AB v An Taoiseach and Ors

APPROVED REDACTED AN ARD-CHÚIRT THE HIGH COURT [2026] IEHC 236 Record No. 2025 4071 P BETWEEN/ AB PLAINTIFF -AND- AN TAOISEACH, THE MINISTER FOR JUSTICE, HOME AFFAIRS AND MIGRATION, THE MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND TRADE AND IRELAND DEFENDANTS JUDGMENT of Mr. Justice Conleth Bradley delivered on the 21st day of April 2026 INTRODUCTION Preliminary 1. The Plaintiff, AB, was married to CD (“the mother”) in 2021. 2. Their daughter, EF (“the child”) was born in County Kerry on XXXXXXXX and is now approximately four and a half years old. 3. The child is an Irish citizen and also holds Polish and British passports. 4. These proceedings relate to the circumstances which have arisen whereby in March 2024, the Plaintiff’s wife, CD, unlawfully took the child, who was then just over two years of age, from their home in Ireland to Poland, and concern the Plaintiff’s efforts in Poland to secure their daughter’s return to Ireland. 5. Whilst there is an involved factual context in this most difficult of cases, the issue which has resulted in the Plaintiff (who is the father of an unlawfully abducted child) considering that he had no choice but to issue these proceedings against the Irish Government was described in an e-mail which he sent last month (13th March 2026) to the Polish Office of the Commissioner/Ombudsman for Children (the Rzecznik Praw Dziecka) (“the RPD”) where, in response to a ruling from the Polish Supreme Court which essentially found in the Plaintiff’s favour – and refused the RPD’s attempts to set aside previous Polish judicial rulings directing the return of his four and a half year old child from Poland to Ireland – the RPD informed the Plaintiff that it had decided to file an extraordinary appeal (complaint) against the decision ordering the child’s return to Ireland. The RPD further stated that pursuant to Article 388(3) 2 of the Polish Code of Civil Procedure, the lodgement of an extraordinary appeal had the effect of suspending the enforcement decision (i.e., the Return Order) issued under the Hague Convention until such time as the appeal proceedings have been concluded. 6. In the following response of the same date by way of e-mail to this letter of 13th March 2026 from the RPD, the Plaintiff sets out his view of the position of the RPD, and summarises the gravamen of the issues which arise in these proceedings: “Your response shows once again that you continue to ignore the rule of law and the rights of a vulnerable Irish child and an Irish father who is incandescent with anger [sic.] towards your illegal efforts to seize an Irish child. Your letter of March 13th, 2026, fails to address the central and undeniable fact in this matter: the courts of the Republic of Poland have decided this case, repeatedly and at the highest level. Your office chose to intervene in this case on 23 December 2024, bringing the matter before the High Court through an extraordinary complaint and spending the entirety of 2025 attempting to overturn the court decisions that had already been issued in my favour. Those efforts have now failed…. Decision of the Supreme Court- 22 January 2026 The Supreme Court has dismissed the action brought by your office. The ruling is clear and final. The courts have spoken. They wrote [sic.] 11 pages admonishing your views of the “law” Despite this, your correspondence continues to avoid acknowledging the outcome of the judicial process and avoids addressing the most serious issue of all: my child has been outside my care since 1 March 2024 and I have received no confirmation of her safety or wellbeing. 3 Your office has now exhausted the legal avenues it chose to pursue. There is therefore no basis for further interference in my family life or in the enforcement of the court decisions that already exist. I am informing you in clear terms: Locate my child. Secure her safety. Ensure that the lawful court decisions are respected and that she is returned to her legal home in Ireland. The actions of your office in attempting to overturn binding judicial decisions have already been tested before the Supreme Court and have failed. I will pursue accountability through the full mechanisms of European law and the European justice system for the violation of my daughter’s rights and my rights as her father. I expect a clear response addressing these matters…”. 7. The position which the Plaintiff finds himself in, at this juncture, is extremely distressing. To say that he is frustrated by these circumstances is an understatement. He is extremely worried about the safety, health and well-being of his young daughter and he is angered by the inability to secure her safe return to Ireland. 8. The Plaintiff is of the view that the issue has now transformed into an urgent child welfare issue. Leaving aside the important legal questions which arise in this case, he is a parent who is beyond worry about his missing child and who is at his wits ends in terms of his concern for her health and safety. As this judgment is delivered today, the Plaintiff does not know where his four and a half year old daughter is or how she is. 4 9. This difficult situation is exacerbated by the fact that in seeking the return of his child, AB has, to date, prevailed at every relevant level of judicial authority in Poland (including, most recently, before the Polish Supreme Court at the end of January 2026) which applies the Hague Convention in that jurisdiction in seeking the return of his daughter, although the correspondence communicated last month (referred to above) would suggest that the legal process, by virtue of the provisions of Article 388(3) of the Polish Code of Civil Procedure, is not yet concluded. 10. Against this background, notwithstanding his successful engagement to date with the Polish legal system, the Plaintiff remains thwarted in his attempt to bring his daughter home to Ireland. In summary, the execution and enforcement by the Polish law enforcement authorities of the Polish judicially sanctioned Return Orders have been entirely unsuccessful mainly because those authorities have been unable to locate the precise whereabouts of the child. 11. The evidence in this case confirms that extensive consular assistance and engagement with the relevant parties has been given by the Irish authorities. This is detailed in the Affidavits furnished on behalf of the respective departments of State. 12. Mr. John Seery, Principal Officer of the ICA, employed by the Department of Justice, Home Affairs and Migration has sworn Affidavits, including on 23rd September 2025, 27th November 2025 and more recently, on 1st April 2026. 13. Ms. Carole O’Sullivan, Director of the Service Delivery Division, which includes the ICA unit, and is also employed by the Department of Justice, Home Affairs and Migration, has sworn an Affidavit on 19th November 2025 which sets out the events which had occurred at that time, 5 including, reference to the Polish court proceedings and orders which had occurred thus far, that infringement proceedings (INFR(2021)2001) had been commenced and that on 26th January 2023 the European Commission had sent a letter of formal notice to Poland pursuant to Article 258 TFEU for failure to fulfil its obligations under the Brussels IIa Regulation, and also details welfare checks made by the Plaintiff. The Affidavit of Mr. Seery on 27th November 2025, by way of update at that time, stated that the action by the Commission against Poland in (INFR(2021)2001) was at the letter of notice stage and had not been referred to the CJEU so there were no proceedings for Ireland to join at that juncture. 14. Ms. Andrea Wickham Moriarty, Deputy Director in the Consular Directorate employed by the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade has sworn Affidavits, including on 22nd September 2025 and on 7th April 2026. 15. A series of Affidavits were sworn on behalf of the Defendants and by the Plaintiff in response to the Defendants’ application to dismiss the Plaintiff’s action and also in response to the substantive matters raised in this case, including Affidavits sworn by the Plaintiff on 21st August 2025 (setting out the facts), 25th September 2025, 20th November 2025 and more recently, on 9th April 2026. 16. In the circumstances of this case, it is perhaps understandable that the Plaintiff would seek the assistance of the Irish executive and the Irish judiciary. However, for the reasons which I have set out in this judgment, I do not consider that the Plaintiff is entitled to the particular reliefs which he seeks against the Defendants and I am compelled, therefore, to dismiss this action. 6 THE CONTEXT Overview 17. These proceedings pose the question as to whether these difficult and distressing circumstances – involving inter alia the initial unlawful abduction of the child by her mother from Ireland to Poland, where the Polish judicial system (including the Polish Supreme Court) have ordered the return of the child to Ireland (although where, apparently from 13th March 2026, a further application is to be made to the Polish Supreme Court by the RPD after it delivered its judgment in the Plaintiff’s favour in January of this year), where the Polish authorities have not yet been able to locate the child in order to effect her return from Poland to Ireland, and where the Irish authorities continue to liaise with the Polish authorities – give rise to a situation in which the High Court in Ireland can grant reliefs against the executive arm of the Irish Government. The Hague Convention 18. In Ireland, the Hague Convention is given the force of law by the Child Abduction and Enforcement of Custody Orders Act 1991, as amended (“the 1991 Act”). The Hague Convention seeks to provide robust and effective international mechanisms to enable an abducted child to be expeditiously returned to its country of habitual residence (subject to a number of prescribed offences) and the central issue where the Convention is invoked is the binary question as to whether or not a child should be “returned” . 