McLoughlin v The Protected Disclosures Commissioner and Ors

[2026] IEHC 149 THE HIGH COURT JUDICIAL REVIEW [2024/1186 JR] BETWEEN: GEORGE MCLOUGHLIN APPLICANT AND THE PROTECTED DISCLOSURES COMMISSIONER RESPONDENT AND AND THE STANDARDS IN PUBLIC OFFICE COMMISSION AND THE MINISTER FOR ENTERPRISE, TRADE AND EMPLOYMENT NOTICE PARTIES JUDGMENT of Mr. Justice Barry O’Donnell delivered on the 10th day of March 2026 INTRODUCTION 1. This judgment is given on an application for leave to seek judicial review challenging a decision made by the Protected Disclosures Commissioner (the PDC) on the 2 July 2024 to close a report made by the applicant. On the 27 January 2025, this Court (Gearty J.) directed that the application for leave was to be made on notice to the respondent and notice parties. For reasons that will be explained and having regard to the history of the applicant’s complaints and their treatment in the High Court, this judgment should be read in conjunction with previous decisions made in related proceedings by Barr J. and Nolan J. respectively reported as McLoughlin v. The Labour Court [2022] IEHC 283, and McLoughlin v. Minister for Enterprise [2024] IEHC 696. 2. The applicant, who is a litigant in person, seeks an order of certiorari quashing the decision of the respondent dated the 2 July 2024 to close a protected disclosures complaint submitted by the applicant. Further to this primary relief, the applicant is also seeking his complaint to be transferred to “an independent and impartial ‘prescribed person’”. The factual and legal grounds upon which the relief is sought are set out by the applicant over 54 paragraphs in his statement of grounds. The factual grounds rehearse a history of issues dating back to 2017 that, broadly speaking, arise from the applicant’s employment as a labour inspector by the Department of Enterprise, Trade and Employment (the Department). 3. The immediate trigger for these proceedings was that the applicant was dissatisfied with the manner in which the Standards in Public Office (SIPO) had dealt with certain complaints that he had made. The applicant made a report to the PDC in October 2023 alleging that SIPO failed to investigate complaints of wrongdoing by officials of the National Employment Rights Authority (NERA), the Workplace Relations Commission (WRC) and the Department. The argument was that SIPO failed to discharge its statutory remit under the Ethics in Public Office and Standards in Public Office legislation (the Ethics Acts). Following an initial assessment process, the PDC made a final decision on the 2 July 2024 that, for reasons that were given, there was no prima facie evidence that relevant wrongdoing may have occurred in this case. There were no further statutory avenues by which the applicant could challenge or appeal that decision and he therefore commenced these proceedings. 4. In very brief summary, the legal grounds for the intended challenge to the PDC decision are that the decision did not explain the reasons why the PDC found that there was no prima facie case made out, the decision was irrational and arbitrary, and the manner in which it reached breached the applicant’s rights to fair procedures. The applicant filed a lengthy verifying affidavit to which he exhibited approximately 150 pages of material. 5. In advance of the hearing of this application, on the 10 March 2025, Damien Cahill swore an affidavit on behalf of the PDC, which exhibited a large volume of material. On the 14 March 2025, Pat Phelan swore an affidavit on behalf of the Notice Party Minister. The applicant swore a replying affidavit on 14 May 2025. The court also had the benefit of written legal submissions from the applicant, the PDC and the Minister. The presentation of the written submissions was structured so that the applicant in effect replied to the written submissions made by the opposing parties, although the burden of establishing an entitlement to an order granting leave to apply for judicial review remained on him. 6. For the reasons set out in this judgment, I am satisfied that leave to apply for judicial review should not be granted in this case. 7. In order to explain that decision, it will be necessary to set out in some detail the lengthy background to the application. In that regard, it is important to note that, as they travelled through the system, a large number of the applicant’s historic complaints were dealt with by statutory appeal mechanisms and were the subject of two unsuccessful applications for relief by way of judicial review. Hence, while there has been no consideration by this court of the treatment of his complaints by the PDC, the court considers it significant that the underlying complaints that triggered the applicant’s complaint to the PDC in fact had been the subject of considerable prior consideration and determinations. Before addressing the facts, it would be helpful to begin by identifying the legal principles that apply to an application of this type. APPLICABLE LEGAL PRINCIPLES 8. This is an application for leave to apply for judicial review and not a substantive hearing of a judicial review application. As confirmed by the Supreme Court in O’Doherty v. Minister for Health [2023] 2 I.R. 488, at paras 39 and 40, the test to be applied by the court remains that of arguability, as explained in G. v. Director of Public Prosecutions [1994] 1 I.R. 374. The Supreme Court noted that the test imposes “a relatively low bar”, but there is a threshold. In that regard, the Court reiterated the observations made by Charleton J. in O.O. (a minor) v. The Minister for Justice and Equality [2015] IESC 26, that a point of law “is only arguable within the meaning of the relevant decisions if it could, by the standards of a rational preliminary analysis, ultimately have a prospect of success. 