G H v TUSLA Child and Family Agency & Ors

AN CHÚIRT ACHOMHAIRC THE COURT OF APPEAL APPROVED – NO REDACTION NEEDED Court of Appeal Record Number: 2025 137 High Court Record Number: 2023 1130 JR Neutral Citation Number: [2026] IECA 31 Faherty J. Binchy J. Collins J. BETWEEN/ G.H. APPLICANT/RESPONDENT - AND - THE CHILD AND FAMILY AGENCY, IRELAND AND THE ATTORNEY GENERAL RESPONDENTS/APPELLANT - AND - X.Y. AND THE IRISH HUMAN RIGHTS AND EQUALITY COMMISSION NOTICE PARTIES JUDGMENT of Mr. Justice Anthony M. Collins delivered on the 12th day of March 2026 -1- I. Background 1. This is an appeal by the Child and Family Agency (hereafter ‘the CFA’) against the judgment, delivered on 8 April 2025, and order, made on 11 April 2025, of the High Court (O’Higgins J. [2025] IEHC 263) whereby it ordered the CFA to furnish G.H. (hereafter ‘the applicant’) with the reasons for a decision it made on 19 December 2022 that a substantiation assessment on foot of a report made by the CFA was unfounded (hereafter ‘the decision of 19 December 2022’ or ‘the impugned decision’). (a) Regulatory Context 2. Section 3(1) of the Child Care Act 1991, as amended (hereafter ‘the Act’), confers the function of promoting the welfare of children who do not receive adequate care and protection upon the CFA. In the performance of that function, the CFA is to take such steps as it considers requisite to identify children who are not receiving adequate care and protection and to co-ordinate information from all relevant sources relating to children: s. 3(2)(a) of the Act. 3. In September 2014, the CFA published its “Policy & Procedures for Responding to Allegations of Child Abuse & Neglect” (hereafter ‘the 2014 Policy’). In June 2022 the CFA published the “Child Abuse Substantiation Procedure” (hereafter ‘the CASP’) which updated and replaced the 2014 Policy. Part B of the CASP describes the procedure for responding to referrals of child abuse, including the carrying out of screening and preliminary enquiries and conducting a two-stage substantiation assessment. A person who makes a disclosure of child abuse is described as a ‘PMD’. A person who is the subject of such -2- allegations is referred to as a ‘PSAA’. A ‘founded’ substantiation assessment is made where it has been established, on the balance of probabilities, that child abuse has occurred. Where that state of affairs is not established, the assessment is ‘unfounded’. Paragraph 2.2, fifth indent of the CASP, observes that “while the CASP social worker must determine if the allegation is founded or unfounded, the purpose of the substantiation assessment is not about the administration of justice but the protection of children. The CASP social worker ‘should not stray into attempting to vindicate the complainant or to sanction the PSAA’ (J. v. CFA [2020] IEHC 464).” 4. Section 20 of the CASP states that a final conclusion is reached once any representation or additional information the PSAA provided in response to a provisional conclusion has been considered, assessed and any follow-up enquiries completed. Paragraph 20.3 requires that the PSAA is informed of the final conclusion and the rationale for it in writing, the option to seek a review of that conclusion and of his/her data protection and privacy rights. Under the rubric “Actions following the final conclusion”, para. 20.4 provides that the CASP social worker will inform the PMD of the final outcome of the substantiation assessment if it is unfounded, offer the PMD an opportunity to meet with the CASP social worker to be informed of that final outcome and inform the PMD of the right to make a written complaint if s/he believes s/he has been treated unfairly. (b) Facts & Procedure 5. The applicant was placed as a child in foster care with the first notice party. In 2015 she complained to the CFA about emotional and physical abuse and neglect she had allegedly suffered in the course of -3- that placement. The CFA assessed that complaint under the 2014 Policy. In a report issued to the applicant and the first notice party in May 2017, the CFA concluded that the former’s concerns about the latter’s behaviour were serious. In September 2018, the applicant commenced plenary proceedings against the CFA and the first notice party for injuries and mental distress allegedly caused as a result of their negligence and breach of duty in respect of her placement. 6. In 2019, the CFA informed the applicant that the first assessment of her complaint was flawed. It commenced a fresh assessment during the currency of which the applicant communicated her concerns about its conduct and progress. In early January 2023, the applicant received an indication that the assessment would be unfounded. By letter dated 10 July 2023, the CFA notified the applicant that the assessment was unfounded. It ultimately transpired the CFA had made that decision on 19 December 2022. Thereafter the appellant obtained leave to seek no less than sixteen reliefs by way of judicial review. The Amended Statement of Grounds dated 23 July 2024 seeks, inter alia, orders of certiorari to quash the decision of 19 December 2022 and the CFA’s decision of 11 October 2023 to refuse to reopen the applicant’s