Langan v Mandate Trade Union

THE HIGH COURT [2026] IEHC 263 [Record No. H.P. 2026/1878] BETWEEN LORNA LANGAN PLAINTIFF AND MANDATE TRADE UNION DEFENDANT JUDGMENT of Ms Justice Bolger dated 24th day of April 2026 1. This is the plaintiff's application for interlocutory injunctive relief. Events have progressed very quickly, reflecting the urgency of the situation. Nevertheless, the parties presented the case with commendable efficiency and skill. It was heard over a day on 22 April. This judgment has been prepared over a very short timeframe as a decision was required to be made in advance of 27 April. Background 2. The plaintiff has been a member of the defendant trade union since 2015 and, in 2024, was elected to its National Executive Council at the Biennial Delegate Conference for a two-year period. Since 2024, the plaintiff has been engaged in raising concerns within the union in relation to issues which she claims to be concerning financial governance, transparency, withholding of information from the NEC, conflicts of interest, settlement expenditure and the handling of protected disclosures. 3. The plaintiff was nominated on 5 December 2025 by her own and other local councils to stand for election to the NEC at the forthcoming BDC scheduled to take place next Monday, 27 April. 4. Rule 11.2 of the Union Rulebook requires that, to be nominated for election for an ordinary member of the NEC, a person must be and have been a member of the union for at least three 2 years. It is not suggested that the plaintiff's nomination was not accepted at the time it was made or her entitlement to seek election to the NEC challenged at that time. 5. As part of the election process, the plaintiff circulated her candidate profile in which she stated, inter alia, that, if elected, she would:- - “challenge waste and poor financial oversight - refuse blank cheques and rubber-stamping - demand accountability from management and officers - defend the rulebook – not ignore it - put members’ interests first, every time." 6. On 9 February 2026, an emergency NEC meeting was held at which there was a request from some members of the union staff that the plaintiff’s candidate profile not be circulated. The NEC decided to prevent the distribution of the plaintiff's candidate profile. The plaintiff subsequently made written complaints about that on 26 February and 1 March. That decision of the NEC to prevent the distribution of the plaintiff's candidate profile is not challenged in the within proceedings, though it appears it may be part of other proceedings the plaintiff has brought pursuant to the Protected Disclosures Act 2014, as amended, to the WRC in a complaint dated 11 March. 7. In the within application for interlocutory injunctive relief, the plaintiff challenges the decision made by the union at a meeting of the NEC on 22 March. The plaintiff did not attend this meeting as she was in hospital. She sent a letter to the meeting explaining that she was unable to attend and presented information that she had intended to present in person, which she asked to be read into the record. Her letter covered issues around her complaint of 23 February, a justification of her profile, her WRC complaint of 13 March, her report to An Garda Síochána of 6 March and her request to the NEC to afford her natural justice and fair procedures in relation to the circulation of her profile. There is no mention in the letter of any prospect of the plaintiff being suspended at the meeting. 8. The decision of the NEC to suspend the plaintiff was communicated to her by letter dated 25 March, though it seems, from an email the plaintiff sent to the NEC on 24 March, that she was aware of her suspension at least from the NEC. The email does not refer to the decision to suspend her from the union. Undoubtedly, the letter of 25 March was the first time the union moved to advise the plaintiff of the suspension of her membership of the union and of the NEC. That letter sets out the following:- 3 - The decision of the NEC to appoint an independent investigator to investigate allegations made against the plaintiff in letters submitted by union staff members on 6 and 9 March, in respect of which further evidence was submitted to the meeting of 22 March. The letter enclosed copies of both letter and a number of social media posts, including the plaintiff's post of her candidate profile, reference is made to her WRC complaint and positive responses to her posts from other union members. - The decision of the NEC to suspend the plaintiff's membership of the union on an interim basis "for the purpose of facilitating the above investigation". - That the NEC was empowered pursuant to Rule 13.1 and 26.4 of the Rulebook to make such a decision "where they consider it appropriate to address such matters". - That the plaintiff was not permitted during her suspension to take part in any union activities, including participating in union elections. - That no finding or penalty had been made that would allow the plaintiff to appeal as provided in the Rulebook. - That the plaintiff's pre-emptive objection to the interim suspension of her membership (which seems to have referred to her email of 24 March) was noted and the author trusted that the letter has provided clarification in respect of the purpose and basis of the suspension. The letter ended with the following:- "It is important to emphasise that it is not an act of penalisation of you contrary to any legislation but, rather, it is entirely for the purpose of facilitating the investigation of staff complaints." It is significant that the letter did not give any explanation as to why it was necessary to suspend the plaintiff to facilitate the investigation of the staff complaints. 9. The 6 March letter from the staff complained that the plaintiff's candidate profile was “damaging to the reputation and integrity of officials and staff”. Their letter of 9 March alleged that a number of individuals, including the plaintiff, had engaged in "conduct injurious to the interests of the union and/or its members and/or conduct unbecoming of a member, as provided for under Rule 26". It went on to state that the allegations made "have the potential to cause significant damage to the reputation and integrity of Mandate Trade Union officials and employees". It said the public dissemination of the allegations "has created an extremely difficult and distressing working environment for staff". 