9. Hence, the Court stated at para. 39: “It must be a case that has a prospect of success (otherwise it would not be an arguable case) but does not require more than that. ... This test — it must be stressed — is solely one of arguability: it is emphatically not a test framed by reference to whether a case enjoys a reasonable prospect of success, still less a likelihood of success. Any such language obscures the nature of the test and may on occasion lead to misunderstanding, appeal and consequent delay.” 10. The Court went on to note at para 40, that, where an application for leave is made on notice, a respondent can put evidence before the court and advance argument. That does not alter the threshold test, but the decision must be made “in the light of the evidence submitted by a respondent, and the arguments adduced.” 11. Accordingly, the court has considered, in the light of the evidence submitted by each side and the arguments that have been made, whether by the standards of rational preliminary analysis the case proposed to be made by the applicant has a prospect of success, but no more than a prospect of success. If an applicant establishes that the case sought to be made has such a prospect of success leave will be granted and the substantive consideration of the overall merits of the case would be a matter for the trial judge. BACKGROUND AND PREVIOUS COMPLAINTS Protected Disclosures 12. The applicant was employed as a labour inspector from the period 2008 to 2017, when he reached the statutory retirement age. The applicant initially was assigned as a labour inspector to NERA, before subsequently being assigned in the same role to the WRC in October 2015. 13. The earliest relevant point in the chronology of these and related proceedings is May 2015. The applicant raised concerns in relation to the manner in which inspections were conducted by NERA. These concerns were relayed by the applicant to Kieran Mulvey, who was director of the WRC at the relevant time and to Padraig Dooley, the deputy director. 14. The precise complaints raised by the applicant alleged a pro-employer bias on behalf of NERA/WRC. Having regard to the fact that the complaints impugn the integrity of several individuals and statutory bodies, are not directly relevant to the application before the Court and have been considered by the High Court in related proceedings, it is not necessary to set the substance of these complaints out in detail. 15. The applicant further explained to Mr. Mulvey and Mr. Dooley that he intended to make protected disclosures pursuant to the Protected Disclosures Act 2014. The applicant subsequently made this disclosure in September 2015 to Philip Kelly, Secretary General in the Department (the First Protected Disclosure). 16. The First Protected Disclosure concluded with a report of Turlough O’Sullivan dated April 2016. The report was prepared by Mr. O’Sullivan in his role with Resolve Ireland, who prepared the report on an independent basis for the Department. The report found that on the basis of the evidence submitted by the applicant, the complaint regarding a culture of deference to employers within NERA could not be upheld. 17. A subsequent protected disclosure was made to the Department on the 2 November 2016 (the Second Protected Disclosure). This disclosure focussed on the manner in which the First Protected Disclosure was considered by the Department. The applicant also alleged penalisation suffered by him conducted by management in NERA and the WRC as a result of making his protected disclosure. The private secretary to Minster Mitchell O’Connor communicated the Minister’s decision by email on the 13 February 2017. The Minister was satisfied that the First Protected Disclosure was investigated in an appropriate and independent manner, and that the conclusion of the investigation was communicated to the applicant. 18. The applicant further repeated his protected disclosure to Minister Frances Fitzgerald in July 2017 (the Third Protected Disclosure). This protected disclosure appears to be a re- iteration of the complaints made to Minister O’Connor and focussed primarily on the manner in which the investigation of his disclosure by the Department was conducted in 2015. WRC and Labour Court Proceedings 19. The protected disclosures of the applicant were made alongside complaints to the WRC and subsequently to the Labour Court. The first WRC proceedings were commenced on the 12 and 15 December 2016. These complaints relate to penalisation in the context of the Protected Disclosures Act. The WRC proposed mediation in respect of these complaints in January 2017 to which the applicant agreed. The mediation process concerning the first WRC complaint concluded without agreement on the 22 June 2017. 