19. In accordance with para. 1 of Article 6(1) of the Convention, the Department of Justice (Civil division) is designated as ‘the Central Authority of Ireland’ (“the ICA”). 7 Regulation 2019/1111 and S.I. No. 400/2022 20. The European Union (Decisions in Matrimonial Matters and in Matters of Parental Responsibility and International Child Abduction) Regulations 2022 (S.I. No. 400/2022) gives full effect to Council Regulation (EU) No. 2019/1111 of 25 June 2019 on jurisdiction, the recognition and enforcement of decisions in matrimonial matters and the matters of parental responsibility and on international child abduction (recast) (Brussels IIb / Brussels II ter). 21. Chapter III, Articles 22 to 29 of Council Regulation (EU) 2019/1111 addresses “International Child Abduction” including the Hague Convention. 22. Article 28 of Council Regulation (EU) No. 2019/1111 provides for the “Enforcement of decisions ordering the return of a child”. 23. Article 28(1) states that “[a]n authority competent for enforcement to which an application for the enforcement of a decision ordering the return of a child to another Member State is made shall act expeditiously in processing the application.” Article 28(2) provides that “[w]here a decision as referred to in Article 28(1) has not been enforced within six weeks of the date when the enforcement proceedings were initiated, the party seeking enforcement or the Central Authority of the Member State of enforcement shall have the right to request a statement of the reasons for the delay from the authority competent for enforcement.” 24. Consistent with this, recital (60) of Regulation No. 2019/1111 provides as follows: “As enforcement procedures could be judicial or extra-judicial depending on national law, ‘authorities competent for enforcement’ could include courts, bailiffs and any other authorities as determined by national law. Where, in addition to authorities 8 competent for enforcement, courts are also mentioned in this Regulation, this should cover cases where, under national law, a body other than a court is the authority competent for enforcement, but certain decisions are reserved to courts, either from the outset or in the form of reviewing the acts of the authority competent for enforcement. It should be for the authority competent for enforcement or the court of the Member State of enforcement to order, take or arrange for specific measures to be taken at the enforcement stage, such as any non-coercive measures which might be available under the national law of that Member State, or any coercive measures which might be available under that law, including fines, imprisonment or the fetching of the child by a bailiff.” 25. In summary, therefore, Poland (as the ‘requested State’) retains the jurisdiction to determine an application for the return of a child in the circumstances which apply to the Plaintiff. Therefore, the Irish State, including this court, is obliged to recognise and respect the jurisdictional differences prescribed by EU law and give effect to the mutual trust between Member States and in this case, the competent authority for enforcement purposes, are the Polish authorities. This respect and recognition is reciprocal amongst Member States, which includes Ireland and Poland. Case C-638/22 PPU 26. In seeking to explain this process at a greater level of particularisation, it is helpful at this point to refer, by analogy, to the decision of the CJEU in Case C-638/22 PPU, Rzecznik Praw Dziecka and Others, 16th February 2023, EU:C:2023:103 (“Case C-638/22 PPU”). 9 27. The judgment of the CJEU in Case C-638/22 PPU provides a helpful explanation of the relevant law and procedures in relation to the Hague Convention which apply in Poland. In terms of sequencing, it also provides a useful benchmark in understanding the Plaintiff’s engagement with the Polish system and where matters now stand at the date of the delivery of this judgment. 28. According to the 2022 amended version of Article 388(1) of the Polish Code of Civil Procedure, any one of three State (‘empowered’) authorities – the Public Prosecutor General, the RPD, or the Ombudsman – can notify or request (without giving reasons) the Polish Court of Appeal in Warsaw, from the date on which a Return Order was made under the Hague Convention became final, that the enforcement of the Return Order should be suspended. 29. This notification or request, therefore, automatically entails suspension for a period of at least two months. Suspension of the enforcement of the Return Order ceases if those authorities do not bring an appeal on a point of law before the Supreme Court against that decision within that period. By contrast, if such an appeal is brought within that period, that suspension is, pursuant to Article 388(3) of the Code of Civil Procedure automatically extended until the conclusion of the proceedings before the Supreme Court. Further, even if the Supreme Court were to dismiss that appeal on a point of law, the empowered authorities could once again obtain suspension of the (Hague Convention) Return Order on the basis of Article 388(3) of the Code of Civil Procedure by bringing a further “extraordinary appeal/complaint” under that provision. 30. By way of observation, the letter from the RPD dated 13th March 2026 (referred to at the beginning of this judgment) where it informed the Plaintiff that it had decided to file an 10 extraordinary appeal (complaint) against the decision ordering the child’s return to Ireland would seem to suggest that is where matters rest at this point in time in AB’s case. 31. Returning to Case C-638/22 PPU, the Court of Appeal in Warsaw had asked the CJEU whether Article 388(1) of the Code of Civil Procedure was compatible with the requirement of expedition underlying Regulation No. 2201/2003, and in particular with Article 11(3). 32. The question asked was described in the following terms at para. 57 of the decision of the CJEU: “whether Article 11(3) of Regulation No 2201/2003, read in the light of Article 47 of the Charter, is to be interpreted as precluding a piece of national legislation which confers on authorities that are not courts the power to obtain automatic suspension, for a period of at least two months, of the enforcement of a return decision handed down on the basis of the 1980 Hague Convention, without having to provide reasons for their request for suspension”. 33. Article 47 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (“the CFREU” or “the Charter”) provides for the right to an effective remedy and to a fair trial as follows: “Everyone whose rights and freedoms guaranteed by the law of the Union are violated has the right to an effective remedy before a tribunal in compliance with the conditions laid down in this Article. Everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal previously established by law. Everyone shall have the possibility of being advised, defended and represented. Legal aid shall be made available to those who lack sufficient resources in so far as such aid is necessary to ensure effective access to justice.” 11 34. The first paragraph of Article 47 of the Charter is similar in terms to Article 13 of the European Convention on Human Rights (“the ECHR”) and the second paragraph of Article 47 corresponds to Article 6(1) of the ECHR. 35. Article 11(1) of Regulation No. 2201/2003 provides that where a person, institution or other body having rights of custody applies to the competent authorities in a Member State to deliver a judgment on the basis of the 1980 Hague Convention, in order to obtain the return of a child that has been wrongfully removed or retained in a Member State other than the Member State where the child was habitually resident immediately before the wrongful removal or retention, paras 2 to 8 shall apply. 36. Article 11(3) of Regulation No. 2201/2003 provides that a court to which an application for return of a child is made as mentioned in Article 11(1) shall act expeditiously in proceedings on the application, using the most expeditious procedures available in national law. Without prejudice to the first subparagraph, the court shall, except where exceptional circumstances make this impossible, issue its judgment no later than six weeks after the application is lodged. 37. At para. 85 of its judgment, the CJEU stated that in view of the considerations set out in its judgment, it must be found that a piece of national legislation as it described in para. 57 (the extract of which is quoted above) may undermine the effectiveness of Article 11(3) of Regulation No. 2201/2003. 38. The CJEU determined at para. 93 of its judgment in Case C-638/22 PPU that Article 11(3) of Regulation No. 2201/2003, read in the light of Article 47 of the Charter, must be interpreted as precluding a piece of national legislation which confers on authorities that are not courts the 12 power to obtain automatic suspension, for a period of at least two months, of the enforcement of a return decision handed down on the basis of the 1980 Hague Convention, without having to provide reasons for their request for suspension. CHRONOLOGY 39. In AB’s case, after the child’s removal to Poland by her mother in or around March 2024, the Plaintiff contacted the Irish Central Authority, the Department of Justice, Home Affairs and Migration (“ICA”) on 4th June 2024 and an application pursuant to the Hague Convention, on the Plaintiff’s behalf, was received by the ICA on 5th June 2024. The Plaintiff’s application was transmitted by the ICA to the Polish Central Authority (“PCA”) for processing on 18th June 2024. 