Minister For Justice, Home Affairs and Migration v Radu Carp

THE HIGH COURT Record No. 2025 279 EXT [2026] IEHC 262 BETWEEN MINISTER FOR JUSTICE, HOME AFFAIRS AND MIGRATION APPLICANT AND RADU CARP RESPONDENT JUDGMENT delivered by Mr. Justice Sean Gillane on 29 April 2026 Introduction 1. This is an application for the surrender of the respondent to Hungary (“the issuing state”), pursuant to section 16 of the European Arrest Warrant Act 2003 (“the 2003 Act”), on foot of a European Arrest Warrant (“the warrant”) issued by the Tribunal Court of Veszprém on the 17th of October 2025. 2. The warrant was issued by a judicial authority in the issuing state. 3. The respondent’s surrender is sought for the purpose of having him serve the remainder of a three-year prison sentence imposed on him by the Ajka District Court on the 28th of July 2021. 4. Part C of the warrant indicated that the remaining part of the sentence to be served is a period of 2 years, 11 months and 27 days. As will be seen in this judgment, this period is incorrect. 5. The respondent was arrested on foot of an SIS alert, pursuant to section 14 of the 2003 Act, and brought before this Court on the 4th of November 2025. The warrant was produced to the Court on the 13th of November 2025. 6. The respondent is a Moldovan national and objects to his surrender. 7. A notice of objection was filed on the 3rd of December 2025, pursuant to Order 98, Rule 5 of the Rules of the Superior Courts 1986. 8. The notice indicated that the respondent required proof of all matters necessary to ground an order for his surrender to the issuing state and included a specific point of objection relating to the conditions of detention in the issuing state. There was also a general reservation of rights in respect of any other points of objection that may be “grounded in affidavit evidence.” 9. A request for further information pursuant to section 20 of the 2003 Act was made on the 31st of December 2025 and a response was sent on the 9th of January 2026. The matter came before me on the 21st of January 2026. A further request for information was made on the 23rd of January 2026 and a reply was sent on the 30th of January 2026. Assurances in relation to prison conditions were sent on the 3rd of February 2026. 2 10. The matter resumed hearing before me on the 13th of February 2026. On that same date, further information was sent by the issuing state to which I will return below. Background 11. Part D of the warrant indicates that the respondent appeared in person at the trial resulting in his conviction. The warrant indicates at Part E that the sentence in question was imposed for one count of the offence of people smuggling, described as a felony, contrary to the Criminal Code of Hungary. 12. In relation to the ‘tick box’ offences as provided for under the European Council Framework Decision dated the 13th of June 2002 on the European Arrest Warrant and the Surrender Procedures Between Member States (“Framework Decision”), the offence ticked is “trafficking in human beings.” 13. Part E of the warrant, which contains a detailed description of the circumstances in which the offence was committed, clearly indicates that the offence involved assisting Afghan nationals who had crossed the state border of Hungary from the direction of Serbia without valid travel documents for the purpose of travelling to Austria. 14. The respondent swore an affidavit on the 31st of December 2025. In that affidavit, he asserted that he was imprisoned in Hungary for the offence on the warrant from the 26th of July 2021 to the 21st of April 2023, having spent two days in police detention from the 26th to the 28th of July 2021, and therefore disputed the claim in Part C of the warrant in relation to the amount of time he had left to serve. 3 15. The respondent also averred that the sentencing judge had ordered his deportation from Hungary immediately following his release from prison and his exclusion from Hungary for a period of six years. He said that he was granted early release on that basis on the 21st of April 2023 and asserted that his sentence had therefore concluded on that date. 16. The respondent said that approximately six to eight weeks prior to his release, he was informed of the possibility of early release. He said that he understood that his release had been “catalysed” on account of prison overcrowding and the fact that he was to be subject to immediate deportation and a six-year exclusion order. 17. The respondent said that he was first taken to an assembly room within the prison with a number of other foreign prisoners and then to a smaller room where there was a television link to an official who he assumed to be a senior prison, police or prosecution officer. He said that he was assisted by an interpreter but not by a defence lawyer and that he was told that he was to be released subject to his immediate deportation and exclusion from Hungary for a period of six years. 18. The respondent said that he was told on the evening of the 20th of April 2023 that he would be released the following day on the condition that he could arrange transport to immediately leave Hungary and that he was permitted to call a friend to make that arrangement. He said that he was collected the following day by a friend and driven first to Romania and then to Moldova. 