20. As the applicant was due to retire in January 2017, he applied for retention in employment, which would allow him to continue to work as a labour inspector when he reached the retirement age of 65-years. There was a disagreement as to whether the applicant withdrew his application prior to its rejection by his employer. However, as subsequently determined by Barr J., the applicant withdrew his application for retention and did not submit any further application thereafter. The applicant thus must be taken to have retired in January 2017. 21. On the 13 June 2017, the applicant submitted a second complaint to the WRC alleging unfair dismissal following what the applicant described as his “forced retirement”. 22. The WRC complaints in train at this point of the chronology were adjudicated on the 27 September 2017. The dispute concerning whether the applicant withdrew his retention application or whether it was rejected was ventilated at this instance. It appears that the WRC provided its decisions in relation to these complaints on the 28 November 2017. 23. The applicant was not satisfied with the manner in which the retention issue was addressed at the WRC hearing and thus submitted a further complaint to the WRC on the 28 September 2017. This was followed by another complaint on the 13 December 2017 concerning how his protected disclosure to Minster Fitzgerald was handled. 24. The applicant appealed the WRC decisions in relation to the first three complaints but withdrew one of these appeals thereafter. The appeal to the Labour Court was heard on the 17 May 2018. Two outstanding WRC complaints were heard on the 27 June 2018. 25. To summarise the months following the June 2018 hearing in the WRC, in essence the WRC found against the applicant in each instance. Following each negative finding, the applicant appealed the decisions to the Labour Court. Therefore, by October 2018, all complaints before the WRC had been adjudicated upon, and appealed unsuccessfully to the Labour Court. 26. The appeal decisions of the Labour Court concerning the unfair dismissal complaint and a penalisation complaint were then appealed by the applicant to the High Court. There appears to be some discrepancy in the record numbers provided by the applicant concerning the Labour Court decisions subject to High Court appeal. It can be extracted from the context that the applicant brought an application to have the penalisation claim struck out, while the unfair dismissals claim was resolved by agreement wherein the Labour Court decision was set aside and the complaint remitted for rehearing. This brings the chronology of events to the end of 2018. 27. On the 10 March 2019, the applicant submitted a further WRC complaint on the basis that the chairman of the Labour Court erred in not recusing himself from hearing the applicant’s appeals in relation to two complaints on the basis of the Chairman’s “longstanding professional relationship with the WRC Director”, as alleged by the applicant. This complaint was rejected on the basis it was frivolous and vexatious. This decision was appealed to the Labour Court in April 2019. An outstanding appeal to the Labour Court in relation to the applicant’s protected disclosure to Minister Fitzgerald was also rejected in April 2019. 28. In January 2020, the three live appeals before the Labour Court were heard. These consisted of the WRC complaint rejected on the basis it was frivolous and vexatious, the complaint concerning the retention application, and the unfair dismissals complaint which was remitted for rehearing. In February 2020, the Labour Court rejected the three appeals. 29. The applicant initiated the first of his judicial review actions in March 2020, challenging the three Labour Court decisions made in February 2020. This judicial review action resulted in judgment being delivered by Barr J. on the 12 May 2022: McLoughlin v The Labour Court [2022] IEHC 283. For the sake of clarity, the judgment of Barr J. will be considered following the chronology of events. 30. At the same time that the judicial review proceedings were in train, the applicant submitted a further WRC complaint alleging penalisation as against the Department due to the fact they sought their costs in relation to the previous complaints raised concerning the applicant’s protected disclosures. The WRC rejected the applicant’s complaint in January 2022 and it does not appear this decision was appealed by the applicant. Chronology of events within these proceedings 31. The events outlined above were not matters required to be adjudicated upon by this Court but were instead set out for the sake of context. The events considered below are those which are pleaded before this Court for the purposes of the application for leave to apply for judicial review. As will become clear, the events before this Court overlap substantially with the events which were before the Court in the applicant’s second set of judicial review proceedings: (Nolan J.) McLoughlin v Minister for Enterprise [2024] IEHC 696. 32. Following the judgment of Barr J. in May 2022, the applicant submitted complaints to SIPO in November 2022. The applicant submitted that this complaint detailed “unfair, unethical and illegal behaviours amounting to serious breaches of the Civil Service Code of Standards and Behaviour by senior officials of NERA/WRC and the Department in response to [the applicant’s] ‘protected disclosures’.” 