T.M. [Georgia] v The International Appeals Tribunal and Anor

[2026] IEHC 150 THE HIGH COURT JUDICIAL REVIEW [2024/1138JR] BETWEEN: T.M. (GEORGIA) APPLICANT AND THE INTERNATIONAL APPEALS TRIBUNAL AND THE MINISTER FOR JUSTICE RESPONDENTS JUDGMENT of Mr. Justice Barry O’Donnell delivered on the 10th day of March 2026 INTRODUCTION 1. The applicant in this case is a Georgian national who sought international protection in the State. In these proceedings she sought orders of certiorari quashing a decision of the first respondent (the Tribunal) made on the 19 August 2024. The impugned decision (the Decision) affirmed an earlier recommendation by the International Protection Office (the IPO) to the second respondent (the Minister) that the applicant should not be given a refugee declaration or subsidiary protection. As the case arises from matters regulated by the International Protection Act 2015 (the 2015 Act), the identity of the applicant and matters that could identify her have been anonymised and presented in a manner which minimises the risk for the applicant to be identified. 2. The Tribunal in this case had accepted that the narrative given by the applicant was credible, including her evidence of various medical conditions. The Tribunal found that the applicant had a well-founded fear of persecution and that the applicant was a member of a particular social group for the purposes of the 2015 Act, being a woman victim of stalking and that she shares a common background that cannot be changed. The applicant’s claim to international protection was rejected on the basis of a finding that Georgia operates “an effective legal system for the prosecution and punishment of gender-based violence. The protection is effective and of a non-temporary nature. The [applicant] has access to that protection.” 3. The applicant was granted leave to apply for judicial review on the 15 November 2024, having filed her statement of grounds on the 11 September 2024. She seeks to quash the Decision on grounds set out in her Statement of Grounds, which can be summarised as: (a) The Tribunal failed to take account of the United States Department of State (USDOS) report on Human Rights 2024, which reported on events from 2023; (b) The Tribunal’s reliance on country-of-origin information (COI) was unreasonable or selective and led to an irrational conclusion; (c) The Tribunal correctly identified the test to be applied in a consideration of the question of state protection, but failed to apply the test properly; (d) The Tribunal unreasonably concluded in the particular circumstances of the case that there was effective independent oversight of the police in Georgia. (e) The Tribunal failed to provide adequate reasons as to why state protection would be effective for the applicant in her circumstances. (f) The Tribunal failed to take sufficient account of or attach sufficient weight to section 28(6) of the 2015 Act in making the Decision. 4. For the reasons set out in this judgment I have concluded that the applicant is entitled to an order quashing the Decision of the Tribunal on the basis of the ground advanced relating to the treatment of the COI by the Tribunal and the resulting finding that there was effective state protection available to the applicant if she was returned to Georgia. BACKGROUND 5. As the core factual elements underpinning the international protection application essentially were accepted and the focus of this case is on the question of state protection, the facts can be dealt with relatively briefly. The facts were set out in detail in the affidavits sworn on behalf of the applicant and in the exhibits that were before the court. 6. The applicant’s claim for international protection focussed on her experiences of extensive and troubling stalking between 2018 and 2021. The person responsible for the stalking was identified by the applicant and will be described in this judgment as ‘GA’. 7. The applicant described that, in 2018, when she was in her early twenties, she was working in a hotel in a town in Georgia. A guest, GA, took interest in her. This began with compliments, progressed to calls, texts, and social media contacts, and developed into extensive stalking. The applicant reported that GA regularly shouted negatively at her on the street about her appearance, and he threatened that he would kill the applicant if she ever had a relationship with anyone else. 8. The applicant reported the matter to the police in 2018, but nothing was done. Likewise, the manager at the hotel where she worked refused to take any action because the man was considered important locally. As a result of the stalking, the applicant left her job and moved to a different city in Georgia. The stalking continued in that other city. In December 2019, she moved again to evade the stalking, but she continued to receive telephone calls from GA until the pandemic lockdown began in March 2020. 9. In April 2021, she returned to her hometown for medical reasons. The stalking started again and she was very afraid. Her family was unable to reason with GA, who regularly sat outside their family home and shouted abuse her. In August 2021, the applicant left Georgia and went to Italy. Despite the move and changing her phone number she stated that GA continued to message her. The applicant stated that GA told her that he was coming to Italy for her, and she then decided to move to Ireland. She chose Ireland because she was in a relationship with her partner, who was already here. 10. In June 2022, the applicant arrived in Ireland and applied for protection. The applicant went through the regular process provided for under the 2015 Act including completing a questionnaire and attending for interview at the IPO on the 13 October 2023. 