T [Algeria] v The International Protection Appeals Tribunal and Anor

THE HIGH COURT JUDICIAL REVIEW [2026] IEHC 183 [Record No. 2023/918 JR] BETWEEN T (ALGERIA) APPLICANT AND THE INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION APPEALS TRIBUNAL AND THE MINISTER FOR JUSTICE RESPONDENTS JUDGMENT delivered by Mr. Justice Micheál O’Higgins on 27th February 2026 Introduction 1. The applicant is an Algerian national who applied for and was refused international protection in the State. In these judicial review proceedings, he seeks to quash the decision of the International Protection Appeals Tribunal (the “Tribunal”) upholding the recommendation of the International Protection Office (“IPO”) that he should not be granted either refugee status or subsidiary protection. The case concerns the process by which an applicant’s credibility is assessed, including the approach to be taken when considering the reliability of documentation. Background facts 1 2. The applicant applied for international protection on 29th July 2021. He completed the standard questionnaire issued by the IPO and submitted documentation in support of his application, including an original Algerian passport in his name, a national ID card, an international driver’s license card and book in his name, birth certificates issued by the People’s Democratic Republic of Algeria in his own name and in the names of his wife, children and parents, a family record sheet, a letter from his attorney, photographs and videos from certain protest events and summonses said to have been issued by authorities in Algeria. 3. On 27th May 2022, the applicant was interviewed under s. 35 of the International Protection Act 2015 (the “2015 Act”). On 8th February 2023, the IPO issued a decision recommending that he be refused refugee status. The applicant appealed the IPO decision to the Tribunal. He provided written submissions in support of his appeal which I will return to presently. He was granted an oral hearing which took place on 19th June 2023. On 10th July 2023, the applicant was informed that the Tribunal had rejected his appeal. 4. Leave to bring these proceedings was granted by Hyland J. on 11th December 2023. Applicant’s appeal submissions to the Tribunal 5. The applicant’s solicitors lodged an appeal to the Tribunal by letter dated 28th February 2023. The “Grounds of Appeal” set out the following: The applicant was born in December 1978 and is from Oran, Algeria. He is married and a father of 3 children. He is a Muslim of Algerian ethnicity. He worked as a chef and then as a mechanic for approximately 14 years. In February 2019, he began participating in the Hirak movement, a series of national marches which took place every Friday. The appellant was first arrested on 26th February 2021, and he was detained for less than a day. He was warned that if he was found participating in marches again, he would be arrested. The submissions state that the applicant was arrested again on 23rd April 2021 and was detained for two nights. The submissions claim that he was tortured while 2 in custody and sustained an injury to his leg, and photographs regarding that injury were attached. It is claimed that the police released him without charge as they did not have any evidence against him and had tried to press false charges against him. After his release, the applicant believed that he was being monitored by the police. He applied for a visa to the United Kingdom and subsequently travelled there. He then came to Ireland. 6. According to the grounds of appeal, the IPO accepted as true the applicant’s nationality, personal circumstances and his claim that he participated in the Hirak movement. However, the IPO made an adverse credibility finding in relation to the applicant’s claims concerning his arrests and beatings in custody. The applicant was asked an “entirely speculative question” about the actions of State actors, over which he had no control. He says he could not reasonably have been expected to know why the police did not fabricate charges and detain him. 7. The applicant furnished written submissions to the Tribunal by letter dated 13th June 2023. Paras. 8 - 16 of the submissions reference relevant excerpts of country-of-origin information (“COI”). 8. As part of his case that he had suffered persecution over his involvement in the protests, the applicant produced two summonses which he claimed had been sent to his house, namely a summons to attend the offices of the police and a separate summons to attend court. The IPO determined that they were unable to verify the origin and authenticity of these documents. In his appeal submissions to the Tribunal, the applicant submitted that the IPO had failed to properly assess the two documents. The decision of the Tribunal dated 8th July 2023 9. In the analysis that follows, I will refer to the impugned decision of the Tribunal dated 8th July 2023 as the “Decision”. The parties can take it that I have considered the Decision in 3 its totality but in the interests of brevity, I will not reproduce the entire document. The paragraphs below give an indication of the Tribunal’s essential rationale. 10. The Tribunal considered the history of the case, the replies given by the applicant in his questionnaire and certain responses given by him during the oral hearing. These are considered at paras. 1.1 - 2.22 of the Decision. Under the heading “Assessment of Facts and circumstances” the following observations are made at paras. 4.1 - 4.3: “[4.1] The Appellant’s claim that he was involved in the protest movement was accepted by the I.P.O. This was a well-publicised event, and involved a large number of protests. The Appellant showed a reasonable level of knowledge of same. Crucially, the Appellant has provided photographs which appear to show him being involved in protests. Having regard to the foregoing, the Tribunal finds that he was involved in the protest movement in Algeria. [4.2] However, what is not clear is his level of involvement in same. He claims to have been a speaker at an event but he wasn’t a member of any organisation [. H]e was asked how he was given that opportunity and he claims that he just took the microphone and started speaking. The Tribunal, having seen and heard from the Appellant, considers this to be a vague and implausible explanation. The Appellant’s claim is that he was targeted by the police because he was speaking at a rally, but there is no real reason to consider that he would have any leadership role or prominence in the rally. His explanation that he just took the microphone is considered an attempt to explain away the implausibility of him being a speaker at the rally without any membership of an organisation, rather than being evidence from actual lived experience. [4.3] His claim to have been arrested and beaten is vague, incoherent and contradictory with his earlier accounts. It was put to him that his claim in the oral hearing is that he was not known to the police until the February arrest and was not 4 physically harmed until April, but in his Questionnaire (continuation sheet) he stated that they beat him more than once, that from then on he became known to them, and then in February he was arrested. In reply, the Appellant stated that they beat him more than once but (sic) on the April occasion i.e. it was several beatings in the one arrest. He also stated that he wrote that the police got to know him since the first time they arrested him.” 11. At para. 4.5, the Tribunal rejects as unreliable a letter from the applicant’s lawyer in Algeria, stating that a letter from a lawyer advocating for political asylum, which claims that he is wanted for inciting violence, but is dated over two months before the police came to his house to summon him, cannot be accepted as reliable. This finding of the Tribunal does not appear to have been individually challenged. 12. At paras. 4.6 - 4.8, the Tribunal rejects as incoherent the applicant’s timeline as to when the authorities wanted to arrest and prosecute him, and criticises what are said to be inconsistencies in the applicant’s account. At para. 4.9, the Tribunal finds fault with his evidence concerning when he applied for a visa to travel to the United Kingdom. 