33. On the 7 March 2023, the applicant submitted a further disclosure to Minister Coveney under s. 8 of the Protected Disclosures Act 2014. That provision is concerned with situations where, inter alia, the applicant has previously submitted a report but has not received feedback in the time period specified within the Act, or where the applicant reasonably believes that the head of a public body is complicit in the wrongdoing complained. 34. On the 8 March 2023, SIPO notified the applicant that they had decided not to investigate the applicant’s November 2022 complaints. This was stated to be on the basis that the subject matter was not of sufficient gravity to warrant investigation by the Commission. 35. On the 28 March 2023, the PDC notified the applicant that the Secretary General of the Department had been appointed to investigate the disclosure made to Minister Coveney. 36. On the 26 April 2023, the Department notified the applicant that the complaint submitted to Minister Coveney has been closed on the basis that “it is a repetitive report and does not contain any meaningful new information about a relevant wrongdoing compared to past reports.” The applicant instituted judicial review proceedings against this decision on the 12 July 2023. 37. During the course of the exchange of pleadings for the second judicial review action, on the 31 October 2023 the applicant submitted a further report to the PDC concerned with the decision of SIPO made on 8 March 2023 not to investigate the complaint submitted to that body in November of 2022. The treatment and outcome of that report is the subject of the proposed challenge in this judicial review. On 23 January 2024, the PDC exercised a statutory power to extend the time within which they must reply to his complaint. 38. In April 2024, the PDC issued a draft decision in accordance with the relevant statutory provisions. The draft decision communicated to the applicant was to close the November 2023 complaint on the basis that the applicant failed to provide “prima facie evidence that a relevant wrongdoing may have occurred.” In accordance with the procedure provided in statute, the applicant was provided one month in which to notify the PDC of any inaccuracies or omissions in the draft decision. 39. The applicant took up the opportunity to provide a response to the draft decision on the 23 April 2024. This reply pointed to what the applicant considered were 16 instances where senior officials in the Department were acting unlawfully in their response to the applicant’s protected disclosure. Subsequently, the applicant provided a further 154-pages of documents which were asserted to support the claim that there were 16 instances of wrongdoing. 40. The final decision of the PDC was communicated to the applicant on the 2 July 2024. The decision closed the November 2023 complaint on the basis proposed in the draft decision. The applicant sought to initiate the instant judicial review proceedings on the 24 September 2024. The applicant noted that he requested the current proceedings to be joined to the second judicial review action, which at this point was set down for hearing but was not yet heard. As the applicant did not have an Order granting leave to bring these judicial review proceedings, the proceedings could not be joined to the second set of proceedings. 41. The second judicial review action was heard on the 7 and 8 November 2024. Judgment was delivered by Nolan J. on the 12 December 2024, refusing the applicant relief. 42. By Order of Gearty J. on the 27 January 2025, this application was directed to be heard on notice to the respondent and notice party, with further procedural directions also made. This application for leave to apply for judicial review was heard on the 13 November 2025, bringing the protracted factual history to the present day. PREVIOUS JUDICIAL REVIEWS 43. In the premise that the judicial review action sought to be advanced by the applicant is linked to a factual matrix which has already produced two judgments of this court – albeit that the applicant argued that they engaged separate legal issues – it may be helpful to set out the scope of these judgments. McLoughlin v The Labour Court [2022] IEHC 283 (Barr J.) 44. The first application for judicial review was heard by Barr J., and it concerned a challenge to three determinations of the Labour Court issued in February 2020. On the basis that the issues arising concerned employment proceedings before the WRC and Labour Court, it is not necessary to repeat in any great detail the decisions impugned in these proceedings. Refusing relief in relation to each impugned decision, Barr J. summarised the position before the Court in the following terms: 116. The evidence before the court suggests that the applicant is a decent man, who conscientiously carried out his duties as a labour inspector. He made a protected disclosure in September 2015. He is convinced that as a result of that, persons within the management of the WRC took steps to secure his dismissal. However, he was not in fact dismissed. He retired upon reaching his normal retirement date at the age of 65 years. Insofar as he may have felt that he was wrongly excluded from consideration for retention in employment beyond the age of 65 years, that issue became moot when he withdrew his application on 28th November, 2016. He never submitted any further application for retention in employment. Thus, no issue arises as to whether anyone in the WRC, or in the notice party, was correct or incorrect to hold that he was ineligible for retention in employment. 