Kelly v Store All Logistics Limited

THE HIGH COURT [2026] IEHC 241 [Record No: H.P. 2025/3453] BETWEEN JOHN PAUL KELLY PLAINTIFF AND STORE ALL LOGISTICS LIMITED DEFENDANT JUDGMENT of Mr. Justice Liam Kennedy delivered on 23 April 2026. 1. The defendant seeks various interlocutory remedies, including the dismissal of this entire claim, or at least the claim to equitable reliefs, in response to the plaintiff’s actions. On the weekend of 13-14 December, he used his administrator privileges to access the defendant’s IT systems and download thousands of emails from at least three colleagues’ email accounts, including information which was evidently private, confidential and legally privileged (“the Incident”). The defendant says that the Incident was an attempt to obtain an improper litigation advantage, both in these proceedings and in ongoing disciplinary proceedings. This judgment considers the plaintiff’s actions and their implications and consequences, the adequacy of his apology, explanations and response (including the evolving positions adopted on his behalf). I am satisfied that the equitable reliefs sought by the plaintiff are now unsustainable and must be 2 struck out and I should also confirm my decision to discharge the undertakings previously tendered by the defendant at my invitation. I will also direct the plaintiff to file a detailed affidavit in relation to the Incident and to take or refrain from taking various steps as outlined below. However, some conclusions in respect of the Incident must be regarded as provisional and it may be premature to dismiss the entire claim at this stage, so I will adjourn that part of the application. Depending on how matters unfold as further information emerges in respect of the Incident and its ramifications, it may still be appropriate for me, or the trial judge, to take that step in due course. The adequacy of the plaintiff’s response to the Incident and the information which emerges as to his actions and their impact will determine whether these proceedings go to trial. Introduction 2. The plaintiff is the defendant’s managing director (“MD”) and one of its principal shareholders. These proceedings concern his claim that the defendant breached his employment contract by seeking to sideline or supplant him as MD. In addition, the defendant, its officers and certain employees have raised issues in respect of his conduct (and vice versa, with him advancing counter-allegations). This includes ongoing disciplinary proceedings concerning a claim that he bullied a senior employee (“the Collingwood Complaint”). In addition, the plaintiff has indicated his intention to commence oppression proceedings. 3. My 27 November 2025 judgment (“the Judgment”) rejected an application for interlocutory relief and was followed by a hearing on 10 December 2025 to settle arrangements pending trial for the provision of information to the plaintiff for the purposes of his role as MD. The plaintiff accepts that, days after that hearing, on the weekend of 13-14 December, he used his corporate IT privileges as MD to access and download information from three colleagues’ email accounts, those pertaining to two of the defendant’s directors and a senior executive, the 3 complainant in the Collingwood Complaint. Those individuals have key roles in the dispute in these proceedings and the other controversies between the parties. Although the plaintiff has been unforthcoming as to details of what was downloaded, the defendant’s evidence suggests that a significant volume of confidential information was downloaded, including messages which were extremely private, sensitive, confidential and legally privileged, and obviously so. 4. The plaintiff has not yet provided full details of the extent of the Incident and there are controversies as to how much data was downloaded, which devices were employed and whether other email accounts were also accessed. However, he admits accessing the three email accounts and downloading “a significant number” of emails therefrom. He has generally not taken issue with the defendant’s specific averments as to the scale of the Incident or the examples of documents accessed save that he denies suggestions that two further email accounts were accessed or that he used a disc drive as well as his Surface Pro. I will accordingly disregard those two controversial allegations which have yet to be established. Although his position has not always been clear, in response to the current application, the plaintiff apologised “unreservedly” for the Incident and accepted that it was a serious error of judgment due to “extreme stress”. He says that he neither used the information “read by” him nor shared it with his lawyers or anyone else, nor has he retained copies in any format. Reliefs Sought 5. In brief, in the alternative to the orders dismissing the proceedings or striking out the claims to equitable reliefs, the defendant seeks to require the plaintiff to furnish an affidavit confirming the detail of the Incident and to restrain his actions in various respects pending trial. It also sought ancillary orders, including as to costs, a particularly significant issue as a result of the forensic examinations triggered by the Incident. The plaintiff opposes the dismissal of 4 the proceedings or the equitable reliefs and says that the issue should be left for the trial judge and other reliefs are unnecessary as he has explained the Incident and offered undertakings. Background 6. The Judgment summarised the proceedings noting that: (a) the plaintiff is one of the defendant’s longstanding shareholders, directors and employees and its MD; (b) these proceedings concern his disputes with his fellow shareholder/directors and with senior executives and employees concerning the company’s structure, governance and management. Such issues resulted in this litigation and duelling HR complaints, investigations and proceedings, including the Collingwood Complaint; (c) in these proceedings he accuses the company of effectively sidelining or preparing to dismiss him by changing corporate reporting lines. The defendant denied his allegations. The interlocutory judgment, in short: (a) criticised both sides, noting issues as to the plaintiff’s own conduct, including his “resignation” and his contribution to the controversies; (b) determined that he had established a fair question to be tried on some issues, including whether proposed changes constituted (attempted) constructive dismissal; (c) criticised the defendant’s failure to furnish information to him, while noting the extent to which the plaintiff’s own erratic behaviour had left the Board little option but to intervene; (d) concluded that the plaintiff had established a strong case that the defendant had sidelined him in breach of contract but that the Court could well award damages rather than injunctive relief; (e) concluded that the plaintiff had also established a fair question (but not a strong case) as to whether the changes constituted an unlawful disciplinary procedure; (f) noted that, even if he won at trial, a Court would be unlikely to order reinstatement given the degree to which relationships had broken down, irrespective of responsibility for that development. (In fact, the defendant maintained that the plaintiff’s position had not been affected by its changes so it was less a question of reinstatement than of reversing changes). While generally 5 rejecting the application (particularly on balance of justice grounds) the Judgment identified an issue to be addressed pending trial, the information to be provided to the plaintiff to enable him to perform his role as MD, criticising both parties and concluding at para. 83 that: “While the plaintiff is MD, he should receive relevant and timely information about important aspects of the defendant’s affairs. I am not satisfied with the defendant’s current proposals. I will, if necessary, impose prescriptive interlocutory orders with regard to the regularity and content of SLT, board and strategic meetings, to be attended by both the plaintiff and Mr Dalton and by other colleagues as appropriate and to require the defendant (presumably via Mr Dalton) to ensure that all material and information which is material to the plaintiff’s role is expeditiously forwarded to him. Reasonable and appropriate requests for information from the plaintiff should be dealt with by Mr Dalton and the SLT reasonably comprehensively and swiftly as possible. Since the effect of the Board's restructuring of reporting lines is, in effect, to make Mr Dalton the conduit between the MD and most other company employees, Mr Dalton should take responsibility for ensuring that any reasonable and legitimate questions constructively raised by the plaintiff are readily addressed. He and the plaintiff should liaise with each other and should speak at least regularly, in person where possible. In any event, Mr Dalton must take responsibility for ensuring that the plaintiff receives appropriate information on a timely basis. The plaintiff must not abuse such access and should likewise engage constructively. The Court will not be impressed if either party (continues to) fail to engage appropriately in that regard. Hopefully the parties can adopt a more mature approach, agreeing appropriate arrangements in this regard. If not, I will give directions”. (emphasis added) 7. I confirmed that, if necessary, I would make limited directions, preferably in agreed terms, as to the provision of information to the plaintiff in a more satisfactory, professional and timely manner. The 10 December hearing addressed that issue. I approved arrangements proposed by the defendant in response to the Judgment for the provision of information pending trial. In line with the exhortations to both parties in my Judgment (including that the plaintiff must not abuse his access and engage constructively), I stated that both parties ought to cooperate and apply the undertakings with common sense, engagement and pragmatism. 