4 10. In their letters, the staff requested an urgent meeting of the Staff Relations Committee which I understand to be a subcommittee of the NEC. A meeting of that subcommittee took place on the morning of 22 March, prior to the NEC meeting that made the decision to suspend the plaintiff from membership of the union and the NEC. The plaintiff did not seem to know that this meeting was taking place. The minutes of the meeting of the Staff Relations Committee were exhibited in the defendant’s replying affidavit, which seems to be the first time those minutes were furnished to the plaintiff. The minutes confirm a proposal was made unanimously that the plaintiff be suspended pending investigations. Further proposals, some similar and some different, were made in relation to other individuals. There is no reference in the minutes as to why the proposed suspension of the plaintiff was necessary to facilitate the investigation that was being sought. 11. The minutes of the NEC meeting later on 22 March are also exhibited in the defendant’s replying affidavit and again this is the first time that those minutes seem to have been furnished to the plaintiff. The minutes:- - confirm receipt of apologies from the plaintiff in respect of her non-attendance at the meeting; - confirm that documentation that the plaintiff had requested to be shared with the NEC was shared and time was given to consider that documentation, which included the plaintiff's letters of 23 February 2026 and 1 March 2026, justification of content and election profile, complaint to AGS, 11 March 2026 WRC complaint and 22 March 2026 letter to NEC from the plaintiff. - confirm receipt of the plaintiff’s complaint lodged with the WRC; - confirm receipt of a separate complaint from the plaintiff regarding the convening of the NEC meeting of 9 February, which was read to the meeting; - set out the decision of the NEC to suspend five members, including the plaintiff, "pending an independent investigation whose actions could be considered unbecoming of a member and injurious to the union". One of the other four members who were suspended who was present at that meeting is recorded in the minutes as having enquired as to what she did wrong, that this was the first she had heard of this and that she wrote nothing. - refer to a discussion of a letter stated to have been sent on behalf of the industrial staff objecting to the candidate profile submitted by the plaintiff, letter dated 27 January 2026. 5 The minutes state "This staff letter of 27 January 2026 was discussed, and it was collectively decided to support the staff as per their request". The letter of 27 January 2026 was exhibited by the defendant's deponent in his replying affidavit, but it is not clear to me that it previously furnished to the plaintiff. 12. In any event, the minutes of the meeting go on to refer to Rule 15.8 and 15.9. The only reference to Rule 26 is in relation to a discussion about the plaintiff’s complaint under Rule 26. The minutes do not record any discussion about Rule 26 in relation to the decision made at the meeting to suspend the plaintiff. 13. The plaintiff was never put on notice:- - that complaints made against her by these staff in their letters of 6 and 9 March were to be discussed at the meeting of the NEC of 22 March: - the proposal made by the Staff Relations Committee that she be suspended; - that the meeting of 22 March would consider her suspension. The plaintiff had no opportunity to make representations about her purported suspension in advance of the decision being made at that meeting. 14. On 26 March, the plaintiff emailed the staff in relation to their complaints, and asked them to withdraw their complaint or otherwise she would refer matters to An Garda Síochána as part of her ongoing complaint to them and include it in her complaint to the WRC. She sought a response from the staff by 30 March. The defendant's description of that letter is set out at para. 81 of their replying affidavit as follows: “I say that I was shocked and appalled to learn about this letter. The letter potentially indicated an intention on the part of the Applicant to intimidate those parties that had come forward to complain about her into withdrawing their complaints or face potential criminal and/or civil liability. Further, by attaching a series of documents to her email, the Applicant was potentially in breach of NEC confidentiality rules and agreements.” 15. On 9 April, the plaintiff’s solicitors wrote to the defendant. The defendant’s solicitors later maintained that this letter only challenged the plaintiff suspension as penalisation for having made a protected disclosure, it actually went further than that in asserting that the union had attempted to prohibit or restrict participation by the plaintiff in the democratic process of the union "in an unlawful manner" and that the union's actions were unlawful and amounted to a breach of her contractual and legal rights, both as a member of the NEC and a member of the union. The letter also claimed that the plaintiff’s treatment was retaliation for having raised protected disclosures. 6 16. The defendant’s solicitors wrote back by letter dated 10 April seeking until 20 April to respond. Not surprisingly, this was not agreed to by the plaintiff’s solicitors, which is understandable given the pending date for the election of 27 April. The plaintiff’s solicitors wrote again on 13 April allowing the defendant’s solicitors until 5.00pm on 14 April to respond. The defendant’s solicitors responded in a timely manner on 14 April. Their letter incorrectly asserts that the claim made by the plaintiff’s solicitor that the plaintiff had been subjected to retaliation for having made protected disclosures was the full extent of the case made out by them in their pre-litigation correspondence. That is not so, as set out above. The letter also confirmed that an intervention investigator had been appointed at an NEC meeting that took place on 13 April 2026 and said: "The question of your client’s suspension was also considered again at this meeting on foot of your correspondence and put to the members and affirmed." There was no further detail provided as to what to place at the meeting or any narrative around the NEC's decision to affirm the suspension that they had imposed at their meeting of 22 March. The letter went on to: - assert that the union was entitled to suspend the plaintiff pursuant to Rule 13.1 and Rule 26.4 as a result of the employee complaints; - challenge the plaintiff's locus standi to bring a complaint to the WRC pursuant to the Protected Disclosures Act; - challenge the claim made by the plaintiff’s solicitor that the plaintiff would be left without a remedy if she was prevented from contesting the upcoming NEC election which the defendant’s solicitors described as inaccurate and referred the plaintiff's solicitors to Rule 12 of the Rulebook. 