13. The Tribunal then deals with the two summonses presented by the applicant at para. 4.10 which is worth quoting in full: “[4.10] In relation to the summonses, the Appellant was unable to explain why they would bring these charges in November when he had stopped protesting several months earlier and in reply he stated that he knows how the Algerian system works. He was ultimately asked if they only came for him after they knew he had left the country and he agreed with same. The Tribunal considers his narrative that he was only summoned to court after the authorities found out that he had left the country is not consistent with there being a genuine interest in prosecuting him, and finds that it is consistent with a contrived or false claim that he cannot return for fear of being prosecuted. With the 5 same observations as above that the Tribunal is not questioning the motives of the police so much as the coherence of the Appellant’s claim, the Tribunal does not consider that this is an adequate explanation for this issue. The Tribunal therefore does not consider that these summonses are reliable and rejects the claim that he is wanted for prosecution in Algeria.” 14. At paras. 4.11 and 4.12, the Tribunal refers to certain answers given by the applicant in the oral hearing in relation to specific pieces of COI that were put to him: “[4.11] The Tribunal asked the Appellant if the new President said anything about Hirak and he said no and that people were still in prison. The Tribunal put a Human Rights Watch report on the protests to him where it stated that: “Four days earlier, President Abdelmadjid Tebboune had called it a “blessed” movement that had “saved Algeria,” as he announced the release of some 60 people imprisoned for their role in it.” [4.12] In reply to this, the Appellant then accepted that he said this and that he released prisoners, but that he just did this to convert international opinion, but he still directs the secret police to arrest people. The Appellant’s Legal Representative points out that there is C.O.I. to suggest that there is still violence and repression of the Hirak protesters and the Tribunal accepts that, but it is not really the point. When dealing with well-publicised events such as the Hirak protests, it would be expected that most citizens of the country would be aware in general terms of the protest, but people who were actively involved would be expected to know in greater detail the events which happened. The Appellant had no knowledge of the above statement or release of prisoners until it was put to him, at which point he accepted same, but deflected onto the more generalised knowledge that most citizens of Algeria would be expected to have in relation to these protests. Thus, while the Appellant’s claim is not contradicted by 6 the C.O.I., the Tribunal does not consider that the C.O.I. provides anything but weak support to his claim.” 15. The Tribunal concludes its credibility assessment at para. 4.14 as follows: “[4.14] Having regard to all of the foregoing, and weighing the positive and negative indicators of credibility to the standard of the balance of probabilities, the Tribunal finds that the significant negative indicators in this case outweigh the relatively limited positive indicators in this case. The Tribunal is not satisfied about any material element of his claim, other than his Algerian nationality. As there are no areas of genuine uncertainty, the application of the benefit of the doubt does not arise.” Finally, at para. 6.1, the Tribunal affirms the recommendation of the IPO that the appellant should not be granted a refugee declaration. The Statutory framework 16. Section 28(1) of the 2015 Act gives effect to Article 4(1) of Council Directive 2004/83/EC (the “Qualification Directive”), by which Ireland remains bound in circumstances where it did not participate in the adoption of the Recast Directive (2006/54/EC). Section 28 of the 2015 Act requires an international protection officer to carry out an assessment of the “relevant elements of the application”. 17. Section 28(4) of the 2015 Act provides as follows: “The assessment, by the international protection officer of an application, and by the Tribunal of an appeal under section 41, shall be carried out on an individual basis and shall include taking into account the following: (a) all relevant facts as they relate to the country of origin at the time of taking a decision on the application, including laws and regulations of the country of origin and the manner in which they are applied; 7 (b) the relevant statements and documentation presented by the applicant including information on whether the applicant has been or may be subject to persecution or serious harm; (c) the individual position and personal circumstances of the applicant, including factors such as background, gender and age, so as to assess whether, on the basis of the applicant’s personal circumstances, the acts to which the applicant has been or could be exposed would amount to persecution or serious harm; (d) whether the applicant’s activities since leaving the country of origin were engaged in for the sole or main purpose of creating the necessary conditions for applying for international protection, so as to assess whether those activities will expose the applicant to persecution or serious harm if returned to that country; (e) whether the applicant could reasonably be expected to avail himself or herself of the protection of another country where he or she could assert citizenship; (f) the general credibility of the applicant.” Summary of the applicant’s submissions 18. The applicant submits that the Tribunal’s assessment of his credibility did not comply with the principles set out by Cooke J. in the leading case of I.R. v. Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform [2015] 4 IR 144. Practitioners sometimes refer to these principles as the “Ten Commandments” of credibility assessment in asylum cases. Principles 4 and 5 at para. 10 of Cooke J.’s decision are specifically relied upon. 19. The Tribunal made a finding that the applicant was involved in the Hirak protest movement in Algeria. However, the Tribunal then found that the applicant’s account of his involvement in the Hirak protest movement was vague and lacked plausibility. It is argued that, 8 when proper regard is had to the COI presented by the applicant, it is difficult to see what is vague or implausible about the account given. 20. It is argued that the Tribunal failed to consider the “full picture” by reference to available COI, including the fact that the Hirak protests were informal and not centrally organised. Moreover, the Tribunal failed to take into account and properly weigh in the assessment the two summonses provided by the applicant which formed a crucial part of his overall account. 21. As noted by the Court of Appeal in R.A. v. Refugee Appeals Tribunal [2017] IECA 297, credibility findings can only be made on the basis of a complete understanding of the entire picture. One cannot assess a claim without placing the claimant, and the claimant’s account, into the context of the background information of the country of origin. 22. The applicant presented COI including, inter alia, a report of Human Rights Watch entitled “Algeria: 3 Years On, Repression on Protest Tightens” dated 21st February 2022, which confirmed that the Hirak protest movement in Algeria was an “informal movement” and provided important context by setting out the non-centralised nature of the protests. The applicant submits that the Tribunal isolated an aspect of his claim concerning his level of involvement in the Hirak protests and, as a result, made a finding of implausibility based on speculation and conjecture without placing the claim into the context of the COI, and without setting out a cogent or logical rationale for rejecting the applicant’s account. 23. Separately, it is argued that the Tribunal failed in its duty to give adequate reasons for the credibility findings concerning the applicant’s involvement in Hirak protests. Such reasons as were given indicate that the findings were based on the applicant’s demeanour, which is a questionable approach and not one encouraged in the case law. In what is a pivotal part of the Tribunal’s Decision at para. 4.8, the Tribunal states that “[h]aving seen and heard from the Appellant, the Tribunal finds this narrative incoherent and vague” (emphasis added). The 9 applicant submits that, in relying on such unclear formulae and phrases, the Tribunal failed to provide sufficient reasons for coming to its main conclusion and failed to explain why the evidence provided by the applicant was insufficient to satisfy the relevant test as to credibility. 