11. By letter dated the 7 December 2023, the IPO issued its report declining to recommend a grant of international protection. Essentially, the IPO accepted the applicant's account and found her account of events descriptive and specific. There was a finding that she had a well- founded fear of persecution, and a finding that she may be at risk of further stalking if she returned to Georgia. There was a finding that the experiences of the applicant had a Convention nexus in that she was a member of a particular social group, being women who suffered gender- based violence. The IPO found that state protection would be available to the applicant if she returned to Georgia. Accordingly, the applicant through her solicitor lodged an appeal to the Tribunal. THE TRIBUNAL PROCESS AND DECISION 12. The applicant, through her lawyers, completed the appeal form and identified a body of COI that was argued to be relevant to the state protection issues that grounded the IPO decision. 13. The appeal before the Tribunal was conducted on a “papers only” basis in accordance with the 2015 Act accelerated procedure, where Georgia has been designated as a safe country. There was no challenge to the Tribunal’s decision in that regard. 14. The Decision overall was clear and reasoned. Substantively, it commenced with a summary of the facts and noted that the applicant had submitted COI that had been identified in her notice of appeal. The Tribunal also had access to the COI collected by the IPO. The following was stated at para. 6 of the Decision: “All of the documents submitted in this case were fully assessed by the Tribunal. However, the Tribunal will only refer to such evidence and information within this decision as is necessary to explain the Tribunal’s findings and conclusions.” 15. The Tribunal accepted the applicant’s account of her negative interactions with GA and accepted the medical evidence regarding her medical conditions and anxiety disorder. In relation to the actions of GA, the Tribunal noted that even though his conduct was not physically violent, “repeated psychological harassment can cumulatively amount to persecution.” The Tribunal also noted that the conduct involved threats to kill the applicant. The Tribunal found that the applicant was at risk of persecution, with the level of risk being that of a reasonable chance. The Tribunal also found that the applicant was a member of a particular social group for the purpose of section 8 of the 2015 Act, because “as a woman victim of stalking she shares a common background that cannot be changed.” Those findings were not challenged. 16. The Tribunal went on to note that Georgia was a designated safe country. With regard to the section 33 analysis, the Tribunal considered that this was not a case where “ordinary” assault was feared. The Tribunal accepted the applicant’s characterisation of her experiences as gender-based violence in her particular circumstances. The Tribunal noted that the USDOS had set out in a report that domestic and gender-based violence “remained a significant problem that the government took several steps to combat”. Against that backdrop, the Tribunal found that the question of state protection should be analysed without the overlay of Georgia being a safe country. 17. In relation to the question of state protection, the Tribunal began by noting B.C. v IPAT [2019] IEHC 763, in which Barrett J. broke down the elements of the test in section 31 of the 2015 Act; and confirmed that the analysis had to be carried out with a focus on the particular circumstances of the applicant. The Tribunal then referred to the COI. The older COI (from 2013 to 2015) observed that violence against women tended to be condoned in Georgia due to “patriarchal norms and deeply entrenched stereotypes”. 18. The Tribunal then noted that the more recent COI pointed to a “positive change”, and reference was made to a Freedom House Report for Georgia from 2022 which observed that domestic violence remained a problem and that the response from police was often inadequate. The Tribunal described the USOS report from 2022 as a “comprehensive recent account” of the law and practice surrounding violence against women. That report also observed that domestic and gender-based violence “remained a significant problem that the government took several steps to combat.” The extract relied on by the Tribunal went on to note various steps that had been taken legislatively and through actions taken by the police and Ministry of Internal Affairs. This led to improvements, although the report stated that “[s]hortcomings, however, remained, including a tendency of some police to ask women what they had done to prompt domestic violence against them.” 19. The Tribunal also noted that the COI indicated that corruption and impunity remained a problem, albeit that the focus appeared to be on high level corruption and that the State Inspectors Service had been replaced with two agencies, one of which provided oversight of the police. 