L.A. v The International Protection Appeals Tribunal and Anor

THE HIGH COURT JUDICIAL REVIEW [2026] IEHC 49 Record No. 2025 1892 JR BETWEEN L. A. AND THE INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION APPEALS TRIBUNAL AND THE MINISTER FOR JUSTICE, HOME AFFAIRS AND MIGRATION RULING of Ms. Justice Siobhán Phelan, delivered on the 29th day of January, 2026 INTRODUCTION 1. The Applicant in this case is a Kosovar national born in 1999, now in his twenties. He is Muslim and of Albanian ethnicity. His mother is a bisexual woman in her fifties who applied separately for international protection. The Applicant is one of four children and has two sisters still living in Kosovo. The matter comes before me on an application for leave to proceed by way of judicial review pursuant to s. 5 of the Illegal Immigrants (Trafficking) Act, 2000 (hereinafter “the 2000 Act”). BACKGROUND 2. By way of brief background, the Applicant and his mother arrived in Ireland on the 26th of October, 2022 and immediately sought international protection. Their claims were based on persecution in Kosovo linked to the mother’s bisexuality and the resulting hostility directed both at her and at the Applicant “by association.” 1 CLAIM 3. In summary, the Applicant claimed that he experienced ongoing bullying, threats, and one violent assault by neighbours after they learned his mother is bisexual. He said this forced him to abandon his professional football career and that he and his mother fled Kosovo with the assistance of a smuggler and their passports were taken. He claimed a fear of being killed if returned to Kosovo. In support of his claim he relied, inter alia, on letters from a named football club and Country of Origin Information (COI) on Kosovo and LGBTQ+ conditions. DECISIONS 4. A decision was made by the International Protection Appeals Tribunal (hereinafter “the Tribunal”) in the Applicant’s mother’s Case to allow her appeal and recommend refugee status. In a written decision, the Tribunal found her account credible, acknowledging widespread discrimination and lack of effective protection for LGBTQ+ people in Kosovo. 5. Although both appeals were decided on the same day by the same Tribunal member, the decision in the Applicant’s case was different. His identity, nationality, religion, ethnicity and that his mother is bisexual were all accepted but important elements of his claim were not accepted. Specifically, it was not accepted that he had been targeted because of his mother’s sexuality. The Tribunal rejected this core claim, finding his account of threats/abuse was vague, lacking dates, details, and corroboration; his description of the motorcycle assault lacked medical documentation and his lack of recall was found to be undermining of credibility. 6. In summary, the Tribunal concluded that there was no credible past persecution, no reasonable chance of future persecution based on the accepted material facts and COI and relied on the fact that Kosovo is a designated safe country of origin. 2 TEST 7. In these proceedings the Applicant seeks leave on a substantial grounds threshold to challenge the Tribunal decision. To meet this test, which is well established, I must be satisfied that the Applicant has identified facts upon which a reasonable or weighty claim may be made that the decision sought to be impugned is unlawful on stateable legal grounds. The grounds must not be “trivial or tenuous”. DISCUSSION AND DECISION 8. The challenge is advanced on various grounds generally grouped under the following headings: I. Internal inconsistency 9. This claim is advanced with specific reference to paras. 37 and 52 of the decision in the Applicant’s case which it is contended result in an internal inconsistency in the decision. It is submitted that the Tribunal member accepted at para. 37 that COI shows possible discrimination by association, yet later at para. 52, said that no COI indicated risk of persecution to him. 10. When regard is had to the terms of para. 37, however, it says: “LGBTQ+ persons in Kosovo often face an unfavourable social environment, stigma and prejudice. It is therefore not implausible that the applicant (X.) could have experienced discrimination by association because of his mother’s sexuality”. 11. This is a statement which in my view carries the plain meaning that the Applicant is not being disbelieved because his account is contradicted by COI. Rather, in view of the COI, the Tribunal considers his claim could be possible, provided the other evidence advanced is accepted as sufficiently probative. The Tribunal then proceeded to consider 3 the other evidence before rejecting the Applicant’s claim on personal credibility grounds. 12. Having rejected the Applicant’s narrative on personal credibility grounds, at para. 52 of the Decision the Tribunal says: “No Country of Origin Information (COI) or other evidence had been furnished to suggest that the applicant would be at risk of persecution on the basis of the accepted material facts.” 