24. The applicant submits that the Tribunal’s finding that his account of his involvement in the Hirak protest movement was vague and implausible is legally irrational. It does not follow in the Meadows sense (see Meadows v. Minister for Justice [2010] 2 IR 701) that it is vague or implausible to say what the applicant has described in his application. 25. The applicant also raises a stand-alone argument about the way the Tribunal deals with documentary evidence presented as part of the appeal. The applicant submitted two summonses dated 9th November 2021 and 17th November 2021 and these were relied on as proof that the Algerian authorities were intent on persecuting him. At para. 4.10 of the Decision, the Tribunal declared the summonses to be unreliable but did so without considering the terms of the documentation. The Tribunal therefore failed to consider adequately, or at all, the relevance and probative force of the summonses, and erred in making a general credibility finding that was not informed by an adequate assessment of all the documents submitted. 26. The respondents ought to have dealt with the documents in accordance with internationally recognised guidance such as the EASO Practical Guide: Evidence Assessment of March 2015. 27. A general lack of credibility should not be cited as an explanation for not considering documents submitted as to their contents. The Tribunal’s consideration of the summonses failed to meet the standards for considering relevant documentation as identified by the Court of Appeal in R.A., and by Phelan J. in M.H. v. International Protection Appeals Tribunal [2023] IEHC 372. 28. The Tribunal’s failure to consider the contents of either summons, or provide any adequate explanation as to why they were not considered or what weight was to be attached to 10 them, amounted to a breach of s. 28(4)(b) of the 2015 Act. The Tribunal failed to place the relevance of the summonses within their proper context, namely as potentially constituting evidence that the applicant has been, or may be subject to, persecution or serious harm. For all these reasons, the applicant contends the Decision of the Tribunal should be quashed. Summary of the respondents’ submissions 29. The respondents contend that the applicant’s proceedings were issued out of time and that no good or sufficient reason justifying an extension of time has been provided. 30. On the substantive issues, the respondents’ headline position is that the Tribunal made no error of law in finding that the applicant’s account of his involvement in the Hirak protest movement was vague and implausible; the Tribunal gave full and detailed reasons for its conclusion and reached a rational decision. The Tribunal fully assessed the documentation before it in a lawful manner, including the two summonses referenced in para. 4.10 of the Decision. 31. Addressing the claim of inappropriate reliance upon the applicant’s demeanour, the respondents submit that, although the Tribunal used the phrase “having seen and heard from the appellant” in both paras. 4.2 and 4.8, it is clear from the Decision as a whole that the assessment of the evidence was based on inconsistencies in the applicant’s narrative and not on any assessment of the manner in which the applicant gave his evidence. The references to the applicant having been “seen and heard” simply reflect the fact that the applicant attended the oral hearing and the Tribunal witnessed a “shifting narrative” in the applicant’s account. Moreover, even if it had been demonstrated (which it has not) that his demeanour was taken into account, decision-makers are not required to completely disregard a person’s demeanour as a matter of EU or Irish law. 11 32. As to the claim that the Tribunal’s credibility findings lacked cogency contrary to the principles set out by Cooke J. in I.R., the respondents question how this line of argument could assist the applicant. There was no finding by the Tribunal that the COI in relation to the Hirak protests was inconsistent with the applicant’s own account, or that it rendered the applicant’s account of events false. At para. 4.12, the Tribunal expressly found that the COI does not contradict the applicant’s account, but notes that the COI provides only weak support where the applicant’s level of knowledge of the Hirak protests appeared to be no greater than that to be expected of most citizens of Algeria, as opposed to someone who had been actively involved in the protests. There was no lack of cogency or logical rationale for the Tribunal’s conclusion in this regard. 33. The applicant’s credibility was assessed on the basis of the full picture that emerged from the evidence, and the relevant COI was considered and put to the applicant as part of the overall assessment of the applicant’s claim. Accordingly, the Tribunal made no error of law in assessing the applicant’s account and finding it to be vague and implausible. 34. Nor has it been substantiated that the Decision was irrational or that no reasons were given. In reality, the applicant’s discontent arises from the outcome of the application, not the process by which the outcome was reached. In effect, the court is being asked to substitute its own view for that of the decision-maker, which is not permissible in judicial review. 35. Turning to the documentation issue, the essence of this complaint is a suggestion that the Tribunal, firstly, concluded that the applicant was not generally credible, and thereafter made a finding that the summonses were not reliable, thereby failing to sufficiently consider the summonses in and of themselves. The respondents say this complaint is without substance and ignores the sequencing and rationale given. 36. It is not the law that the Tribunal was under a duty to assess the summonses prior to, and independently of, the rest of the case before it. 12 37. The summonses were given little or no weight, not because the Tribunal had already found the applicant not to be credible, but because the applicant’s explanation of the summonses was incoherent and inconsistent with the applicant’s story. Application for extension of time 38. I will deal firstly with the applicant’s application for an extension of time. A 28-day time limit applies to challenging a decision of the Tribunal by virtue of s. 5 of the Illegal Immigrants (Trafficking) Act 2000. It is accepted that the 28-day statutory time limit was not met. However, the applicant seeks a short extension of time of two days based upon the matters set out in the second affidavit of the applicant’s solicitor, Brian Burns, sworn on 31st January 2025. In fairness to the respondents’ position, that affidavit had not been provided by the time opposition papers were filed in May 2024. 39. The affidavit of Mr. Burns indicates that the applicant was notified of the impugned decision by letter of 10th July 2023. He instructed his solicitor to challenge the decision, provided there were grounds for such, on 12th July 2023. Papers were sent to counsel on 11th July 2023. Counsel liaised with senior counsel and settled papers were sent to the solicitor on 3rd August 2023. All of this occurred within the 28-day period. When the solicitor received papers from counsel, arrangements were made to organise the finalisation of pleadings with the applicant. 