Health Service Executive v C.M. and Ors

[2026] IEHC 158 THE HIGH COURT IN THE MATTER OF SECTION 52 OF THE COURTS (SUPPLEMENTAL PROVISIONS) ACT 1961 [2025/944 SS] BETWEEN HEALTH SERVICE EXECUTIVE APPLICANT AND C.M. SUBJECT CHILD AND L.M. RESPONDENT AND THE CHILD AND FAMILY AGENCY RESPONDENT AND OLIVIA O’BRIEN GUARDIAN AD LITEM AND K.T. RESPONDENT JUDGMENT of Mr. Justice Barry O’Donnell delivered on the 12th day of March, 2026 INTRODUCTION 1. This judgment concerns a consultative case stated referred by District Judge Catherine Ghent, sitting in the Dublin Metropolitan District Court. The proceedings that gave rise to the case stated involved applications to the District Court for the involuntary admission of a child (C.M.) to an approved centre pursuant to section 25 of the Mental Health Act 2001 (the 2001 Act). The case arises from proceedings that are subject to statutory reporting restrictions, and the court considers it appropriate to carry over those restrictions. In those premises, I have referred to parties by initials only and nothing can be published or broadcast that would identify or tend to identify C.M. 2. The parties involved in the case stated were the Health Service Executive (the HSE), the Child and Family Agency (the Agency), the guardian ad litem appointed in respect of C.M. (the GAL), and C.M.’s mother L.M. With the exception of the GAL, the parties were largely in agreement as to how the court should resolve the questions in the case stated. The GAL was in agreement in relation to the central matters but suggested that the court should also answer certain questions that the other parties submitted did not arise on the facts. 3. As will be discussed, section 25 of the 2001 Act establishes a process for the involuntary admission of children which differs in several respects to that provided for adults. One of the main differences is that the process requires the District Court to make and discharge the necessary orders. A further difference is that section 25 of the 2001 Act expressly imports powers from the Child Care Act 1991 (the 1991 Act) which can be utilised in the case of a child involuntarily detained. The meaning of, and interaction between those powers is central to the resolution of the questions posed. 4. On the 16 June 2025, the HSE applied for, and the learned Judge granted, an order pursuant to s. 25 of the 2001 Act, which provided for C.M.’s involuntary admission to an approved centre (the Order). The stated duration of the Order was 14 days. At the relevant time, C.M., separately, was the subject of an interim care order that had been sought and obtained by the Agency pursuant to s.17 of the 1991 Act. 5. On the 24 June 2025, in accordance with the statutory process, the HSE applied for the discharge of the Order, approximately 6 days before it was due to expire. Rather than seeking 2 to have the discharge take immediate effect, the HSE, on the basis of a medical opinion, sought to have the discharge occur shortly after the application, within a period of approximately 24 hours. The proposed delay was premised on the medically advised need to make certain arrangements for the child concerned. In very brief summary, the learned Judge accepted the medical evidence but decided that she did not have the power to defer the discharge, and that decision gave rise to the case stated. 6. In approaching this consultative case stated, the court is mindful that there is a general limitation to the questions that may be answered. As put by O’Malley J. in O’Shea v. West Wood Club Limited [2015] IEHC 24, at para 38, “The question of law must be one ‘arising’ from the facts as found – that is, it must relate to a matter in issue in the case.”. In that regard, O’Malley J. referred to the following summary of the position given by Sullivan P. in Attorney General v. M'Loughlin [1931] I.R. 480: “It is obvious that the only question which a District Justice can refer to this Court is a question of law arising in any case before him, and that he has no right to ask this Court to answer questions ‘extraneous to the issues affecting the defendant’s case’ because they appeared to him ‘to affect the jurisdiction of the District Court in the interpretation of the Betting Acts and Finance Acts.’ The power conferred upon a District Justice by the section is limited in express terms, presumably because the Legislature recognised that without such limitation an intolerable burden might be cast not only upon this Court, but upon the parties bearing the costs of the proceedings.”. 7. However, also as noted by O’Malley J. in O’Shea, at para. 42, referring to observations by Charleton J. in Director of Public Prosecutions v. Buckley [2007] IEHC 150, “This is not to 3 say that the High Court is not obliged to assist the District Court in so far as it can, having regard to the contents of the case stated.” 8. For the reasons set out in this judgment, I have concluded that the learned Judge was incorrect in finding that she had to discharge the Order immediately upon the application by the HSE. I am satisfied that, in the factual situation that arose, the District Court had the legal power to defer the discharge in the manner sought by the HSE. Further, I have decided, in light of the nature of a consultative case stated and the facts as found, that certain of the questions referred by the learned Judge do not properly arise, or fall for consideration in this case stated. Finally, given that the Order itself is spent and the application before the District Court has concluded, there is a preliminary issue in relation to mootness that must be considered. I will address the mootness issue first and then move to the substantive issues that should be determined. Before doing so it would be helpful to set out the questions that were referred and the facts as found or agreed. THE CASE STATED 9. The District Court referred the following questions to this Court for determination: “1. In the context of an application to discharge an Order made under s.25(6) of the Act of 2001, where there is clear evidence that it is in the best interests and welfare of the child to do so and where the evidence is equally that it would be detrimental to those interests not to; does the District Court have jurisdiction to adjourn the determination of an application made under s.25(14) of the Act of 2001 taking into account s.24 of the Child Care Act of 1991 in order to effect a managed release from an approved centre under s.25(14) of the Act of 2001. 