8. At the 10 December hearing it was envisaged that the litigation and related issues would progress expeditiously in accordance with agreed directions and, pending trial, the defendant would furnish appropriate information to the plaintiff who I had warned not to abuse the access to information afforded to him. In the event, the Incident has derailed the proceedings. 6 The Emergence of the Incident 9. The details of the Incident appear from correspondence, starting with the defendants’ solicitors’ 16 December 2025 letter which noted the arrangements for the exchange of information with the plaintiff pending trial and queried how it should be implemented while the plaintiff was on sick leave: "You will also be aware that your Client is currently on sick leave. Our Client agreed to waive the restriction on paid sick and extended it to encompass the Christmas period. Your Client was asked to confirm that operating the mechanism agreed / undertaken would not adversely affect his health.” The letter then asked the plaintiff’s solicitors to raise a matter “of the highest concern” with their client for his immediate action as follows: “The Matter of Concern The Company's IT service has made this office aware of digital 'footprints' in the Company system. Pending further analysis, we do not exclude any explanation of these 'footprints' but they prima facie show that: i. on Saturday 13 December 2025, the Defendant's company Microsoft Account was remotely accessed by an email account associated with your Client; ii. Your Client's status as "Global Administrator'' on the Company Microsoft Account was used to grant full access to the electronic mail of company personnel; iii. during Saturday, 13 December 2025 and Sunday, 14 December 2025, the electronic mail of Derek Dalton, Liam Dalton, Bonnie Collingwood (of the SLT, who is also the complainant in ongoing disciplinary proceedings involving your Client); Irene Irish (company HR Business Partner who is chairing that disciplinary process) and Richard Kervick (a witness in the disciplinary proceedings) was accessed; iv. over 1,100 emails including sensitive and confidential information relating to the matters before the High Court, the proposed mediation and matters relating to his ongoing disciplinary hearing were accessed” 10. Noting that none of the individuals concerned had consented to such access to their emails, the letter gave examples of emails accessed - including emails to counsel “Re: Ongoing mediation between John Paul Kelly and other shareholders" and an internal email entitled 7 “Meeting with SC". Other subject lines referenced "Statement of Fact Bullying", “Invitation to a Disciplinary Hearing”, "Discovery", “Script Options for Wednesday Hearing Strictly Subject to Legal Professional Privilege". The letter concluded: “Immediate Action We have no doubt that your Client will wish to assist the Company in getting to the bottom of what has occurred and to mitigate the concerns of those whose electronic mail has been accessed without their permission. Accordingly, your Client should (through your office) by 4pm tomorrow, December 17th: a. state whether any of the matters at (i) to (vi) above were carried out by him or at his direction; b. ..; c. confirm that he will preserve all information on such equipment and devices in its current form, pending expert analysis; d. confirm that he is willing to submit such computers and devices to third party analysis; and e. provide a list of all those having access to devices or accounts ordinarily used by your Client. In due course, the foregoing can be bolstered by a formal undertaking to the Court (if necessary). As stated above. no assumptions are made in relation to the foregoing unauthorised access. If, however, your Client confirms that one or more of the actions at (i) to (vi) was carried out by him or at his direction, your Client should, in addition to the foregoing: f. confirm that no copies, notes or other records have been made of any material remotely accessed or that all such copies, notes or other records have been destroyed. Depending upon the nature of the response (if any) from your Client. our Client reserves its entitlement to take whatever action is necessary...”. 11. The plaintiff’s solicitors responded promptly, confirming that they had sent the letter to their client for instructions and promising to revert by 18 December which they duly did (the letter was dated on 19 December), stating: 8 “You will be aware that our client is on sick leave and we are advised that today your client's doctor advised that he was not fit for any form of work. 1n those circumstances we have been able to take only limited instructions. In response to matters a-f of your email we are instructed by our client as follows: a. That on Saturday 13th and Sunday 14ᵗʰ December he gained access to a number of email accounts using his administrator permissions using his company tablet. b. That this access was by him alone c. That he will preserve all information on his tablet in its current form pending expert analysis d. That he is willing to submit his tablet to a third party for analysis e. That no other person has access to his tablet f. That no notes or records have been made of any material accessed and any copies downloaded have been destroyed”. 12. The defendant’s solicitors responded on 19 December, stating that it interpreted the plaintiff’s response "as implicitly acknowledging responsibility for all of the actions at (i) to (vi) of our letter. You might explicitly confirm, by return, that this is an accurate reading of his response and in particular explicitly confirm that your client acknowledges item (iv) in our letter (i.e. the scale of the data breach); item (v) (i.e. the fact that the breach included emails that were self-evidently privileged and confidential); and item (vi) brackets i.e. that it was carried out without permission or lawful reason)”. The letter requested undertakings and proposed that the plaintiff’s electronic devices should be collected for examination, noting the then anticipated cost (€16,500 plus VAT) of the forensic “analysis occasioned by your client's actions”. The defendant’s solicitors asked the plaintiff’s solicitors to confirm their client’s agreement to indemnify the plaintiff in relation to the cost. 17. On 23 December, the plaintiff’s solicitors replied, nothing that as the plaintiff was on stress related sick leave, certified as unfit for any form of work, they had been able to take only limited instructions, but were able to respond to the issues raised, confirming that: 9 “…our client did grant himself full access to the email accounts you mention on foot of his administrator permissions. The only accounts he accessed were Derek Dalton Blackstar account, Liam Dalton Store-All account and Bonnie Collingwood Store-All account. He cannot confirm the number of emails accessed but it was a significant number. He maintains that he did not act unlawfully and that his administrator permissions entitled him to this access. In relation to the second issue concerning company equipment our client confirms that he is taking the steps requested and that the Surface Pro laptop and the Windows I0 laptop will be placed in a sealed zip folder pending collection by a third party. He advises that the Windows I0 laptop contains personal files and he intends to transfer and delete them prior to handing it over. He confirms that he will not otherwise use either piece of equipment. In relation to the third issue, the only other device he uses is his mobile phone and this is used for work and personal purposes. He instructs that he did not use this phone to gain any access and accordingly it will not be handed over. He confirms that he will not use the phone for any work-related purpose In relation the fourth issue concerning the costs of the analysis, we have no instructions from our client in relation to this matter.” 18. The defendant’s solicitors’ 24 December email acknowledged that the plaintiff was on sick leave, adding that "it is for this reason that his actions in accessing the electronic mail… are all the more surprising." It, inter alia, dealt with the collection of the devices and repeated the request as to costs. The plaintiff’s solicitors’ 27 December response, inter alia, confirmed the plaintiff’s willingness to offer undertakings, dealt with the device collection and stated that they had no instructions as to costs, describing the request as premature. The defendant’s solicitors’ 29 December email disagreed, observing that: “The unauthorised access by your client, while on sick leave, necessitates a retainer of an external expert to determine the nature and scope of the access period. The cost of this is not related to the company or to the proceedings which are pending. Accordingly, your client should immediately confirm his willingness to discharge the costs involved." 