40. A consultation was arranged on 4th August 2023 to take instructions in relation to certain issues, and the applicant swore his affidavit on that date. Again, this was within the 28- day period. However, there was insufficient time to file the papers on that day, and the 28-day period expired on 7th August, which fell during the long vacation and on a bank holiday, when the Central Office was closed. Mr. Burns says there was therefore an unavoidable delay in filing the statement of grounds and grounding affidavit in these proceedings. Ultimately, the 13 papers were filed on Tuesday, 8th August 2023. An application to stop time (which was then the practice) was made on 9th August 2023. It was necessary to have the application listed before the duty judge, Simons J., who deemed the matter open for the purpose of time on that date. 41. Mr. Burns stresses that the applicant himself was not responsible for the failure to meet the 28-day deadline. The extension sought is in the nature of a de minimis extension. The applicant submits that the underlying merits of the case should be taken into account, and that in all the circumstances there are good and sufficient reasons for extending the time. Neither the respondents nor any third party has been prejudiced by the minimal delay involved. In the circumstances, it is urged that it would be contrary to the EU law principle of effectiveness to refuse to extend time. 42. Based upon these facts, I am satisfied that it would be in the interests of justice and in accordance with Order 84, rule 21 RSC to grant the short extension that is sought. The respondents adopted a realistic and fair-minded approach in not vigorously pressing the time issue and in focussing on the substantive issues in the case. In my view, this was the correct approach. For all these reasons, the applicant is entitled to an extension of time to bring these proceedings. Consideration of the substantive grounds of challenge 43. Turning to the substantive issues, it seems to me that, broadly speaking, there are two overarching grounds of challenge to be considered: firstly, the contention that the Tribunal erred in the manner in which it considered the applicant’s application, and in coming to its conclusion that the applicant’s account of his involvement in the Hirak protest movement was vague and implausible; and secondly, the contention that the Tribunal erred in its approach to considering the documentary evidence presented by the applicant. 14 44. In many respects, the issues raised in this case are quite finely balanced: reasonable arguments can be made for and against the impugned Decision. This is not as clear-cut a situation as arose in I.R., where Cooke J. found that relevant documents presented by the applicant were ignored in the Tribunal’s decision. Nor is this a case where the Tribunal has relied upon generic formulae for rejecting the applicant’s overall credibility. Rather, and in fairness to the decision-maker, the Decision is a detailed and considered document which runs to some 48 paragraphs over 13 pages. The report outlines credibility concerns regarding the applicant’s account, vagueness and inconsistencies in his narrative, and particular question marks over his claimed timeline of events. 45. It also has to be borne in mind that the applicant was granted an oral hearing and was alerted to concerns the Tribunal had about his overall account, particularly with respect to his timeline of events, the timing of his departure to the UK and his arrival in Ireland. This is not a case where the Tribunal member remained mute in a ‘sphinx-like’ fashion, holding back questions or failing to identify potential misgivings in the overall narrative. 46. On the other side of the coin, the court is persuaded that there were frailties in the decision-making process, particularly: in how the Tribunal went about assessing the COI before it; in failing to consider the full picture as to the realities of conditions in Algeria by reference to the COI; and most of all by the manner in which potentially probative documentary evidence was rejected without any consideration of the authenticity or relevance of that evidence in its own terms. 47. Having carefully considered the materials in the case and having weighed up the competing submissions of the parties both written and oral, I have come to the conclusion that aspects of the decision-making process followed by the Tribunal were unsatisfactory and that the overall approach was sufficiently flawed to warrant setting aside the Decision. I have come to this conclusion principally because the assessment of credibility was not made by reference 15 to the full picture that emerged from the COI, and secondly because the Tribunal, in my view, failed to properly assess the contents and significance of the two summonses relied upon by the applicant as evidence of past or future persecution. In the view of the court, these matters together amounted to a breach of s. 28(4) of the 2015 Act. I will now set out my reasons for coming to this conclusion. The court’s reasons for invalidating the Tribunal’s Decision 48. The first thing to note is that, like the applicant in I.R., the present applicant’s case was based not just on oral testimony, but on specific personal documents and substantive COI which provided prima facie support for the applicant’s account. Section 28(4)(a) of the 2015 Act requires the Tribunal to take into account all relevant facts as they relate to the country of origin and section 28(4)(b) requires the Tribunal to take into account the relevant statements and documentation presented by the applicant, including information on whether he has been or may be subject to persecution or serious harm. 49. It is relevant to note that the applicant sent written submissions to the Tribunal dated 9th June 2023 in support of his appeal and these relied on the following five extracts of relevant COI: (i) Human Rights Watch, Algeria: 3 Years On, Repression on Protest Tightens, 21st February 2022 (ii) United Kingdom Home Office, Country Policy and Information Note, Algeria: Actors of Protection, August 2020 (iii) US State Department, 2021 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Algeria (iv) US State Department, 2022 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Algeria 16 (v) Freedom of the World 2023 – Algeria These COI materials were included as exhibits to the affidavit of the applicant’s solicitor, Mr. Burns, dated 11th March 2025. In addition, the Tribunal also introduced COI during the hearing on 19th June 2023, namely “Human Rights Watch, Algeria’s Hirak Protest Movement Marks Second Anniversary”, dated 23rd February 2021. 50. It is not necessary, in the interests of brevity, to summarise the contents of every piece of COI presented. In any given case, it is a matter for the Tribunal to decide what weight, if any, to give to any individual piece of evidence or COI. However, on any view of matters, the applicant managed to assemble a significant body of COI which appeared to provide at least prima facie support for the thrust of his account that persons suspected of being involved in Hirak protests were being targeted and persecuted, and that the Algerian authorities were utilising the coercive powers of the criminal justice system to quell protests and discourage others from getting involved. The documentary evidence in the form of the two summonses relied upon by the applicant had a prima facie linkage with aspects of the COI as presented. 51. Obviously, it is not the role of the court in this judgment to pronounce upon the correctness or otherwise of the various COI excerpts relied upon by the applicant. However, in circumstances where the Tribunal was satisfied (see para. 4.1) that the applicant was indeed involved in the Hirak protest movement in Algeria, it seems to me that there was a duty on the Tribunal to consider whether, viewed against the backdrop of the full picture as described in the available COI, the applicant’s story could have happened and/or whether his apprehended fears could have come to pass. COI materials presented by the applicant 52. I have reviewed the COI presented in the case and these appear to provide support for the following assertions inter alia: 17 (a) The Hirak protest demonstrations in Algeria started in 2019 and contributed to then President Bouteflika’s resignation in April 2019. (b) The Algerian government had increasingly used pre-trial detention in response to the Hirak movement since 2019. (c) The use of violence and repression of Hirak protestors was still ongoing during the interval of time under discussion. (d) Arbitrary arrests were being effected to suppress demonstrations and freedom of speech. (e) The Algerian authorities used force and arrests to pre-empt or disrupt Hirak rallies. (f) When the Hirak movement opposed plans to hold presidential elections without the government first effecting reforms, the authorities began to arrest individuals who were perceived to be leaders of the informal opposition movement. (g) After winning power, President Tebboune initially made conciliatory gestures towards the Hirak movement and freed over 70 Hirak detainees. (h) However, the government’s crackdown on the Hirak movement intensified shortly thereafter. (i) When the pandemic hit in 2020, and Hirak suspended outdoor protests, the authorities tightened their control on the movement, jailing some of its perceived leaders. (j) Hirak protestors faced increasing repression when demonstrations resumed in 2021 following the period of the COVID-19 pandemic. (k) In February 2021 (when the applicant claims that he was a speaker with a microphone at a Hirak demonstration) the Hirak protests had resumed. 