117. The applicant turned 70 years of age on 9th January, 2022. The court is hopeful that this judgment will bring an end to these acrimonious proceedings and allow the applicant to enjoy his retirement in the company of his wife and daughters. 45. Notwithstanding that a substantial proportion of the papers submitted by the applicant were concerned with the underlying WRC complaints, the judgment of Barr J. is conclusive as to the issues relating to the matters adjudicated upon by the Labour Court. While it is reasonable for the applicant to provide by way of context some level of detail concerning matters which are not strictly before this court, a clear distinction must be made between documentation by way of context, on the one hand, and documentation intended to rehearse matters already determined by the High Court, on the other. 46. It was evident throughout the hearing of the application for leave that the distinction between the precise decision impugned in this application and those decisions previously decided was blurred in the mind of the applicant. McLoughlin v Minister for Enterprise Trade and Employment [2024] IEHC 696 (Nolan J.) 47. This application for judicial review concerned the manner in which the Department dealt with the 2023 protected disclosure submitted to Minster Coveney, as well as the decision of the PDC to appoint the Secretary General of the Department to investigate the complaint. It can be noted that the applicant clearly must be taken as accepting that the second judicial review proceedings and these proceedings had a rational connection, as he had sought unsuccessfully to have both proceedings heard together. 48. The applicant sought orders of certiorari setting aside the decision of the Department to close his protected disclosure. That decision was made on the basis that is was a repetitive report that did not contain any new meaningful information about a relevant wrongdoing when compared to previous reports. Similarly, the applicant sought certiorari in relation to the decision to choose the Secretary General to investigate the protected disclosure. 49. Nolan J. noted in his judgment that the applicant utilised the judicial review application before him as a forum in which to ventilate matters previously considered by Barr J. Nolan J. further considered that the applicant showed a lack of understanding of the role of the High Court in the proceedings, confusing the purpose of judicial review with that of an appeal. 50. After setting out the well-established principles underpinning the test to be applied in judicial review, Nolan J. considered that having regard to the wide discretion afforded to the PDC to choose an appropriate person to consider the disclosure, the decision to choose the Secretary General of the Department could not be said to be illogical. The judgment engaged in a detailed and considered analysis of the ancillary and indeed tangential matters raised by the applicant during the course of the proceedings. These matters were in reality issues already determined by Barr J., and as put by Nolan J., were simply “old wine in old bottles”. ARGUMENTS Applicant’s arguments 51. The crux of the applicant’s case is that the respondent closed the applicant’s complaints without proper investigation and follow-up. For the sake of clarity and having regard to the sheer volume of complaints already referred to above, the applicant seeks to impugn the decision of the PDC to close a complaint submitted against SIPO. The applicant contends that the decision of the respondent is “arbitrary, irrational, unreasonable self-contradictory.” The applicant notes that it took 8 months for the respondent to conclude on the applicant’s complaints. The applicant contends that the respondent failed within this period to identify any reasonable grounds to explain SIPO’s decision to close the applicant’s complaints. 52. The applicant further argues that the respondent’s finding that the applicant failed to provide sufficient evidence to support his complaints to SIPO is both incorrect and incompatible with the finding of SIPO. The applicant considers that the period of 8 months which it took the respondent to make its decision coupled with the respondent seeking legal advice on multiple occasions, directly contradicts the finding that the complaint was inadmissible prima facie. A related argument is outlined such that if the complaint was truly inadmissible, it ought not to take 8 months to make a decision. 53. A further finding of SIPO that the complaints of the applicant relate to historical matters is also impugned. The applicant argues that it is irrational and unreasonable to conclude that what the applicant describes as “serious breaches of the Civil Service Code of Standards and Behaviour by senior officials of NERA/WRC and the Department” constitute “historical matters”. 