complaint. It also seeks declarations that the applicant was entitled to access to, and notification of, the decision of 19 December 2022. The grounds upon which these reliefs are sought include para. E(c), which states, in part, that: The First Respondent erred in law in failing to provide the Applicant with reasons for its decision dated 10 July 2023 and/or the decision dated 19th December 2022. The said decision of 10 July 2023 and/or the decision dated 19th December 2022 provides no reasons for the First Respondent’s decision that the Applicant’s complaint was “unfounded”. … The First Respondent was obligated to give reasons for the decision and -4- failed to do so…., the claimant must know if the decision maker has directed its mind adequately to the issues which it has considered or is obliged to consider. (c) High Court Judgment 7. The following summary of the High Court judgment is limited to identifying those of its findings as are of direct relevance to the determination of this appeal. 8. The High Court was satisfied that, in the overall circumstances of the case, the applicant had demonstrated that the CFA’s decisions that she sought to challenge had affected her in a real and meaningful sense and concerned matters of importance to her. The applicant accordingly had a clear interest, as the Supreme Court defined that term in Mohan v. Ireland [2021] 1 I.R. 293, in ensuring that the complaint that she had made to the CFA was properly and fully processed in accordance with law. She therefore had locus standi to maintain the proceedings, notably by reference to D.M. (A Minor) v. Child and Family Agency and R.K. [2022] IEHC 716 (hereafter ‘D.M.’), paras. 55 to 57 per Phelan J. 9. The High Court proceeded to consider what it regarded as the main issue before it, whether the CFA was under a legal duty to provide the applicant with reasons for the impugned decision. It identified seven “unusual features about the proceedings which … have a bearing on the duty to give reasons”. First, the CFA’s conclusion in May 2017 that there were “some matters of concern” with respect to the notice party’s stewardship of children in her care. Second, the overall duration of the investigation between 2015 and 2023. Third, the shift between 2017 and 2023 in the CFA’s approach -5- to the communication to the applicant of the reasons for the outcome of assessments. Fourth, the CFA’s failure to inform the applicant of its decision of 19 December 2022. Fifth, the criticisms emanating from the applicant and the CFA as to the state of the other party’s pleadings. Sixth, the “somewhat mixed messages on the question whether reasons for the decision will be made available” in the CFA’s letter of 10 July 2023 by which it had communicated the outcome of the assessment to the applicant. Seventh, the absence in that letter of both the reasons for that decision and the existence of the impugned decision. 10. The High Court accepted that although the applicant could not expect it to rewrite the CFA’s risk assessment procedures, which were a matter for the CFA to adopt, the point at issue was whether the CFA was obliged to give reasons for the impugned decision. The CASP neither expressly referred to an obligation to provide a complainant with the reasons for an unfounded conclusion nor did it expressly rule that possibility out. Paragraph 60 of the judgment under appeal gave examples of a number of instances where the CASP acknowledges the PMD’s involvement in the assessment process. The CFA had taken insufficient account of the reality that the PMD has an interest in ensuring that his/her report is properly investigated and that his/her allegations are accorded such credibility and consideration as they may be due, as the High Court had held in D.M. The High Court finally observed that the parties agreed the case against the State respondents would fall away in the event the applicant succeeded against the CFA. Having decided that the CFA must provide reasons for the impugned decision, the High Court concluded that should happen before it would be in a position to examine any challenge to the validity of the -6- impugned decision. For those reasons it did not consider the other reliefs and issues in the Amended Statement of Grounds. II. The Appeal 11. The Notice of Appeal contains five grounds. These may be summarised as follows: (a) Applicants in proceedings by way of judicial review are limited to the reliefs and grounds in the order granting leave. In making its overall assessment as to why the applicant was entitled to reasons for the impugned decision, the High Court took account of matters in respect of which she had not obtained leave. (b) The applicant was entitled to the benefit of the procedures published in the CASP. Those procedures did not confer a right on a PMD to obtain the reasons for making an unfounded assessment and she accordingly had no right to receive them. To grant the relief sought would alter a procedure the CFA submitted was a fair and proportionate implementation of its statutory obligations and oblige it to follow a process it had never adopted. (c) CASP assessments are made in furtherance of the CFA’s statutory mandate to protect children from harm. Their outcome is capable of having adverse impacts upon the legal rights of a PSAA but has no equivalent consequence for the legal rights of a PMD. Since the outcome of an assessment has no legal consequences for the applicant she has no justiciable interest in challenging its validity. Absent that legal interest she has no right to access the reasons by which it was arrived at. -7- 12. The applicant stands over the judgment under appeal and does not contend that it be upheld on an alternative basis. 