ACE Autobody Limited -V- Motorpark Limited & Ors

Final but unapproved No redaction required AN CHÚIRT UACHTARACH THE SUPREME COURT S:AP:IE:2024:000075 [2026] IESC [ 19 ] Woulfe J. Murray J. Collins J. Donnelly J. BETWEEN ACE AUTOBODY LIMITED Plaintiff/Respondent AND MOTORPARK LIMITED, BRECOL LIMITED AND JDM AUTOMOTIVE LIMITED Defendants/Appellants RULING OF THE COURT ON COSTS Delivered on 23 March 2026 PRELIMINARY 1. The Court gave judgment on this appeal on 18 February 2026 ([2026] IESC 9). For the reasons set out in the judgment of Collins J (Dunne, Murray and Donnelly JJ agreeing; Woulfe J agreeing in part and dissenting in part), the Court allowed the appeal brought by the Defendants (for convenience referred to here as “Motorpark”) and set aside the Order made by the Court of Appeal. 2. The Court gave the parties the opportunity to file submissions on the issue of costs and they have since done so. This is the Court’s Ruling on that issue. It should be read with the judgments delivered on the substantive appeal which set out in detail the factual background to the proceedings, the procedural history, the nature of the issues in dispute and this Court’s conclusions on those issues. 3. Briefly, ACE sued Motorpark asserting an entitlement to a 10-year lease. Motorpark defended that claim and also counterclaimed for a declaration that ACE had no estate, interest, right or title in or over the disputed premises and also sought an injunction requiring ACE to vacate the premises. The High Court (Owens J) dismissed both ACE’s claim and Motorpark’s counterclaim. Importantly, Owens J found that, although ACE was not entitled to a 10-year lease, it was not a mere licensee (as Motorpark asserted) but was instead a contractual tenant from year to year. 4. Owens J directed ACE to pay Motorpark the costs of its claim and directed Motorpark to pay ACE the costs of its counterclaim. He made no order for costs in relation to Page 2 of 9 ACE’s application for an interlocutory injunction or in respect of reserved or discovery costs. 5. ACE appealed to the Court of Appeal from the dismissal of its claim and Motorpark cross-appealed against the High Court’s finding that ACE was a yearly tenant. The Court of Appeal allowed ACE’s appeal and dismissed Motorpark’s cross-appeal. It set aside the costs order made in the High Court and awarded ACE its costs in the High Court (including all reserved costs) and its costs of the appeal. 6. Motorpark appealed the Court of Appeal’s finding that ACE was entitled to a 10-year lease to this Court. It did not, however, seek to maintain a challenge to the High Court’s finding that ACE was in occupation of the disputed premises as a yearly tenant. Motorpark was entirely successful in its appeal. Page 3 of 9 THE PARTIES’ SUBMISSIONS ON COSTS Motorpark’s Submissions 7. Motorpark says that the “pre-eminent issue” throughout the proceedings has been ACE’s claim to a 10-year lease, a claim squarely rejected by this Court. According to Motorpark, the weight of evidence, legal argument and costs have been directed to that issue. The issue of a periodic tenancy was never argued for by ACE and, according to Motorpark, the fact that ACE is still in possession (and has a prima facie entitlement to a new tenancy) is of little or no relevance for the purposes of adjudicating on the costs. Any such entitlement arises, it says, from the Landlord and Tenant (Amendment) Act 1980 and is extraneous to the appeal 8. Motorpark seeks its costs of the appeal before this Court. It was, it says, “entirely successful” in that appeal and its costs should be dealt with in accordance with section 169(1) of the Legal Services Regulation Act 2015. Motorpark says that nothing in Little v Chief Appeals Officer [2024] IESC 53 suggests otherwise. 9. As regards the Court of Appeal costs, Motorpark suggests that the most straightforward course may be for it to have the costs of ACE’s appeal with ACE getting the costs of the cross-appeal, though (it also says) it is arguable that no order should be made on the cross-appeal given that ACE obtained a valuable occupancy entitlement in the period pending the appeal to this Court and that the cross-appeal occupied relatively little time in the Court of Appeal and might not have proceeded at all but for ACE’s appeal. Page 4 of 9 10. Finally, in respect of the costs of the High Court, Motorpark re-iterates that ACE never made a claim to a periodic tenancy. Owens J had dismissed both the claim and the counterclaim and costs had effectively followed the event as regards both claim and counterclaim. Such an order was one which the High Court Judge was clearly entitled to make in the exercise of his discretion and Motorpark urges this Court to re-instate that order. ACE’s Submissions 11. While ACE acknowledges that Motorpark has been entirely successful in this Court, it nonetheless contends that no order for costs should be made in