40. As set out in the Affidavit of John Seery sworn on 23rd September 2025, by order of the Regional Court in Łódź, XII Civil Family Division dated 25th July 2024, a court-assigned lawyer was appointed to represent the Plaintiff from the Regional Bar Council in Łódź. 41. The Affidavit of John Seery sworn on 23rd September 2025 states that the Plaintiff first sought consular assistance from the Consular Directorate of the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade on 2nd September 2024. 42. The Plaintiff’s case under the Hague Convention was heard on 26th September 2024. 43. By order dated 10th October 2024, the Regional Court in Łódź, XII Civil Family Division ordered inter alia that “[CD] ensures the return of the minor [EF], born on XXXXXXXXXX in 13 Kerry (Ireland) to [CD] and [AB], to the territory of Ireland, either by returning to Ireland with her minor daughter or by returning the minor to the child’s father, [AB], within two weeks of this order becoming final”. 44. On 28th October 2024, the PCA transmitted a copy of the court order for the return of the child to Ireland to the ICA. 45. In an e-mail dated 30th October 2024, the PCA informed the ICA that the order was not yet final and may still be appealed. The Plaintiff was informed that a number of queries had been raised on his behalf in relation to the process by the ICA to the PCA. 46. Further communication took place between the Plaintiff and the ICA, with the Plaintiff seeking further updates and information, in November and December 2024. 47. On 6th January 2025, the Plaintiff emailed the ICA seeking an update and requesting escalation by the Department of Justice. 48. In a response dated 8th January 2025, the Plaintiff was informed that “[t]he Irish Central Authority and Department of Justice have no measures available to enforce action on the Polish authorities and we rely on them to take any necessary steps to ensure proceedings can move ahead.” 49. On 9th January 2025, the PCA advised that the Return Order dated 10th October 2025 had not become final and that CD had lodged an appeal to the Court of Appeal in Warsaw. 14 50. On 10th January 2025, the ICA was informed by the PCA that the Court of Appeal in Warsaw had decided on 7th January 2025 to seek the opinion of a Judicial Expert Panel comprised of psychological and psychiatric experts. 51. On 16th January 2025, the Plaintiff shared correspondence from his Polish lawyer with the ICA which inter alia stated that CD’s appeal included a request to admit expert evidence taking into account “XXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXX XXXXX XXX XXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXX XXXXX XXXXXXX XXXX XXXX”. 52. On 17th January 2025, the PCA informed the ICA that the Polish Court of Appeal had requested information through the ICA. 53. On 22nd January 2025, the request from the Polish Court of Appeal was forwarded by the ICA to the office of the Irish Hague Liaison Judge. The ICA contacted Túsla (the Child and Family Agency), the Health Service Executive (“HSE”), the Department of Education and the Department of Children for relevant information. 54. On 28th January 2025, the Plaintiff informed the ICA that the RPD had become involved in the case on behalf of CD. 55. On 28th January 2025, the Plaintiff shared with the Consul from the Embassy of Ireland located in Poland, a letter from the RPD which was submitted to the Polish Court of Appeal. 15 56. On foot of this communication, on 28th January 2025, the Irish Ambassador to Poland requested a meeting with the RPD. The purpose of this meeting was to gain an understanding as to how Hague Convention cases were dealt with in Poland and to understand the role of the RPD in such cases. 57. A meeting was arranged between the Irish Consul and the Plaintiff in the Irish Embassy for 31st January 2025. 58. The Plaintiff appeared before the Polish Court of Appeal evidence panel on 31st January 2025, together with his lawyer. 59. On 28th February 2025, the Irish Ambassador, Consul and Consular Officer met with the RPD. The Ambassador raised the Plaintiff’s case in more detail and sought guidance on the path forward through the Polish legal system. 60. On 5th March 2025, the ICA provided the Plaintiff with preliminary information received from the Department of Education, the Department of Children and Enable Ireland in relation to the request for further information from the Court of Appeal. 61. Further information received was sent to the Plaintiff on 10th March 2025. This information was compiled, translated and forwarded to the PCA for onward transmission to the Court of Appeal in Warsaw on 10th March 2025. 16 CD’s appeal dismissed 62. An appeal hearing was set for 27th March 2025, at which stage CD’s appeal was dismissed. EF was to be returned to Ireland by 10th April 2025. 63. On 27th March 2025, the Irish Consul sought a further meeting with the RPD. 64. On 4th April 2025, the Irish Ambassador, Consul and Consular Officer met with the Polish Deputy Ombudsman for Children (RPD) and raised the Plaintiff’s concerns regarding EF’s wellbeing. 65. In correspondence dated 4th April 2025, the PCA provided information to the ICA in respect of the enforcement process if the child was not returned to Ireland by 10th April 2025, being a procedure “which is carried out on the basis of national legislation”. This information was shared with the Plaintiff. The ICA advised the Plaintiff to engage a lawyer to discuss the necessary steps to enforce the return order in Poland and before the Polish Courts. 66. By way of e-mail dated 19th May 2025 from the Plaintiff to the ICA, the Plaintiff confirmed that he had requested enforcement action in Poland. Polish District Court: 28th May 2025 67. By order of the District Court in Pleszew dated 28th May 2025, the court ordered, inter alia, that a Curator of the District Court shall: (a) Immediately set a date for compulsory removal of the child from the home of CD; (b) Notify the Plaintiff of the said date; (c) Personally remove and hand the child to the Plaintiff and, 17 (d) Prepare a written record of actions. 68. The Irish Embassy advised the Plaintiff in relation to obtaining emergency travel documents on 3rd June 2025. 69. On 5th June 2025, the Plaintiff wrote to the ICA, the office of the Tánaiste and the Minister for Justice, Home Affairs and Migration advising that the Polish authorities were unable to locate the mother and child and criticising both the Irish and Polish authorities in relation to their perceived lack of action in ensuring the return of the child to Ireland. 70. On 11th June 2025, the Court Curator wrote to the Consular Officer to say that under Polish law, she had no obligation to engage with the Embassy. 71. On 13th June 2025, the Irish Ambassador spoke to the Deputy Minister for Justice and the Director of the Department of Family Law in Poland to raise the Plaintiff’s case. 72. On 17th June 2025, the ICA raised the Plaintiff’s case at a bilateral meeting with the PCA while participating in a meeting of the European Judicial Network in Civil and Commercial Matters. 73. On 20th June 2025, the ICA furnished information provided to it by the Court Curator through the PCA which suggested that CD and EF were likely at a hospital in Warsaw. The Plaintiff was advised to engage with his Polish lawyer in relation to enforcement. 74. By way of several emails in June 2025, the Plaintiff advised the ICA of multiple failed attempts to collect the child in Poland. 18 75. On 25th June 2025, the Ambassador, Consul and Consular Office met the RPD. 76. On 26th June 2025, the Ambassador wrote to the PCA seeking assistance in the case. 77. On 4th July 2025, the Plaintiff sent an email to the Department of the Taoiseach and to the Department of the Tánaiste seeking assistance. 78. On 9th July 2025, the Consular Officer wrote to the PCA seeking a meeting. 79. On 10th July 2025, the ICA transmitted the Plaintiff’s request for a welfare check in relation to the child to the PCA. 80. On 11th July 2025, the Plaintiff received a formal acknowledgement of a complaint lodged by him with the Directorate-General for Justice and Consumers of the European Commission and was advised that the “European Commission only acts in the general interest. It does not and cannot act on behalf of complainants so that even in the event of incorporation of your case into the infringement proceedings you would have to continue to pursue your claims in court.” 81. Correspondence passed between the Plaintiff and the Irish Embassy on 13th July 2025 and 22nd July 2025. 82. On 15th July 2025, the Private Secretary for the Minister for Justice, Home Affairs and Migration wrote to the Plaintiff to inform him that “[r]egrettably there are limited steps that can be taken by the Irish authorities as, under the terms of the [C]onvention, any enforcement action is the duty of the contracting state and the institutions of the state a child has been taken 19 to.” It further stated that “successful enforcement of the return now lies with the local court in Plesnaw, in cooperation with your solicitor.” 83. On 21st July 2025 and 23rd July 2025, the Plaintiff advised the ICA of two further unsuccessful attempts to collect the child. 84. The Plaintiff issued a Plenary Summons against the Defendants on 22nd July 2025. 85. On 23rd July 2025, the Irish Embassy transmitted by way of email a letter from the Tánaiste to the relevant Polish Minister in relation to the case. 86. On 23rd July 2025, the Plaintiff advised the ICA that there had been at that point a total of ten unsuccessful collection attempts by the Polish authorities without being able to verify the location and safety of the child. 87. On 28th July 2025, the Plaintiff updated the ICA that he believed the RPD had petitioned the Supreme Court in Poland to suspend the Return Order. The Plaintiff also contacted the Embassy on the same date with this information. (On 9th September 2025, the PCA advised that the “case files containing the Ombudsman for Children’s cassation appeal are still at the Court of Appeal in Warsaw” and that “[t]hey will probably be forwarded to the Supreme Court after 22 September 2025”). 