19. The defendant’s solicitors’ 9 January 2026 letter noted the extension of the plaintiff’s sick leave following receipt of a further medical certificate, confirming that it had adjourned the Collingwood Complaint hearing until 20 January and proposing an appointment with the 10 company doctor on that date to confirm the plaintiff’s fitness to return to work. The letter then referred to the email access issue: “Unauthorised Data Access by Mr. Kelly As you were kind enough to acknowledge in yours of 19th December and subsequent correspondence from your office, your client accessed a large number of emails by using his global. administrator status to access the email accounts of a number of colleagues. We read your earlier correspondence implicitly acknowledging that your client accessed without prejudice emails and emails from the complainant alleging bullying against him and (on the information currently available) a witness in the disciplinary process which is pending, as set out in correspondence from this office. We note from yours of 23ʳᵈ December that you have not been able to obtain full instructions. We confirm that the two devices alleged by your client to have been used by him to secure access to the Company's computer system have been collected and are being delivered, along with a download of the Company's computer system, to a forensic analyst The analyst will verify the extent and nature of the unauthorised data access, details of which were sought by this office. We hope that the fruit of the forensic analysis will be to hand in early course. When the analysis is carried out, we will communicate further with you. In the meantime, it is noted that (d) We await your client confirming that the costs occasioned by his unauthorised access of the Company's computer system (i.e. the cost of the enquiry into it) will be discharged by him. 20. The letter commented on the plaintiff’s proposed undertakings, setting out alternative wording, before dealing with the then scheduled mediation observing that: “In light of the fact that your client is currently sick and not expected to recover until 19th January and in light of the fact that (according to yours of 23"' December) you have only limited instructions regarding the extent and nature of your client's unauthorised data access (including the extent to which he accessed without prejudice correspondence) it is - regrettably- clear that the mediation currently scheduled for 19 January will have to be deferred”. The letter noted that it would be premature to predict the impact of the unauthorised data access on the proceedings until the scope of that access had been established by independent analysis, raising the possibility of the amendment of the Defence to include a counterclaim. The plaintiff’s solicitors responded the same day opposing the deferral of the mediation, as they were “fully prepared to proceed” on 19 January. It was deferred at the defendant’s request. 11 21. On 19 January 2026 the plaintiff’s solicitors replied to the 9 January letter: “We have had a consultation with our client on Friday last I6th January and have taken instructions from him on the issues raised by you in your correspondence. As you are aware, due to our client's ongoing health issues, it has not been possible to take instructions until now. We respond to the various matters raised as follows: - Our Client's sick leave: Further to our client's appointment with his doctor on the 16th January last he has been further certified as being unable to attend work until 30th January. In any event, your proposed resumption of a disciplinary process on the day that an employee returns to work from extended sick leave is not appropriate. We suggest that a decision on this should not be made until our client has been medically certified as fit to attend work, taking into account any occupational health recommendations made by medical practitioners”. 22. As to the Incident itself, the letter stated that the plaintiff used his own login user ID to access the system, adding that: “The administrator permissions were provided by and were authorised by the Company. insofar as your letter makes reference to unauthorised access of the Company's computer system, this is patently not correct, Our client had at all times been authorised to access the computer system. Further to your suggestion that you read our correspondence as "implicitly acknowledging" certain matters, please also note that there is nothing implicit in our correspondence in this regard. Our client has not instructed us as to the material which might have been accessed, nor has he shared that information with us. He has also instructed us that he has not shared that Information with anyone else and has not used this information in any way. You might note further that we did not consider. nor do we consider that it is appropriate to ask our client this information, which we are instructed has remained at all times private. Further to your request seeking costs occasioned by what you describe as our client's unauthorised access of the Company's computer system, you will note our client's position set out above, that he was authorised to access the Company’s computer system ... Our client has already provided you with confirmation as to the material that was accessed, which is also clearly discernible from the system itself. Notwithstanding same, the Company has decided to conduct an analysis. This is not a cost that has been incurred by our client. Having been incurred by the Company this is a cost that will fall to be discharged by the Company. It is also relevant to your client's request, that our client is absent from work on sick leave and that your client has determined that this is on an unpaid basis. In the circumstances of the issues to be resolved between our clients, it is our view that 12 the question as to the discharging of any such cost incurred by your client, is premature. In the event that mediation does proceed (and we await your client's confirmation of this), we would propose that this issue be included”. The letter attached a copy of proposed undertakings and protested the deferral of the mediation. 23. The defendant’s solicitors’ 23 January 2026 letter; (a) noted that, with the plaintiff having been certified as unfit for work until 30 January, the Collingwood Complaint hearing would be adjourned, again proposing an appointment with the company doctor on his proposed return; (b) disagreed with the response on costs, reiterating that the costs flowed “ from the data access itself and the approach taken by your Client to questions about its nature and scope”. The letter also noted that the plaintiff’s position “as now communicated” by the plaintiff’s solicitors’ 19 January letter was that the inference which the defendant’s solicitors had drawn from the plaintiff’s solicitors’ 18 December letter was not the meaning which the correspondence sought to convey, observing that: “The position now urged contradicts the assertion in the rest of your letter that "your client has already provided ... confirmation as to the material that was accessed". Previous correspondence from your office acknowledged only that your Client had granted himself access to a "significant number" of emails, in accounts other than the accounts of Irene Irish and Richard Kervick. The statements made were also qualified by reason of the fact that you had been unable to obtain full instructions. The implications of the foregoing are for another day however, and we will work on the basis communicated on 19th: namely that the matters raised by ours of 16th December 2025 (i.e. paras (iv) and (v) of ours of 16th December) which we had inferred were accepted by your Client, are not accepted; (i) the Company had also inferred that the matter set out at paragraph (vi) of ours of 16th December, 2025, was also accepted: i.e. that your Client accepted that none of the directors or personnel gave their permission to him to access data of the type in question on these dates. It is noted that issue is now taken by your Client to the data access being described as "unauthorised'. Once again, there seems to be something of a contradiction, since the impropriety of the data access by your Client is tacitly reflected in the fact that your office has, quite 13 properly, declined to be copied with or to review the material accessed. Be that as it may, we understand your Client's position to be that his status as administrator 'authorised' him to access the data of the individuals concerned without first seeking their permission; and (ii)the Company reserves its position to seek liberty to amend its pleadings in due course if necessary”. The letter agreed that the deferral of the mediation was regrettable, blaming the plaintiff: “… the deferral was caused by your Client's accessing of data and uncertainty about the precise nature and scope of the data access. This and your Client's unwillingness or inability to give clarity in respect of this data access have made it necessary to involve an expert analyst to establish the nature and scope of the data access. It is hoped that, when the nature and scope of the data access has been clarified that mediation can proceed”. 24. The plaintiff’s solicitors’ 27 January letter, inter alia, reiterated that “our client does not accept that the access was unauthorised” and on 28 January 2026 the plaintiff’s solicitors issued a detailed letter before action, threatening oppression proceedings under s212 of the Companies Act 2014. 25. The plaintiff’s solicitor’s 30 January letter responded to the 23 January letter by, inter alia, noting that their client’s further sick leave certificate until 13 February, stating that the disciplinary hearing should not be scheduled on the day of his return to work “whenever that may be”. The letter also noted the plaintiff’s instructions that he had been certified as not fit for any form of work so it was not appropriate for the defendant to send any communication to him and that the continued exchange of correspondence between solicitors in respect of the Incident was inappropriate as it was “an internal HR matter and should be dealt with as such”. 26. Emails dated 31 January and 2 February 2026 between the defendant’s solicitors and Mr D’Arcy (the defendant’s independent forensic expert) summarised the latter’s initial findings from his examination of two devices received from the plaintiff as, inter alia: a. he had found evidence of documents viewed and downloaded on the Surface Pro including, for example, at least one invoice from the defendant’s solicitors to its 14 client in respect of work on mediation, an outline of litigation strategy issued by the defendant’s solicitors: correspondence marked "strictly private and confidential" and a letter from the defendant’s senior counsel to its solicitor. b. He also found downloaded documents relating to the Collingwood Complaint and financial information relating to Derek and Liam Dalton including property transactions, valuation materials, correspondence with solicitors in respect of matters apparently unrelated to the proceedings, documents relating to property and other transactions apparently unrelated to the proceedings. c. In addition, medical records of the wife of one of the directors and personal records (including passport details and utility bills) of Liam Dalton were “downloaded and viewed on the Surface Pro”. 