20. Starting at paragraph 24 of the Decision, the Tribunal commenced its analysis of the COI. The Tribunal saw the COI as presenting a “mixed picture” noting the improvements set out over the period reviewed. The Tribunal then considered the position of the applicant, and, by reference to the developments noted in the COI, observed the situation was now quite different to that encountered by the applicant when she made her report to the police concerning GA in 2018. Insofar as the position and influence of GA was concerned, the Tribunal noted that the applicant’s case did not have a political element and that the Special Investigation Service – which was not in place in 2018 – now provided independent oversight of the police. This led to a finding that there “is effective oversight of the police in Georgia even if the Appellant encounters a police officer who has been overborne by [GA].” 21. The Tribunal summarised its view in the following way at para. 28: “Taking everything into consideration in the context of the individual circumstances of the Appellant’s claim, and having regard to the four-part test set out in B.C. v. International Protection Appeals Tribunal [2019] IEHC 763, the Tribunal is satisfied by the country of origin information that Georgia takes reasonable steps to prevent the kind of persecution feared by the Appellant arising from possible future harassment or violence. Georgia operates an effective legal system for the prosecution and punishment of gender-based violence. That protection is effective and of a non-temporary nature. The Appellant has access to that protection. The effective state protection includes oversight of the police by the Special Investigation Service. Therefore, the Tribunal concludes that effective State protection would be available to the Appellant should she returned to Georgia.” 22. Regarding the question of serious harm, because of the availability of state protection, the Tribunal found that there were not substantial grounds for believing that the applicant would face a real risk of serious harm if she were to return to Georgia. THE PROCEEDINGS 23. On the 10 September 2024, the applicant filed a Statement of Grounds seeking to quash the Tribunal’s decision. The application was grounded on affidavits sworn on the 10 September by the applicant and her solicitor. The High Court granted leave to apply for judicial review on the 15 November 2024, and the notice of motion was filed on the 19 November 2024. The respondents are opposing the relief, and a Statement of Opposition was dated the 24 February 2025. The respondent’s opposition papers were verified by John Moore, a Higher Executive Officer on the Immigration Delivery Service function of the Minister’s department by an affidavit sworn on the 26 February 2025. That affidavit also exhibited documents relating to the proceedings, and documents received by the department for the purposes of a permission to remain application under section 49 of the 2015 Act. DISCUSSION OF THE ARGUMENTS AT HEARING 24. The court had the benefit of comprehensive and very helpful written and oral submissions from counsel on both sides. The hearing in this case occurred shortly after the hearing of an application that also involved claims for protection from a Georgian woman in which issues of state protection in the context of gender-based violence were at the fore. That application has given rise to a judgment which is reported as MG (Georgia) v. IPAT [2026] IEHC 151. Given the overlap between the arguments and issues between both cases, I will address certain issues more briefly in this judgment. 25. In particular the observations made by the court concerning the CJEU decision in WS v. Intervyuirasht organ na Darzhavna agentsia za bezhantsite pri Ministerskia savet C-621/ 21, ECLI:EU:C:2024:47, 16 January 2024 (W.S.), which addressed the significance to be attached to claims for protection based on concerns of what broadly can be described as domestic or gender-based violence, should be taken as repeated and relied upon for the purposes of this judgment. In a similar way to the treatment of these matters in the M.G. v IPAT judgment, in this case I am satisfied as to the undoubted general importance of what is set out in the WS judgment. Ultimately the court’s view is that in this case the Tribunal accepted the applicant’s account of stalking and harassment and found that the applicant had a well-founded fear of persecution. As such, it cannot be said that the findings and underlying concerns expressed in the CJEU case law in that regard were ignored or afforded insufficient weight. The main issue of concern, as will be set out, is the Tribunal’s treatment of the COI that was considered in connection with the question of effective state protection in Georgia. DISCUSSION OF SUBSTANTIAL ISSUES Failure to consider 2023 USDOS report 26. The first argument made by the applicant was that the Tribunal referred to the USDOS report from 2022 as a “comprehensive recent account” relating to gender-based violence. In fact, the applicant argued that the most recent report from USDOS was a report relating to 2023. The applicant noted that Article 8(2) of the Procedures Directive (2005/85/EC) requires that “precise and up-to-date information” should be obtained as part of the decision-making process. While the substance of the two reports was similar, the point was made that the 2023 report was material in that the earlier trend of improvement was not evidenced where matters, in effect, remained somewhat static. 