88. On 30th July 2025, the PCA rejected an earlier request from the Embassy for a meeting in relation to the Plaintiff’s case. 20 89. On 1st August 2025, the Plaintiff wrote to Consul to report that the District Court in Plesnaw, Poland had instructed the police to search for the child. 90. The Defendants entered an Appearance on 11th August 2025. 91. By way of correspondence dated 12th August 2025, the Polish Minister for Foreign Affairs responded to the letter from the Tánaiste. 92. A Statement of Claim was delivered by the Plaintiff on 14th August 2025. 93. By way of correspondence dated 19th August 2025, the Polish Ministry of Justice responded to the Ambassador’s letter. 94. The Plaintiff issued a Notice of Motion on 22nd August 2025 (essentially seeking similar reliefs sought in these proceedings by way of an interlocutory application), which was grounded on an Affidavit sworn on 21st August 2025. This motion was made returnable to the High Court vacation sitting on 27th August 2025. 95. On 27th August 2025, the Plaintiff’s motion was adjourned to the High Court Hague- Luxembourg Convention List on 12th September 2025. 96. On 29th August 2025, the Plaintiff was advised by the ICA, on seeking an update in relation to the welfare check on the child that, as the Polish authorities had been unable to locate the mother and child, the responsible court had as yet been unable to conduct the requested checks and provide a report. 21 97. On 12th September 2025, the High Court (O’Donnell J.) adjourned the Plaintiff’s motion to the general High Court vacation list on 24th September 2025, with a direction that the Defendants file affidavits in response to the Plaintiff’s motion, if required. 98. The Defendants filed an Affidavit of John Seery sworn on 22nd September 2025 (setting out the engagements of the Department of Justice (as the ICA) in relation to the case) and an Affidavit of Andrea Wickham Moriarty sworn on 23rd September 2025 (setting out the engagement of the Department of Foreign Affairs in relation to the matter) in response to the Plaintiff’s motion. 99. On foot of an ex parte application made on 22nd September 2025, the Defendants were granted the liberty of the Court to issue and serve a Notice of Motion (also dated 22nd September 2025) seeking to dismiss the Plaintiff’s proceedings returnable to 24th September 2025. 100. On 24th September 2025, both the Plaintiff’s motion dated 22nd August 2025, and the Defendants’ motion dated 22nd September 2025 were listed. On that date, the Plaintiff was afforded an opportunity to respond to the Defendants’ motion. The motions were adjourned to the Non-Jury/Judicial Review Directions List on 8th October 2025. 101. A Replying Affidavit of the Plaintiff sworn on 25th September 2025 was filed in the Central Office of the High Court on 25th September 2025. 102. On 8th October 2025, both motions were listed for hearing on 21st October 2025. 22 103. The Defendants had been directed to identify the reason why correspondence between the Tánaiste and the relevant Polish counterpart, while referred to on Affidavit, was not exhibited. 104. Under cover of correspondence dated 7th November 2025, the Chief State Solicitor’s Office enclosed three letters which had been referenced in the Affidavit of Ms. Wickham Moriarty sworn on 22nd September 2025, namely a letter from the Tánaiste and Minister for Foreign Affairs and Trade to the Polish Minister for Foreign Affairs dated 18th July 2025, a letter from the Under-Secretary of State at the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the Minister of State for International Development and the Diaspora dated 31st July 2025, and a letter from the Department of Family and Minor Affairs to the Irish Ambassador to Poland dated 12th August 2025. The correspondence also enclosed a copy of a letter from the Department of Family and Minor Affairs to the Irish Ambassador to Poland confirming that the Polish Ministry did not object to the release of correspondence. The letter dated 7th November 2025 from the Chief State Solicitor’s Office stated that the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade had agreed, as an exceptional measure (subject to its right to claim privilege in future instances where the contents of inter-governmental communications are requested) to share this correspondence with the Plaintiff to demonstrate its transparency in relation to the handling of the Plaintiff’s case. 105. The Plaintiff’s and the Defendants preliminary interlocutory motions, and issues in relation to the privilege of documentation, came before the High Court (Simons J.) on 21st October 2025 who inter alia made a protective or pre-emptive costs order in favour of the Plaintiff, gave directions for the hearing of the substantive action including allowing the Plaintiff to deliver an amended Statement of Claim. 23 106. The Plaintiff delivered an amended Statement of Claim dated 28th October 2025. 107. The Defendants delivered a Defence dated 17th November 2025. 108. It appears that in the Polish return proceedings, the RPD sought, towards the end of 2025, to have an appeal heard by the Polish Supreme Court (as a court of cassation). As part of that process the Polish Prosecutor’s Office had submitted a report which was not sympathetic to the position of the RPD. 109. A further case management hearing took place before the High Court (Simons J.) on 18th November 2025 who transferred the matter to the List Judge of the High Court Non- jury/Judicial review List for the purposes of giving a date for the hearing of the action. 110. The action was assigned a hearing date before the Dundalk High Court on 2nd December 2025. 111. This action was initially heard before me in Dundalk on 2nd December 2025 and judgment was reserved. 112. After the hearing of this matter, and prior to delivering judgment, the Plaintiff contacted the Court Registrar and furnished a number of documents which he requested to be brought to my attention. A further hearing was convened on 20th March 2026 whereby the parties were afforded an opportunity to consider this new documentation and, if they so choose, to make submissions and file further Affidavits arising from this updated situation. 24 113. In his Affidavit sworn on 1st April 2026, Mr. Seery exhibited correspondence and communications which had passed between the ICA with, firstly, the Plaintiff and secondly, the PCA, after the substantive hearing of this matter on 2nd December 2025 and which confirmed the continuing engagement between the parties. 114. It appears that the Polish Supreme Court delivered its decision on 22nd January 2026 and the ICA obtained an official translation which is exhibited in Mr. Seery’s Affidavit of 1st April 2026. The Supreme Court in the Civil Chamber, composed of a single member in a closed session on 22nd January 2026, refused to accept the cassation complaint from the RPD and also refused the Plaintiff’s application for costs as against the RPD. 115. The ICA became aware of the decision of the Polish Supreme Court on 6th February 2026 when it was written to by the PCA and the ICA passed this on to the Plaintiff on the same date. When the ICA received its own translation of the Polish Supreme Court decision on 9 th February 2026, this was transmitted to the Plaintiff on 10th February 2026. 116. The Plaintiff forwarded a letter to the ICA which he received in Polish from the RPD dated 13th March 2026 and on 16th March 2026, the ICA advised the Plaintiff that it was arranging a translation of this as well as seeking clarity on the matter from the PCA. (The translation of the RPD letter dated 13th March 2026 was received from the PCA on 17th March 2026). 117. On 16th March 2026, the ICA updated the PCA with the correspondence received at that juncture from the Plaintiff and sought clarification as to whether the interpretation of the letter from the RPD was correct and inquired as to what steps the RPD was taking. Specifically, the Plaintiff, in his statement in correspondence to the ICA, referred to the decision of the Polish 25 Supreme Court and requested what actions the ICA and the Irish State were “taking to secure the wellbeing of a child which has been illegally abducted by another state. There are no more legal roads available to me. When another sovereign state decides to ignore the rules, you have to step up in your official capacity.” 118. On 17th March 2026, the ICA received correspondence from the PCA enclosing a translation of the RPD letter dated 13th March 2026. The PCA correspondence dated 17th March 2026 also stated that the curator (the Polish official assigned by the court) had scheduled the removal of the child for the following day (i.e., 18th March 2026) and that the applicant (the Plaintiff) had been informed of the date but had not confirmed his participation in the proceedings nor had appointed a representative to collect the child. The correspondence stated that if the curator found the child at the pickup location, he would not be able to take the child into custody because there would be no one to whom he could hand the child over. The letter also enclosed correspondence dated 12th March 2026 from the Ministry of National Education on certain educational programmes for children. 119. On 18th March 2026, the ICA emailed the Plaintiff this response and update from the PCA and a translation of the letter from the RPD dated 13th March 2026. It also indicated that it was arranging to have the letter of 12th March 2026, from the Ministry of National Education, translated. This correspondence from the ICA urged the Plaintiff “to continue to engage” with his Polish solicitor “for further details on both the removal attempt by the Regional Court and further proceedings by the Ombudsman [i.e., the RPD] at the Polish Supreme Court. Once any additional information is received, we will update you”. 