27. The defendant’s solicitors observed to Mr D’Arcy that: “… the foregoing is very much a high-level interim account of your findings in relation to the material downloaded or viewed on the Surface Pro and that your work is ongoing. Nevertheless we consider that it is appropriate to raise this with the solicitors for Mr Kelly now, rather than awaiting the completion of your work and a formal report, so that they can respond to it. This is in light of the fact that Ms Collingwood (whose account was on the face of it, accessed) has brought a complaint against Mr. Kelly for bullying... Given this and given the apparently incontrovertible evidence that the Surface Pro was used to download or to view both 'without prejudice' material and the personal data of a number of non-parties (including private financial information, medical records of Ms Rebecca Dalton end the personal data of Mr. Liam Dalton) it may also be necessary now to notify third parties and/or the Data Protection Commissioner. Accordingly, your confirmation that we have correctly understood the position would be very much appreciated”. Mr D’Arcy confirmed that the summary of his initial findings was correct. 28. On 3 February 2026, the defendant’s solicitors wrote to the plaintiff’s solicitors, stating that although examination was ongoing, the forensic analyst’s initial analysis suggested that instructions given to the plaintiff’s solicitors by their client (as communicated in 15 correspondence) were inaccurate. Noting that such findings raised issues of the most serious nature, the defendant’s solicitors invited proposals. (There has been no suggestion that the letter should be regarded as anything other than an open letter). 29. On 4 February, the plaintiff’s solicitors replied that it was “entirely inappropriate” that they should be asked to comment and engage on a letter which was not addressed to them and which set out extracts of a report which they had not seen and was carried out by a person whose credentials and independence had not been confirmed. It added that: “in any event as we have previously advised you, this is an internal HR matter which should be dealt with as such once our client returns to work from sick leave. It is not appropriate to be engaging between solicitors in relation to this matter”. While generally not denying and not dealing with the specifics of the summary, including the references to the emails downloaded, the plaintiff did deny connecting an external data key to his Surface Pro. For present purposes I am assuming that this was the case and that the access during the Incident was limited to the email accounts acknowledged by the plaintiff. 30. On 11 February the defendant’s solicitors reverted giving details of Mr D’Arcy’s expertise and independence (which the plaintiff never subsequently queried) expressing disappointment that despite protracted correspondence: “only limited instructions had been given on some matters and your Client has declined to bring other matters to finality. The fact that he is absent on sick leave cannot absolve your Client from giving a detailed account of what he did on 13ᵗʰ and 14ᵗʰ and how the consequences of his actions are best remediated…. As you state in your letter, the data access undoubtedly raises "internal HR" issues which will fall to be dealt with on your Client's return from sick leave. This is, with respect, not the only issue which your Client has to address, however. There are the costs occasioned by the data access, including but not limited to the costs thrown away in the adjourned mediation and the costs of the forensic enquiry into your Client's lap tops. There are Data Protection issues generally. There is also the issue of how the proceedings currently pending before the High Court have been impacted by your Client's actions. The foregoing arises from your Client's admitted actions. Further inquiry into the nature and scope of his actions is continuing and may well add to or deepen the issues raised”. 16 31. The defendant proposed to bring these issues to the Court’s attention, noting that a formal motion might be required in view of the gravity of the issue and to deal with issues such as amendments to the pleadings, agreed undertakings or, in default of such agreement, an application for injunctive relief. It noted that the defendant would request the determination of the costs of the unsuccessful application for interlocutory relief and that the Court would be invited to consider what directions should be made for the hearing these proceedings, in light of the Incident, raising the possibility of seeking orders which were subsequently enumerated in the current notice of motion, including an order directing such steps by the plaintiff as might be necessary to avoid the dismissal of the proceedings in limina, adding that: “For example, it may be that the Court would be persuaded by your Client that instead of dismissal, he would be required immediately to furnish a witness statement and a book of documents upon which he will rely at the trial herein…to ensure that no element of the evidence he proposes to adduce directly or indirectly derives from the data access carried out by the plaintiff”. 32. On 16 February 2026, the plaintiff’s solicitors responded as follows: “We have already pointed out that if your client intends to raise an issue with our client in the context of his employment, that is a matter for it to deal with as his employer and not through solicitors. To date your client has not raised any such complaint with our client nor has it forwarded to him the report you refer to. It is a basic principle of fair procedures that a party is made aware of precisely that which it is accused of and offered an opportunity to respond to same. We have already pointed out the difficulty in you seeking to do this through solicitors and in the context of this litigation, as to do so would require our client to instruct us as to matters which you say are privileged and which we otherwise are unaware of. We confirm again as we have previously that we do not know the content of any material which our client might have accessed. It may be that if this issue is raised in the context of his employment, that our client, if he requires legal representation, will need to engage a different firm and counsel. Our client was authorised as the Managing Director of the Defendant to access the IT and email system of the Defendant. This access was never withdrawn or limited by your client. There was no unauthorised access of the Defendant's system. Our client has also confirmed that there has been no use of any data accessed. We have confirmed repeatedly that no such information has been shared by our client with his lawyers. We note the 17 details you have provided regarding an expert that the Defendant has engaged. We trust that the Defendant will provide this report to our client. Insofar as you refer to costs occasioned by the data access, this again is an internal employment matter and does not relate to this litigation”. 33. The letter also criticised the defendant for having on three occasions caused a proposed mediation not to proceed suggesting that: “any issue that your client has in relation to any data allegations against our client can also be included in such mediation” and threatening that if the defendant remained unwilling to mediate, the plaintiff would apply to the Court in respect of the issue. The letter consented to the amendment of the defence and reiterated the plaintiff’s position as to undertakings denying that there was any basis for injunctive relief or the other remedies referred to in the previous letter. 34. The defendant’s solicitors 18 February reply stated: “With respect, the issues broached in your letter have been the subject of protracted correspondence by this office, since the data access complained of took place, without your client being able or willing to bring them to finality. We do not propose to debate the matter in further correspondence. It is sufficient to note that we do not agree with your characterisation and do not agree that the conduct of your client in accessing material raises solely disciplinary matters. There are other consequences, and these are appropriately resolved by the Court and if Mr. Justice Kennedy believes that it is appropriate or necessary, before him. As to mediation, it was the uncertainty surrounding the nature and scope of your client's accessing of data that prevented the mediation from occurring as scheduled. As it happens, your client would have (presumably) been unable to attend due to the extension of his sick leave. We note that you reiterate that your client was "authorised" to access the data which he accessed. In our very respectful view, the contention that your client was "authorised" to access without prejudice material, material which attracts litigation privilege and personal medical records and other private material (while absent on sick leave and where undertakings governing the furnishing of information were in place) is unsustainable and we do not propose to debate the matter further. Turning to the specific matters: 18 (i) your client's consent to the amendment is noted and we now attach Amended Defence and we look forward to receipt of the Reply to this Amended Defence within two weeks (i.e. on or before 25th February) as previous correspondence makes clear, we require undertakings in the form sought and we require these to be given to the Court, so as to be enforceable by the Court. In the absence of this, we will have to apply for injunctive relief. (ii) the written submissions for a determination of who should bear the costs of your client's unsuccessful application have been exchanged. We agree that the issue can be dealt with whenever Mr. Justice Kennedy considers it appropriate: The data access by your client impacts on this determination in the manner set out in our submissions. (iii) the contents of our correspondence is, in our view, clear. It was open to your client, notwithstanding the fact that he was on leave, to give a precise account of the reason for and nature/scope of the data access which he carried out He has been unable or unwilling to do so. A laborious (and increasingly expensive) analysis has had to take place and while a report is awaited, the contours of your client's actions are now coming to light. We are of the view that the fairness of the trial has been compromised and that orders of dismissal/remedial directions for the mode of hearing are warranted. (iv) we do not accept the characterisation set out in your letter and we remain of the view that a direction given by a judge of the High Court cannot be simply varied by the parti.es unilaterally and should (at a minimum) be notified to the judge in question...” 