13. The Tribunal therefore concluded that there is not a reasonable chance that the Applicant would face a well-founded fear of persecution if returned to Kosovo, emphasising that Kosovo is a designated safe country of origin under S.I. 121/2018 and that the accepted facts (including his mother’s bisexuality) did not indicate an objective risk. 14. It seems to me that it cannot reasonably be contended that the identified findings at paras. 37 and 52 of the Tribunal decision are inconsistent bearing in mind that the Tribunal is considering COI which might be described as neither damaging, therefore not undermining of plausibility, nor positively supportive. When material facts are not accepted by reason of the Applicant’s personal credibility, then the conclusion that no COI or other evidence had been advanced to suggest that the Applicant would be at risk of persecution based on the accepted material facts is not amenable to challenge as it does not meet a substantial ground’s standard. To my mind the reasoning is both logical and coherent. II. Failure to assess relevant COI especially regarding risks to children of LGBTQ+ parents in Kosovo. 15. Exploring this ground of challenge with counsel for the Applicant, I asked him if any of the COI before the Tribunal referred to a risk to a person by association. He fairly responded in the negative accepting that the COI evidenced difficulties for LGBTQ+ people and organisations representing them but was silent on the specific question of the children of such people. 4 16. Having reviewed the COI exhibited to satisfy myself that there is no sufficient evidential basis for a claim that there was a failure to assess relevant COI, it seems to me that the material before me demonstrates that in Kosovo LGBTQ+ individuals themselves may face stigma, rejection, harassment, abuse, and sometimes violence and that families are often the perpetrators of harm. I found nothing to suggest that merely being the adult son of an LGBTQ+ person leads to a risk of harm. 17. The Tribunal accepted that the COI evidenced difficulties for LGBTQ+ persons. This did not assist the Applicant because his claim to have been targeted by reason of his mother’s sexuality was not accepted. I am not satisfied that substantial grounds for challenging the Tribunal’s decision are demonstrated having regard to its assessment of COI in this case in circumstances where the COI regarding difficulties for LGBTQ+ persons was accepted and there was no COI directed to the situation of the adult children of such persons. III. Failure to consider his mother’s successful protection claim 18. It is contended that the Tribunal granted refugee status to the Applicant’s mother on similar factual grounds but did not explain the different outcome. In relation to this complaint, it seems to me that it is evident that where the same Tribunal Member made the decision in respect of the Applicant’s mother on the same day and it was recorded in the Applicant’s claim that it was accepted that his mother was bisexual, that the Tribunal was fully cognisant of the different decision in the Applicant’s mother’s case. Indeed, at para. 36 of the Decision, express reference is made to the separate decision in the Applicant’s mother’s case and it is stated: “For the reasons set out therein, it is accepted on the balance of probabilities that the Appellant’s mother is bisexual.” 19. The reasons why the Applicant’s claim was unsuccessful were given in the decision in his case. The separate decision in his mother’s case, also exhibited in this application 5 and expressly referenced by the Tribunal member in the Applicant’s separate case, explain why she was successful. 20. Specifically, in his mother’s case, the Tribunal accepted the mother’s account as coherent, detailed, consistent and supported by COI. Her bisexuality was accepted as a fact. Her reports of harassment, threats ("we will kill you") and discrimination were found credible and consistent with COI about risks facing LGBTQ+ individuals in Kosovo and no adverse credibility findings were made. The Tribunal was satisfied that the account she gave formed a reliable foundation for assessing real risk. 21. In the Applicant’s case, however, the Tribunal did not accept his account of being persecuted due to his mother’s sexual orientation. The decision repeatedly describes his account as vague because he could not recall dates of incidents, timing, or frequency of abuse. His account was considered to be insufficiently detailed and lacking idiosyncratic detail expected from lived trauma. The Tribunal also noted that it was unsupported by medical evidence despite his claim to have suffered serious back injuries requiring medical attention. For these reasons, the Tribunal concluded that his general credibility had not been established and therefore did not extend the benefit of the doubt to the Applicant rejecting his claim on the balance of probabilities. 