17. Whilst the letter did not provide any further detail about what took place at the meeting of 13 April, some further information was provided in the defendant’s replying affidavit, the relevant paragraphs of which I set out below: "(87) On 13 April 2026, another urgent NEC meeting was held online during which the NEC considered the latest developments. (88) During the course of this meeting, the NEC gave fresh consideration to its original decision to investigate the staff complaints and the Applicant’s suspension pending same. This consideration was given in the light of the above legal correspondence that had been received from the Applicant’s solicitors threatening litigation. (89) Reference was made to the fact that while one of the NEC members that had been suspended had attended the previous NEC meeting on 22 March 2026, the Applicant 7 had not been present. The Applicant’s letter of 24 March 2026 was discussed, which had pre-emptively criticised the NEC’s decision to suspend her (confirmed in writing the following day). So too was the Applicant’s requested appeal of the decision to suspend her and the attendant threat of legal action, including injunctive action. (90) It was confirmed at this meeting that Janet Hughes, a former union official and WRC adjudication officer, would be asked to conduct an independent factual investigation into the staff complaints contained in letters dated 6 and 9 March 2026. (91) There was a debate about whether to continue with the suspensions and to proceed with investigations or to overturn these NEC decisions. Notwithstanding the threat of litigation, the NEC decided collectively to keep the suspensions in place and to proceed with Ms Hughes’ appointment. It was decided that the Respondent would defend its decisions in court, if necessary, emphasising the importance of following proper procedures. It was also decided that it is imperative to defend the Union’s reputation and the importance of collective decision-making and legal preparedness in defending their actions.” 18. The defendant’s replying affidavit goes on to assert, at para. 92, that the meeting considered further concerns about “online posts”. The paragraph merits being set out herein full; "(92) The meeting went on to consider further concerns about ‘online posts’. The staff representative, Mandy Kane, referred to concerns expressed to her by staff relating to leaked letters and damaging comments on Facebook, which targeted staff and NEC members, causing reputational harm. A letter regarding industrial action was leaked onto Facebook, leading to offensive comments, including online references to staff as being “cunts.” Ms Kane referred to the fact that a petition by the Applicant to “stop the silencing of mandate members – reinstate the suspended mandate five” had been posted by the Applicant. Ms Kane confirmed that Union officials were expressing their distress about online abuse and the impact on staff morale. On foot of this information, a commitment was given to investigate how the said letter had been leaked and how comments of this nature had appeared online.” 19. The online posts exhibited show those of the plaintiff referred to already above in which she circulated her candidate profile and sought support for her re-election to the NEC. None of her posts leaked letters or made offensive comments describing staff members in the utterly reprehensible 8 terms as referred to at para. 92. It appears that both the meeting and the affidavit seek to attribute responsibility to the plaintiff for posts that were, in fact, made by others. 20. The defendant submitted to the Court that the correspondence that was considered at the meeting of 13 April including the plaintiff's email to the NEC of 24 March and the pre-litigation correspondence from plaintiff’s solicitor, constituted a “fresh consideration” of the plaintiff’s response to her suspension. This, according to the defendant, constitutes sufficient fair procedures insofar as there is any obligation on the part of a trade union to apply fair procedures in advance of a decision to suspend a member. I return to that below. 21. The minutes of the meeting of 13 April were not exhibited by the Defendant, which I was told was inadvertent because of the tight timeframe in which the affidavit had been prepared. I accept that. However, it is very clear that the plaintiff was not given the minutes before the institution of the within proceedings and there was never any intention evidenced by the defendant to do so. The only information furnished to her in advance of the institution of her proceedings was in the defendant’s solicitor’s letter referred to above, which was brief to say the least. The affidavit does not bring matters much beyond that in explaining to the court how the plaintiff's rights to fair procedures were vindicated by the holding of that meeting, a point to which I return further below. The test for injunctive relief 22. The plaintiff seeks what is clearly mandatory relief restraining the defendant from giving effect to the purported suspension and specifically from interfering with her right to contest elections to the NEC. She must, therefore, establish a strong case that she will succeed at trial (Maha Lingam [2006] ELR 137). She must also, as per the decision of the Supreme Court in Merck Sharp and Dohme v Clonmel Healthcare [2020] 2 IR 1 establish that she might secure the same injunction on a permanent basis at trial. Thereafter, the court must consider the balance of justice which includes a consideration of the maintenance of the status quo, whether there will be any meaningful trial before the relevant event has passed and where the least risk of injustice lies. 23. The parties agree that damages are not an adequate remedy in the circumstances that present here. 24. However, before I consider whether the plaintiff has satisfied those requirements, I must consider the following matters the defendant has raised which they say operate to deny the plaintiff the relief she seeks:- (i) A lack of candour/unclean hands in relation to her membership status; (ii) The plaintiff pre-litigation conduct; 9 (iii) Delay; (iv) Alternative statutory remedies; and (v) Premature application. (i) Lack of candour 25. This issue was first raised in the second letter from the defendant's solicitors of 21 April, referring to previous periods of the plaintiff's unemployment in 2024 during which time her membership lapsed. This is potentially relevant as she is required to have been a member at the time of her nomination on 5 December 2025. Three days before that nomination, she sought to be returned to a full subscription rate as she said she was employed in Centra in Santry. Subsequently, her solicitor confirmed in a letter of 20 April that the plaintiff did not commence that employment due to medical advice. The defendant asserts a breach of the plaintiff's obligations pursuant to Rule 25.1 to keep her membership updated and that her nomination form that said she was employed in Centra, Santry was a misrepresentation to her local council for the purpose of a nomination. 