54. Significantly from the perspective of the court, the applicant in his written submissions described his complaints to SIPO as distinct from the complaints to the WRC and Labour Court. He argued that significant elements within those complaints fell outside the 7 month “cognisable period” identified by the Labour Court, whereas his complaints to SIPO “would be investigated in terms of the totality of the nine years of my employment with NERA/WRC so that the full truth in relation to my attempts to raise legitimate concerns over the entire period would be in the public domain.” From the point of view of the court, this statement clearly locates the current dispute squarely in the context of the previous matters that already have been determined. Respondent’s Arguments 55. The PDC asserted that this application for leave to bring judicial review proceedings is a mechanism by which the applicant seeks to ventilate long-standing grievances which have already been adjudicated upon both by statutory bodies and by the High Court. This application, it is argued, is therefore vexatious and / or an abuse of process. In a connected argument, the PDC contended that the grant of any relief to the applicant would be futile in light of the existing findings made by the High Court. 56. The PDC argued alternatively that an arguable case has not been made out on the basis that the applicant has confused the purpose of judicial review with that of a de novo type appeal, when one considers the relevant statutory provisions in issue. 57. The arguments on behalf of the Minister were premised entirely on the abuse of process arguments. In summary the Minister, in common with the PDC, highlighted that in his report to the PDC of 31 October 2023 the applicant stated at paragraph 2: “The ‘relevant wrongdoing’ identified in this report relates to the failure by the Standards in Public Office Commission (“the Commission”) to investigate complaints I submitted to that body in November and December 2022 arising from specific actions and omissions, detailed hereunder, amounting to unfair, unethical and illegal behaviours, by senior officials of the National Employment Rights Authority (“NERA”) – subsequently the Workplace Relations Commission (“WRC”) – and the Department of Enterprise Trade & Employment (“the Department”), aimed (a) at penalising me for ‘protected disclosures’ critical for their mismanagement of the state’s labour inspectorate that I made to NERA/WRC Director Kieran Mulvey and Deputy Director Padraig Dooley in May 2015, to the Department’s Assistant Secretary Philip Kelly in September 2015 and to Minister Frances Fitzgerald in July 2017 and (b) at preventing me from securing redress for the penalisation at the WRC and Labour Court.” 58. Both parties noted that this summary identified (a) the clear connection between the complaints to SIPO and then to the PDC and the earlier complaints that all had been ventilated through the relevant statutory processes, and (b) an attempt to re-litigate the matters that had been disposed of in the earlier judicial review proceedings. The Minister emphasised that Barr J. found that the applicant had retired in January 2017 and that the claim that the applicant was wrongly excluded from retention was moot. Likewise, the Minister noted that Nolan J. had held that the applicant’s complaint that he had been subjected to punitive action was wrong, and that the applicant was seeking to ventilate personal matters. 59. In relation to the abuse of process arguments the PDC and Minister referred to Fay v. Tegral Pipes [2005] 2 I.R. 261, and the following observations of McCracken J at page 266: “12. … the courts are entitled to ensure that the privilege of access to the courts, which is of considerable constitutional importance in relation to genuine disputes between parties, will only be used for the resolution of genuine disputes and not as a forum for lost causes which, no matter how strongly the party concerned may feel about them, nevertheless have no basis for a complaint in law. The second, and equally important purpose of the jurisdiction is to ensure that litigants will not be subjected to the time consuming, expensive and worrying process of being asked to defend a claim which cannot succeed.” 60. Similar observations can be found in Doherty v. Minister for Justice [2009] IEHC 246, Fox v. McDonald [2017] IECA 189, Kearney v. Bank of Scotland plc [2018] IEHC 265, Grange v. Information Commissioner [2022] IECA 153, and Cronin v. Cowen [2023] IEHC 190. It can also be noted that the Supreme Court in Ewing v. Ireland [2013] IESC 44 set out a number of factors that are indicative of vexatious litigation. I agree with the PDC argument that the following factors are pertinent to this application: “(a) the bringing of one or more actions to determine an issue which has already been determined by a court of competent jurisdiction; … (d) where issues tend to be rolled forward into subsequent actions and repeated and supplemented, often with actions brought against the lawyers who have acted for the or against the litigant in earlier proceedings; (e) where the person instituting the proceedings has failed to pay the costs of unsuccessful proceedings;” 61. In relation to factor (d) in the above list, it is clear that the applicant is not suing lawyers who had acted for or against him, although he used the proceedings as a platform inter alia to criticise a body that had provided him with advice at an earlier stage. Moreover, the point is that these proceedings effectively involve the applicant suing parties who he perceives had mishandled complaints made in relation to matters that have been determined in a variety of fora, including for some complaints, the High Court. The PDC also argued that at the point when the issue was being argued, which in fairness to the applicant was shortly after the decision from Nolan J was handed down, it was far from clear that the applicant would be in a position to discharge the costs order that had been made. 62. Over and above the arguments relating to abuse of process, the PDC made arguments directly related to the grounds that the applicant wished to agitate if leave was granted. 