New Ireland of deliberately misrepresenting the terms of the policy and of mis-selling. Complaint to FSPO 6. In August 2019, the plaintiff made a complaint to the FSPO. The FSPO rejected the plaintiff’s complaint in a written decision dated 21 April 2021 (“the FSPO decision”). Decision of the FSPO 7. The FSPO requested New Ireland to supply its written response to the complaint and to supply all relevant documents and information. The plaintiff was then given an opportunity to make submissions in reply. A preliminary decision was issued to the parties on 15 March 2021 and the parties were afforded a further opportunity to make written submissions in the absence of which a legally binding decision would issue to the parties on the same terms as the preliminary decision. The plaintiff availed of the opportunity to make a further submission by email of 16 March 2021. This email, together with enclosures, were transmitted to New Ireland. New Ireland did not make any further submission. 8. The FSPO decision was that New Ireland had not mis-sold the PRSA and that the plaintiff's complaint was therefore rejected. Although the plaintiff understood that he could transfer his PRSA to an overseas provider pursuant to a quick and simple process, it was nonetheless reasonable to expect him to have been aware that certain documentation and information would be required from him and from the Polish pension provider, before the transfer request could proceed. In requesting this documentation and information, New Ireland was not refusing to transfer the plaintiff’s PRSA. It was simply the case that certain processes needed to be followed in order to carry out the transfer. 4 9. The FSPO’s essential conclusion was that New Ireland's requests for information and documentation, which were in accordance with revenue rules and pensions legislation, were reasonable. New Ireland had endeavoured to facilitate the plaintiff's transfer request, to keep him updated on the transfer process and to advise him of the difficulties being encountered. Specifically, New Ireland had written to the plaintiff's Polish pension provider on approximately six occasions between September 2018 and March 2019 seeking the information necessary to transfer the PRSA. There was no response. Ultimately, by email of 2 August 2019, New Ireland advised the plaintiff that it had still not received a response and that the transfer could not proceed until this information was received. It suggested that he might contact the Polish pension provider to bring the matter forward. 10. The FSPO acknowledged that the cooperation of the Polish pension provider was fundamental to the transfer of the PRSA. In light of the lack of cooperation and engagement from the Polish pension provider, over which New Ireland had no control, it was unable to complete the transfer of the plaintiff's PRSA. The FSPO decision also noted that the plaintiff had an existing policy relationship with the Polish pension provider and that it was reasonable for New Ireland to suggest that he contact it with a view to implementing the transfer. There was no evidence to suggest that the plaintiff had made efforts to do this and the FSPO had difficulty understanding why he had not done so. 11. The FSPO did not therefore accept that New Ireland had misled or misinformed the plaintiff regarding the overseas transfer of his pension funds. The plaintiff was free to transfer his pension funds subject to certain requirements. The mere fact that certain information/documentation was required to carry out the transfer or that the transfer did not transpire to be a straightforward process did not mean that the plaintiff’s PRSA was mis- sold. The total lack of engagement and cooperation from the Polish pension provider was ultimately what had prevented the transfer. 5 No appeal from decision of FSPO 12. The plaintiff maintains that, although he was given an opportunity to appeal the FSPO decision to the High Court, he was impeded from doing so because he resided in Poland at that time. The plaintiff pleads that on 5 January 2021 (shortly prior to the FSPO decision), he was run over by a motor vehicle. He argues that at the time that the FSPO decision issued, he was in hospital and in rehabilitation centres recovering from his injuries which prevented him from submitting his appeal in time. The plaintiff has not, to date, sought an extension of time within which to bring a statutory appeal against the decision of the FSPO in accordance with s. 64 of the Financial Services and Pensions Ombudsman Act 2017 (“the 2017 Act”). Circuit Court proceedings 13. The plaintiff returned to Ireland in 2023. He contacted the Free Legal Advice Centre who apparently advised him to commence proceedings in the Circuit Court, which he did. It is common case that those proceedings advanced the same claim of mis-selling of the PRSA as had been before the FSPO. New Ireland delivered a full defence to the Circuit Court proceedings denying liability and pleading that the case was res judicata and/or an abuse of process due to the previous finding by the FSPO. The plaintiff set the Circuit Court case down for trial. On 13 November 2023 the case came before Quinn J. in the Dublin Circuit Court. Following submissions, Quinn J. made an order dismissing the case on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction. He made no order as to costs. The present High Court proceedings 14. The present proceedings were initiated by plenary summons issued on 16 May 2024. This pleads that New Ireland is guilty of mis-selling a financial product and of negligence for which the plaintiff seeks compensation in the sum of €500. 