27. In reply, the respondents argued first that the Tribunal had taken account of the 2023 report and referred expressly to that report in considering issues in relation to the applicant’s medical treatment. Second, the respondents relied on the line of authority from GK v Minister for Justice [2002] 2 IR 418 to Rana v Minister for Justice [2024] IESC 46 for the proposition that the general statement in the Decision to the effect that all materials were considered must be taken as accurate in the absence of evidence to suggest that certain materials were not considered. Here, the general statement was not undermined because the Tribunal expressly referred to the 2023 report at para 11 of the Decision. Insofar as the applicant had argued that the Tribunal must have excluded the 2023 report from its consideration when it expressly relied on the 2022 report in connection with the state protection section of the Decision, the respondents argued that this did not follow. In any event, the respondents argued that even if the Tribunal emphasised the 2022 rather than the 2023 report this should not lead to the Decision being quashed. 28. Overall, I consider that this situation is one governed by the authority flowing from GK v Minister for Justice [2002] 2 IR 418. The Tribunal stated that it had considered all the materials, which included the 2023 USDOS report, and went on expressly to refer to that report in the body of the Decision. 29. If I am incorrect in that analysis, in my view, the respondents also are correct that where the Tribunal relies on relatively upon to date information and does not expressly rely on more up to date COI from the same source, something more is required to warrant the court quashing the consequent decision. I agree with the analysis conducted by Phelan J. in A.S. v. IPAT [2025] IEHC 184 and her comments at para 39 of that judgment: “To properly maintain a complaint of the type contemplated there should be a qualitative, comparative exercise in evidence which demonstrates that it is arguable that there was in fact a relevant and material difference between the two – the old COI considered and the new COI which it is contended ought to have been considered. No such proper comparative exercise was done in this case. Accordingly, there has been a failure to provide a sufficient evidential platform to ground a legal argument for the relief claimed.” 30. Applying the test set out – is there something that demonstrates a relevant and material difference between the two sets of COI – I am not satisfied that the applicant can succeed in obtaining relief on this ground. It must be noted that the task of the Tribunal was not directed to noting improvements but to consider whether the COI supported the proposition that effective and non-temporary state protection would be available to the applicant if she was returned to Georgia. I do not consider that some slowing down in the trend of improvements – as opposed to some suggestion of a reversal – is sufficiently material to warrant relief. The applicant did not provide a basis for arguing that this analysis would have differed in a material sense if the more recent COI from the USDOS was considered. Analysis of State Protection issues 31. The second argument made by the applicant was the main focus of submission at hearing and related to the Tribunal’s assessment of the state protection issues. Here, the applicant accepted that the caselaw makes clear that what is required is an analysis of “whether the country concerned provides reasonable protection in practical terms”, as identified in Idiakheua v Minister for Justice [2005] IEHC 150. The applicant submitted that the type of analysis required was summarised in the EASO “Practical Guide: Qualification for International Protection, 2018” where at page 38 the following was stated: “Mere detection, prosecution and punishment of acts constituting persecution or serious harm, after they have taken place, does not meet the requirement of effective protection. The actors of protection have to take reasonable steps to prevent such harmful acts and to diminish the risk of them occurring. Elements such as human rights records, corruption, sufficiency of resources, law enforcement practices and independence of the judiciary can be taken into account when assessing whether effective protection can be provided.” 32. Turning to the impugned Decision, the applicant made two related points. First, the argument was that, overall, the Tribunal focussed on observed improvements in the situation in Georgia without conducting a separate analysis of whether the improvements led to effective and non-temporary protection being available to the applicant. Second, the argument was that there was a selective reliance of aspects of the COI which ignored other pertinent aspects of the same COI. Particular emphasis was placed on the fact that the Tribunal quoted from a subsection in the USDOS 2022 report, which addressed domestic violence and developments in the reporting and responses to that issue. The applicant argued that the Tribunal did not refer to a subsequent passage in the same section of the USDOS report that addressed rape and gender-based violence and which noted significant shortcomings. In that section the report noted that in relation to rape, the government did not enforce the law effectively. The 2022 report also noted that femicide and femicide attempt rates had not fallen in the period under review. 33. Finally, the applicant highlighted that the report recorded that the Georgian Young Lawyers Association had noted, in relation to sexual violence, that: “…sexual violence remained one of the most serious, most hidden, and unpunished forms of gender-based violence. Current legislation and practice failed to provide effective, survivor-centred, gender-sensitive legal solutions to combat sexual violence. For women and girls experiencing violence, justice was unavailable or difficult to access. Despite the existing challenges, GYLA reported the detection of sexual violence cases and the detection rate of registered crimes increased compared with previous years.” 