26 120. On 19th March 2026 the Plaintiff responded to the ICA and to the email and enclosures of 18th March 2026. The Plaintiff stated that there had been “17 failed attempted collections” which he stated that the PCA had omitted to tell them and that he received letters on a weekly basis from the (Polish) District Court stating that “they attend the address and fail to find my missing child. This is now in a never-ending cycle of failure. I wish to clarify that there are no further legal steps available to me, so in direct response to your point about urging me to engage, please feel free to refrain from expressing your views”. 121. The Affidavit of Andrea Wickham Moriarty sworn on 7th April 2026 refers to e-mails sent by the Plaintiff to the RPD and copied to the Irish Embassy in Poland on 13th March 2026. A further email from the Plaintiff on 16th March 2026 refers to the matter coming before me by way of update on 20th March 2026. Ms. Moriarty states that on 18th March 2026, details were provided by the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade for a response to a proposed Parliamentary Question. 122. In her Affidavit sworn on 7th April 2026, Ms. Moriarty avers that the Irish Embassy in Poland continues to seek to engage with relevant counterparts in Poland to emphasise the issues surrounding the operation of the Hague Convention in Poland via the limited diplomatic avenues available to it. She states that the Irish Embassy and other embassies in Poland intend to issue a joint letter highlighting the broader challenges in relation to the Hague Convention in Poland and reference is made to the fact of the Department’s awareness of the decision of the CJEU in Case C-638/22 PPU and that supplemental legal submissions filed on behalf of the State defendants address that decision of the CJEU. 27 123. The apparent translation of a document dated 12th February 2026 furnished at the hearing before me on 20 March 2026 suggests that on 12th February 2026, in reply to correspondence dated 3rd February 2026, the District Court in Pleszew 3rd Department of Family and Juvenile Affairs, records that by decision dated 21st July 2025 issued by the District Court in Pleszew, the Polish police were ordered to ascertain the place of residence of the child and that as of the 9th February 2026, the Polish police had not established the child’s place of residence. The translated document states that a probation officer was unable to find any persons present at the address for CD and EF and no report was made and a similar failure occurred in four scheduled court hearings. An apparent translated internal memorandum dated 2nd February 2026 states that there was no possibility to conduct a community interview regarding the child residing at the address given on the date indicated by the court because the probation officer did not find any person at that address. 124. As mentioned at the beginning of this judgment, the apparent translation of the document dated 13th March 2026 from the RPD to the Plaintiff, and furnished at the hearing before me on 20 March 2026, suggests that the RPD has decided to file an extraordinary appeal (complaint) against the decision ordering the child’s return to Ireland and that pursuant to Article 388(3) of the Polish Code of Civil Procedure, the lodgement of an extraordinary appeal such as this has the effect of suspending the enforcement decision issued under the Hague Convention until such time as the appeal proceedings are concluded. 28 DISCUSSION AND DECISION 125. The legal context for the Plaintiff’s claim is a central consideration. 126. This must be viewed against the circumstances where the Plaintiff has extensively engaged with the Hague Convention process in Poland. 127. To recap, by way of brief overview, in a decision dated 10th October 2024, the Polish Regional Court, on foot of an application brought by the Plaintiff, ordered the return to Ireland of their child after she had been taken by her mother from Ireland to Poland in March 2024. 128. The Court of Appeal in Warsaw on 27th March 2025 dismissed the challenge to this decision (the cassation complaint) brought by CD, the child’s mother. 129. The RPD challenged (by way of cassation complaint) the decision dated 27 th March 2025 of the Court of Appeal in Warsaw. 130. The Supreme Court in the Civil Chamber (composed of a member of the court) in a closed session on 22nd January 2026 refused to accept the cassation complaint from the RPD and also refused AB’s application for costs as against the RPD. 131. By correspondence dated 13th March 2026 from the RPD to the Plaintiff, the RPD has indicated that it has decided to file an extraordinary appeal (complaint) against the decision ordering the child’s return to Ireland and that pursuant to Article 388(3) of the Polish Code of Civil Procedure the lodgement of this extraordinary appeal has the effect of suspending the 29 Return Order issued under the Hague Convention until such time as those appeal proceedings are concluded. The Plaintiff’s claims 132. It is against that context which, in summary, by way of an amended Statement of Claim dated 28th October 2025 (“the claim”), the Plaintiff alleges as follows: (1) the Plaintiff, by way of preliminary pleas at paras 1.1 to 1.3 inter alia pleads that the Defendants (“the Irish Government”) have failed to protect and vindicate the constitutional and Convention rights of his daughter who is an Irish citizen, following her unlawful removal from Ireland to Poland; (2) the Plaintiff, at paras 2.1 to 2.6 of the claim refers to Articles 40.3, 41 and 42A of the Constitution and pleads that the child’s right to family life with him and his right to same with her is a constitutional right and that “those obligations do not cease at the Irish border”; (3) at paras 3.1 to 3.4 of the claim, the Plaintiff refers to the Hague Convention, the 1991 Act and Council Regulation (EU) No. 2019/1111; (4) at paras 4.1 to 4.8 of the claim, the Plaintiff alleges the failure of the Irish State in practice and, for example, refers at para. 4.4 that during the summer of 2025 he made eleven attempts to collect his child, reported his child missing to the police in Poland and co-operated with every authority and was warned that if he attempted to take his daughter home himself, that he would be arrested. He also refers to the RPD intervening on behalf of CD since in or around 23rd December 2024 and he alleges as follows at para. 4.7 of the claim “The Irish Government has made no formal protest, no EU escalation, and no legal representation to challenge this interference. The Irish Government has made no attempts to instigate legal proceedings against my wife, yet 30 I have been summoned to appear in person by a foreign court (Warsaw Court of Appeal) [on] January 31st, 2025, the last time I saw my daughter)” and he alleges at para. 4.8 of the claim that he has been “stripped of my lawful duties to be a father to my child with no visibility of my child’s safety or wellbeing. If anything happens to her during this prolonged delay, I will hold the Irish State fully responsible for its action”; (5) at para. 5, the Plaintiff sets out his reply to the Defendants’ Legal Submissions; (6) at paras. 6.1 to 6.9 of the claim, the Plaintiff sets out a number of legal authorities under the sub-heading “Justiciability and Judicial Oversight” and pleads that the High Court “has jurisdiction and a duty to review the adequacy of the Defendant’s conduct. To hold otherwise would render constitutional and Convention rights meaningless whenever breached abroad…”; (7) the Plaintiff sets out the reliefs sought at paras. 7.1 and 7.2, stating at para. 7.1 “the Plaintiff seeks a Mandatory order directing the Defendants – namely, the Taoiseach, the Minister for Justice, and the Minister for Foreign Affairs – to take all reasonable and necessary steps, as set out in detail below, to secure the immediate enforcement of the Polish Return Order and the safe return of the Plaintiff’s minor child, an Irish citizen, to the State” and 7.2 “Without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing”, the Plaintiff specifically seeks an Order that the Defendants take the following measures, both individually and collectively, within their respective constitutional and statutory powers: (A) Diplomatic Measures (listed at (1) to (10); (B) Legal proceedings to be instituted (listed at B.1(a) to (e), B.2, B.3 and B.4(a) to (f); (C) Domestic Legal and Procedural Measures at sub-paragraphs (1) to (4); (D) Child Welfare and Protection Measures at sub-paragraphs (1) to (4) stating that “These measures are necessary and urgent to ensure that the Irish State discharges its constitutional and international obligations to protect its citizens, vindicate the rights 31 of the child, and secure the effective enforcement of a valid judicial order issued under EU and international law”; at para. 7.2 seeks various declaratory relief; at para. 7.2 the Plaintiff seeks damages for alleged negligence, breach of statutory duty, and breach of constitutional and Convention rights arising from the alleged failure of the Defendants inter alia “to take reasonable steps to secure the prompt return of his child … as required under Irish law, the Constitution, and international treaties binding upon the State. The Plaintiff and his daughter have been separated for 606 days and counting. Each day of that separation deepens the injury to their relationship and to their rights under Articles 40.3, 41 and 42A of the Constitution and Article 8 of the [ECHR] … The Plaintiff’s daughter was only two years old when she was removed. Those first years of life – when a child learns trust, love and security from her parent – can never be repeated. The absence of her father’s daily care and affection during this critical time has inflicted emotional and developmental harm that words cannot adequately express … The cumulative effect of this prolonged ordeal has been the destruction of the father-child relationship, the deprivation of family life, and profound emotional and psychological injury to both father and child”; at paras and sub-paras. 