4 19. The respondent said that, thereafter, he travelled to Ireland to join his mother and brother and arrived in this country on the 2nd of May 2023. 20. At paragraph 11 of his affidavit, the respondent said: “For the avoidance of doubt, I was assisted by a State appointed lawyer at the court hearing two days after my arrest and police detention. I was given his name on the date of my arrest but had no contact with him until just before the hearing. I had a consultation of very short duration: approximately two minutes. I pleaded guilty and was sentenced. I was not assisted or advised by a lawyer at any later stage. I was assisted by an interpreter in court. I was not ordered or advised as to any probation service requirements conditional upon my release, other than the conditional requirement of expulsion from Hungary for a period of 6 years.” 21. The respondent exhibited a number of documents, to include a document entitled “Certificate on legal residence outside a penal institution” which appears to indicate that he had submitted a request for the suspension of his imprisonment. 22. A further document was exhibited that appears to be a decision from the National Directorate General of Immigration, which stated that the respondent “requested the transfer of the execution of the prison sentence based on (1.12) of 3/2023, government decree, as well as the suspension of the execution of the prison sentence, which was authorised.” 5 23. In the same affidavit, the respondent made a somewhat generic reference to prison conditions in the issuing state. He said that he provided detailed instructions to his solicitor in relation to the conditions of detention that he experienced and that he verified the contents of a draft affidavit to be sworn by his solicitor in relation to prison conditions in the issuing state. 24. After the respondent’s affidavit was filed, Burns J. directed that a request for further information be made to the issuing judicial authority on the 31st of December 2025. 25. The respondent’s solicitor swore a short affidavit in respect of prison conditions in the issuing state on the 21st of January 2026 and exhibited copies of the following documents: • The Council of Europe’s C.P.T. report dated the 16th of December 2025 and published after their ad hoc visit to Hungary; • The Council of Europe’s C.P.T. report dated the 3rd of December 2024 and published after their periodic visit to Hungary; • The submission of the Hungarian Helsinki Committee to the C.P.T. dated March 2025; • The submission of the Hungarian Helsinki Committee to the UN Special Rapporteur on Torture dated the 22nd of September 2025. 26. Arising out of a consideration of those exhibits, further information and assurances in respect of prison conditions were sought from the issuing judicial authority on the 23rd of January 2026. 6 The Further Information 27. On the 9th of January 2026, the issuing judicial authority acknowledged that the respondent had been held in custody from the 26th to the 28th of July 2021 and that the period spent in custody had been “credited towards the duration of the custodial sentence by the Ajka District Court.” It was also indicated that the period to be credited towards the duration of the custodial sentence extends from the 26th of July 2021 to the 25th of April 2023. 28. The issuing judicial authority stated that the respondent had been informed by the sentence enforcement unit of the Regional Court that if the Moldovan judicial authority refused to take over enforcement of his sentence, the suspension of enforcement would be lifted. This was the basis for the issuance of the Hungarian arrest warrant. 29. The issuing judicial authority also enclosed an English translation of Government Decree 3/2023 (“the Decree”). This is a provision that appears to permit the transfer of sentences imposed in Hungary on persons of non-Hungarian nationality to other states for the purpose of execution. It is a condition of the transfer of execution that “the foreign sentenced person consents to the execution of the custodial sentence in another State.” Section 10 of the Decree provides that if the execution of the custodial sentence is not taken over by the other state, Hungary will retain jurisdiction to enforce the sentence. 30. On the 30th of January 2026, the issuing judicial authority confirmed a number of matters. In the first instance, it was confirmed that having regard to the period to be 7 credited in respect of the three-year sentence of imprisonment imposed on the respondent, the remaining sentence to be served was 1 year, 3 months and 1 day. 31. It was indicated that pursuant to the Decree and in circumstances where certain conditions are met, a convicted person had the possibility to “interrupt the enforcement of imprisonment” and request the Ministry of Justice to transfer the remaining sentence to the state of the convicted person’s citizenship. 32. After such “interruption”, the convicted person would be required to leave Hungary and reside at the place indicated by him. The convicted person is required to co-operate with the authority of the other state and appear as requested to serve the prison term. If it transpired that the other state did not take over enforcement, the National Penitentiary Department shall immediately enforce the imprisonment and an arrest warrant could be issued. 