34. The applicant did not invite the court to substitute its own view for that of the Tribunal but submitted that this situation was close to the situation criticised by Ferriter J. in FM. & R.M. v. IPAT [2021] IEHC 817. The applicant referred to the following observations made by Hogan J in BD v IPAT [2024] IECA 186, at para.7: “ … it is not enough to say that the country of origin is making endeavours to prevent the persecution if it should transpire that those efforts are themselves ineffective.” 35. The respondents noted the provisions of section 31 of the 2015 Act and the analysis of the elements in that section set out by Barrett J in B.C. v. IPAT [2019] IEHC 763. The respondents set out that the burden was on the applicant to show that state protection from the type of persecution she feared would not be available to them in Georgia, relying on X.S. v. IPAT [2022] IEHC 100. The respondents noted a number of authorities that make clear that perfect or absolute state protection is unobtainable and that the focus of the analysis must be on whether reasonable steps are being taken to address the issue of concern. Illustrative of that approach are the observations of Phelan J. in W.P.L. v IPAT [2024] IEHC 184 where it was said: “The test turns not on success rate in preventing crime or corruption but on the nature of the measures put in place and whether they can be characterised as ‘reasonable steps’.” 36. In summary, the respondents argued that in this case it was clear that the Tribunal considered the correct test, observed that the COI presented a “mixed picture”, but engaged in the necessary process of weighing that mixed evidence to reach a conclusion. The respondents rejected the contention that there was selective reliance on the COI and argued that the situation in this case was distinct from that addressed in cases such as D.V.T.S. v Minister for Justice [2008] 3 IR 476. Fundamentally the respondents contended that the applicant was seeking to conflate the concepts of reasonable protection and success rates in preventing crimes. In that regard, by reference to ES v IPAT [2022] IEHC 613, the respondents noted that Phalan J. had held that “for the Tribunal to conclude that State protection is available, it is not the case that there must be evidence that both crime and corruption are completely or even substantially under control in a state.” 37. The starting point for analysis is that court must acknowledge that the Oireachtas has assigned to the Tribunal the task of engaging with and appraising the evidence and materials before it, in cooperation with the applicant. The task of court in a judicial review is not to consider whether it would reach a different view on the materials to that reached by the Tribunal but instead to be satisfied that the views and decisions of the Tribunal were reached lawfully. In the context of its appraisal of the COI for the purposes of considering the question of state protection, this means that the view reached by the Tribunal on the COI must have been one reasonably open to it on a fair reading of all the relevant material having proper regard to the factors identified in section 31 of the 2015 Act. 38. In that sense, if the view reached simply is not open to the Tribunal because it cannot be seen to be supported by the COI, the decision cannot be said to be lawful. Similarly, if the COI is appraised fairly, but, objectively, cannot satisfy the criteria set out in section 31 of the 2015 Act, it follows that the Tribunal will have misdirected itself as to the proper legal test. If the Tribunal view is based on only some of the COI – which points in one direction – and, without good reason or proper explanation, ignores or discounts elements in the COI that point in the other direction, the decision likewise cannot stand. 39. None of those scenarios contemplate the court quashing a decision on the basis that the court disagrees with the outcome or would have come to a different conclusion. The decision is quashed because the legally flawed process leads to a conclusion that cannot be permitted to stand. The case law cited by the parties, to my mind, illustrates those principles. 40. Accordingly, in D.V.T.S. v. The Minister for Justice [2008] 3 IR 476, the reasons identified by Edwards J. for quashing the Decision in that case were (a) the lack of recognition that there was conflicting COI, (b) and the consequent failure to explain or indicate how that conflict came to be resolved. 41. In B.A. v. IPAT [2020] IEHC 589, the manner in which the Tribunal considered the COI in the context of state protection was treated in some detail by Burns J. in the High Court. In brief summary, the Tribunal had summarised the COI, noting that there was no law of nationwide applicability to criminalise gender-based violence; only certain states had enacted domestic violence laws; and, where such laws did exist, they were often not effectively implemented in practice and there was widespread under-reporting. It was also noted that the police were perceived as reluctant to take violence against women seriously and pursue allegations. Notwithstanding that analysis, the Tribunal determined that “Nigerian authorities are willing and able to provide protection from non-state agents, albeit that women face greater difficulties in seeking and obtaining protection then men for gender-based violence”. 