7.4(1) to (7), the Plaintiff seeks the convening of an independent review/panel to inter alia examine “the effectiveness of the Hague Convention and its application in modern life”; at para. 7.5 the Plaintiff seeks interest pursuant to statute; at para. 7.6 the Plaintiff seeks costs; the further or other relief sought by the Plaintiff includes direction to the ICA, reporting obligations on progress and “any orders necessary to vindicate the rights of the Plaintiff and his child”; and (8) at para. 8, the Plaintiff lists the exhibits he is relying upon. 32 133. As with his initial Statement of Claim, therefore, the Plaintiff inter alia alleges that the Irish Government has failed to uphold the right of access of the Plaintiff and his child to each other contrary to Articles 40.3, 41 and 42A of the Constitution; that the Irish Government has failed to protect and/or take reasonable steps to protect the Plaintiff’s and child’s constitutional rights to family life pursuant to Article 41 and 42 of the Constitution; that the Defendants have failed to comply with the Hague Convention and to take “all appropriate measures” to secure the prompt return of his child; that the Defendants have failed to comply with Article 11 Brussels II bis which requires judicial or administrative authorities to act expeditiously and resolve return proceedings within six weeks; and that the Defendants have failed to comply with its obligations under Article 8 of the ECHR. 134. In their Defence delivered on 17th November 2025, the Defendants raise by way of preliminary objections a number of pleas, including that: (i) the exercise of the executive power of the State in connection with its external relations falls within the exclusive power of the Government under Articles 28 and 29 of the Constitution; (ii) except in cases of clear disregard of the provisions of the Constitution, the exercise by the Government of the executive powers of the State in connection with its external relations is not justiciable and/or otherwise amenable to, or appropriate for, review by the Courts (and if invited to do so, the Defendants expressly reserve their right to object); and (iii) the Defendants plead that the Plaintiff has failed to plead any facts suggesting that the Defendants have acted in clear disregard of the Constitution in its exercise of the executive power of the State in relation to the matters arising. 135. At paras 4 to 33 of their Defence, the Defendants set out a full denial seriatim traverse of the claims made in the Plaintiff’s amended Statement of Claim dated 28th October 2025. 33 136. The parties agreed that the determination of these matters would be on the papers without oral evidence, though the Plaintiff represented himself and made both oral and written submissions. International relations: Article 29 of the Irish Constitution 137. Of the provisions of Article 29 of the Constitution dealing with ‘international relations’, the following are most relevant to the issues which arise in the Plaintiff’s action. 138. Article 29.1 of the Constitution provides that “Ireland affirms its devotion to the ideal of peace and friendly co-operation amongst nations founded on international justice and morality.” 139. Article 29.2 of the Constitution provides that “Ireland affirms its adherence to the principle of the pacific settlement of international disputes by international arbitration or judicial determination.” 140. Article 29.3 of the Constitution provides that “Ireland accepts the generally recognised principles of international law as its rule of conduct in its relations with other States.” 141. Article 29.4.1º of the Constitution provides that “The executive power of the State in or in connection with its external relations shall in accordance with Article 28 of this Constitution be exercised by or on the authority of the Government.” (In a similar format, Article 28.2 of the Constitution provides that “The executive power of the State shall, subject to the provisions of this Constitution, be exercised by or on the authority of the Government.”) 142. Article 29.4.2º of the Constitution provides that “For the purpose of the exercise of any executive function of the State in or in connection with its external relations, the Government 34 may to such extent and subject to such conditions, if any, as may be determined by law, avail of or adopt any organ, instrument, or method of procedure used or adopted for the like purpose by the members of any group or league of nations with which the State is or becomes associated for the purpose of international co-operation in matters of common concern.” 143. Insofar as the application of the Hague Convention in Ireland is concerned, at paras 158 to 162 of his judgment in Nottinghamshire County Council v KB [2011] IESC 48, [2013] 4 I.R. 662 (“Nottinghamshire CC”), O’Donnell J. (as he then was) described its effect in Irish law, as follows: “[158] The Hague Convention itself was adopted in 1980. Ireland decided to adhere to the Convention by decision of the Government made pursuant to its obligation to conduct the external relations of the country under Article 29.4 of the Constitution. The Convention in turn became part of Irish domestic law as envisaged by Article 29.5 by the enactment of legislation in the shape of the Child Abduction and Enforcement of Custody Orders Act 1991. The process of adherence to the Convention and ratification within Ireland was preceded by a comprehensive report recommending such course issued by the Law Reform Commission then chaired by Mr. Justice Walsh. In my view it is not insignificant that both of the other organs of Government have endorsed the provisions of the Convention which clearly enjoys the presumption of constitutionality.[Underlining/Emphasis added in this judgment] [159] In due course, the compatibility of the Convention with the Constitution was challenged, unsuccessfully, in ACW v Ireland [1994] 3 I.R. 232 where Keane, J. dismissed the claim inter alia on the grounds that Article 20 of the Convention afforded adequate protection to the fundamental rights and freedoms set out in Articles 40-44 of the Constitution. 35 [160] It is not difficult to see why the provisions of the Convention incorporated in Irish law were found compatible with the Constitution. The Convention provides a mechanism for the speedy return to the jurisdiction of the Irish Courts of children habitually resident in this jurisdiction – something which the Irish Courts could not readily enforce by virtue of their own powers alone, or by virtue of the comity of courts. More generally, the Convention recognises that decisions on the future care and custody of children are best made by the courts of their habitual residence which will normally have an understanding of the culture, conventions, mores and norms of the society in which the children (and in all probability their parents and relatives) have been resident. Childcare decisions are rarely straight forward and these nuances can be particularly important. Furthermore, the courts of the habitual residence of the child will have the additional benefit of reports and evidence from that country’s social care system as well as familiarity with, and understanding of, the system producing such reports. [161] The Convention also recognises that child abduction is a scourge which can cause untold distress to children and their parents and moreover, that it can be encouraged, or at least facilitated, by the uncertainties and delays that are an unavoidable feature of all legal systems. There is a strong belief that a court seeks to make its own determination as to the best interests of the child. In ordinary cases this does not pose any problem. It is different however in cases where a child is removed to a new jurisdiction. While there may be cases where it is possible to believe, at least at the level of principle, that a court to whose jurisdiction the child has been brought may be able to make just as good if not better decisions in relation to the care of the child than a court in whose jurisdiction the child may have resided perhaps only fleetingly, this theoretical possibility comes at a price that is too high to pay: the 36 certainty that if the issue is raised and discretion given to the requested Court to make its own determination on the custody or care of the child, that all or nearly all cases can become mired in delay, which from the perspective of the child, can be devastating. Furthermore, the chance that a court might find that after the passage of time the child’s interests are now to stay in a situation where it has put down roots, creates an incentive for child removal, and gives the appearance of rewarding a parent for wrongful behaviour. [162] To this problem of the legal process the Hague Convention provides a legal solution. It was a remarkable achievement to persuade the countries participating in the Convention to accept the fundamental principle of speedy return of a child brought (wrongfully) to the jurisdiction of the court and without permitting that court to itself ascertain what it considered was in the best interests of the child. The Convention also embodies the salutary principle that a person who wrongfully removes a child from a jurisdiction should not obtain by default the benefit of that conduct. However, it is very doubtful that it would have been possible to achieve agreement on an absolute rule of immediate return which was incapable of adjustment in the particular circumstances of the case. Accordingly, the Convention provides for very limited exceptions to the principle of immediate child return. Under Article 13 it is possible for the requested court to refuse to return the child where there has been acquiescence or where there is a grave risk of physical or psychological harm or where the child would otherwise be placed in an intolerable situation. Article 20, as we have seen, permits the refusal of the return of a child when that would not be permitted by the fundamental principles of the requested State’s constitutional provisions.” (see also Z v S [2025] IECA 141; A.X. v R.X. [2025] IEHC 431; see generally, Cormac Corrigan SC, The Law of Child Abduction in Ireland (Clarus Press, 2025)). 