33. It was indicated that in this case, the required conditions were satisfied and the enforcement of imprisonment was “interrupted at the convict’s request.” After receipt of the respondent’s request, the penitentiary judge interrogated him and released him from prison on the 25th of April 2023. It was stated that the respondent consented to the enforcement of his imprisonment in Moldova. 34. It was stated that, with the assistance of an interpreter, the respondent was informed of these matters, the nature of consent and the conditions of release by the penitentiary judge on the 20th of February 2023. Minutes were taken of the hearing and it was indicated that the respondent had signed the minutes after translation. 8 35. The issuing judicial authority also provided these minutes to the Court. 36. The minutes reflect the attendance of the penitentiary judge, the respondent and an interpreter and record that the respondent accepted the interpreter and understood what the interpreter was saying. The minutes record that the penitentiary judge explained “the request for the suspension of the execution of the prison sentence” and the respondent is recorded as saying “I maintain my request.” 37. The minutes record that the penitentiary judge informed the respondent of the “essential circumstances and consequences of the transfer of imprisonment” and that if the other state takes over execution of the sentence, the respondent was obliged to co-operate with the authorities of the other state and report to serve the sentence when called upon. 38. The minutes set out a number of circumstances in which “abolition of the interruption of the execution of imprisonment” would arise, to include a situation where the other state has not taken over execution of the prison sentence. 39. The minutes record that the respondent said that he understood the information provided and, thereafter, contain a declaration in the following terms: “I am leaving the territory of Hungary, and to this end I will cooperate with the authorities, I submit myself to the immigration proceedings initiated against me, I will return to the state of Moldova; 9 I will not return to the territory of Hungary before the completion of the execution of the prison sentence or the cessation of its enforceability, or during the period of expulsion. I agree that the prison sentence will be carried out in the state of Moldova.” 40. It is also recorded that the respondent said that he would go to Moldova and reside there at a particular address. 41. The minutes were signed by the respondent. 42. The issuing judicial authority stated that the Moldovan judicial authority refused to take over enforcement of the sentence. 43. On the 3rd of February 2026, the issuing judicial authority provided further detailed information and assurances in respect of prison conditions. 44. It was stated that in accordance with international and national legal provisions, the respondent will be guaranteed at least three square metres of personal space (excluding sanitary facilities) during any period of his detention regardless of the institution’s occupancy rate. It was indicated that the rules of separation will apply, which can adequately ensure the protection of the respondent’s physical integrity. 45. Details were provided in relation to nutrition, sanitation, ventilation, contact with lawyers, medical personnel and family, and information was provided in relation to recreational activity. It was stated that the respondent: 10 “… shall at all times be placed under conditions that are in compliance with the provisions of the European Convention of Human Rights, the United Nations’ Recommendation on the Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners, as well as Recommendation No. Rec(2006)2 of the Council of Europe on the European Prison Rules.” (Emphasis in the original.) Discussion 46. The position advanced on behalf of the respondent initially focused on three central points: the lack of clarity in relation to the balance of the sentence to be served; the circumstances of his release from custody and expulsion from Hungary as set out in his affidavit; and the conditions of detention in the event of his surrender to the issuing state. 47. As the case developed, most of the focus of the legal submissions before me related to the circumstances of the respondent’s release and the question of sentence ‘enforceability’ in a broad rather than a narrow sense. Arising out of some of the arguments advanced, I sought further information pursuant to section 20 of the 2003 Act in relation to the suspension of enforcement of the sentence. 48. It is submitted that the surrender of the respondent was prohibited pursuant to section 37 of the 2003 Act on the basis of incompatibility with Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights (“ECHR”). 49. The respondent expressly makes a case for abuse of process. It is submitted that the Hungarian authorities made the decision to release foreign prisoners arising out of the 11 pressing circumstances caused by prison overcrowding within Hungary. It is submitted that the respondent was not properly informed of the consequences of agreeing to his early release and that the fundamental legal safeguard of access to independent legal advice was not provided to him. 50. The respondent submits that there has been an “emphatic” breach of his fair trial right of access to legal advice and, in that regard, refers to Salduz v. Turkey ECHR (App. No. 36391/02) (2009) 49 E.H.R.R. 19. 