26. By letter dated 16 April, the plaintiff’s solicitor confirmed the plaintiff's employment as an administrative worker in the Bonnington Hotel. Later, in their letter of 20 April, they clarified that she had not in fact commenced that job due to health issues but that the role "remains allocated" to her. 27. The defendant asserts that the plaintiff is and has been unemployed since August 2024 and as per Rule 29.2 is not entitled to contest the elections and that her entire basis for injunctive relief simply does not exist. The plaintiff asserts that she comes within Rule 23.1, i.e. as a member as a person who "seeks to be employed". She disputes that she is unemployed as she is currently in receipt of disability allowance and that the defendant’s stance is discriminatory to members whose ability to commence work is delayed by illness or disability. She refers to Rule 25.2 which recognises every member's right to equal treatment without discrimination on grounds of, inter alia, disability including the express right at Rule 25.2(c) to participate in the democratic process of the union. 28. A lack of candour must have a sufficient nexus to the relief sought in order to serve to deny a plaintiff equitable relief to which they might otherwise be entitled. I am not satisfied that the defendant has established any such nexus by their assertion that the plaintiff is currently unemployed and was at the time of her nomination, such as might deny her the membership status she requires to be qualified to seek nomination. I take judicial note of the fact that she is medically certified, and recognised by the Department of Social Protection, as unfit for work and eligible for payments arising from her prior PRSI contributions as an employee. While a person who is 10 temporarily disabled may be unable to work, that does not mean they are unemployed; if they were, they would instead be in receipt of Jobseeker’s payments (subject to eligibility), rather than disability-related payments. There is merit in the plaintiff's assertion to her contractual right, as per Rule 25.2, to participate in the democratic process of the union without discrimination on grounds of her disability. 29. In addition, the plaintiff asserted in her replying affidavit at para. 78 as follows:- “I also say, from my own knowledge, that there are others associated with the NEC or union structures who are retired or unemployed and no equivalent issue has been raised in their case.” This has not been challenged in the defendant's oral submissions. This allegation challenges the bona fides of the defendant's assertion that they are entitled to treat the plaintiff as a member who was not qualified to seek nomination for election to the NEC. 30. I do not find a sufficient nexus between the plaintiff’s alleged lack of candour here and the reliefs sought, given the time and circumstances of those matters being raised, the plaintiff's claim that she was qualified as a member at the time of her nomination and her claim that to treat her otherwise is in breach of her rights under Rule 25.2. (ii) Conduct 31. The conduct the defendant relies on was the correspondence the plaintiff sent to employees after her purported suspension when she asked them to withdraw their complaint, in default of which she would refer the matter to An garda Síochána and the WRC. 32. I was referred by the defendant to the decision of Dignam J in O’Longain v Burke [2023] IEHC 22 in which the court confirmed that the authorities "acknowledge that as an equitable remedy the courts have a discretion to refuse relief on the basis of an applicant’s past or prospective conduct – even if the applicant might otherwise be entitled to relief". In that decision of the High Court, equitable relief was refused because of the plaintiff's established contempt of court. However, the Court of Appeal overturned that decision and the plaintiff was granted injunctive relief in relation to the objective bias of a disciplinary panel due to consider an appeal from the termination of his employment. Faherty J stated, at para. 223; “Accordingly, whilst I consider the appellant’s contempt no less egregious now than it was when he was before Dignam J. in the 2022/4507P proceedings, as I have said the distinguishing feature of the present case is the spectre of unfairness that will hover over the appeal process before the DAP if the appellant has to face that body as presently 11 constituted given that he has made out a case of a reasonable apprehension of objective bias.” 33. The plaintiff's conduct in Burke was described by Faherty J as "egregious". The plaintiff's conduct here falls short of that of Mr Burke. Contempt of court was not sufficient to deny the plaintiff equitable relief in the context of their rights to fair procedures viz-a-viz an appeal from the termination of their employment. I am satisfied neither was the plaintiff's conduct here sufficient to merit a refusal of equitable relief to which the plaintiff might otherwise be entitled. The conduct the defendant seeks to rely on was that she engaged in what the defendant described as threatening correspondence to employees. The court does not condone any such threats to include employees in the plaintiff's complaints to An Garda Síochána or the WRC but the fact of her correspondence does not deprive her of her right to seek injunctive relief to resist what she asserts was an unlawful suspension of her as a member of the union and the NEC. 34. The approach of Faherty J applies equally to the lack of candour claimed as to the relevance of the plaintiff’s pre-litigation conduct. I do not uphold the defendant’s claim that these matters deny the plaintiff any equitable relief to which she is otherwise entitled. At risk of pointing out the obvious insofar as the plaintiff seeks equitable relief at trial (which she does in her plenary summons), these issues can be revisited at trial if necessary or appropriate. (iii) Delay 35. The defendant contends that the plaintiff knew of her suspension since her email of 24 March but waited until 15 April to institute the within proceedings. 