63. The PDC arguments emphasised, correctly in my view, that this is an application for judicial review and not an appeal from the decision made by the PDC. The PDC has been tasked with the statutory power to make certain decisions, and the process for making those decisions is described in statute. Within the parameters of the statutory powers exercised by the PDC, and subject to adherence with the usual principles of natural justice, the PDC and not the court must make the prescribed decisions. There can be no question of the court considering the relevant materials and reaching its own view on the subject matter. The court is concerned with the separate issue of whether the decision that the applicant seeks to impugn has been made lawfully. Hence it is essential to consider the statutory framework within which the decision in question was made. 64. The PDC highlighted the wording and operation of section 10C of the Act. That provides for the direct reporting of matters to the PDC. The first substantive task under section 10C is for the PDC to identify an appropriate prescribed person or other suitable person to receive the report. If a suitable recipient cannot be identified, section 10C(5) of the 2014 Act provides that the PDC “shall accept the report” and notify the reporting person (which for these purposes is the applicant) of the reasons for accepting the report. Subsection (6) requires the PDC to establish procedures “for handling reports accepted under subsection (5) and for follow-up.” 65. The nature of the focus of the initial stages of the consideration of a report is set out clearly in section 10C(7) of the 2014 Act. By section 10C(7) (a) (i) and (ii), the PDC is to carry out “an initial assessment, including seeking further information from the reporting person if required, as to whether there is prima facie evidence that a relevant wrongdoing may have occurred.” If, having carried out that initial assessment, the PDC decides that there is no prima facie evidence that a relevant wrongdoing may have occurred, the procedure is to be closed and the reporting person is to be notified in writing of and provided with reasons for the decision. 66. Turning to the decision that the applicant seeks to impugn, it is readily apparent that the PDC complied with the procedural requirements set out in section 10C. 67. As noted above, the PDC received the complaint in question on the 31 October 2023, and the report was formally acknowledged on the 1 November 2023. The PDC was unable to identify a suitable recipient for the report, and this was explained to the applicant. An initial assessment of the report was conducted. Further information was sought from the applicant. In an email dated the 5 December 2023 the applicant stated that he considered that his report was comprehensive but if any particular matters required clarification he was happy to do so. The PDC notified the applicant of its draft decision in an email dated the 18 April 2024. The applicant was invited to make observations as to whether there were any inaccuracies or omissions in the draft. The applicant made relatively extensive submissions on foot of the draft decision. Having considered those responses, the PDC issued its final decision on the 2 July 2024. 68. The decision rehearses the history of the report and the initial assessment process. The decision maker noted that the process utilised had regard to the 2014 Act and the underlying Directive. The substantive part of the decision noted that, if substantiated, a decision by SIPO to close a complaint without reasonable grounds for doing so could constitute “relevant wrongdoing” within the meaning of section 5(3)(b) and (f) of the 2014 Act, i.e. a failure to comply with a legal obligation and gross mismanagement. 69. The decision noted that the burden at the initial assessment stage was on the applicant, as reporting person, to provide prima facie evidence which shows that relevant wrongdoing may have occurred. 70. In a letter dated the 8 March 2023 from SIPO to the applicant, the applicant was informed that SIPO had considered his complaint in line with the provisions of the Ethics Acts. The letter went on to inform the applicant that, in accordance with section 4(5) of the Standards in Public Office Act 2001, the Commission decided to close the complaints on the basis that the subject matter was not of sufficient gravity to warrant investigation by the Commission. In that regard the PDC found that a decision was made on the applicant’s complaint. That decision was within the remit of SIPO, as set out in the relevant legislation, the complaints were not ignored and they were considered. The decision went on to state: “Therefore, while it is clear you do not agree with the decision made, based on the evidence provided by you, I do not consider but there was a refusal by SIPO ‘to discharge its core remit of promoting compliance by public servants.’” 