51. It is submitted that where the respondent had already served “the lion’s share” of his custodial sentence, it was emphatically not in his best interests to agree to his release in the circumstances set out above. 52. The respondent refers to the C.P.T. report of Hungary dated the 3rd of December 2024 where, in the context of the measures described above in respect of alleviating prison overcrowding pursuant to the Decree, the committee said: “The CPT would like to receive further information from the Hungarian authorities on the nature and state of implementation of this measure and considerations related to the terms of the Council of Europe Convention on the Transfer of Sentenced Persons (ETS No. 112), where applicable. Further, the CPT would like to receive information about the legal safeguards, such as access to legal aid and interpretation, that apply to foreign nationals in this context.” 12 53. The respondent submits that while the principles of law in relation to a refusal of surrender for an abuse of process often manifest in repeat applications for surrender, those principles are not confined to such applications. 54. In that regard, he relies on Minister for Justice and Equality v. Angel [2020] IEHC 699 where Burns J. summarised the principles that apply in abuse of process cases. At paragraph 31, by reference to the judgment of Donnelly J. in Minister for Justice v. Tobin [2012] 4 I.R. 147, Burns J. listed the applicable principles as follows: “(a) there is no bar to bringing a fresh application to the Court for surrender; (b) there can be circumstances which justify or require the High Court refusing an application for surrender on the basis of abuse of process; (c) a finding of an abuse of process should not be made lightly; (d) it is only where the case has exceptional circumstances that an abuse of process will be found (although exceptionality is not the test) and that the abuse of process is that of the High Court in this jurisdiction rather than a concern about an abuse of process to put the requested person on trial; (e) there is a broad public interest in bringing things to finality in one set of proceedings; (f) there is a strong public interest in Ireland complying with its international obligations and surrendering individuals in accordance with the relevant extradition provisions; (g) a repeat application for surrender is not per se abusive of process. It would only be abusive of the process where to do so is unconscionable in all the circumstances; 13 (h) mala fides or an improper motive is not a necessary precondition for an abuse of process; and (i) the Court should look to the cumulative factors which may make the application for surrender oppressive or unconscionable.” 55. The respondent also relies on Minister for Justice v. Bailey [2017] IEHC 482 in support of the argument that bad faith does not have to be established for an abuse of process to be found. In that case, Hunt J. said at paragraph 58: “I believe that it is also necessary to emphasise that a finding of abuse of process does not express or imply that the Minister acted with mala fides or bad faith, which may be a factor in analysing circumstances to determine whether or not there has been an abuse of process. It is not a factor in this case. Abuse of process can arise without any institution acting in bad faith. It may be caused, as it was in this case, by the cumulative effect of the circumstances of the case rendering an abuse of process on the individual concerned. These principles are all expressed in the judgment of Denham C.J. in Tobin (No.2). ‘Abuse of process’ is described in the same case by Hardiman J. in characteristically vivid and eloquent terms. I can do no better than borrow his words. He described it at para.[313] as:- ‘a many headed concept whose manifestations range from the deliberate maintenance of legal proceeding without probable cause….to a ham fisted or unthought out conduct of litigation, particularly by making two or more actions where one would do, which tends to oppress the other party and to cause him expense and/or distress.’” 14 56. The respondent says that the issuing judicial authority was invited to make observations on his sworn affidavit but that they did not do so. In those circumstances, it is argued that the affidavit evidence stands “uncontroverted.” 57. The applicant asks the Court to take a different approach to the respondent’s affidavit. In the first instance, counsel for the applicant said that the exhibited documents, referred to above, and in particular the references to the respondent’s “request” for transfer are not at all explained in the body of his affidavit. 58. Counsel for the applicant placed heavy emphasis on the additional information provided in relation to the circumstances in which the execution of the sentence was “interrupted”, particularly on the minutes of the hearing at which the respondent was present with an interpreter. The applicant says that all of the matters explained to the respondent by the penitentiary judge are of significance in the context of the complaint now being made by the respondent. 