35. The amended Defence: a. dealt with the Incident and advanced a counterclaim, alleging that the plaintiff used information entrusted to him as MD to access the defendant’s computer systems and/or to access the three email accounts of his two co-directors and the employee who had brought a complaint against him for bullying (which was then pending), viewing and/or downloading significant numbers of emails and attachments without the defendant’s or the three individuals’ consent. b. Noted that the documents accessed or downloaded included: (a) correspondence with the defendant’s solicitors and counsel's correspondence (b) medical records relating to the wife of one of the directors (c) personal data (d) documents emanating from a witness in the Collingwood Complaint (e) private and confidential documentation of the plaintiff’s codirectors and others. 19 c. Alleged that the plaintiff’s actions were carried out knowingly, intentionally or recklessly without any lawful excuse and in breach of applicable law, the law relating to privacy and/or confidentiality and the rules protecting solicitor/client communications from disclosure. d. Alleged that the plaintiff’s actions were carried out with the intention of undermining the defence of the proceedings, undermining the Collingwood Complaint, causing damage or embarrassment to the defendant and/or obtaining litigation advantage. e. Alleged that the plaintiff’s actions were negligent, in breach of his duties to the defendant and in breach of law relating to data processing and the protection of privacy. f. Alleged that the plaintiff was disentitled to the equitable reliefs claimed by reason of his contumelious actions and/or his breach of the principles of Equity. g. Alleged that the plaintiff had exposed the defendant to complaint or suit by the individuals involved and/or had caused it to suffer damage, inconvenience and loss including special damage including the ongoing forensic investigation cost, the ongoing cost of remedial steps, the costs of the abandoned mediation and ongoing legal costs. The Grounding Affidavit 36. The defendant’s solicitor’s affidavit grounding the application: a. recounted the history of the proceedings, noting at para. 5 that, after the Judgment had indicated that the plaintiff should be furnished with appropriate information as MD, on 10 December I overruled the plaintiff’s objections to the undertakings subsequently furnished by the defendant to ensure that business information was shared with the plaintiff, exhorting the parties to co-operate in the exchange of such information, observing that the plaintiff should not abuse his access to 20 information, observing, correctly, that when making these remarks to both sides, I would scarcely have anticipated the plaintiff’s actions days later. b. Noted that on 26 November 2025, the day before the Judgment, the plaintiff furnished a doctor’s certificate stating that he was unfit to work but he attended a board meeting on 11 December 2025 and a staff party on 12 December 2025. Further certificates had subsequently been furnished and, as at the issuing of the motion the latest certificate was due to expire on 27 February 2026. c. Noted that although the defendant was cognisant of its undertaking to provide information relating to work, that was not appropriate due to the plaintiff’s absence on sick leave. The defendant asked the plaintiff’s solicitor whether it should furnish information in accordance with the undertakings during the sick leave and it was eventually asked not to do so. d. Noted that hearing of the Collingwood Complaint against the plaintiff was suspended given his absence on sick leave. The complaint had been investigated and it had been established that there was a case to answer. The hearing was scheduled for 19 November but was repeatedly adjourned due to the plaintiff’s sick leave and remained pending. e. Recounted the details of the Incident. On Monday 15 December, the defendant’s IT team discovered that the company's computer systems had been accessed over the weekend and on further inquiry, it appeared that the plaintiff had accessed email accounts used by the defendants’ officers and employees. f. Noted that the plaintiff's solicitor’s 23 December letter was silent on important points raised by the defendants’ solicitor’s previous letter. Given that the 23 December letter accepted that the plaintiff had accessed a "significant number" the solicitor initially understood that he admitted having accessed private emails and 21 documents, including privileged documents, but his solicitor subsequently denied that the plaintiff intended any such inference to be drawn and made no admission as to the exact nature and scope of the Incident. As a result, the defendant had to carry out a forensic investigation, which confirmed that the plaintiff accessed a wide range of private and privileged material relevant to these proceedings as well as a wide range of material relevant to the disciplinary process against him. g. Noted the controversy as to whether the data access was unauthorised, with the plaintiff’s solicitor objecting to it being described as "unauthorised', stating that the plaintiff "did not act unlawfully and that his administrator permissions entitled him to this access". He noted that the Court was not asked to make any finding at this stage as to whether the data access was unauthorised but that a claim that it was anything other than unauthorised was at odds with the facts because: “The plaintiff’s status as administrator may have facilitated him in accessing email accounts but I am instructed by the defendant company and believe that, at no stage, was authorisation or consent to such data access requested by the plaintiff. Nor was there an implied authorisation or consent to the accessing by the plaintiff of private and/or privileged communications and documents. The actions which have been admitted by the plaintiff (i.e. of accessing email accounts of fellow directors and a complainant in a disciplinary process against him, without specific cause or consent) falls outside anything that could be described as part of his employment duties. This is particularly the case where the plaintiff carried out the data access at a time that he was certified as being unfit to work due to illness, was at home and was accessing the email accounts outside of office hours. Furthermore, the plaintiff would have been aware of the policies of the defendant company in relation to the use of information technology”. h. Observed that the actions were most serious, given the nature of the material accessed and since the plaintiff did not suggest that it was a limited or inadvertent data access and that due to the inconclusive nature of the plaintiff’s response, it was necessary to make arrangements over the Christmas period to establish the nature and scope of the data access. 22 i. Confirmed the details of the forensic process undertaken by an independent analyst retained at considerable expense. He also noted indirect costs such as those arising from the postponement of the mediation hearing. j. Referred to the defendant’s request for undertakings, explaining why it was dissatisfied with the plaintiff’s response, necessitating the application for injunctive relief and offering an undertaking as to damages. k. Referred to the independent analyst’s preliminary findings. l. Noted that he did not make any accusation of impropriety against the plaintiff’s solicitor, accepting the latter’s assurance that they had not had sight of downloaded materials but observing that the correspondence had not treated the plaintiff’s actions as he would have expected and that it remained unclear what precautions were being taken to ensure that instructions received by them from the plaintiff were not influenced by his viewing of material (including privileged material) to which the plaintiff should not have had access. m. Observed that while he could not recall any privileged correspondence which he would be embarrassed to put before the Court, the fact remained that the plaintiff had downloaded and viewed material which he was not entitled to view, including privileged material. That concern had been confirmed by independent analysis of one of the devices which the plaintiff said that he used. n. Noted that the correspondence from the plaintiff’s solicitor did not address the plaintiff’s purpose when accessing the material, much of which related to these proceedings and the Collingwood Complaint, but which also included also commercially sensitive material and personal data (including medical records). o. Noted that while the fact that an employee was on sick leave might ordinarily excuse a failure to address issues in a timely way, there had been engagement 23 between the plaintiff and his solicitor on some issues but only "limited instructions" on others. In particular, nearly eight weeks after the data access, the plaintiff had yet to furnish a comprehensive account of his actions. At the same time, s212 proceedings had been drafted on his behalf and a letter before action had issued which largely rehashed the allegations in these proceedings. p. Noted that the last word on the matter from the plaintiff's solicitor at the time of swearing was the 16 February 2026 letter expressing the view that the Incident was an internal HR matter. The defendant’s solicitor noted that while the Incident raised disciplinary issues, that was not the end of the matter. The proceedings were to be assigned a date for hearing, but the plaintiff’s actions necessitated amendments to the Defence and directions. q. Observed that it would now seem unsustainable for the plaintiff to seek equitable relief, noting that the dismissal of those claims would considerably shorten the time needed for hearing and that the issue could have an impact on the manner in which the costs of the unsuccessful application for interlocutory relief should be determined. 