13. I shall address these submissions in reverse order. (a) Entitlement to reasons for the impugned decision Argument 14. As para. 32 of the judgment under appeal observes, the main issue of substance in these proceedings is whether the CFA is under a legal duty to provide the applicant with reasons for the impugned decision. 15. That question falls to be examined in two stages. The first is the appellant’s standing to challenge the decision of 19 December 2022. Should she have the locus standi she asserts, the second stage is her entitlement to be informed of the reasons for that decision. 16. As concerns the first stage, the CFA invites the Court to distinguish D.M. from the circumstances in which these proceedings have arisen. That submission implies that the CFA accepts, for the purposes of this appeal, that D.M. was correctly decided, which proposition the applicant does not contest. This Court therefore cannot go behind D.M. in its adjudication of this appeal. 17. In D.M. a complainant challenged the validity of CFA decisions to close a file on a complaint that had been made on her behalf and to decline to re-open its assessment of that complaint. The CFA decisions were based upon a report of an independent Appeal Panel that had reversed an earlier finding of a founded assessment. The complainant argued that, in the discharge of its child protection -8- functions under s. 3 of the Act, the CFA could not be bound by, or hide behind, an Appeal Panel decision. The CFA took the view that since the Appeal Panel had discharged its task there was no basis upon which it could look behind that decision and conduct a fresh assessment. The High Court dismissed the proceedings, holding that the CFA had neither delegated its functions to the Appeal Board nor considered itself precluded by that decision from assessing any future complaint. 18. In its submissions in this appeal, the CFA appears to accept that D.M. is authority for the proposition that a complainant has standing to challenge its refusal or failure to commence or to reopen an assessment on the grounds it did not comply with its obligations under s. 3 of the Act. Whilst it might follow from this that the CFA would not contest the applicant’s standing to challenge the decision of 11 October 2023, the Amended Statement of Opposition not only contests the applicant’s locus standi to maintain her application (para. 5) but regards the challenge to the decision of 11 October 2023 as, inter alia, a collateral attack on the impugned decision (para. 27). This may be explained by the fact that the ruling on standing in D.M. was made in circumstances where the decision under challenge was based upon the findings of an Appeal Board, whilst the decision of 11 October 2023 traces its origins to the impugned decision, which the CFA contends the applicant has no standing to challenge. 19. The CFA submits that s. 3 of the Act confers upon it the function of protecting vulnerable children in the present and into the future: M.Q. v. Gleeson [1998] 4 I.R. 85, 98-100 per Barr J. Where it is alleged that the CFA has not complied with its obligations under that -9- provision, the performance or non-performance of the CFA’s statutory duty may be subject to judicial review at the suit of a complainant: see D.M. That duty is engaged when it decides to open or to reopen an assessment, which decision has tangible consequences for both a PSAA and a vulnerable child. The interests of either or both of them are affected by that decision, such that they are entitled to challenge its validity. 20. The CASP assessment seeks to protect vulnerable children by ascertaining and identifying the presence of a risk to their well-being, on foot of which the CFA can fulfil its statutory duty by taking steps to protect those persons. The outcome of that assessment does not find that abuse occurred or that particular harm was perpetrated and/or suffered, which matters fall to be determined in criminal and/or civil proceedings: J v. CFA [2020] IEHC 464. Unlike the decision to undertake an assessment, its outcome has asymmetrical effects. A founded assessment can have severe and direct repercussions for a PSAA, thereby giving him/her a legally cognisable interest in the validity of that conclusion. Irrespective of its outcome, in the CFA’s submission, an assessment has no consequences for a PMD, such as the applicant, as would confer upon her a legally cognisable interest to challenge its validity. 