71. The decision went on to note that the designated person's view was that the information provided by the applicant consisted of a series of assertions and that the background information provided which concerned the applicant’s interactions with NERA and the Department was not relevant to the actions of SIPO. In those circumstances the decision maker was unable to identify any evidence in the applicant’s report to support a conclusion that SIPO failed to discharge its core remit, as opposed to it making a decision with which the applicant did not agree. Accordingly, the decision was that there was no prima facie evidence that relevant wrongdoing may have occurred in the case. 72. When one considers the Decision in the light of the clear statutory provisions that governed the process, it is clear to the court that the PDC was correct in approaching the initial assessment on the basis that it was necessary to find that the report established on a prima facie basis that relevant wrongdoing had occurred. I agree with the PDC that the statutory provisions strongly support the proposition that the reporting person is to provide sufficient information to allow the initial assessment to ascertain if a prima facie case has been made out. This is reinforced to my mind by the express statutory power to seek further information from the reporting person if required, but without referencing the seeking of further information from other persons. This is further supported by section 10C(9) of the 2014 Act which requires the reporting person to cooperate with the Commissioner. 73. In those premises I am satisfied that the applicant has not established a prospect of succeeding in his assertion that the PDC acted unlawfully in proceeding on the basis that he bore the burden of proving a prima facie case. 74. I am also satisfied that the applicant is not correct and has no prospect of succeeding in making his argument that the decision was not adequately reasoned. A decision on whether a prima facie case has been made out, in analogous statutory regimes does not require the same level of reasoning as other situations, see for instance Flynn v. The Medical Council [2012] 3 IR 236. In this case the basis for the decision is clear and I do not consider that there is a basis for the claim that the decision was not explained. 75. There is no basis for the applicant’s claim that there must have been some merit or a prima facie case made out in his report simply because there was a period of 8 months between the initial report and the final decision. In the first instance, the draft decision was produced on the 18 April 2024, which was approximately 6 months after the initial report. Even then the PDC had sought further information on the 27 November 2023 (just under a month after the initial report) and the applicant replied on the 5 December 2023. The applicant responded to the draft decision by sending on a considerable volume of material which had to be considered, with the latest email being sent on the 13 May 2024. These had to be considered, and the final decision was produced approximately 6 weeks later. In any event the applicant has provided no cogent basis for considering that there is any sustainable argument that the duration of a process could lead to a finding that there was in fact a prima facie basis to consider that relevant wrongdoing had occurred: that is a non sequitur. 76. It is abundantly clear that the applicant disagrees strongly with the decision that was made by the PDC and remains very aggrieved at his treatment since 2015. However, that is with respect, not the test to be applied. The question is whether, in the light of the evidence and the arguments that have been made, the court can be satisfied that the applicant’s reaches the relevant threshold: do the legal grounds upon which he seeks leave to apply for the order of certiorari – or any of them – have a prospect of success. 77. In all the premises, I am fully satisfied that the applicant has not reached this threshold. The primary basis for this finding relates specifically to the provisions of section 10C of the 2014 Act and the manner in which the PDC conducted and reached a decision on the initial assessment of the applicant’s report. While that is sufficient to dispose of this application, I am also persuaded that, while the applicant genuinely believes that he has been the victim of mistreatment, this application is a further attempt to re-litigate underlying complaints and concerns that have ventilated and determined on a number of occasions in a number of forums, including by way of two unsuccessful judicial reviews in the High Court. In the circumstances, while I accept the genuine nature of the applicant’s stance, this application must be seen as an abuse of process. 78. Hence, the court will make an order refusing the applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review. I will list the matter for arguments in relation to costs and any final orders that require to be made at 10.30am on Tuesday, the 24 March 2026.