59. The applicant submits that none of these matters have been addressed by any further affidavit evidence from the respondent and are therefore not disputed. Counsel took a step further and said that the respondent’s account in his affidavit is not credible in light of the information received. It is submitted that the account in his affidavit is inconsistent with the objective facts set out in the additional information. 60. It is submitted that instead of going to Moldova on the 25th of April 2023 to reside at the address specified, the respondent travelled to Ireland on the 2nd of May 2023. 15 61. The applicant submits that there is simply no evidence on which to base an argument that surrender should be refused because of an abuse of process or a breach of Article 6 of the ECHR. 62. Further, the applicant argues that, in any event, an abuse of process argument must relate to an abuse of the processes of this Court. See Minister for Justice v. Downey [2019] IECA 182. 63. Counsel for the applicant submitted that the other issues raised in relation to prison conditions and the balance of the sentence have been definitively addressed by the provision of further information. Decision 64. I am of the view that the failure of the respondent to address, on affidavit, the additional information provided in relation to the circumstances in which his sentence was “interrupted” is of significance and goes to the core of the case and the complaints advanced by him. 65. The picture painted by the respondent in his affidavit is a wholly misleading one. The impression sought to be created in his account of how he came to be released from prison and leave Hungary is that he was, in effect, released and deported out of the blue because of prison overcrowding, subject only to the condition that he could arrange transport out of the country and remain outside Hungary for a period of six years. 16 66. It seems clear to me on the available information that the respondent himself requested the transfer of the execution of his sentence and maintained that request during the course of the hearing on the 20th of February 2023. In the course of that hearing, he had the assistance of an interpreter and confirmed that he understood what the interpreter was saying. 67. The penitentiary judge explained the nature of the consent that he was giving and the conditions of his release, and it is manifest from the minutes of the hearing that the circumstances in which the suspension of execution of the sentence may be terminated had been explained to him. 68. The declaration that the respondent made, which is recorded in the minutes and signed by him, flies in the face of what he has averred to on affidavit. A single sentence in the minutes, just above the respondent’s signature, illustrates this: “I agree that the prison sentence will be carried out in the state of Moldova.” 69. In light of this bald statement, the proposition that the respondent came to Ireland days after his release believing his sentence to be spent is simply unsustainable. 70. I am also of the view that any abuse of process or Article 6 argument based on the evidence must fail. There is in fact no evidence on which I could rely to the effect that the respondent did not understand the consequences of his sentence being interrupted or his obligations upon his release. While there is no reference to legal advice or access to a lawyer during or before the hearing on the 20th of February 2023, a document signed by the respondent at the end of the application (initiated by him) confirms that he did 17 understand the process. The respondent has chosen not to engage with this issue at all by way of affidavit. 71. For the avoidance of doubt, I reject the submission that the respondent’s affidavit is “uncontroverted.” Further information was sought pursuant to section 20 of the 2003 Act arising out of matters referred to in the affidavit and the arguments advanced on the basis of what was deposed to therein, and the Court is entitled to rely on the material received in that context. 72. Further, I agree with the submission on behalf of the applicant that, in principle, any abuse of process argument has to relate to an abuse which is asserted to exist in respect of the processes of this Court. In Downey, Peart J. said at paragraph 19: “It is clear from J.A.T (No. 2) that there can be circumstances which justify the High Court refusing an application for surrender on the basis of abuse of process. But it is equally clear firstly that such cases require some exceptional circumstance to justify such refusal, but, and critically, that the abuse asserted to exist must be of the processes of the High Court here dealing with the application for surrender, and therefore must relate to the application for surrender itself, and not to the prosecution of the offences which the respondent will face if he/she is surrendered. The different question whether there might be an abuse of process were the respondent put on trial for the offences for which surrender is sought is not a matter for determination in this jurisdiction on an application for surrender. Absent any suggestion that there is no possibility of a fair hearing of any application to have his trial on these offences stayed, and there has been no such suggestion made by the appellant, it is in my view clear 18 that any such question of abuse of process will be a matter to be pursued by the appellant before the courts in the requesting jurisdiction.” 