21. The applicant contends, in essence, that the following paragraphs of the judgment of Phelan J. in D.M. apply, or apply by analogy, to the question of her standing to challenge the impugned decision: 55. In this case, the Applicant is the complainant in a statutory process. Whilst the purpose of the process is not to determine rights inter partes and has been found in earlier cases not to amount to a vindication of a victim's rights, it seems to me that - 10 - the Applicant has an interest in ensuring that her complaint is processed in accordance with law. … 56. The force of these comments is in the recognition that the assessment process is part of a protection package for a child and the process is concerned not only with the rights of the accused person but also with the welfare of the child. In F.A. v Child and Family Agency [2018] IEHC 806, the task of the Agency, charged as it is with very weighty and serious duties under s. 3 of the 1991 Act, was acknowledged as not an easy one, particularly in relation to the investigation and determination of whether an allegation of child abuse of a sexual nature is founded or unfounded. As MacGrath J. observes in F.A., the failure to properly investigate an allegation of such nature may have devastating consequences for a child at the centre of the inquiry, or other children who may be at risk. He observed that in line with the requirements of Article 42A of the Constitution, the paramount consideration in the s. 3 process is and must be that of the welfare of the child. 57. As recognised by the Supreme Court, albeit in the context of constitutional challenge to legislation, in Mohan v. Ireland [2021] 1 I.R. 293, “interest” is a deliberately broad term, extending beyond legal rights. In Mohan it was concluded that it was sufficient if a person was affected in a real way in his or her life. I consider that the Applicant, as a victim of alleged abuse, has an interest in ensuring that public agencies with a legal mandate to promote her welfare and to protect others from similar abuse properly discharge that mandate. Further, as acknowledged in Lancefort Ltd v. An Bord Pleanála [1999] 2 I.R. 270 (Keane J.), there is a public interest in ensuring that public bodies obey the law which mitigates a narrow approach to recognising the interest of the Applicant as a child complainant. Analysis 22. In Sister Mary Christian v. Dublin City Council [2012] 2 I.R. 506, 539-540, Clarke J. made the following observations: It must be recalled that the underlying jurisprudence in respect of the obligation to give reasons suggests that the basis for the obligation (…) is to enable the court to exercise its legitimate judicial review function. In at least some cases if a court does not - 11 - know why a decision was taken, then the court may not be able to ascertain whether the decision was lawful for the lawfulness of the decision in question may depend on whether the reasons were valid in the light of the appropriate statutory and legal regime applicable. The rationale behind the requirement to give reasons was articulated by Kelly J. in Mulholland v. An Bord Pleanála (No. 2) [2005] IEHC 306, [2006] 1 I.R. 453, at pp 460 and 461, … … It is, of course, the case that Kelly J. in Mulholland v. An Bord Pleanála (No. 2) [2005] IEHC 306, [2006] 1 I.R. 453, was concerned with reasons required to enable a person to consider a statutory appeal within the planning system. However, in Meadows v. Minister for Justice [2010] IESC 3, [2010] 2 I.R. 701, at p 732, Murray C.J. (part of the majority in that case) suggested that the failure of the Minister in question to supply adequate reasons meant that the applicant's “constitutional right of access to the courts to have the legality of an administrative decision judicially reviewed could be rendered either pointless or so circumscribed as to be unacceptably ineffective”. While Meadows v. Minister for Justice [2010] IESC 3 was, of course, a case in the immigration field, there is no reason why, at the level of principle, the comments of Murray C.J. are not applicable in an appropriate way in respect of any other type of statutory or administrative decision. The underlying rationale of cases such as Meadows v. Minister for Justice [2010] IESC 3 (in that respect) and Mulholland v. An Bord Pleanála (No 2) [2005] IEHC 306 is that decisions which affect a person's rights and obligations must be lawfully made. In order to assess whether a relevant decision is lawful, a party considering a challenge, and the court in the event of a challenge being brought, must have access to a sufficient amount of information to enable an assessment as to lawfulness to be made. … 23. That survey of the law discloses that the obligation to give reasons serves to enable individuals to invoke the High Court’s judicial review jurisdiction and to facilitate that court’s exercise of its jurisdiction. For the applicant to persuade the High Court to order the CFA to communicate to her the reasons for the impugned decision, she must show she is entitled to challenge the validity of that decision. - 12 - It also follows that, should it be held that she has standing to challenge the impugned decision, she is entitled to have sight of the reasons why it was adopted. 