37. The forensic expert’s affidavit confirmed his credentials and expertise and recounted the circumstances of his instruction, the forensic processes and the preliminary conclusions reached. These generally accorded with the summary in correspondence. Key points from his affidavit included his findings from examining the Surface Pro that: a. he was able to forensically recover many documents although there had been an attempt to delete some. b. He had cross-referenced his Surface Pro analysis to the emails (referenced in the defendant’s solicitor’s 16 December letter) which had been identified by the defendant’s IT department as having been accessed over 13-14 December, 24 confirming that the Surface Pro was the device on which two of those emails had been accessed, the documents referring to “meeting with SC” and “Script options for Wednesday hearing”, the latter marked “strictly subject to Legal Professional Privilege”. He noted that work was ongoing in respect of the other four documents, but numerous other similar documents had been identified on the plaintiff’s Surface Pro including: i. documents referring to counsel such as a letter from Senior Counsel to the defendant’s solicitor dated 25 October 2025. ii. an email from Derek Dalton to the defendant’s solicitors enclosing an attachment called "25.07.16 Meeting with SC” which was a transcript of a conference call between the defendant, its solicitors and counsel on 16 July 2025. The email file itself had been deleted but Mr D’Arcy could establish that the file was accessed on the Surface Pro by the user 'johnpaulkelly' on 14 December 2025. iii. Documents referring to statements of bullying including 10 emails from Bonnie Collingwood such as an email with an attached file called "Statement of Bullying 17.07.2025.docx” which contained her statement regarding the bullying allegation. Although Mr D’Arcy could not determine when the document was created on the Surface Pro, he could identify similar documents being accessed on the device on 13 December 2025. iv. An email from sent by Mr Derek Dalton to the defendant’s solicitors on 6 October 2025, copied to counsel, with the subject "Re: 25.10.07 LTR to Solr re Disciplinary MTG Invite" which was accessed on the device on 14 December 2025. 25 v. An email from Derek Dalton to Liam Dalton on 6 October 2025 with the subject-line "FW:Script options for Wednesday Hearing Strictly Subject to Legal Professional Privilege" which forwarded an earlier email from counsel to the defendant’s solicitor, copying Derek Dalton and others which discussed "discovery" within its body. vi. Another email was sent from Derek Dalton to Eoin Dalton on 19 June 2025, forwarding an earlier email from the defendant’s solicitor with the subject line "Re: 25.06.17 JPK Proposal Further Response V3”. vii. An email from Derek Dalton to Liam Dalton on 6 October 2025 with the subject "FW:Script options for Wednesday Hearing Strictly Subject to Legal Professional Privilege", forwarding an earlier email from junior counsel to the defendant’s solicitor and senior counsel along with, inter alia, Derek Dalton. d. His investigation and recovery of deleted files identified evidence on the Surface Pro of other downloaded documents, and he exhibited a large selection of redacted copies. These included some of the documents referred to in the solicitors’ correspondence, namely an invoice from the defendant’s solicitors addressed to the defendant, an outline of litigation strategy issued by the defendant’s solicitors to the defendant; correspondence marked "strictly private and confidential" and at least one letter from senior counsel to the defendant’s solicitors. e. The redacted exhibits also included documents downloaded on the Surface Pro relating to the Collingwood Complaint, financial information relating to Derek and Liam Dalton, medical records of one of their spouses and records (including copy passport details and utility bills) of Liam Dalton. 26 f. Noted that although the Surface Pro was used to access and download documents on 13-14 December, there were emails and documents accessed before those dates. (I disregard this issue for now as it is a matter of controversy). g. Noted the laborious nature of his analysis, which was made more time-consuming because the plaintiff’s only acknowledgment was that a "significant number" of emails for three email accounts were accessed. It would be several weeks before he could correlate his findings from the devices to the defendant’s computer system. While his investigations were ongoing his initial findings confirmed that; (i) the Surface Pro was used to access the defendant’s computer system; (ii) the email accounts for Derek Dalton, Liam Dalton, Bonnie Collingwood and Irene Irish have been identified to date as having been accessed (the plaintiff only admits accessing three of these); and (iii) it was used to access emails marked "legal professional privilege" and a variety of documents were downloaded to the Surface Pro which were marked "privileged", "private" or "confidential". h. Identified numerous further examples of documents accessed by the plaintiff. 38. The plaintiff’s replying affidavit is worth quoting at length: “3. I say, by way of explanation and not excuse, that at the time I accessed the data, which I have admitted from the outset, I was under extreme stress as a result of the ongoing matters in relation to my employment and these proceedings. I had already found the situation in my employment prior to the issuing of these proceedings and the hearing before this court in October 2025 to be extremely distressing and stressful. However matters became much worse for me where I also suffered an impact on my health in or around late November 2025. I say that I have been on stress related sick leave, since the 26th day of November 2025 having been certified as unfit to work, first by my own GP and subsequently by the Defendant's occupational health professional. At my most recent appointment with my GP last Wednesday 25th February 2026 my GP issued a further certificate which covers the period up until 13th March 2026. She is also arranging to refer me to a consultant psychiatrist for assessment of my mental health. 27 4. My situation at work was already very difficult prior to these matters, but I was doing my best to perform my role within the constrained circumstances in place at the time. Matters were however further compounded by disciplinary proceedings commenced against me by the Defendant, in or around 16th July 2025. I have always disputed the underlying complaint of bullying, the substance of which in part related to the changes in reporting structures that are subject of the within proceedings. However at all times, I cooperated fully with the investigation process and the appeal process, notwithstanding that in my view, this was not conducted in a manner that was fair or appropriate. I also held the view, as already averred by me in these proceedings, that the disciplinary process and the underlying complaint was initiated for the purposes of achieving the termination of my employment which would have such a detrimental effect on my life and that of my family. My livelihood and everything that I have worked so hard for was at risk. 5. I cooperated fully with the disciplinary process and the underlying investigation and appeal and had tried to point out in the course of the investigation and to the Defendant, the issues that were unfair in how it was being conducted but my representations in this regard were either disregarded or not accepted and I felt utterly helpless in trying to address these issues. 6. In the face of this horrendous situation, I was so stressed and in such a desperate position that I accessed the Defendant's computer system. I make this averment not to excuse what I now understand and accept to have been a grave error of judgment and something that I should not have done, but to explain my thought process at the time. 7. I say that I apologise unreservedly for this, and I acknowledge that it was a serious error in judgment. I say that I have not used any of the information read by me and I confirm that I did not share any of the information with my solicitors, counsel, or any other party. I further confirm that I have not retained copies of any of the information read by me in any format, be that electronically, in hard copy or otherwise. 