favour of either party in respect of the costs in any court (though in fact it later appears to advocate for the re- instatement of the High Court order, varied to include an order for the costs of the injunction application in its favour). It emphasises that it was Motorpark’s demand for possession that gave rise to the proceedings, as well as the fact that ACE’s entitlement to remain in possession (and to pursue a new tenancy) is unaffected by the decision of this Court on the appeal. It also says that the appeal before this court involved important issues relating to the law of contract and the role of equitable estoppel in commercial transactions and claims that Motorpark’s “significant change of position” on the periodic tenancy issue significantly impacted on the scope and focus of the appeal. ACE relies on those factors to submit that no order for costs should be made in respect of the costs in this Court. As for the Court of Appeal, ACE effectively suggests that the costs Page 5 of 9 of the appeal and of the cross-appeal cancel one another out and that no order should be made. Page 6 of 9 DECISION 12. Motorpark was entirely successful in its appeal to this Court. Prima facie, it is entitled to the costs of the appeal: section 169(1) of the 2015 Act. It is, of course open to the Court to order otherwise having regard to the particular nature and circumstances of the case and the conduct of the proceedings but the Court is not persuaded that there is any basis for departing from the default or presumptive position here. The fact that the appeal raised issues of general public importance is not, in itself, a basis for departing from the general rule. So much is clear from Little v Chief Appeals Officer, §46. This was a commercial dispute between private commercial actors and in the Court’s view, the costs of the appeal to this Court should follow the event in the ordinary way. That conclusion is not altered by the fact that Motorpark elected not to challenge the finding of a periodic tenancy in this Court. It elected to focus on the Court of Appeal’s findings that ACE was entitled to a 10-year tenancy and, having persuaded the Court that the Court of Appeal was in error, costs follow in the ordinary way. 13. However, in the Court’s view the position regarding the costs of the High Court and of the Court of Appeal is different. The immediate catalyst for the proceedings was Motorpark’s assertion of an entitlement to immediate vacant possession of the disputed premises, on the basis that ACE was not a tenant and was a mere licensee. Motorpark counterclaimed for a declaration to that effect and for an order requiring ACE to vacate. That claim failed in the High Court. While ACE may not have claimed to be a periodic tenant, and while that fell short of the status that it asserted in the proceedings (that of tenant pursuant to and/or with an entitlement to a 10-year lease), the High Court’s Page 7 of 9 finding that it was a yearly tenant was nonetheless a significant benefit for it. That is illustrated by the fact that Motorpark clearly considered it appropriate to pursue a cross- appeal from that finding. It is not appropriate to speculate whether, absent an appeal by ACE, such a cross-appeal would have been pursued. The fact is that such a cross-appeal was pursued and was unsuccessful. 14. As a result of bringing these proceedings ACE has obtained a significant benefit. It has been found to have been a periodic tenant and, on the basis of its occupation of the disputed premises in that capacity for five years, has applied for (and is prima facie entitled to) a new tenancy under Part II of the Landlord and Tenant (Amendment) Act 1980. In the Court’s view, it is wholly unrealistic to suggest that the fact that ACE remains in possession of the premises is extraneous to these proceedings. Motorpark sought to persuade the High Court that ACE had no interest in the premises and ought to be ordered to vacate forthwith. That issue was determined against Motorpark and that determination (which Motorpark appealed unsuccessfully to the Court of Appeal) was the basis on which the entitlement to apply for a new tenancy arose. 15. In these circumstances, it appears to the Court that, although ultimately unsuccessful in its fundamental contention that it was entitled to a 10-year lease, ACE has obtained something of real value from the proceedings. That being so, the Court considers that the appropriate order to make in relation to both the High Court and the Court of Appeal proceedings is that there should be no order for costs in favour of either party. Page 8 of 9 16. The Court will therefore (1) set aside the costs order made by the Court of Appeal; (2) direct ACE to pay Motorpark the costs of the appeal to this Court, such costs to be subject to adjudication in default of agreement and (3) make no other order in respect of the costs of these proceedings. Page 9 of 9