24. The CFA submits that D.M. involved a challenge to a decision of a nature different from that challenged in these proceedings: namely to close or not to re-open an assessment process, as distinct from the outcome of that process. Whilst that reading of D.M. is literally correct, the language of the paragraphs of that judgment cited at para. 25, above, is sufficiently broad and strong as to make it capable of application to the facts that arise for consideration here, as the High Court held and the applicant urges this Court to affirm. It cannot be overlooked that the decisions challenged in D.M. and the impugned decision are both founded upon assessments by professional persons who carry out their duties on behalf of the CFA under the CASP. It is thus far from clear that the reasoning at paras. 55 to 57 of D.M. ought not to apply to the facts of these proceedings. 25. It is unnecessary to determine that issue for the following reasons. The CFA accepts that the serious consequences for a PSAA that follow from the final outcome of an assessment are such that s/he must be informed of the reasons upon which that conclusion was reached. That amounts to a concession that a PSAA may, in principle, bring proceedings by way of judicial review to challenge the validity of an assessment, notwithstanding that the CFA conducts assessments in the discharge of its functions under s. 3 of the Act. The CFA thus does not contend that the outcome of an assessment is, of its nature, incapable of being subject to judicial review: e.g. Rajah v. Royal College of Surgeons in Ireland [1994] 1 I.R. 384, 395 per Keane J. - 13 - The CFA’s argument thus comes down to a claim that, upon the conclusion of a CASP assessment, PMDs, including persons such as the applicant, are not exposed to the same legal consequences as PSAAs. Since the outcome of an assessment has no legally cognisable consequences for PMDs, they have no entitlement to challenge their validity. Absent that entitlement they have no right to be informed of the reasons for which those assessments were made. 26. R.S.C. Ord. 84, r. 20(5) provides that an applicant for judicial review must have “a sufficient interest in the matter to which the application relates”. In Lancefort Ltd v. An Bord Pleanála (No. 2) [1999] 2 I.R. 270, Keane J. observed, at 310-311, that that provision correctly embodied Irish law as to locus standi in cases such as Cahill v. Sutton [1980] I.R. 269. The test of sufficient interest to bring judicial review proceedings is thus informed by judgments on locus standi in proceedings challenging, inter alia, the constitutionality of legislation. 27. It is in that context that the Court was referred to the development by the Supreme Court of the concept of interest, including its sufficiency, in Mohan v. Ireland [2021] 1 I.R. 293 (O’Donnell J., nem. diss.). The plaintiff was the sole male nominee at a convention of the Fianna Fáil party to select candidates to contest the Dublin Central constituency at the 2016 General Election. That party’s General Secretary directed that the candidate to be selected had to be female, by reason of which he was excluded from participating in the convention. He commenced proceedings to challenge the constitutionality of s. 17(4B) of the Electoral Act 1997, which reduced public funding to political parties that did not nominate a minimum - 14 - percentage of male and female candidates in a general election. Both the High Court ([2016] IEHC 35) and this Court ([2018] IECA 13) dismissed his action on the ground that he lacked locus standi to bring it ([2021] 1 I.R. 293, 299-300). 28. The Supreme Court commenced its consideration of the appeal by discussing whether the plaintiff could establish the primary and most commonly applied ground for standing by demonstrating that his interests had been or were in real danger of being adversely affected by the operation of the impugned statute. It identified the test as the necessity “to show adverse effect, or imminent adverse effect, upon the interests of a real plaintiff”: [2021] 1 I.R. 293, 302. The issue to be determined was “…what precisely is meant by a person’s interests being ‘adversely affected’. … [i]t is enough that the plaintiff is, or can plausibly claim to be, affected or likely to be affected in a real way.”: [2021] 1 I.R. 293, 303. The Supreme Court delivered the following answer to that question ([2021] 1 I.R. 293, 304): It is, I think, noteworthy that Henchy J., in Cahill v Sutton [1980] I.R. 269, speaks in terms of a person's “interests” being affected, rather than his or her rights. This, in my view, is logical, …, the first question is whether a person's interests are affected by the provision in question. “Interest” is a deliberately broad term, extending beyond constitutional or even legal rights. It is sufficient if a person is, therefore, affected in a real way in his or her life. If so, they normally have standing, at least, to contend that the operation of the Act upon them breaches some constitutionally protected right. … In general, it is at least a useful preliminary approach to ask if the Act affects the plaintiff as a matter of fact. Normally this will be enough to establish standing to challenge the Act, … 29. It was deemed sufficient that the plaintiff show that the impugned provision had had some effect upon him in