42. Burns J. expressed her difficulty in understanding how the Tribunal determined that the criteria set out in s. 31 of the 2015 Act had been met. The court was very clear that this was not a situation in which the court effectively was substituting its views for that of the Tribunal or coming to a different conclusion. Rather the court determined that the Tribunal erred in its assessment of the COI, because the finding it made regarding state protection did not reflect the summary of the COI information which it itself had compiled. In essence, the court was not persuaded that the Tribunal's summary – which was negative regarding the existence of domestic protection laws in the applicant's region, negative regarding the implementation of such laws, and negative regarding police investigation into allegations of domestic violence – could rationally lead into a positive finding that the Nigerian authorities were willing to provide protection to women facing gender-based violence. Accordingly, the court determined that the finding was irrational. 43. A variation on that difficulty was found in F.M. and R.M. v. International Protection Appeals Tribunal and Minister for Justice [2021] IEHC 817. The applicants in that case had sought international protection and claimed that if they were returned to South Africa, they were likely to face xenophobic violence on the basis that they originally came from the Democratic Republic of Congo. The conclusion of the Tribunal was that the COI indicated that the level of state protection available to the applicant was less than perfect but on balance it was effective protection for potential victims of violence. 44. In his judgment, Ferriter J. identified a series of errors in the process of reasoning. One of the identified errors was that the court found that the question was not whether the COI material demonstrated a real effort on the part of the authorities to address xenophobic violence but rather whether there was an effective response to that challenge. As Ferriter J. noted at para. 30 of his judgment, what s. 31 requires is that there is an effective system of protection in place which is non-temporary in nature and which involves the taking of reasonable steps to protect those who otherwise faced a real risk of persecution or serious harm including through the operation of an effective legal system for the detection persecution and punishment of acts constituting persecution or serious harm. As noted by the court: “It is no answer that ‘a state is doing its incompetent best if it nevertheless falls below the appropriate standard [of protection]’ (to adopt the phrase used by Baker LJ in the English Court of Appeal in R (Atkinson) v. Secretary of State for the Home Department [2004] all England Reports (D) 14 at paragraph 22).” 45. In that regard, the court noted that while the was some material before the Tribunal, which was cited in its Decision, which could form the basis of the conclusion that some steps were taken by the authorities to seek to address xenophobic violence, there was unequivocal evidence in the COI material there was not an effective legal system in place in the sense required by s. 31(4) of the 2015 Act. 46. In all the circumstances the court was of the view that the Tribunal failed to ask itself the correct legal questions arising from the application of the provisions of s. 31 to the issue of whether state protection would exist for the applicant and her daughter if returned to South Africa. 47. In contrast with the decisions cited above, it can be noted that in X.S. and J.T. v. IPAT and Minister for Justice and Equality [2022] IEHC 100, Ferriter J. refused an application to quash a decision of the Tribunal where that application was grounded in the Tribunal's assessment of the question of state protection in Albania against the backdrop of the applicants assertion that they found themselves in a blood feud involving violence against women and a form of forced marriage. In that case, the Tribunal had considered the COI regarding the approach in Albanian criminal law towards blood feuds and noted a number of reports. The Tribunal noted that the COI information in an EASO COI Report on Albania from 2016 presented “a mixed picture”. The Tribunal also considered reports from the USDOS in 2019 which likewise identified a mixed picture, and a report described as the “CEDOCA report” from June 2017. The Tribunal explained that it found the CEDOCA report particularly helpful because of its specificity to blood feuds together with its compliance with best standards on COI, and preferred it to the more general authorities which did not have a focus on blood feuds. 48. The court considered that this was an appropriate approach to be adopted by the Tribunal. The court found that the Tribunal acted lawfully in looking at the general COI in relation to the adequacy of police functioning in Albania which presented a mixed picture, but relying principally on the CEDOCA report because of its specificity to blood feuds. That approach was described as a “cogently reasoned approach”. 