22. I have carefully considered both the decision in the Applicant’s case and in his mother’s. It seems to me to be patent from the terms of the two decisions why one succeeded and one failed. While the cases were linked there were material differences between the two cases. These differences resulted in different decisions. There can be no requirement on the Tribunal member to explain in its Decision in the Applicant’s case why he was not successful when his mother was as the reasons for each decision were given individually. In other words, the decisions individually speak for themselves. Indeed, it is apparent that the Applicant has access to the decision in his mother’s case as he exhibits it in these proceedings and must be taken to know the different reasoning in each case. 23. In short, the Applicant’s mother’s case succeeded because her story was accepted as true and was supported by the COI on risks to bisexual women in Kosovo. His case on the other hand failed because the Tribunal did not believe his account, found no past 6 harm and concluded there was no COI-supported risk to him on the facts which the Tribunal had accepted as established. I cannot find that there are substantial grounds for challenging the Tribunal decision on the basis of an alleged failure to consider the mother’s successful claim. IV. Inadequate reasoning and breach of s.46(6) IPA 2015 and constitutional justice 24. In advancing this ground it is argued on behalf of the Applicant that the Tribunal did not engage with crucial evidence, namely the finding in his mother’s case, including parallel risks arising from his mother’s accepted persecution. In this regard the Applicant’s claim is that his mother’s Tribunal’s decision was “highly significant” evidence of risk to him, as they come from the same community setting. It is contended that the Tribunal’s failure to address this undermines the decision’s logic and legality. In urging this position, I was referred by counsel for the Applicant to the decision of the Supreme Court in YY v. Minister for Justice [2017] IESC 61. 25. In YY the Supreme Court found that the Minister had not clearly explained why she rejected the Refugee Appeals Tribunal’s finding of a “present and foreseeable” risk of serious harm in an earlier decision in the Applicant’s case, ECtHR decisions (Daoudi, H.R.) which found a real risk of torture for similar Algerian terrorism suspects and UK Special Immigration Appeals Commission findings raising similar concerns. The Supreme Court found the reasoning confusing and too heavily reliant on generic statements rather than clear engagement with the specific Article 3 risk. In his decision the Minister appeared to treat the decision as partly discretionary, but Article 3 is absolute—if real risk exists, deportation is prohibited. In essence, the Supreme Court found the Minister’s reasoning too unclear to be lawful. 26. The decision in YY supports the proposition that a decision should engage with earlier findings which are being departed from and explain why. At the heart of the case was a duty to give reasons for a decision which departed from earlier decisions on the same or apparently like facts. As already noted above, however, it seems to me that the reasons for reaching a negative conclusion in the Applicant’s case whilst making a positive one in his mother’s are clear in this case. It was because of different findings 7 made on the evidence having regard to those material elements of the claim as were accepted in each case. 27. I am satisfied that the fundamental proposition upon which this case is advanced is misconceived, namely, that the case of the Applicant and his mother were advanced on a similar factual base and therefore they faced the same risk. This is not a sound premise given the differences between the two cases. While they are mother and son and their cases were connected, they are not in the same position. The Applicant’s mother is bisexual and it is accepted that she has been persecuted on this basis. The Applicant is not bisexual and his claim to have encountered persecution because of his association with his mother has been disbelieved. COI demonstrates that LGBTQ+ encounter problems in Kosovo but nothing in the COI before the Tribunal addressed problems experienced by family members by association. In those circumstances, it is not reasonably arguable on a substantial grounds threshold that the two outcomes are inconsistent and the different decision in the Applicant’s case is inadequately explained. CONCLUSION 28. As I am not satisfied that the Applicant meets the threshold for leave under s. 5 of the 2000 Act, I refuse leave on this application. 8