order to establish - 15 - his locus standi to challenge it: [2021] 1 I.R. 293, 309. Whilst a court might conceivably hold that legislation had such an attenuated or remote impact upon a person as to be de minimis, it was contrary to principle to deem any measurable degree of such an impact insufficient to afford him or her standing. It concluded its consideration of that issue at [2021] 1 I.R. 293, 310: If standing could be denied because the impact of the allegedly unconstitutional legislation on a person, though real, was deemed insufficient or because it was possible to hypothesise a person more clearly affected by the Act, then litigation on such matters would become an unpredictable and hazardous game of chance. The purpose of the rule is not to identify the person with the best claim and prevent anyone else from bringing a claim: it is to exclude those who have no possible interest, and no claim to justify having the rule relaxed. 30. It may be the CFA is correct in its strongly held view that, in the generality of cases, the outcome of a CASP assessment has no impact upon a PMD’s legal rights. As the CFA also correctly asserts, the soundness or otherwise of a policy not to disclose the reasons for a CASP assessment to a PMD is not challenged in these proceedings and it therefore does not arise for determination in this appeal. What the Court is asked to decide in these proceedings is whether the applicant has demonstrated her entitlement to be informed of the reasons for the impugned decision. Paragraph 29 of the judgment under appeal contains the following findings of fact, which are not in dispute: …The decisions of the Agency that are under challenge in these proceedings affected the applicant in a real and meaningful sense. The complaint to the Agency concerned matters of importance to her childhood, her wellbeing in early life, her relationship with her foster carer and her relationship with other children. The issues raised were confidential and sensitive and - 16 - had implications for her dignity and personal sense of wellbeing…. 31. These uncontested facts are sufficient to establish that the impugned decision has had at least some impact upon the applicant’s interests as to satisfy the requirements of the test for locus standi that the Supreme Court laid down in Mohan. 32. As for the second stage, in Dunnes Stores Ireland v. Maloney [1999] 1 I.L.R.M. 119, 138, Laffoy J. held that a bona fide belief that an abuse of power may have occurred may require reasons to be given in order to enable a putative applicant to “explore the possibility of or pursue redress by way of judicial review”: The CFA does not challenge the applicant’s bona fides. Once she has standing to challenge the impugned decision she enjoys a corresponding right to know the reasons for its adoption so as to enable her to exercise the standing recognised by law. 33. For these reasons, I dismiss the appeal under this heading. (b) Binding procedures by reference to published policies 34. The CFA also submitted that the applicant was entitled to the benefit of its published policy on the giving or withholding of reasons in the context of CASP assessments. Since the CASP did not envisage giving reasons for the outcome of assessments to PMDs, the CFA was not under a duty to furnish them to the applicant. Reliance was placed upon Lidl Ireland GmbH v. Chartered Accountants Ireland [2022] IEHC 141 to support that proposition. Lidl invoked the respondent’s complaint procedures for the purpose of ventilating certain grievances - 17 - against a third party. That led the respondent to open disciplinary proceedings against that third party. The High Court found that Lidl’s procedural entitlements were limited to those set out in the regulations the respondent had made with a view to the management of those disciplinary proceedings. The respondent’s regulations imposed upon it, inter alia, an express duty to give reasons to a complainant where it decided that a complaint resulted in no case to answer. In Lidl the reasons the respondent gave for its decision of no case to answer were unintelligible since they referenced correspondence between the respondent and the notice party to which the applicant had no access. In those circumstances Lidl was entitled to have sight of correspondence that in the normal course of events it would have been unable to access by reference both to the respondent’s regulations and the observation at para. 79 of the judgment that “as a matter of sensible legal policy,…the complainant does not have a right to be furnished with information, evidence, documentation and representations furnished by or on behalf of a member who is the subject of a complaint and to make representations on such material. The complainant is not being accused of any wrongdoing…. It has no right to dictate how the disciplinary bodies conduct their investigations.” 35. In contrast to Lidl, where the respondent’s regulations clearly set out the applicant’s entitlement to information, as appears from paras. 