49. The court reiterated that it was not a function of the court on a judicial review application to substitute its own view of the COI for that of the decision-maker. The court considered that the conclusion of the Tribunal on the CEDOCA report – that it was indicative of state protection when considered in the round notwithstanding some misgivings – was a conclusion that was open to the Tribunal to reach in light of the contents of the report as a whole. In those circumstances, the court considered that the Tribunal had approached the state protection on the basis of asking itself the correct legal question and thereafter arrived at a decision on the state protection issue which was properly reasoned and open to it on the basis of the COI. 50. Similarly, in W.P.L. and BP v. The Minister for Justice and Equality [2024] IEHC 184, Phelan J. considered the question of the proper approach to state protection issues. The court noted at para. 179 that there was authority to the effect that a failure to make a complaint to the police may legitimately be considered in assessing state protection. The key consideration when assessing whether state protection is available was whether the applicants through their testimony and considering all the documentary evidence established that they have a prospective well-founded fear of persecution on a convention ground if they were to return, in that case, to South Africa. The court also noted that a high level of crime generally committed by non-state actors does not necessarily lead to a conclusion that state protection is unavailable where the Tribunal is satisfied “reasonable steps are being taken to deal with same.”. The court at para. 182 noted it was mindful that the obligation to provide state protection is to provide “effective protection” not “perfect protection”. The court subsequently noted: “184. The key consideration for the Tribunal when assessing whether State Protection is available is whether the applicants through their testimony and considering all the documentary evidence established that they have a prospective well-founded fear of persecution on a Convention ground if they were to return to South Africa. On this key consideration I am satisfied that it was open to the Tribunal to conclude on the case made and the material available that they had not. I am satisfied that in this case COI had been considered in terms of whether the material constituted clear and convincing proof that State Protection was not available to the Applicants. The reasons given adequately explain the Decision that it was not established that State Protection was available, even though a contrary decision might also have been supported by some of the material before the Tribunal. 185. It has been repeatedly held in cases such as H.O. v. Refugee Appeals Tribunal and Anor [2007] IEHC 299 (Hedigan J.), E.G. (Albania) v. IPAT and Anor [2019] IEHC 474 (Humphreys J.), E.D. (a minor) v. Refugee Appeals Tribunal [2017] 1 IR 325 (Clarke J.) and B.A. v. IPAT [2020] IEHC 589 (Burns J. ), that courts should not interfere with findings which were within the range of conclusions which would be open to a Tribunal properly directed as to the law, on the basis of the materials available. Whether one agrees or not with the conclusion that State Protection is available is not the test in judicial review proceedings.” 51. Accordingly, it is clear that the test to be applied by the court in a challenge of this type is to consider whether the Tribunal considered all of the relevant COI – and where differences in the analyses of state protection were identified – explained rationally why one analysis was preferred over another. 52. In this case I have considered the COI that was made available to the Tribunal and considered the manner in which the COI was addressed and appraised by the Tribunal. It must be recalled that there was no express treatment of stalking in the COI and it remains unclear how that situation is addressed in Georgian law. The Tribunal reasonably described the situation as repeated psychological harassment, and seems to have considered the applicant’s position in the context of an analysis of the overall position in Georgia regarding domestic and gender based violence. 53. As described above, the Tribunal correctly in my view described the COI relating to those issues as presenting a “mixed picture”. Essentially, it was observed that here had been improvements but that shortcomings remained. Having considered the COI in detail, my finding is that this case falls into the category of case where the Tribunal made errors. It must be acknowledged that the situation described in the COI was challenging in the sense that improvements were noted and the materials were not directly concerned with the question of the effectiveness of the state protection for persons in the circumstances of the applicant. 54. I am not persuaded that the Tribunal engaged in any selectivity of the type criticised in D.V.T.S. v. RAT. The respondents were correct to highlight, as observed in caselaw, that no state can provide absolute protection against the actions of non-state actors, such as an apparently well-connected and determined stalker. The test is one of reasonableness. Nevertheless, there is very little in the COI that plainly supports the finding that state protection in cases of domestic violence is effective, and the general tenor of the COI is that the response more generally to gender based violence is inadequate. In those circumstances, it is very difficult to identify what protection is actually available in the case of stalking. 