8. As Managing Director of the Defendant I am authorised to fully access the Defendant's computer system. I used the access provided to me by the Company to view information stored on the Store-All network. At the time that I did this, I was of the view that I was authorised to access the system. I say that on Saturday December 13th 2025 using my own credentials johnpaulkelly.ie and from my company Surface Pro tablet I granted myself access to the mailboxes of Derek Dalton, Liam Dalton, Bonnie Collingwood, Irene Irish and Richard Kervick at their Store- All addresses and Derek Dalton's Blackstar email address. I scrolled through the mailboxes of Liam Dalton, Bonnie Collingwood and Derek Dalton's Blackstar mailboxes at various times on Saturday 13th and Sunday 14th December 2025. I say that I did not look at the mailboxes of Richard Kervick, Irene Irish or Derek Dalton's Store-All email address. 9. I say that I saved some emails to the company Surface Pro tablet, but I deleted them on Tuesday 16th December 2025 following receipt of the letter of 16th 28 December 2025 from Ormondes Solicitors which required confirmation that any copies of downloaded items had been destroyed… 10. I say that the only device that I used for this access was the company Surface Pro and I confirm that I did not download any documents or material to any device other than the Surface Pro. I say that I did not otherwise retain any of the data accessed by me on 13th and 14th December 2025. Further I did not download any such data to any other device from the company Surface Pro. 11. I say that with regard to paragraph 5 of Mr Darcy's Affidavit, I confirm that I deleted documents as per the instruction at point 'f’ of the letter from Ormonde Solicitors of the 16th December 2026, as exhibited at exhibit SOI of the grounding affidavit of Sean Ormonde, there being some conflict between the instruction at point 'c' and 'f of that letter. I am fully aware that these would be recoverable by an IT expert. I did not clear the cache of the browser as this would have been tampering with the preservation of the data, and I was instructed not to do this by the said letter which I took most seriously. 12. I say that with regard to paragraph 6 of Mr Darcy's Affidavit I say that I do not understand the conclusion that "the email account of Irene Irish was accessed using the Surface Pro". I say that the correspondence provided at exhibit PD2 of Mr Darcys affidavit between Helen Barry and Irene Irish was most likely provided to me by Ms Barry as part of a GDPR request I made to Ms Barry, however, I say that as I do not have access to my email currently, I cannot definitively confirm this. I am adamant that to the very best of my recollection, that I did not view Irene Irish's sent or received emails. 13. I say that while "material emanating from Richard Kervick was viewed or downloaded on the Surface Pro" as referred to in paragraph (6) of Mr. Darcy's email, this material was not obtained though accessing Richard Kervick's email account. Material emanating from Richard Kervick would have been sent to this deponent from various staff members of the Defendant. Again it is not possible for me to provide the exact details of this at this point as I do not have access to my email account. 14.Further to paragraph 11 of Mr Darcy's Affidavit I say that I did not insert a USB storage device into the laptop on 9th December 2025, which preceded the days on which the data access occurred as I do not own such a device. I do own a computer mouse which I connect to laptops and other such devices through the USB port, the same place one would connect a USB storage device, and this may be what Mr Darcy is detecting. However I say with certainty that I have not copied any material onto a USB stick or any such storage device. I can confirm that I have not downloaded any of the emails accessed by me to a USB device. I can further confirm that I have not downloaded, printed, or otherwise retained copies or records of the material viewed in any format whatsoever. 15. I say that with regard to paragraph 12 of Mr Darcy's Affidavit, that all evidence will align with the fact that I only accessed these emails on 13th and 14th of December 2025. I say that any emails and documents accessed prior to that date are connected with my own email account. I say that with regard to paragraph 29 13 of Mr Darcy's Affidavit, I confirm that the only access of emails other than my own emails was through the Surface Pro device and was on the weekend of the 13th / 14th of December 2025. I say that any emails and documents accessed prior to that date are connected with my own email account. 16. I say that with regard to paragraph 13 of Mr Darcy's Affidavit, I confirm that the only access of emails other than my own emails was through the Surface Pro device and was on the weekend of the 13th / 14th of December 2025. I confirm that I did not download any documents to a USB device. I say that I have offered to provide my telephone for forensic examination if required, and I have requested that I be in attendance for any such examination. No request has been made of me to date to progress this. 17.I say that with regard to paragraph 14 of Mr Darcy's Affidavit, this Deponent responds as follows: (a) I have accepted this from the outset (b) I have stated from the outset that I accessed emails of Derek Dalton, Liam Dalton and Bonnie Collingwood. However I do not accept that I accessed the email account of Irene Irish. (c) With significant regret, I accept that this is the case. 18. I made a huge mistake and I accept that. However once this was pointed out to me I have honestly and fully cooperated with all that has been asked of me. I seek in this Replying Affidavit to continue to do so. 19. I say that while I have always admitted the access of emails over the weekend of the 13th and 14th December 2025, I do dispute some of the conclusions of Mr. Darcy. I say that I have not had sight of the finalised report of Mr Darcy and cannot aver further as to his findings until the report is to hand. 20. In regard to the reliefs that have been sought by the Defendant in its Notice of Motion, I have never been asked to swear an affidavit of the nature sought at paragraph 1 prior to the motion issuing. However I have no difficulty in doing so and I have made the averments sought, in this Replying Affidavit. I say that I have already provided the Undertakings sought of me in writing on 19th January last and have complied with these. 21. I understand that the Defendant is seeking various reliefs in the terms set out in paragraph 4 of the Notice of Motion. I say that my proceedings were issued having attempted first to engage in mediation with the Defendant to resolve the difficulties which occurred in my employment. I say that the claim within my proceedings is genuine and bona fide and is not an abuse of process. I have sought to engage in mediation on two further occasions but mediations which were convened did not proceed. I remain open and willing to seek to resolve all issues in dispute with the Defendant. The Defendant is unwilling to engage in mediation of the within proceedings unless the mediation includes the dispute between myself and Mr. Derek Dalton. I have not disagreed with this approach, but it has served to impede the possibility of engaging in mediation of the dispute in these proceedings. I remain willing to engage in mediation in relation to this dispute. 30 22. I say, with respect, that dismissing my proceedings or striking out reliefs sought in the Statement of Claim, as the Defendant has urged, would be disproportionate and drastic in the circumstances. My claim is not of a frivolous or vexatious nature. I have suffered greatly, and I continue to suffer by reason of the Defendant's actions. While I acknowledge that I made a mistake which I greatly regret, I did not use the information for any advantage, did not share it with my lawyers or anyone else, did not copy it, have admitted my actions and have sought to cooperate fulsomely with the Defendant with respect to its various requests. 23. Where mediation has not taken place, I have been most anxious for my claim to be heard as soon as possible and have complied with all court directions with a view to obtaining an expedited hearing. My situation has become so much worse since the matter was last before the court in that my health has been seriously impacted, I am on sick leave from work since late November and have not been paid any salary for a number of months. It is of vital importance to me that I be permitted to proceed with my claim and I ask that the court assigned to hear these proceedings, if I am permitted to proceed with my claim, determine whether the reliefs sought by me in my proceedings are appropriate or not, if I am successful.” 