36. The defendant sought before this Court to rely on what it was doing between that letter and its meeting of 13 April to validate the suspension that it imposed on 22 March and reconsidered at its meeting of 13 April. The defendant had sought a lengthy period of over 10 days to respond to the plaintiff’s solicitor’s letter of 9 April, which was refused by the plaintiff’s solicitor but they did allow until 14 April and the defendant’s solicitor gave a lengthy response with admirable speed. 37. It is very clear that there was correspondence, engagement and solicitors’ correspondence ongoing from 24 March until the within proceedings were instituted on 15 April. In those circumstances, there was no delay such as might deprive the plaintiff of equitable relief to which they might otherwise be found to be entitled. Indeed, a plaintiff could be criticised for rushing into court without affording a defendant, whether before or after the commencement of legal correspondence, an opportunity to engage with the issues that had been raised and which were intended to be put before a court. 12 38. The delay in the circumstances here was not such as would merit refusing the plaintiff the relief that she seeks. (iv) Alternative statutory remedy 39. The plaintiff made a complaint to the WRC pursuant to the Protected Disclosures Act on 11 March, pre-dating her purported suspension. The defendant asserts that a more appropriate statutory remedy for the plaintiff, rather than the within proceedings, was for her to file a further WRC complaint form alleging additional penalisation, which could then be considered together with her existing WRC complaint dated 11 March. She could then have sought relief before the Circuit Court pending the WRC hearing pursuant to s. 12 of the Protected Disclosures Act 2014, as amended. 40. I do not accept that this serves to deny the plaintiff the relief she seeks for the following reasons:- (1) The purported suspension postdates the penalisation complaint of 11 March. (2) The plaintiff did not limit her challenge to her suspension in her first solicitor’s letter to protected disclosure penalisation alone, but made clear allegations of breach of her legal and contractual rights arising from what she says were the defendant’s unlawful acts. Those same claims are made in the within proceedings in relation to what she says was a breach of the Rules and a failure to comply with fair procedures. Those claims could not be made in the projected disclosures penalisation claim on a stand-alone basis but, rather, as evidence of what she might claim was penalisation on grounds of having made protected disclosures. She is not limited to such a claim simply because she has previously decided to challenge her treatment as penalisation for having made a protected disclosure (a matter on which I make no comment as it is currently before the WRC). (3) The defendant has clearly asserted in correspondence and in their submissions to the court that the plaintiff is not covered by the protected disclosures as she does not come within the statutory definition of an employee. Again, that is a matter for the WRC, but the defendant’s approach is a matter that can be taken into account by this court in assessing the plaintiff’s decision to institute the within proceedings. For those reasons, I do not consider that the plaintiff was prohibited from bringing these proceedings because of the existence of previous protected disclosure proceedings. (v) A premature application 13 41. The defendant asserts that an injunction at this stage would be premature because of the appointment of an independent investigator into staff complaints made against the plaintiff, citing the decision of the Supreme Court in Rowland v An Post [2017] IESC 20as authority for why the court should not intervene prematurely. 42. The defendant’s reliance on Rowland is misplaced. That decision related to an investigation whereas the within application is for an injunction to restrain the effects of a suspension. The independent investigator or her appointment has not been challenged by the plaintiff in this interlocutory application or in her plenary summons. 43. I cannot agree that that the damage the plaintiff has asserted is capable of being remediated within the current investigation process and that, therefore, the plaintiff's application to restrain her exclusion from an election due to take place in a matter of days, is premature. The investigation cannot cure the damage that the plaintiff will suffer if she is unlawfully denied the opportunity to seek election to the NEC on 27th April next. Has the plaintiff established a strong case? 44. There are three elements to the plaintiff's case:- (1) An injunction in support of s. 13 of the Protected Disclosures Act, as amended. (2) Whether the Union’s Rules confer a power to impose an interim suspension on the plaintiff. (3) Whether the plaintiff was afforded her rights to fair procedures, such as they are. (1) An injunction and s. 13 of the Protected Disclosures Act 45. The plaintiff asserts a right to seek injunctive relief arising from what counsel says is a s. 13 claim in her plenary summons. The plenary summons seeks, inter alia, damages for the tort of detriment. There is no mention of s. 13 or any other provision of the Protected Disclosures Act in the plenary summons or in the notice of motion. 46. The defendant disputes that the plaintiff can proceed pursuant to s. 13 in the within proceedings because she is required to elect between a s. 12 claim as she has already made in her 11 March complaint to the WRC, and a s. 13 claim as both arise from the same matter, in accordance with the provisions of s. 13(2)(b). 47. The court may have jurisdiction to craft a relief beyond what is sought in a notice of motion. In Bhblasted S.R.L Societa Benefit & Ors v Meta Platforms Ireland Ltd I held that” whilst the court does have jurisdiction to craft remedies different or in addition to that sought, ideally the 14 court's focus should be on the remedy that the plaintiff has sought and on which the affidavit evidence of both parties is based.” 48. The plaintiff may still argue at trial that she has a s. 13 claim in these proceedings, which entitles her to injunctive relief and the damages she seeks for the tort of detriment but that will be a matter for the trial. 