4 and 11, above, and in sharp contrast to the position of the PSAA, the CASP does not set out clearly what precisely a PMD is entitled to receive by way of reasons for the outcome of substantiation assessments. The statements - at para. 20.4 of that policy that the CASP social worker will inform, inter alia, the PMD of the final outcome of the substantiation assessment if it is unfounded, offer the - 18 - PMD an opportunity to meet with the CASP social worker to be informed of that final outcome and inform the PMD s/he is entitled to make a written complaint if s/he believes s/he has been treated unfairly - lack clarity. They do not rule out the possibility that the CFA could communicate to the PMD the reasons for the conclusion reached on a substantiation assessment: indeed, as para. 43 of the judgment under appeal observes, that text may be construed so as to reach the opposite conclusion to that which the CFA apparently applies as a matter of principle and practice. In those circumstances, the CFA cannot oppose the application for judicial review on the grounds that, since it had clearly represented to the applicant her entitlements to information under the CASP, she was taken to have accepted the limits it placed on the operation of that policy. 36. For these reasons, I also dismiss the appeal under this heading. (c) The ‘accumulated factors’ 37. In A.P. v. DPP [2011] 1 I.R. 729, 733, Murray C.J. observed that: …it is incumbent on the parties to judicial review to assist the High Court, and consequentially this court on appeal, by ensuring that grounds for judicial review are stated clearly and precisely and that any additional grounds, subsequent to leave being granted, are raised only after an appropriate order has been applied for and obtained. 38. The CFA submits, inter alia, that the Amended Statement of Grounds does not challenge the validity of the decision-making process that terminated in May 2017. Neither did that document complain of the excessive duration of either assessment, the fact that the assessment that led to the impugned decision had been conducted under the 2014 Policy and the CASP and that the applicant had sought - 19 - updates on the progress of the second assessment process. By reference to A.P. v. DPP none of these matters were before the High Court. The High Court was thus not entitled to take them into account when it ruled upon the application for judicial review. The CFA might have given a complete explanation for the various matters complained of. It did not because the applicant had chosen not to seek leave with respect thereto. As the Supreme Court recognised in A.P. v. DPP judicial review is, like almost all litigation before the Courts of Ireland, an adversarial procedure. That the High Court is called upon to review the legality of the acts of public bodies does not confer upon it an investigative jurisdiction to enquire into matters not properly before it. 39. Since the applicant did not seek leave in respect of the matters adumbrated in the preceding paragraph, they were not before the High Court in the sense that relief referrable thereto could not have been obtained without that court permitting the amendment of the pleadings. I am, however, of the view that, in reaching its decision, the High Court was entitled to take account of such elements of fact as it could extract from the uncontested elements in the material placed before it. The judgment under appeal discloses that the High Court identified what it described as “…the main issue of substance in the case, namely…. whether the first respondent is under a legal duty to provide the applicant with reasons for the impugned decisions.” It decided that issue by reference to legal principle and authority, without overlooking the various elements of fact available to it, which of themselves did not determine the “main issue of substance”. 40. For those reasons, I consider that this ground of appeal also fails. - 20 - III. Conclusion 41. For the reasons set out at Part II, above, I propose to dismiss the appeal and to affirm the High Court Order of 11 April 2025. 42. The default position under s. 169(1) of the Legal Services Regulation Act 2015 is that a party that has been entirely successful in proceedings is entitled to an award of costs against the unsuccessful party unless the court hearing the matter orders otherwise. As the applicant has been wholly successful in this appeal, I am of the provisional view that she is entitled to an order against the CFA for the costs of the proceedings before this Court, to include any reserved costs. Should the CFA disagree with that proposed order, it should cause to have filed and served a written submission of not more than 1,500 words within fourteen days of the delivery of this judgment, after which the applicant will have a further fourteen days in which to respond by the lodgment and service of a reply of no greater length. 43. Since this judgment is delivered electronically, I am authorised by Faherty and Binchy JJ. to state that they agree with it and with the orders proposed therein. - 21 - Appearances: For the Child and Family Agency: Feichín McDonagh SC and Jim Benson, instructed by the Office of Legal Services of the Child and Family Agency For the Applicant: Derek Shortall SC and Michael Kinsley, instructed by Daly Hempenstall Solicitors LLP