18 (l) In June 2021, President Tebboune amended the penal code by presidential decree, expanding the already broad definition of “terrorism”. Authorities allegedly used this expanded definition to prosecute journalists, activists and other protesters. (m) While large-scale Hirak protests did not recommence in 2022, the Algerian authorities continued to arrest individuals who were alleged to have ties to the Hirak movement. (n) As of 2022, the Algerian authorities were holding an estimated 280 to 330 Hirak suspects in custody on the basis of what were said to be “vague” charges. (o) While the Hirak movement grew organically from its initial origins, it remained an informal movement without centralised structures. (p) Three years after the Hirak movement began its weekly street marches for political reform, the number of detainees soared across 2022, while the authorities also moved against associations and political parties deemed supportive of Hirak. 53. Obviously, the above description of suggested conditions in the country of origin is based on the COI materials presented by the applicant. The applicant’s description of conditions ‘on the ground’ in Algeria may well be refuted by the relevant authorities. Nonetheless, on any view of matters, the applicant assembled quite a substantial body of COI which formed an important framework by reference to which the overall credibility of the applicant’s account fell to be measured. Even if one allows a reasonable margin of appreciation for the Tribunal’s assessment, it is not immediately obvious on what basis the Tribunal concluded at para. 4.12 of the Decision that the COI provided no more than “weak support” for the applicant’s claim. 54. This was, after all, a case where the Tribunal accepted that the applicant was involved in the Hirak movement in Algeria, that he proved this by providing photographs, and that he 19 had done enough to satisfy the Tribunal that he had a reasonable level of knowledge of the protests. 55. A separate aspect of the applicant’s complaint is that, when describing the relevance and impact of the COI, all that is said in the Decision is that the applicant’s claim was “not contradicted” by the COI. The applicant contends that this amounts to a serious understatement of the actual position and a failure by the Tribunal to properly assess credibility by reference to the full picture as emerged from the available COI. 56. In the view of the court, it is difficult to fully reconcile the positive findings made by the Tribunal at para. 4.1 of the Decision with the overall conclusion reached at para. 4.14 where the Tribunal found that it was not satisfied about any material element of the applicant’s claim other than his Algerian nationality. On the basis of that finding, the Tribunal concluded that “[a]s there are no areas of genuine uncertainty, the application of the benefit of doubt principle does not arise”. 57. At first glance, the two paragraphs seem internally inconsistent. It may be that the seeming inconsistency arises more from an issue of language rather than a major contradiction of substance. In any event, leave was not sought to challenge the Decision on grounds of internal contradiction. Furthermore, I note that at para. 4.2 of the Decision the Tribunal draws a distinction between the applicant’s claim that he was involved in the Hirak protests and the separate question as to his level of involvement. Nonetheless, it is not altogether clear how the Tribunal concluded it was not satisfied with any material element of the claim, in circumstances where both the IPO and the Tribunal accepted that he was involved in the Hirak protest movement and had participated in protests. Consideration of the Tribunal’s conclusion at para. 4.2 20 58. It is clear from the run of the Decision that a pivotal issue underlying the Tribunal’s overall adverse credibility finding was its rejection of the applicant’s claim that, in February 2021, he was at a Hirak protest rally when he took a microphone and started speaking. The Tribunal deals with this issue at para. 4.2 of the Decision. In relation to the applicant’s claim that he was targeted by the police because he was speaking at the rally, the Tribunal stated that there was “no real reason to consider that he would have any leadership role or prominence in the rally”, and that his explanation that he simply took up the microphone was rejected because it was implausible that he could be a speaker at the rally “without any membership of any organisation”. 59. As I have said, this credibility finding at para. 4.2 appears to have been quite pivotal in the Tribunal member’s thinking. The rejection of the applicant’s account as to his claimed involvement in the February 2021 rally had a knock-on effect on the credibility of the applicant’s overall account. According to his timeline, he was arrested later that month on 26th February 2021. He states that he was taken to the police station and detained for a day, that the police used “bad language” towards him, and that he was told not to protest or else things would get worse for him. Despite this warning, he continued to protest every Friday. He claims that on 23rd April 2021 he was arrested again, and this time was assaulted by five policemen, suffering an injury to his leg, and threatened. He claims the police asked him questions, such as whether he was a member of any organisation. He claims he replied that he was a simple citizen, protesting his right to freedom of expression. He claims he was detained for two nights, and that upon his release the police said that if they caught him again, they would prosecute him for encouraging people to protest. 60. The applicant submits that the Tribunal’s credibility findings are legally infirm as they lack cogency and are not based on actual facts but on conjecture and speculation. In this regard, the applicant relies upon principle 5 in I.R., where Cooke J. stated that a finding of credibility 21 must be based on correct facts, untainted by conjecture or speculation and that the reasons drawn from such facts must be cogent and bear a legitimate connection to the adverse finding. The respondents disagree with this characterisation and submit that there was no lack of cogency or logic in the Tribunal’s conclusion. The respondents submit that, to the extent the applicant is arguing that the Tribunal was obliged to accept the applicant’s story because it was not directly contradicted by anything in the COI, this argument is untenable. 61. While the issue is not all one way, I do have a concern about the cogency of the Tribunal’s reasoning at para. 4.2 of the Decision. The reasons given for rejecting the applicant’s account of the February 2021 rally are somewhat speculative and insubstantial. The reasoning relies on quite an amount of speculation and surmise. It is not immediately obvious to the court why the applicant’s averment that he took up a microphone to speak at the rally was inevitably untrue, or why the fact that he was not a member of any organisation somehow precluded him from wanting to speak at the rally or seeking a chance to do so. It is difficult to see how the adverse finding can truly be said to flow from the stated premise. To rest a significant part of the Tribunal’s credibility finding on this reasoning was potentially unsafe. 