49. The plaintiff has not established a strong case that she will succeed at trial on this point. (2) Do the Rules provide for the defendant's right to suspend on an interim basis pending investigation? 50. The defendant's decision to dismiss was grounded in Rule 13.1 (as referred to in the minutes of the meeting) and insofar as the letter of 25 March refers to it, in Rule 26.4. In defending this application, the defendant has also sought to rely on Rule 26.1 and on what it says is an implied right to suspend to ensure that the rules reflect what a reasonable trade union members would understand them to mean. The defendant relies on the decision of the UK EAT in Evans v Prospect & Ors [2025] EAT 143. In effect, the defendant seeks to apply, from the ratio in Evans, a version of the business efficacy/officious bystander test. 51. The defendant also relies on the power the Rules purport to confer on its President, in conjunction with the NEC, to determine the Rules. Regardless of what the Rules might say, they cannot be above the law and whatever power is conferred on the President or the NEC does not absolve the defendant from its contractual or legal obligations to the plaintiff and taking account of the plaintiff's rights, including her contractual rights, also having a constitutional dimension and reflecting her constitutional rights (Geoghegan v Institute of Chartered Accountants [1995] 3 IR 86; Glover v BLN [1973] IR 388, Doyle v Croke (Unreported decision of the High Court, 6 May 1988) and Rogers v ITGWU (Unreported decision of the High Court, 15 March 1978). Rule 13.1 52. Rule 13.1 states: "13.1 The Officers of the Union and the ordinary members of the NEC may be removed from office by the BDC or a Special Delegate Conference should they be deemed to have acted in a manner injurious to the Union or its members, or should they become so incapacitated as to be unable to fulfil the duties of their office or if they should, from any cause, be unable or unwilling to act in the office or position to which they were elected. The NEC may suspend an Officer or any ordinary member of the NEC 15 for any of the foregoing reasons pending a determination by the BDC or a Special Delegate Conference.” It confers a power directed to suspension from the NEC office pending determination by one of the Union’s delegate conferences. This was not the power the NEC purported to exercise here as they did purport to suspend the Plaintiff as an NEC member or pending BDC or Special Delegate Conference determination, as contemplated by Rule 13. Their letter of 25 March makes no reference to the BDC or a Special Delegate Conference for determination, which Rule 13.1 expressly contemplates. Rule 26.1 and 26.4 "26.1 The NEC on receiving a complaint in writing of any member/s as per Rule 25.1, and/or Mandate employee, and/or on a report from any Local Council shall have power to investigate the conduct of any member/s in order to determine if that member/s has been guilty of any breach of these rules, and/or of conduct injurious to the interests of the Union and/or its members and/or of conduct unbecoming a member. 26.4 Subsequent to exercising Rule 26.1 the NEC will consider any complaint referred to them in whatever way they consider appropriate and consistent with the principles of natural justice and fair procedures. At the hearing of the charge, the member shall be entitled to be accompanied and/or represented by another member of the union who is not an employee of the union. There shall no legal right to legal representation on the hearing of a complaint. If the NEC considers that there are exceptional reasons which make legal representation appropriate, it may allow the member and the NEC to be legally represented at the hearing.” 53. The letter of 25 March refers to Rule 26.4. That rule is clearly exercised after an exercise of Rule 26.1. which allows the NEC to investigate a complaint. The Union is currently investigating the staff complaints against the Plaintiff by way of an independent investigation that the plaintiff does not seek to impugn. The defendant asserts that the plaintiff’s suspension is in accordance with the NEC's power to consider any such complaint “in whatever way they consider appropriate and consistent with the principles of natural justice and fair procedures". However, the remainder of Rule 26.4 is about the hearing of the charge and the member’s right to representation. 54. The powers conferred by Rule 26.4 are powers relating to the consideration of a complaint and the NEC is empowered to consider the complaint in whatever way they consider appropriate 16 subject to fair procedures. The plaintiff has been suspended "for the purpose of facilitating the above investigation" (as stated in the NEC letter of 25 March). No evidence has been put before the Court as to why the consideration of the complaint required the Plaintiff to be suspended or how a suspension was part of the NEC’s consideration of the complaints made to them. The Union’s members have determined that the NEC should be empowered to consider a complaint referred to them in whatever way they consider appropriate. They have not conferred them with an express power to do whatever they consider appropriate to facilitate an investigation as considering a complaint is a different thing to facilitating an investigation. 55. In addition, the Supreme Court in O’Sullivan recognised the decision in Braganza v BP Shipping Limited & Anor [2015] 1 W.L.R. 1661 as providing a “useful analysis of the approach to be taken by a decision-maker” (at para. 87). She held that “the decision should also be one which is neither arbitrary, capricious or irrational, and further, as was stated in Braganza, it follows that such a decision could be impugned, not only where it was one that no reasonable decision-maker could have reached, but also where the decision-making process has failed to exclude extraneous considerations, or to take account of all obviously relevant ones.” The NEC’s powers pursuant to the Rules are not as unlimited as they seem to contend. They must act fairly and lawfully in doing whatever they consider appropriate and give sufficient reasons to enable the person who has been suspended to understand why they have been suspended. Here, the plaintiff has been given no understanding why it was necessary to suspend them as a member of the union and a member of the NEC in order to facilitate the investigation into the staff complaints made against them. 56. The defendant also seeks to rely on an implied power to spend which it says is supported by Rule 25.1, which provides; "25.1 For the purposes of this rule and Rule 53, the term “member” shall mean a member of the Union whose arrears of contributions are less than the amount payable by that member in any period of 8 weeks and who is not suspended from membership or under disciplinary sanction imposed under the provisions of rule 26, such as would disqualify or prevent him/her from exercising the rights, privileges and entitlements prescribed by this rule or in rule 53. Any member whose union subscriptions are paid through deduction at source or by direct debit is automatically deemed to be a fully paid-up member of the union so long as the 17 deductions at source or direct debits are continued and are ongoing. The responsibility to ensure that union subscriptions are continued and up to date lies solely with the member concerned.” 