6 15. New Ireland delivered a full defence to the present proceedings on 17 July 2024 denying the merits of the plaintiff's claim. The defence also advances a preliminary objection that the dispute the subject matter of these proceedings is in substance the same as the complaint to the FSPO and that the matter is therefore res judicata. Statutory provisions 16. The 2017 Act provides for the making of complaints to the FSPO in relation to the conduct of a financial service provider such as New Ireland. Section 62 provides that, subject to the outcome of any appeal under Part 7 of the Act, any decision of the FSPO in respect of a complaint is binding on any party to the complaint. Section 64 provides that a party to a complaint before the FSPO may appeal to the High Court against a decision or direction of the FSPO no later than 35 days after the date of notification of the FSPO decision or within such further period as the court considers just and equitable in all the circumstances. Applicable legal principles 17. In Damien Murphy v. Canada Life Assurance Ireland Ltd and Irish life Assurance Plc [2016] IECA 128 the Court of Appeal, per Hogan J. considered whether the doctrine of res judicata applied to decisions of the Financial Services Ombudsman (“the FSO”). The FSO is the precursor to the FSPO pursuant to legislation which was in all material respects on all fours with the legislative provisions set out at para. 16 above. 18. Hogan J. found that a claimant cannot advance a complaint to the FSO and then, should the claim prove unsuccessful, re-litigate the same matter before the courts under the guise of separate proceedings. There is a clear public interest in the finality of litigation coupled with the requirement that a litigant should advance the entirety of a claim and not endeavour to litigate matters in a piecemeal basis. There was manifest potential for abuse of the litigious 7 process by such repeated applications. These principles are reflected in the doctrine of res judicata, which holds that a matter which has been finally judicially determined cannot generally be reopened. The principle of res judicata serves to protect these important public interests and to safeguard the legitimate interests of litigants by ensuring that they are not harassed by unnecessarily burdensome litigants who endeavour to reopen matters which have already been determined. Hogan J. held that therefore the High Court had been entirely correct in concluding that the proceedings were barred by the doctrine of res judicata and were for that reason doomed to fail. He therefore held that the proceedings had been correctly dismissed as disclosing no reasonable cause of action. 19. In Florence Crowley v. Zürich Life Assurance [2016] IECA 381 the Court of Appeal, per Ryan P. again applied the principle of res judicata to a decision of the FSO. Indeed, the Court of Appeal noted that that the High Court had applied a test that was more favourable to the plaintiff in looking beyond the question of res judicata to consider whether there were reasons that would justify refusing to apply that legal rule. The Court of Appeal noted that it was not clear that the principle of res judicata was subject to such an unspecified limitation. Rather, the principle of res judicata disposes of a claim in circumstances where it is applicable and that the court has no discretion whether or not to apply it. The Court of Appeal had no hesitation in holding that the principle of res judicata applied in the case before it because the FSO decision was final, subject to the statutory right of appeal to the High Court and operated in a closed statutory scheme. A complainant who has got an adverse result was not therefore free to embark on separate court proceedings. 20. Finally, in Connors v. Zurich Insurance PLC [2018] IECA 250, the Court of Appeal, per Hedigan J., following its two earlier decisions reiterated that there was no exception to the res judicata doctrine. The Court of Appeal noted that the scheme established by statute was one created to favour those in the plaintiff's position. It provides for a simplified, expeditious 8 cost-free method of resolving disputes with service providers. Those deciding to embark upon it, however, do so at the cost of being precluded from pursuing their claim through Court proceedings. Decision 21. The authorities discussed at paras. 17 to 20 above definitively establish that as a matter of principle, statute and authority, a claimant cannot advance a complaint to the FSPO and then issue fresh court proceedings seeking damages against the financial services provider in question on essentially the same grounds. I accept New Ireland’s submission that this is precisely what the plaintiff seeks to do in these proceedings. 22. The plaintiff asserts that the FSPO did not correctly understand his complaint which it assumed related to the transfer procedure and not to a complaint of mis-selling. However this is demonstrably incorrect. Contrary to the plaintiff's submissions the FSPO did not interpret his complaint as relating to the transfer procedures operating in New Ireland. The FSPO decision correctly records that the plaintiff’s complaint was that he was told that he would be able to transfer his PRSA at any time to another EU member state which was the only reason that he purchased the policy. The FSPO decision states that the plaintiff maintained that New Ireland had deliberately misrepresented the position and that he submitted that the PRSA had been mis-sold. 23. Although the plenary summons also includes a claim for “negligence" this is not developed in any way. It appears that the negligence claim is essentially one of mis-selling, the very complaint that was dealt with by the FSPO. 24. As such, the plaintiff’s plenary case is, in truth, no wider than the claim before the FSPO. Both concern, essentially, a claim of mis-selling on the basis of a misrepresentation 9 concerning how quickly and simply the pension could be transferred to another service provider. 25. As noted by Hogan J. in Murphy, in enacting the 2017 Act, the Oireachtas clearly intended that adjudications by the FSPO would have a binding character subject only to an appeal. It would be quite inconsistent with that legislative intent if these statutory provisions could be effectively circumvented by issuing new High Court proceedings which attempted in effect to re-litigate the same matters that were already determined in the course of the adjudication upon the earlier complaint. I am, accordingly, satisfied that res judicata applies to the plaintiff's claim and that same falls to be dismissed as revealing no reasonable cause of action. 26. In all the circumstances, I must grant New Ireland the relief it seeks in the motion, namely an order dismissing the plaintiff's proceedings for failure to reveal a reasonable cause of action and as constituting an abuse of process.