62. Having said that, the court bears in mind that a margin of appreciation should be afforded to the decision-maker, and further that the decision-maker had an opportunity to observe the applicant giving this account at the oral hearing, unlike the court’s review which is confined to the papers. The court is also conscious that in a decision-making process such as this, the spectrum of decision- making may extend from the (permissible) drawing of inferences from established facts, right up to the (impermissible) rejecting of credibility based on conjecture and speculation. Identifying the border line between these two poles is not always straight forward. 22 63. In view of the additional frailties set out below, it is ultimately not necessary for the court to determine whether the cogency concerns just referenced, on their own, would be enough to invalidate the Decision. 64. In the view of the court, what tips the scales against the Tribunal in the present instance are two specific features of the decision-making process: first, the manner in which the COI was assessed and second, the manner in which the Tribunal dealt with the documentary evidence. The applicant submitted COI which included a report of Human Rights Watch, Algeria: 3 Years On, Repression on Protest Tightens, dated 21st February 2022. This report appeared to confirm that the Hirak protest movement in Algeria was “an informal movement” and did not have centralised leadership. The report provided the following context setting out the non-centralised nature of the protests: “On February 22, 2019, millions of Algerians marched through Algiers and other cities to oppose a fifth term for the country’s president, Abdelaziz Bouteflika. The protesters marched through the streets every Friday thereafter and came to be known as the Hirak (Arabic for “movement”). They forced Bouteflika’s resignation in April 2019. But when the movement opposed plans later that year to hold presidential elections without first putting reforms in place, the authorities began to arrest the perceived leaders of the informal movement.” (emphasis added) 65. The court finds that, in concluding that the applicant’s claim that he spoke at the rally in February 2021 was implausible because he was not a member of any organisation and/or because there was no reason to consider that he would have any leadership role or prominence in the rally, the Tribunal fell into error and made an unsafe finding that was to a certain extent based on surmise and conjecture, but which crucially also failed to consider the applicant’s claim within the context of the “full picture” of the background information presented by the COI assembled by the applicant. 23 66. While not as clear-cut as the situation in I.R., I find myself persuaded that the impugned Decision breached principle 4 and, to a lesser extent, certain aspects of principle 5 of Cooke J.’s list in that case, namely: “(4) The assessment of credibility must be made by reference to the full picture that emerges from the available evidence and information taken as a whole, when rationally analysed and fairly weighed. It must not be based on a perceived, correct instinct or gut feeling as to whether the truth is or is not being told. (5) A finding of lack of credibility must be based on correct facts, untainted by conjecture or speculation and the reasons drawn from such facts must be cogent and bear a legitimate connection to the adverse finding.” 67. In my view, the Tribunal failed to factor into the assessment of credibility the full picture as to the factual context presented by the COI, including these three potentially important pieces of information: (1) The COI indicated that the authorities in Algeria at this time were arresting perceived leaders of the informal movement; (2) It also indicated that Hirak marches had resumed on the 22nd and 26th February 2021, and on the 3rd April 2021 police had carried out further arrests of Hirak protesters; (3) Crucially, the COI provided important background information as to the informal and non-centralised nature of the Hirak protests. 68. The Tribunal’s finding that the applicant’s account in para. 4.2 was implausible because he was not a member of any organisation and/or billed as a speaker at the event failed to have sufficient regard to the full picture presented by the COI, including the three pieces of information described above. To declare that the applicant’s account of speaking at the rally was implausible because he was not a member of any organisation or a formal speaker at the 24 event overlooked or failed to factor into the assessment important COI to the effect that the Hirak protest movement was an informal movement without centralised structures. 69. The court also has concerns about the cogency and fairness of the reasoning at para. 4.12 of the Decision, where the applicant is criticised for not having direct knowledge of COI relating to what the new President had initially said, praising the Hirak movement, and the releasing of Hirak prisoners. On a fair reading of the COI materials, the applicant’s responses at the hearing, after the COI article was brought to his attention, appear to have been essentially correct, namely that the new President had indeed, in the initial stages, made conciliatory remarks and gestures to the Hirak movement, but had later gone on to direct the police to arrest people involved in the protests. 70. It is not clear to the court how the applicant’s (ostensibly correct) reference to the Algerian President’s later actions not matching his earlier public utterances should somehow rebound against the applicant’s credibility or the level of support to be derived from the COI materials, which appeared to back this up. While the decision-maker extrapolates adversely about the applicant’s expected level of knowledge, he omits to consider to what extent the overall thrust of the account given, that persons suspected of involvement in Hirak protests were being rounded up, was or was not supported by the available COI. 71. Since a decision on credibility must be read as a whole and should not have its individual parts subjected to isolated examination in disregard of the cumulative impression made upon the decision-maker (principle 8 in Cooke J.’s list), it is only proper to note that in the present case the Tribunal made several other negative credibility findings against the applicant. These included: • The Tribunal’s finding that the applicant provided a vague and contradictory timeline with regard to being arrested and beaten (paras. 4.3 and 4.4). • The Tribunal’s rejection of the applicant’s letter from his lawyer (para. 4.5). 25 • The Tribunal’s finding of inconsistencies in the timeline of the applicant’s arrest and prosecution (para. 4.6). • The Tribunal’s finding that the overall narrative was vague and incoherent (para. 4.8). • The Tribunal’s finding of inconsistencies around the applicant’s decision to apply for the UK visa in March 2021 (para. 4.9). 72. In the view of the court, however, the infirmities identified in the decision-making process here are not saved by the separate credibility findings made against the applicant in the balance of the Tribunal’s Decision. At a minimum, it is likely that the adverse credibility findings made in para. 4.2 would, at the very least, have contributed to a build-up of momentum against acceptance of the applicant’s overall account. In the view of the court, the findings at para. 4.2 of the Decision were quite pivotal and appear to have played a significant role in the final outcome. 73. Moreover, in I.R. itself, Cooke J. quashed the decision of the Tribunal on the documentary ground even though the decision was separately based on stand-alone criticisms of the applicant’s case, including discrepancies in answers given at interview and a finding that the applicant lacked basic knowledge of the history, leadership and activities of the party of which he claimed to be a member and for which he says he was imprisoned. It follows, therefore, that the mere fact that a Tribunal decision may be based on other grounds that are not the subject of challenge does not mean that certiorari will not be available. 74. Applying the approach mandated by the Court of Appeal in R.A., the court concludes that, when viewed against the totality of the COI presented, the Tribunal’s rejection of the applicant’s credibility in this case failed to sufficiently place the applicant’s claim into the context of the available COI; the probative value of the applicant’s evidence was not evaluated in the light of the full picture as to what was known about the conditions in Algeria. 