57. Rule 25.1 appears in a separate section entitled "Rights of Members". The Union seems to contend that those rights of members include the right of the NEC to suspend a member. That is stretching the plain words of Rule 25 which, as the plaintiff submitted, is little more than a definitional section. It does not provide for the stand-alone power to suspend a member who was being investigated for which the defendant seems to contend and does not support the existence of any such power on an express or implied basis. 58. The defendant places heavy emphasis on the decision of the UK EAT in Evans. This decision arose within a statutory regime that does not exist in Irish law. I have not found this decision to be persuasive, not least as it ignores (understandably as a UK court) any constitutional context to the contractual rights of an Irish trade union member, such as have been recognised in Glover. In any event, I distinguish the decision in Evans on the facts which involved a trade union official accused of sexual harassment of a staff member. A protective measure in such a situation could be a suspension, as was recognised by the EAT where Eady J stated at para. 134: "Where (as here) allegations are made of bullying harassment on the part of an official against an employee of a trade union, it may well be both appropriate and necessary to suspend the official on a precautionary basis while an investigation is carried out; as recognised in Lewis v Heffer, to the extent such a power is not expressly provided, where a suspension would be necessary to allow for the fair investigation of allegations without risk of further complaint, this would need to be implied". 59. I prefer and apply the decision of this Court in Doyle v Croke and where Costello J in holding at p. 16 of his decision, that the plaintiffs, as members of their union, had constitutional rights to fair procedures arising from Article 40.6.1.iii and Article 40.3, stated: "So it seems to me that there should be implied into the contract between the union and each of its members by virtue of this Article a provision that fair procedures will be adopted when any decision materially affecting the members’ rights is to be taken". He went on at p. 17 to say that the common law implied the same term that fair procedures would be adopted in relation to decisions taken by the committees of trade unions which materially affect the rights of any of its members, from common law principles. He said: 18 “The courts must not interfere officiously in the affairs of private associations such as trade unions and must only do so in clear cases to prevent or remedy some manifest injustice”. He considered that this test was satisfied in that case by the "important rights" of each union member to require the union to represent them in negotiations with their former employer and to participate in any settlement that negotiations might produce. Whilst the plaintiff's rights here are not identical, I consider them to be as important, particularly taking account of the recognition of the court in Rogers v ATGWU that; "A necessary corollary of the right to join, and become a member of a trade union that the right must extend to taking part in the democratic processes provided by it". 60. I should say for the avoidance of doubt that I do not discount the possibility of an implied right to suspend a trade union member where it is appropriate or necessary to do so, such as the extreme urgency that arose in Sullivan v HSE [2023] IESC 11. However, the circumstances that arose here, together with the absence of any evidence identified by the defendant as to why the plaintiff’s suspension was necessary to facilitate the investigation are entirely insufficient to imply a right to suspend into those Rules. It seems to be similar to the situation in Bank of Ireland v Reilly [2015] IEHC 241, where, at para. 49, Noonan J said; "No evidence has been adduced by the Bank as to why it was necessary to suspend Mr Reilly, lest still justify the manner in which it was done" Noonan J. went on to conclude, at para. 50, having considered the situation of other employees who had not been suspended that "It must follow as a logical consequence that the suspensions were nothing to do with the pending investigation and disciplinary process but rather were an expression by the Bank of its view of the seriousness of the matter and its resolve to punish those responsible accordingly". 61. In this regard, I note the comments of the plaintiff's counsel, in making his case that there was no evidence before the court as to why the investigation into the staff’s complaints require the plaintiff to be suspended, that the plaintiff does not need to be suspended to be told not to ask staff to circulate her candidate profile. 62. I am satisfied that the plaintiff has established a strong case that she will succeed at trial in establishing that the defendant’s Rules do not permit her interim suspension, whether pursuant to Rules 13.1 and 26.4, as identified by the defendant in its letter of 25 March confirming the decision 19 taken at the meeting of 22 March, or by implication in the circumstances relied upon by the defendant and said to be supported by Rule 25.1. Fair procedures 63. There is ample authority for the proposition that an employee is entitled to some, albeit not the full panoply of, fair procedures in advance of a decision to suspend (Bank of Ireland v Reilly, Sullivan v HSE, Mason v ILTT Ltd [2021] IEHC 477. The plaintiff is not an employee. Nevertheless, having regard to the significant impact that her suspension will have on her and her constitutional rights as a trade union member as set out above and confirmed in the decisions Doyle, Glover and Rogers, I am satisfied that the same minimum fair procedures apply to the decision of a union to suspend a member as a member of the union and/or its National Executive Council. 