73. In relation to the absence of legal advice, counsel for the respondent submitted that the proper mechanisms provided for in many international instruments relating to the transfer of prisoners have not been applied in this case and asked rhetorically whether it is a “proper use” of the European Arrest Warrant regime to seek the respondent’s surrender in that context. 74. I cannot see, in the authorities, a basis on which to conclude that the mere fact of a request for surrender in these circumstances is an abuse of the processes of this Court requiring or justifying a refusal to surrender. It hardly needs to be recited that the Framework Decision provides that Member States are required to execute a European Arrest Warrant on the basis of the principle of mutual recognition and in accordance with the provisions of the Framework Decision. 75. I am also of the view that the Article 6 argument based on Salduz is misconceived. Salduz related to fair trial rights in the context of rights afforded to those charged with a criminal offence. The application and hearing in this case relate to the enforcement of a sentence post-trial (at which the respondent was legally represented) and which could have no effect on questions of guilt or innocence or the length of the sentence imposed. Further, rather than there being any unfairness visited on the respondent, the outcome, i.e., a return to Moldova, was one positively agitated for by him. 19 76. The CJEU has held in clear terms that Article 6 of the ECHR does not apply to the execution of a custodial sentence unless the proceeding relating to the execution of the sentence affects the finding of guilt or the length of the sentence. In Ardic (Case C- 517/17 PPU, ECLI:EU:C:2017:10126), the CJEU held at paragraph 75: “While the final judicial decision convicting the person concerned, including the decision determining the custodial sentence to be served, falls fully within Article 6 of the ECHR, it is apparent from the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights that that provision does not apply, however, to questions relating to the detailed rules for the execution or application of such a custodial sentence” 77. Similar findings were made in Openbaar Ministeries v. Zdziaszek (Case C-271/17 PPU, ECLI:EU:C:2017:629) and L.U. and P.H. v. Minister for Justice (Joined Cases C- 514/21 and C-515/21, ECLI:EU:C:2023:235). 78. In Openbaar Ministeries, the CJEU held at paragraph 85: “… It is moreover apparent from the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights that Article 6(1) of the ECHR does not apply to questions concerning the methods for executing a sentence, in particular those relating to provisional release” 79. In L.U. and P.H., the CJEU held at paragraph 58: “… According to that case-law [i.e., that of the ECHR], first, proceedings concerning the manner of execution of sentences do not fall within the scope of Article 6 of the ECHR and, second, measures adopted by a court after the final 20 sentence has been imposed or while it is being served can be regarded as ‘sentences’ for the purposes of that convention only if they may result in the redefinition or modification of the scope of the penalty initially imposed” 80. This matter was listed for judgment on the 22nd of April 2026. Immediately prior to handing judgment down, counsel for the respondent handed in to the Court a copy of Minister for Justice Home Affairs and Migration v. O’Kane/McNicholl [2026] IECA 53, a judgment delivered by Owens J. on the 16th of March 2026. I provided an opportunity for the parties to address me on the significance of this judgment. 81. That case, which arose out of a Trade and Cooperation Agreement arrest warrant, concerned a certified point of law as to whether a delay of 48 years by the issuing state in seeking the surrender of a respondent could amount to an abuse of the process of the Irish courts or to oppressive litigation in the particular circumstances of the two respondents. 82. Counsel for the respondent submitted that the decision was “very useful” in the context of the arguments he had advanced at hearing in relation to abuse of process and section 37 of the 2003 Act, albeit with a greater emphasis on section 37. 83. Counsel for the applicant submitted that the decision did not alter the legal position, that the evidential deficit was still present in respect of the arguments raised and that the decision in fact strengthened the arguments advanced by the applicant. 84. I agree with counsel for the applicant. 21 85. At paragraph 19, Owens J. emphasised that: “Abuse of process involves misuse by an issuing state of the process of the executing judicial authority. This takes place where, by happenstance or design, an issuing state engages in conduct which undermines the integrity of the surrender process. Executing judicial authorities are obliged to uphold the integrity of this process. Examples of abuse of process are refusals to cooperate with the executing judicial authority, or provision of false or misleading information to that authority, or use of the process for improper purposes.” 