26 75. There is a further reason why the Tribunal’s conclusion is unsafe, and it relates to the way the Tribunal approached its consideration of the two summonses produced by the applicant. This issue formed the second main plank of the applicant’s challenge, to which I now turn. Did the Tribunal err in how it considered the documentary evidence? 76. The applicant submits that the Tribunal erred in its treatment of the two summonses dated 9th and 17th November 2021. The applicant says the Tribunal erred in making a decision on general credibility which was not informed by an adequate assessment of the documents submitted, and that this amounted to a significant error of law. Arising from that finding of unreliability, he submits that the Tribunal failed to consider adequately or at all the relevance and/or probative force of the summonses and how they fitted into the overall picture. 77. In response, the respondents submit that the applicant’s arguments under this heading mischaracterise what actually occurred. The thrust of the applicant’s claim is that the Tribunal first concluded that the applicant was not generally credible and then made a finding that the summonses were not reliable, and thereby did not sufficiently consider the summonses in and of themselves. In point of fact, says the respondents, it is clear from the Decision that the reason for the Tribunal’s finding in respect of the summonses was the incoherence of the applicant’s explanation and the fact that his account was not consistent with the Algerian authorities having a genuine interest in prosecuting him. There was no finding within the Decision that the applicant’s broader lack of credibility led to the Tribunal’s rejection of the summonses. Rather, the Tribunal considered all the evidence before it and was entitled to reach the conclusion that the summonses were not reliable evidence. 78. The respondents submit that, on a proper review of the case law, the necessity for documents to be considered by a decision-maker and reasons given as to why documentary 27 evidence may be discounted or rejected does not include a requirement for this to be independent of the overall assessment of the claim. To the extent that the decision of Hogan J. for the Court of Appeal in R.A. indicates to the contrary, those findings in R.A. were obiter and, say the respondents, difficult to reconcile with the practical considerations highlighted by Humphreys J. in O.A. (Nigeria) v. International Protection Appeals Tribunal [2020] IEHC 100. 79. The respondents submit that, although the Tribunal made a number of findings that the applicant’s story was vague and implausible in specific respects, no general finding as to credibility was made prior to its examination of the summonses. Nor did it find, on that basis, that it was unnecessary to examine the summonses or that little or no weight should be attached to them. On a fair reading of the Decision, the respondents say the terms of the summonses were considered but were given little or no weight, not because the Tribunal had already found the applicant not to be credible, but because it was found that the applicant’s explanation of the summonses was incoherent and inconsistent with his overall story. Analysis of the second ground regarding the summonses 80. In the view of the court, notwithstanding the skilful manner in which this issue was addressed in submissions, the Tribunal’s treatment of the summonses produced by the applicant was cursory and unsatisfactory. The entirety of the Tribunal’s consideration of the two summonses is found in one paragraph of the Decision at para. 4.10. In the court’s view, the Tribunal failed to have sufficient regard for the fact that the documents on their face - potentially at any rate - constituted prima facie proof of the correctness of the applicant’s core claim, namely that the authorities in Algeria were intent on persecuting him and were prepared to use the coercive powers of the criminal justice system to suppress dissent and imprison persons thought to be involved in the Hirak protest movement. 28 81. In the particular circumstances of the applicant’s case, I find that the Tribunal was under a duty to give greater consideration to the potential relevance and significance of the two summonses in question and, by reference to the totality of the background information including the COI, consider the actual contents of the documentation and the extent to which they fitted into the overall picture. 82. This is the case even though the court does not know, one way or the other, whether the documents in question are genuine or authentic. As noted by Cooke J. in I.R., it may well be the case that, on closer scrutiny, such documents could be proven to be false or even fabricated for the very purpose of the asylum application. However, that does not remove the need for the documents to be properly considered during the assessment process. 83. An important authority with a direct bearing on the documentary plank of the applicant’s case is the decision of Ms. Justice Phelan in M.H., where the judge considered the guidance/requirements set out by the Court of Appeal in R.A., as well as the relevance of the EASO Practical Guidelines. 84. At para. 69 of her judgment, Phelan J. references the respondent’s reliance on the judgment of Humphreys J. in O.A. as supporting the general proposition that an assessment of the reliability of documents cannot be separated from an assessment of the credibility of the applicant, and that if there are exceptions to that rule, then they are more theoretical than real for virtually all practical purposes. Phelan J. states, however, that when the judgment in O.A. is read in its proper context, Humphreys J. clearly did not intend his words to be relied upon by decision makers to absolve them from a requirement to consider submitted documents during the assessment process. 85. At para. 73, Phelan J. refers to the decision of Hogan J. in the Court of Appeal in R.A. In R.A., the Tribunal member made no specific findings in relation to a number of documents because he concluded that this information did not assist the applicant in circumstances where 29 his credibility was found wanting to such a degree that the very basis of his claim was not believed. The Court of Appeal held that the Tribunal member was in error to conclude that, because the oral testimony of the applicant was very unsatisfactory from a credibility perspective, there was therefore no need to consider the documentary evidence. Phelan J. goes on to state that the statement of the Court of Appeal in R.A., endorsing the principles of Cooke J. in I.R., articulates a duty to assess credibility having regard to the contents of documents submitted in support of the application. 86. Then at para. 93 Phelan J. states the following: “Irrespective of whether a duty arises extending to an attempt to verify or authenticate a document because features of the documents prompt such enquiry, there is an overriding duty to consider documents submitted and not to reject them without further scrutiny simply because the account given is implausible or not believed. Where the account given is implausible and not believed, this may be the basis advanced for not attaching much weight to the documents even in the absence of reference to features of the documents themselves, but it should be clear that this conclusion was arrived [at] having considered the terms of the documentation. A general lack of credibility should not be cited as an explanation for not considering documents submitted as to their contents as this is tantamount to a failure to assess and falls foul of the principles established in I.R., R.A., Article 4 of the Qualification Directive and the EASO Guidelines. From each of these I consider it to be clear that the general lack of plausibility of an oral account given does not excuse the decision maker from assessing the documentation submitted. A decision on general credibility should be informed by an assessment of the documents submitted, even if the conclusion is that it is not possible to attach much weight to the documents in view of other identified elements 