37 144. The giving effect to, or enforcement of, the Return Order in the circumstances of the Plaintiff’s case is a matter for the Polish authorities pursuant to the Hague Convention. 145. Lord Browne-Wilkinson in In re H (Minors) (Abduction: Acquiescence) [1998] A.C. 72, at p. 87 has, for example, observed that “[a]n international convention, expressed in different languages and intended to apply to a wide range of differing legal systems, cannot be construed differently in different jurisdictions. The Convention must have the same meaning and effect under the laws of all contracting states”: (see the reference to this quoted extract by Lord Bingham, “Widening Horizons, the influence of comparative law and international law on domestic law”, The Hamlyn Lectures, 2010, at p. 33). 146. In this regard, Article 2 of the Hague Convention obliges contracting states to take all appropriate measures “within their territories” to achieve the implementation of the objects of the Convention. The Defendants, including the ICA, are not empowered to direct the Polish authorities in the manner contended for by the Plaintiff and in consequence, for the reasons set out in this judgment, he is not entitled to the reliefs sought in this action. 147. Further, the Superior Courts in Ireland have continually recognised that the conduct of international relations is carried out by the executive branch of government, which includes the defendants to this action. 148. In Costello v Government of Ireland and Others [2022] IESC 44 (“Costello”), Hogan J. observed as follows at para. 28 of his judgment: 38 “It is true, of course, that the conduct of international relations is committed generally by Article 29 of the Constitution to the executive branch of government. The power to make treaties is a matter in the first instance for the executive as Article 29.5.1 itself makes clear. Diplomacy is generally conducted by and with the governments of other nation states. The conduct of foreign affairs more often yields to the necessities of pragmatism and Realpolitik than the dispassionate, principles-based approach which is the lodestar of judging. Matters such as treaty-making, State recognition, diplomacy and the practical realities of policy making and the day-to-day relations with other States are quite obviously committed to the Government to determine. The precepts of international law – to which Article 29 itself makes several references – are, of course, traditionally the concern of nation states rather than individuals.” 149. In terms, therefore, of the diplomatic and consular assistance provided to the Plaintiff by the Irish authorities, which has been summarised earlier in this judgment, the Plaintiff is not entitled to orders from the High Court augmenting or directing the services provided. It is that issue which I now address. Diplomatic and Consular Relations 150. In this regard, an important aspect of the practical functioning of international law and the peaceful conduct of relations as between sovereign States concerns relations between states and their official representatives. 151. A central aspect of this is the conferring of certain privileges and immunities in international and domestic law. An example of this, and of the operation of the executive power of the Government (and also the legislative power), can be seen in the ratification of treaties. 39 152. Of relevance to the issues which arise in this case, for example, is the ratification by Ireland in May 1967 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations 1961 and the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations 1963. The ratification of these important conventions was effected by first the enactment of the Diplomatic Relations and Immunities Act 1967-2017 (“the 1967 Act”) in May 1967 and, second, consequent upon the enactment of this legislation, the deposition by Ireland of its instruments of ratification with the UN Secretary General, also in May 1967. 153. In Kelly: The Irish Constitution (Fifth Edition, 2018), at para [5.3.131], p. 632, the learned authors refer to the decision in Hutchinson v Minister for Justice [1993] 3 I.R. 567, [1993] I.L.R.M. 602 and observe that “The ultimate supremacy of the executive in relation to the conduct of foreign affairs is reflected in the fact that the power of the courts to review executive action in this context does not encompass a power to direct the executive to ratify an international agreement.” 154. Earlier, in O’Brien v Ireland [1995] 1 I.R. 568, the High Court (O’Hanlon J.) observed that the 1967 Act had incorporated into Irish law the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations. 155. Thus, the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations 1961 and the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations 1963 were both given the force of law in Ireland by s. 5(1) of the 1967 Act (in relation to diplomatic relations) and by s. 6(1) of the 1967 Act (in relation to consular relations): see reference by the High Court (Hogan J.) in Wicklow County Council v Fortune [2012] IEHC 406; Kelly, The Irish Constitution (Second Ed., 1984) at p. 192. (In England and 40 Wales, the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations 1961 was incorporated into law by the Diplomatic Privileges Act 1964). 156. Article 41(1) of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations 1961 as set out in the First Schedule to the 1967 Act provides that “Without prejudice to their privileges and immunities, it is the duty of all persons enjoying such privileges and immunities to respect the laws and regulations of the receiving State. They also have a duty not to interfere in the internal affairs of that State.” 157. Similarly, Articles 55(1),(2) and (3) of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations 1963, as set out in the Second Schedule to the 1967 Act, provides for “[r]espect for the laws and regulations of the receiving State” with Article 55(1) of that Convention providing that “[w]ithout prejudice to their privileges and immunities, it is the duty of all persons enjoying such privileges and immunities to respect the laws and regulations of the receiving State. They also have a duty not to interfere in the internal affairs of that State.” 158. In terms of consular and diplomatic language, Ireland is the “sending State” and Poland is the “receiving State” under the Conventions. 159. Article 5 of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations 1963 provides for consular functions which includes at Article 5(h) “safeguarding, within the limits imposed by the laws and regulations of the receiving State, the interests of minors and other persons lacking full capacity who are nationals of the sending State, particularly where any guardianship or trusteeship is required with respect to such persons.” 41 160. Insofar as the consular and diplomatic relations between government officials of Ireland and Poland are concerned, both states have agreed not to interfere in the internal affairs of the other state. Practically, as is borne out in the evidence adduced in this action, the Defendants cannot seek to direct the internal affairs of the Polish authorities and vice versa. As the evidence in this case confirms the Irish consular officials have at all times sought to progress the Plaintiff’s case within consular and diplomatic channels that are open to them in accordance with Ireland’s international obligations. 161. By analogy, whilst the exercise of certain prerogative powers of the UK (outside those now regulated by legislation) are justiciable, including R v Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, ex p. Everett [1989] QB 811 which concerned the refusal of passports, in R v Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, ex p. Butt (1999) 116 ILR 607 Lightman J. observed at para. 12 (p. 615) that “[t]he general rule is well established that the courts should not interfere in the conduct of foreign relations by the Executive, most particularly, where such interference is likely to have foreign policy repercussions (see R v Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, ex p. Everett [1989] 1 QB 811 at 820). This extends to decisions whether or not to seek to persuade a foreign government to take any action or remind a foreign government of any international obligation (e.g. to respect human rights) which it has assumed.” 162. In Reyes v Al-Malki and Anor [2017] UKSC 61; [2019] AC 735 the UK Supreme Court held that the immunity conferred on diplomatic agents and their families under that Convention came to an end when the diplomatic agent leaves his post. 42 163. In R (on the application of Bancoult) v Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs (No. 3) [2018] UKSC 3; [2018] 1 WLR 973 (“Bancoult”) the appellant was the chair of the Chagos Refugees Group, representing former residents of the Chagos Archipelago in the British Indian Overseas Territory who were removed and resettled elsewhere by the UK government between 1971 and 1973 and were prevented from returning. 