86. At paragraph 145, Owens J. held that: “The purpose of the power of an executing judicial authority to refuse surrender on grounds of abuse of process is to protect the integrity of the process mandated by the 2003 Act and the rights of the person whose surrender is sought to due process in the surrender procedure.” 87. Owens J. was also clear that the scope of the power to refuse to entertain a legal proceeding on grounds of abuse of process is very narrow. Ordinarily, grounds for refusal to surrender will be identified by reference to arguments based on the Framework Decision and the 2003 Act, and Owens J. counselled against relabelling these arguments as “giving rise to an abuse of process.” Owens J. also commented that the term ‘abuse of process’ is capable of being used imprecisely and is a term best avoided by a court when it is assessing complaints by reference to the criteria set out in the 2003 Act. 22 88. At paragraph 249, Owens J. identified a clear test: “… Abuse of process may only be relied on as a ground for refusal of a surrender sought under the 2003 Act where it is clearly demonstrated that the purpose or effect of the asserted abuse is such as is to undermine the enquiry which the executing judicial authority is obliged to conduct before making a decision on surrender.” 89. In my view, the respondent has not come close to meeting this test on any view of the evidence before the Court. 90. I am satisfied that the detailed and comprehensive assurances given in relation to how the respondent is to be treated upon his surrender, in particular the positive assurances in relation to respect for his ECHR rights, address the complaints in relation to prison conditions, and this is not a basis on which surrender should be refused. 91. I am satisfied that the further information provided by the issuing judicial authority clarifies the precise balance of the sentence remaining to be served i.e., 1 year, 3 months and 1 day, and that there is no lack of clarity justifying a refusal to surrender. 92. The respondent was lawfully brought before the Court on the 4th of November 2025 on foot of the SIS alert and the warrant was lawfully produced to the Court on the 13th of November 2025 in accordance with section 14 of the 2003 Act. 93. I am satisfied that the name and nationality of the respondent is clearly set out on the face of the warrant. 23 94. The name and address of the judicial authority that issued the warrant and its telephone number, fax number and email address are set out on the face of the warrant. 95. Section 11 of the 2003 Act requires that the offence to which the relevant warrant relates be set out, including the classification of the offence concerned under the law of the issuing state. I am satisfied that Part E of the warrant states that it relates to a single offence and that it describes the facts underpinning that offence in significant detail. The classification of this offence under the law of the issuing state is also clearly set out in Part E of the warrant. 96. The tick box provision has been utilised by the issuing state to indicate that this offence falls within the category of “trafficking in human beings” and is punishable by a period of imprisonment of a maximum of at least three years. No issue in relation to correspondence therefore arises, however, it is clear that the offence set out in the warrant corresponds with the offence contained in section 6 of the Criminal Justice Smuggling of Persons Act 2021. This section provides that: “(1) A person is guilty of an offence if he or she intentionally assists the entry into, transit across or presence in the State of another person, where— (a) such entry into, transit across or presence in the State is in breach of a specified provision, and (b) the first-mentioned person knows or has reasonable cause to believe that such entry into, transit across or presence in the State is in breach of a specified provision. 24 (2) A person who, in a place outside the State, engages in conduct that would, if the conduct occurred in the State, constitute an offence under subsection (1), is guilty of an offence. (3) A person who, in a place outside the State, aids, abets, counsels, procures or attempts the commission of an offence under subsection (1) or subsection (2) is guilty of an offence.” 97. I am satisfied that Part C of the warrant confirms that the sentence remains enforceable, that the offence occurred in the issuing state, and that no question of extraterritoriality arises. 98. Part D of the warrant confirms that the respondent appeared in person at the trial resulting in the sentence now sought to be enforced. 99. I am satisfied that I am not required to refuse the respondent’s surrender under sections 22, 23 or 24 of the 2003 Act. I am also satisfied that I am not required to refuse surrender for any other reason pursuant to Part 3 of the 2003 Act. Conclusion 100. For the reasons set out above, I reject the points of objection raised by the respondent to his surrender. I, therefore, propose to make an order for his surrender to such person as is duly authorised to receive him on behalf of the issuing state. 25