30 assessed as undermining of credibility and difficulties in authenticating the documents.” (emphasis added) 87. It seems to me that the above passage supports the general thrust of the applicant’s claim in the present case. While I take counsel’s point that a general lack of credibility was not cited in the Decision as an explanation for not considering the submitted documentation, the failure to properly consider the importance and effect of the summonses, coupled with the Tribunal’s Decision to reject them outright as unreliable without considering their terms or their potential authenticity, resulted in the documentary evidence, which had been expressly relied upon by the applicant before the Tribunal and which was on its face relevant to the events on which credibility depended, not being meaningfully considered by the decision-maker. The reliability of the documents was rejected outright without their form or authenticity being considered. EASO Practical Guide 2015 88. Earlier in the course of her judgment in M.H. at para. 87, Phelan J. addresses the legal status of the EASO Guidelines. “EASO” stands for European Asylum Support Office, and the full name of the Guide is EASO Practical Guide: Evidence Assessment (March 2015). Phelan J. states that, while the Guide does not have force of law in the State, it nonetheless signals the correct approach to the law applicable to the assessment of evidence under provisions which do apply in the State, namely Article 4 of the Qualification Directive. She therefore considers it an authoritative statement of the law and practice regarding the proper approach to the assessment of evidence in international protection applications. 89. According to para. 1.3.2.1 of the 2015 Guide, a case officer should, where possible, obtain information as to the generally expected content and form of any documents presented (e.g. arrest warrants, court summons). The Guide states that such information may be obtained 31 through relevant country of origin information. According to the Guide, any documents presented by an applicant as evidence to support their claim must be examined thoroughly. Consideration of the applicant’s demeanour objection 90. The Guide cautions against case officers relying on a person’s demeanour in quite forthright terms as follows at para. 2.2.1.3: “The case officer should not rely on demeanour as an indicator of credibility. Findings based on the applicant’s demeanour would often amount to simple assumptions and subjective judgements based on gut feelings”. 91. In the present case, the applicant advances a stand-alone ground of challenge under this heading and submits that the Decision is infirm because the decision-maker made credibility findings based on the applicant’s demeanour. Paras. 4.2 and 4.8 of the Decision are relied upon in that regard. Having re-read the Decision several times, I am not inclined to set aside the Tribunal’s Decision solely on this ground. In my view, on a fair and holistic assessment of the Decision, the references to the decision-maker ‘seeing’ and ‘hearing’ the applicant were more in the nature of unhelpful surplusage than of hard evidence that credibility was rejected on grounds of pure demeanour. Viewing the Decision as a whole, the Tribunal’s rejection of credibility was based on suggested inconsistencies in the applicant’s narrative, rather than purely on an assessment of the way in which the applicant gave his evidence. 92. Moreover, the debate around decision-makers relying on demeanour is quite layered and I note for instance in I.R. itself, Cooke J. at para. 10(8) of the judgment (p. 152 of the Irish Report) refers to the overarching need to read a decision on credibility as a whole “especially where the conclusion takes particular account of the demeanour and reaction of an applicant when testifying in person”. Overall, on the facts here, I am not prepared to uphold the applicant’s demeanour objection. 32 93. Returning to the applicant’s main grounds of challenge, there are two other features of Phelan J.’s decision in M.H. that, in my view, make it a relevant, on-point authority in the applicant’s favour: Firstly, like the present case, M.H. was not a clearcut case where the documents in question were not considered at all. Nonetheless, that did not prevent the court granting certiorari. Secondly, the Tribunal’s decision in M.H. was struck down on the documentary ground even though there were multiple unchallenged findings in an otherwise careful Tribunal decision (see para. 95 of the judgment). 94. The manner in which the documentary evidence was considered in the present case was unusual. In arriving at the conclusion that the Tribunal’s consideration of the summonses was flawed, I have had regard to the following cumulative factors: (i) The Tribunal discounted as unreliable documentary evidence on a key aspect of the applicant’s case, namely his fear of prosecution, without identifying any concerns regarding the authenticity or individual contents of the documents. (ii) Neither the contents nor the potential significance of the documents was expressly addressed in the Tribunal’s Decision. (iii) It was not claimed that either document contained internal contradictions or obvious flaws. (iv) It was not claimed that either document was in a suspicious or irregular form. (v) It was not claimed that either document lacked detail or precision. (vi) In a general sense, the summonses appeared prima facie to be compatible with the thrust of the applicant’s account and the available COI. (vii) The potential relevance of the documents went beyond a mere recounting of the applicant’s statements and had direct relevance to a material issue, namely the question of whether the police were intent on prosecuting the applicant. 33 (viii) This was not a question of the Tribunal attaching reduced weight to the relevant documents. Rather, the documents were discounted outright as unreliable, without any examination of their form, contents or authenticity taking place. (ix) The Tribunal raised no issues as to difficulties in authenticating the documents. (x) It is not clear that the probative value of the summonses was evaluated in light of what was known about conditions in the country of origin, in particular the claimed use by police of coercive powers in the questioning and detaining of persons suspected of involvement in Hirak protests. 95. Stepping back from matters, the Tribunal’s overall conclusion on general credibility does not appear to have been informed by an adequate assessment of the documents submitted by the applicant, including the two summonses. Even if the Tribunal harboured significant concerns (which it clearly did) that the applicant’s claimed sequence of events lacked clarity and coherence, the import and effect of the summonses, if genuine, should at least have been weighed in the overall assessment. As noted by Cooke J. in I.R., the probative value of documents depended on their nature and their content. 96. In light of this accumulation of unusual features, the court is compelled to conclude that, on this separate ground, the process employed by the Tribunal in reaching the negative credibility conclusion was sufficiently flawed to warrant setting aside the Decision. Conclusion 97. In the circumstances, notwithstanding the other carefully considered aspects of the Decision under challenge, the court concludes that in the particular circumstances of the case, the assessment process carried out by the Tribunal was flawed. There was an inadvertent breach of the statutory code in that the Tribunal omitted to take into account all relevant facts as they related to the country of origin (s. 28(4)(a) of the 2015 Act) and the relevant statements and 34 documents presented by the applicant, including information on whether the applicant has been or may be subject to persecution or serious harm (s. 28(4)(b) of the 2015 Act). 98. For the reasons indicated, the court will grant an Order of Certiorari quashing the Decision of the first respondent and remitting the matter to the Tribunal for fresh consideration. Signed: Micheál O’Higgins Appearances: For the applicant: Michael Conlon SC and Aoife Doonan BL instructed by BKC Solicitors For the respondents: Hannah Godfrey BL instructed by the Chief State Solicitor’s Office 35