164. In Bancoult, the appellant wanted to ‘put in evidence’ a document purporting to be a confidential diplomatic cable, published by WikiLeaks, from the United States embassy in the United Kingdom to the US federal government in Washington. The UK Supreme Court unanimously held that the cable should have been admissible in evidence before the Administrative Court. The confidentiality and inviolability of diplomatic correspondence depended not on its subject-matter or contents, but on its status as part of the archives or documents and official correspondence of a diplomatic mission, protected by Articles 24 and 27(2) of the United Nations Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations 1961. Lord Sumption, at para. 69 explained that: “It has been recognised ever since Vattel (Droit des Gens, Bk IV, 123), the first writer to deal with the question, that the basis of the rule of international law is that the confidentiality of diplomatic papers and correspondence is necessary to an ambassador’s ability to perform his functions of communicating with the sovereign who sent him and reporting on conditions in the country to which he is posted.” [The reference to Vattel is to Emmerich de Vattel, The Law of Nations (1758)]. 165. The facts of AB’s case confirm that such consular and diplomatic assistance which could have been given in this difficult case, has been – and is currently being – provided to the Plaintiff. 43 Accordingly, the Plaintiff is not entitled to any relief as against the Defendants insofar as the provision of diplomatic and consular assistance is concerned. 166. In this action, the Plaintiff also seeks relief in the context of the conduct of the executive power of the State in relation to foreign affairs or external relations. 167. In Burke v The Minister for Education and Skills [2022] IESC 1, [2022] 1 ILRM 73 (“Burke”) O’Donnell C.J. reviewed the caselaw which had applied the “clear disregard” standard since its establishment in Boland v An Taoiseach [1974] I.R. 338 (“Boland”) (see also paras 57 to 61 of the judgment of O’Donnell C.J. in Costello v The Government of Ireland & Ors [2022] IESC 44 (“Costello”). 168. In Burke, the Supreme Court determined that the decision of the Calculated Grades Executive Office (a non-statutory executive office in the Department of Education and Skills) that it would not be possible to award the applicants with calculated grades under the Calculated Grades System introduced during the Covid-19 pandemic for the Leaving Certificate of 2020 was an impermissible interference with the constitutional freedom of the family to provide education in the home as provided for in Article 42.2 of the Constitution. 169. The Supreme Court (as per the judgment of O’Donnell C.J. at para. 61) held that in circumstances where it was claimed that the personal rights of the citizen were infringed by the government, there was no justification for applying a ‘clear disregard test’ and the courts must uphold the Constitution by applying the same standards as would apply in cases where it is alleged that those rights had been infringed by the actions of the legislative branch of government. 44 170. The facts of the Burke case are, of course, not an analogous situation to that which applies in the Plaintiff’s case. Further, in the circumstances of the Plaintiff’s case, whilst he has sought to invoke the provisions of the Constitution, including Articles 40.3, 41 and 42A in the context of seeking to argue that the Defendants have failed to vindicate his and his child’s rights by failing to reunite them, I have determined that no such failure has arisen. The Plaintiff is, in my view, not entitled – and there is no constitutional basis – to obtain orders of the court directing the Government Defendants to take the steps outlined in his Amended Statement of Claim directed to the Polish authorities in seeking the immediate return of his child to Ireland. Having regard to the facts of this case, the Plaintiff is not entitled to judicial remedies in this action which seek to direct the Irish Government to intervene in the jurisdiction of another contracting (and sovereign) state. 171. Insofar as the clear disregard test is concerned in Burke, at para. 51, O’Donnell C.J. stated as follows: “However, the specific enumeration of certain matters in the Constitution concerning the exercise of power by the executive, if viewed in isolation, would not give a true picture of the executive power under the Constitution and the approach the Constitution takes to it. Some of the most important functions of Government are not subject to detailed or, indeed, in some cases, any regulation. External relations of the State is a classic area of executive function, and might indeed be said to be captured by the general provisions of Article 28.2, but the express terms of Article 29.4 repeat and emphasise the fact that the Government, and not the legislature or the judiciary, is to conduct the foreign affairs of the State. The Constitution says little enough in concrete terms as to how the external affairs of the State should be conducted other 45 than stating that Ireland affirms its devotion to the ideal of peaceful and friendly cooperation, and the principle of pacific settlement of international disputes, and accepts the general principles of international law. These are not bright-line constraints on Government, and the Government has, by and large, been able to conduct the foreign affairs of the State without much scrutiny by judicial decisions, as indeed the Constitution intended.” 172. In Burke, at paras 57 to 61, O’Donnell C.J. drew a distinction between proceedings in which it was contended that the exercise of the executive power, whether external or internal, infringed the constitutional rights of a citizen, and those cases in which the claim was made that the Government was exceeding its proper role under the Constitution. The clear disregard standard was appropriate and correct in the latter context, but not in the former. O’Donnell C.J., referring to Crotty v An Taoiseach [1987] I.R. 713 and McKenna v An Taoiseach (No. 2) [1995] 2 I.R. 10, observed inter alia at para. 57 as follows: “It was entirely logical, therefore, that the Court should find that the power of the Court to intervene in such circumstances would, in a field such as foreign relations, only arise where it could be said that the executive was acting in “clear disregard” of what the Constitution either expressly said, or necessarily implied.” 173. At para. 60, for example, O’Donnell C.J. observed that “[t]hese cases illustrate circumstances where the courts have been called on to review the actions of the Government in different spheres, where it is contended the Government has failed to act in accordance with the express or implied mandates of the Constitution, and have held that the court may only interfere in an exercise of power consigned by the Constitution to the Government where there has been clear disregard of such express or implied mandate.” 46 174. Having regard to the circumstances of this case, the Defendants in their actions have not acted in disregard, still less in clear disregard, of any of the provisions of the Constitution, including under Articles 28 and 29 of the Constitution. Constitutional rights outside of the State 175. At a general level, a similar argument to that raised by the Plaintiff in this case concerning the circumstances of when acts or circumstances outside of Ireland can raise possible arguments involving the provisions of the Irish Constitution were addressed in the judgment of O’Donnell J. (as he then was) in Nottinghamshire CC (judgments were delivered by O’Donnell J. and John Murray J.). 176. The facts of Nottinghamshire CC involved married parents who had removed two children from England to Ireland where they were brought into the care of the HSE. At the time of their removal, Nottinghamshire County Council had brought proceedings relating to the care and custody of the children. Neither the parents nor the children had any prior connection with Ireland. 177. Nottinghamshire County Council brought an application seeking the return of the children to the jurisdiction of England and Wales. The parents resisted an order for the return of the children and contended on the basis that, if returned, the children would be liable to be adopted, against their (the parents’) wishes in circumstances which would not be permissible in Ireland because of the rights of the family protected by Articles 41 and 42 of the Irish Constitution: see the summary of the facts as outlined C.T. v P.S. [2021] IECA 132 (Faherty J., Maurice 47 Collins J. and Pilkington J.; at para. 69 per Collins J.). The Supreme Court held that there was no breach of the Constitution in making the return order sought. 178. The case involved Article 20 of the Hague Convention which provides that “[t]he return of the child under the provisions of Article 12 may be refused if this would not be permitted by the fundamental principles of the requested State relating to the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms.” 179. O’Donnell J. observed that Article 13 of the Hague Convention prescribed a limited exception to the rule that a child be returned swiftly whereas Article 20 of the Convention did not create an exception but rather recognised one. Therefore, a court in a Contracting State may not order the return of a child if such an order was not permitted by the constitutional order of that State. 180. Adopting the observations of O’Donnell J. at para. 163 of the reported judgment, it was held that Article 20 of the Hague Convention “provided a mechanism whereby the necessary flexibility is built into the Convention to avoid a conflict between the international obligations imposed by the Convention, and the dictates of the domestic constitution”: see also the decision of the High Court in I.F. v J.G. [2023] IEHC 495 and the observations of Gearty J. at para 9.2. 181. In Nottinghamshire CC, O’Donnell J., at paras 206 to 208 of his judgment, observed as follows: “[206] It seems plain however, that the Irish Constitution does not demand the imposition of Irish constitutional standards upon other countries or require that those countries adopt our standards as a price for interaction with us. First and most obviously, the Constitution simply does not say so. Indeed, it might be expected that 48 such a sensitive issue would be dealt with i