39. The plaintiff’s solicitor’s affidavit, in summary: (a) said that the application was unnecessary, noting that the affidavit sought had not been requested prior to the motion issuing, that the replying affidavits had provided the “relevant averments” and that the plaintiff had furnished signed undertakings which were almost identical to the orders sought (recounting the correspondence as to the undertakings and explains the plaintiff’s position); (b) claimed that the defendant was responsible for the repeated postponement of the mediation, accusing it of frustrating that process; (c) As far as the Incident was concerned, it: a. referred to the initial exchange of letters on 16 and 19 December, stating that: “each of (the defendant’s) queries were answered fully and completely in correspondence by this office dated the 19ᵗʰ December 2025, despite the Plaintiff being on certified sick leave”. b. Took issue with averments in the Grounding Affidavit suggesting that the forensic analysis was necessitated by the plaintiff’s purported inadequate responses to the initial queries raised, observing that the defendant always 31 intended to have the plaintiff’s devices forensically analysed and that, from the outset, the plaintiff indicated that he would cooperate with the said analysis, and did indeed do so, cooperating in the collection of his devices over the Christmas period and also confirming his willingness to provide his phone for analysis provided that it would be examined in his presence, given the “significant personal content” thereon. c. Explained that it was and had always been the plaintiff’s solicitor’s and counsel’s position that; “it would be wholly inappropriate to interrogate the Plaintiff with regard to the content of the documentation he may have accessed. I have, in agreement with Counsel, firmly advised and instructed the Plaintiff herein not to disclose the content of the documents he may have accessed, to this office, to Counsel, or to any third party. It follows therefore, leaving aside the fact that the Plaintiff was and remains on certified sick leave, not possible to seek and or to obtain anything other than limited instructions with regard to the content of the material which the Plaintiff may have accessed. Further to do so would potentially create precisely the type of concern averred to on behalf of the Defendant in terms of possible litigation advantage. I say that the Plaintiff has never relied on in his instructions to this firm on any of the documentation or information accessed by him. I say that it has been made abundantly clear to the Defendant that no such material has been disclosed to this office”. d. Noted that, although the plaintiff had not disclosed privileged material to his office, even if he had done so any such material would remain privileged, and could not be proffered in evidence, noting that the plaintiff has made no attempt to introduce or rely on privileged material. e. Opposed the dismissal of the proceedings on the basis that; (a) there was no suggestion that the plaintiff had attempted to rely on “any material he may have accessed” in the proceedings; (b) the events to which the proceedings relate predate the alleged accessing of the material at issue; (c) the Collingwood Complaint was at best peripheral to these proceedings; (d) if 32 privileged material was accessed by the plaintiff, that material remained privileged, and could not be relied upon by him in any event; (e) the plaintiff provided all undertakings and assurances sought by the defendant (save as specified and for stated reasons.); (f) the proceedings were not an abuse of process, concerning a justiciable claim, which pre-dated the Incident and in respect of which I had determined that the plaintiff had established: "a strong case that the changes to reporting lines and associated restrictions were so all encompassing in their impact on his role and responsibilities as to constitute a breach of contract". f. Stated that: “the serious matters raised in this application and pleaded in the Amended Defence are clearly factors for the trial judge to consider in the event of relief being awarded to the Plaintiff, if his claim is successful, this is a different issue to claiming that the proceedings constitute an abuse of process”. 40. A final supplemental affidavit from the defendant’s solicitors took issue with the plaintiff’s statement that he originally understood that as MD he was authorised to fully access the defendant's computer system, confirming the defendant's instructions that; (a) no policy, direction, authorisation or consent from the defendant company authorises actions such as those carried out by the plaintiff; (b) administrator permissions are to enable a designated person (in this case, the MD) to manage the computer system and effect changes such as software installation and other changes affecting email and other functions; (c) such permissions are not for the purpose of accessing the email accounts of individuals without their knowledge or to view and download material enjoying legal professional privilege or which is otherwise private and confidential. The affidavit observed that the plaintiff’s suggestion flew in the face of the Court’s statements in the Judgment and on 10 December 2025 admonishing both parties to approach matters appropriately and not to abuse information given or received. It rejected the 33 suggestion the suggestion that its questions about the Incident were "fully and completely" acknowledged by the plaintiff at an early stage noting that the defendant: “…has an obligation to ascertain the precise nature and scope of the data access, particularly in the light of the correspondence and this process was commenced and continues. The cost of enquiring into the data access has been enormous in terms of management time and resources generally. The costs attributable to the data access alone are nearly €55,000 to date, exclusive of value added tax-which figure does not include costs thrown away due to the adjournment of the mediation hearing and other costs. Discussion 41. I cannot resolve certain issues at this stage (such as the number of accounts accessed, the possible use of a USB drive or whether the plaintiff’s ill-health excuses his actions, if that is asserted). Such issues would need to be resolved on the basis of further evidence and, possibly, cross examination. However, the plaintiff accepts that the Incident should not have happened. Matters have been made worse by subsequent actions, including his deletion of downloaded data. When the facts first emerged, he should have immediately acknowledged the gravity of the Incident, accepting that it should not have happened, even if it was necessary to couch it carefully because of the legal implications. The plaintiff and his lawyers should have taken steps to ensure that all evidence was preserved. In the event, the positions adopted by the plaintiff after the Incident detract from the credibility of the contrition articulated by him in response to this application. The inconsistency of approach in correspondence, affidavits and submissions does him no credit. 42. Notwithstanding previous protestations, the plaintiff now accepts that he should not have accessed the data. Indeed, this was implicit in his reaction when the issue first emerged. If the plaintiff’s advisers had believed that there was any justification for accessing the material, then they would have responded differently from the outset. The plaintiff should also have 34 furnished as much information as possible as to what happened, and why, and proposed steps to ensure that other parties were not prejudiced. He failed to do so, and the issue remains unremediated. The correspondence, affidavits or submissions on his behalf have failed to adequately tackle that responsibility on his part, a duty to the Court independent of the duties the plaintiff may owe the defendant or the individuals affected, whether under GDPR and privacy law, Company law or by virtue of his contractual obligations. The Plaintiff’s Explanations 43. The plaintiff’s explanation for his actions boils down to his having been extremely stressed and to having originally believed he was authorised to access the documents. I do accept that he was stressed at the time of the Incident. This litigation was undoubtedly difficult for him in view of his and his family’s long involvement in the defendant. Tensions were mounting within the workplace, to the detriment of all concerned, including the plaintiff, even if he himself had allegedly contributed to that situation. Litigation is stressful and all protagonists were also subjected to such pressure before - but even more so as a result of - the Incident. The plaintiff adverted to stress as explaining rather than excusing his actions. He has furnished medical certificates suggesting that he is unfit to return to work and has repeatedly secured the deferral of the hearing of the Collingwood Complaint, has failed to attend board meetings and has indicated that he does not (for now) wish to receive the company information which he was previously so anxious to obtain and was the subject of the 10 December hearing and undertakings. His health issues have also been cited as delaying or impeding his ability to respond to the defendant’s legitimate questions about the Incident. However, the plaintiff was able to devote many hours over the fateful weekend reviewing and downloading enormous volumes of data and was also willing and able to proceed with the 19 January mediation hearing and able to give his solicitors instructions in respect of their detailed 28 January 2026 letter 35 threatening s212 proceedings. Accordingly, the defendant’s reference to an apparent selectivity in respect of the plaintiff’s ability to engage with issues does not appear to be entirely unreasonable. I do not express a view on that issue, but I would require medical evidence (formally presented on the basis stipulated by the Rules of the Superior Courts governing the provision of such expert testimony) if it was suggested that such stress was a significant mitigant. In view of the gravity of the issue and the extraordinary circumstances, a suitably qualified medical expert, aware of the full context of the Incident, would need to acknowledge their understanding of their duty to the Court and provide detailed testimony in person explaining the plaintiff’s medical condition and the degree to which it might account for his recent actions. They would need to be available for cross examination if required. Accordingly, for now I simply note the plaintiff’s explanation as to stress without evaluating its credibility or determining whether it constitutes a mitigant. 44. I note the plaintiff’s explanation that at the time of the Incident he believed he was acting within his rights. While it is fortunate that he never shared the downloaded documents with his solicitors, that would have been the obvious course if he believed that his actions were legitimate. Any such belief appears objectively unreasonable and it is surprising that a senior company officer and executive should have formed such a view. However