55. It seems to me that, by analogy with the observations of Ferriter J. in R.M. v IPAT, a Tribunal must go beyond finding that a state may be doing its best and assess whether what the state is doing reaches the threshold of effectiveness. Here, I consider that the Tribunal erroneously elided improvements with effectiveness. The Tribunal, as I read and understood the Decision, seems to have placed considerable emphasis on the elements within the COI that considered the undoubted improvements that have been observed over the years in Georgia’s response to gender based violence. That can be very important, particularly where an applicant asks the Tribunal to consider previous analogous decisions by differently constituted tribunals or asks the court to draw inferences from findings in earlier ECtHR cases that deal with older situations, as had occurred in this case. The question of state protection is not fixed, and the situation may very well alter positively or negatively over a number of years. The difficulty that I apprehend in the Decision is that the focus on improvements did not progress to a proper analysis of whether the COI disclosed that there was effective state protection. In turn, this means that even though the Tribunal correctly identified the constituent elements in the test set out in section 31 of the 2015 Act, it did not apply the test correctly because what is required is not just whether there have been improvements, but whether in light of the improvements there is effective state protection. 56. By reference to the principles summarised above I am satisfied that the Tribunal erred (a) by reaching the conclusion that effective state protection was available to the applicant when that finding did not flow rationally from the COI; and (b) by conflating improvements with effectiveness, and thereby misdirecting itself as to the proper test in section 31 of the 2015 Act. Police oversight issues 57. This was the third issue identified by the applicant. In light of the findings made in relation to the overall question of state protection, I consider that this may be dealt with shortly. Here, the argument proceeded from the premise that the applicant in 2018 had not received a proper response from the police when she made her complaint about GA. I am not satisfied that this issue was approached erroneously by the Tribunal. On this issue, the Tribunal traced the improvements in police oversight in Georgia, and noted the establishment of the Special Investigation Service to provide oversight over the police. All of those matters occurred after the complaints made by the applicant. There was no evidence to suggest that this body, unlike certain other predecessor type bodies, was ineffective. It is hard, having read the materials, to understand how the Tribunal could have reached a negative view on the question of police oversight and, in that regard, I am not satisfied that the applicant can succeed on this ground. Adequacy of reasons 58. The final issue raised by the applicant related to the adequacy of reasons given by the Tribunal. Again, this issue can be disposed of briefly. The parties were in large part agreed as to the applicable legal principles, which are very well established. 59. I am satisfied that the Tribunal’s decision was properly reasoned, and it is clear why the Decision was made. This, of course, is different to the question of whether the Decision was properly and lawfully made. 60. There are two elements to this aspect of the claim. First, there is the well-established general proposition that that the reasons to be given by a decision maker such as the Tribunal do not have to be discursive or engage in a narrative way with each and every point made by the applicant; see for instance, G.K. v IPAT [2022] IEHC 204. That requirement has to be adjusted where the Tribunal is addressing what could be described as a core claim made by the applicant, and, in that regard, there is a need to ensure that there has been proper engagement with a core claim. On this element, I am satisfied that the Tribunal engaged actively with the core claims of the applicant. 61. The second element is that a person affected by the decision and the court should be given sufficient information and explanation to allow it to understand the reasoning process of the decision maker; see for instance YY v Minister for Justice and Equality [2017] IESC 61, and Middelkamp v Minister for Justice and Equality [2023] IESC 2. 62. The applicant here asserted that the reasoning process was unclear, particularly on the issue of whether state protection would be effective in her circumstances. I disagree. The court’s view is that, while it considers that the approach adopted to state protection was erroneous for the reasons explained above, the Tribunal set out its reasons on this and the other main claims in a way that provided sufficient clarity to understand why the Decision was made. That is not the same as the court necessarily accepting the separate issue of whether the outcome rationally flowed from the evidence or was reasonably open to the decision-maker. However, even where as here the Decision itself has been found to be flawed, this was facilitated by the manner in which the Tribunal sought to explain the Decision. It is clear that the applicant was in a position to understand why the Decision was made and to marshal her arguments to challenge the Decision. CONCLUSION 63. In those premises, I consider that the applicant should be granted the relief sought on her second ground only. To summarise, relief will be granted because material errors in the treatment of the COI concerning state protection. For these reasons, the Decision of the Tribunal will be quashed and the applicant’s appeal from the IPO decision will be remitted to a differently constituted Tribunal for reconsideration. 64. As this judgment is being delivered electronically, my provisional view is that having succeeded in obtaining the relief sought albeit only on some but not all of the grounds in the Statement of Grounds, the applicant should be entitled to an order for costs to be adjudicated in default of agreement. I will list the matter before me at 10.30am on Thursday, the 19 March 2026 for final orders.