64. The main requirement of fairness was considered most recently by the Supreme Court in Sullivan v HSE where, at para. 78, Dunne J stated:- “Thus, where it is clear that a decision to place someone on administrative leave is being contemplated, that person should be so informed and should be afforded the opportunity to make representations as to why that should not occur. That is no more than fairness requires. That does not mean the ‘full panoply’ of fair procedures, as Noonan J said in bank of Ireland v Reilly, but it is a basic level of fairness that is required.” 65. Counsel for the defendant says that fair procedures must be considered in context and in the round. No matter how many times one might go around what the NEC did between 22 March and 13 April, there is no evidence of the plaintiff having received anything resembling the basic fair procedures to which she was entitled. 66. The defendant contends that the plaintiff was afforded fair procedures in their consideration of her letter to the employees and her solicitor’s correspondence at their meeting of 13 April. Those letters were not the representations that the plaintiff was entitled to make and, even if they were, they were being considered (a) by the same body who made the original decision and (b) by a body that included persons whom the plaintiff says could benefit from her exclusion from the election. The suggestion that a consideration of the plaintiff's letter to employees and her solicitor’s pre- litigation correspondence constituted an opportunity to make representations as to why she should not be suspended, is unconvincing. 67. The defendant’s deponent gives a very brief account of the 13 April meeting at paragraph 91 of his affidavit in which he refers to "the threat of litigation", the Union’s decision to defend their position in court, the need to defend the Union's reputation, the importance of collective decision- 20 making and "legal preparedness in defending their actions". Their focus seems to have been on the Union and the prospect of defending litigation rather than on why the plaintiff should or should not be suspended. That is not the fair procedures, even the minimum fair procedures, to which the plaintiff was entitled. 68. The plaintiff has established a strong case that she will succeed at trial in establishing an unlawful denial of the fair procedures owed to her in relation to the decision to suspend her membership of the union and the NEC at its meeting of 22 March and again at its meeting of 13 April. Balance of justice 69. I now proceed to consider the balance of justice in circumstances where the parties agree that damages are not an adequate remedy. 70. The consequences for the plaintiff of her purported suspension include, in the immediate short-term, that she is denied the opportunity to seek re-election to the NEC in accordance with the nomination of her local council and other councils. The pending election will form the membership of the NEC for the next two years. 71. Counsel for the plaintiff accepts that the defendant may seek to invoke Rule 12 given their issues in relation to the validation of her nomination. Rule 12 provides as follows; "12.1 Any complaint as to an alleged breach of the rules relating to the NEC elections shall be made in writing to the Returning Officer. If the opinion of the Returning Officer there has been a breach of these rules, the Returning Officer shall consult the President. The Returning Officer shall then decide whether the election shall proceed, whether an election shall be declared null and void or if the election of any person void or any nominee disqualified and take such decisions as may be proper to him or her. 12.2 The decision of the Returning Officer on any matter under this section of the rules shall be final and binding on all members. The General Secretary shall publish to Local Councils the written report of the Returning Officer on any investigation conducted by him/her, together with the Returning Officer’s decision thereon.” 72. The defendant has also accepted the applicability of Rule 12 where, in their solicitor’s letter of 14 April, they referred the plaintiff’s solicitor to Rule 12 in refusing the plaintiff's solicitor’s claim that the plaintiff would be without a remedy if she was prevented from contesting the election. However, the plaintiff will not be able to invoke Rule 12, and neither will the defendant be 21 able to invoke it against her, for so long as she is suspended and expressly precluded from taking part in any Union activity, including participation in Union elections (as stated in the NEC's letter of 25 March). The Plaintiff’s suspension is not simply of a breach of the Rules in relation to NEC elections but the issues relating to the plaintiff's nomination may be, and the plaintiff's counsel accept this to be so. 73. If an injunction is not granted, the plaintiff loses her right to even assert an entitlement to participate in the elections due to take place on 27 April next. If the injunction is granted, the defendant will have to allow the plaintiff to participate in Union activities, including elections, insofar as she is entitled to do so. If, at trial, it is found that she is not entitled to similar injunctive relief on a permanent basis, the outcome of any election in which she participated may be at issue. That will be a matter for the trial. 74. I have no evidence before me as to how or why the Plaintiff’s participation in the election could interfere with the current independent investigation. For the avoidance of doubt, it may be (and is accepted by counsel for the plaintiff) that protective measures may have to be put in place to facilitate that investigation, but there is no evidence that her suspension or denying her any opportunity to participate in the election and the conference scheduled to take place on 27 April next, is necessary. 75. The least risk of injustice clearly rests with the grant of injunctive relief in relation to the plaintiff’s purported suspension and subject to strict case management to ensure that this case gets on for hearing as soon as is possible. Conclusion 76. I will make interlocutory orders in terms of paragraph 5 of the Notice of Motion. I have put the matter in before me at 10am on 8 May to deal with costs and such case management as may be appropriate. Counsel for the Plaintiff: Conor Power SC, Michael Kingsley BL Counsel for the Defendant: Lorna Lynch SC, Tiernan Lowey BL