4 2. Does the District Court have jurisdiction under an application to discharge, to grant a stay on that Order having heard evidence from the clinician as set out above. 3. In the absence of specific statutory provision, does the District Court have jurisdiction to direct the review of any child once they are discharged from the orders made under s.25 in relation to their best interests and welfare post- discharge. 4. What weight, if any, does the District Court place on the provisions of s.25(15) of the Act of 2001 and the restriction in relation to voluntary admissions of children who are in the care of the Child and Family Agency under the provisions of the Act of 1991. Specifically in determining when a discharge application should take place and whether a stay should be granted on same. 5. Does the District Court have jurisdiction under s.25(14) of the Act of 2001 when dealing with an application to discharge an Order made under s.25(6) to apply any modification of s.22 of the Act of 1991 to have a managed release from an Approved Centre. 6. Does the District Court have jurisdiction s.25(14) of the Act of 2001 when dealing with an application to discharge an Order made under s. 25(6) to apply any modification of s.47 of the Act of 1991 to have a managed release from an Approved Centre.” 10. The case stated by the learned Judge set out facts that had been agreed or found by the court for the purpose of posing the questions. The following matters which are taken from the text of the consultative case stated appear pertinent. 5 11. At the relevant time, C.M. was 16 years old and was subject to an interim care order pursuant to the provisions of the 1991 Act. C.M. has diagnoses of autism spectrum disorder, ADHD, cannabis use and challenging behaviours. There was also a suggestion that they may meet the criteria for emotionally unstable personality disorder. They had been under the care of various Child and Adolescent Mental Health Service (CAMHS) departments and there had been multiple hospital admissions following episodes of self-harm. The issues that gave rise to the proceedings in the District Court and led to this consultative case stated are as follows: a. On the 13 June 2025, following concerns about suicidal ideation and a self-harming incident, C.M. was admitted to Linn Dara psychiatric unit. That admission was done on an involuntary basis and by reference to the doctrine of necessity. b. On the 16 June 2025, the HSE made an application pursuant to s. 25 of the 2001 Act to have C.M. detained, and the application was heard on the same date. The learned Judge heard evidence from Dr. S., found the statutory threshold had been met, and the Order was made pursuant s. 25(6) of the 2001 Act authorising C.M.’s detention for a period of 14 days. c. On the 24 June 2025, the matter came before the learned Judge on foot of an application brought under s. 25(14) of the 2001 Act to have the detention order discharged. The court had a report from Dr. S. and heard direct evidence from her. The doctor’s evidence expressed a clinical view that C.M. no longer met the statutory criteria required for the court to continue their detention in Linn Dara. The doctor expressed a clinical opinion that an immediate discharge without proper care planning would not be in C.M.’s best interests; opining that such a course would be detrimental to their mental health and could lead to a deterioration in same. 6 12. On the basis of that evidence, the learned Judge was asked either to discharge the order on that day and permit a phased release to allow a care planning meeting to take place later that afternoon, or, in the alternative, to adjourn her decision on the section 25(14) application until the following day. The learned Judge noted the court’s overriding obligation to children as set out in Article 42A of the Constitution and in statutory provisions giving effect to same. Critically, the learned Judge stated that she made a finding that to proceed by way of either of the options proposed by the HSE of necessity involved the court detaining the child without a statutory basis. The court also made a finding that neither s. 47 nor s. 22 of the 1991 Act permitted the court to make such an order. 13. The learned Judge concluded the recitation of facts as found with the following observation: “11. In effect I am of the view that this Court is being asked to grant a Stay in circumstances where that is to provide for a purpose other than that permitted by the 2001 Act and this is impermissible having regard to the local and limited jurisdiction of the District Court.” PRELIMINARY ISSUE – MOOTNESS 14. This issue was the subject of agreement between the parties and can be dealt with reasonably briefly. 15. There was a preliminary hearing of the case stated in December 2025. The issue at that point was whether the court should proceed to direct a hearing of the substantive matter or whether the court should decline to conduct a hearing on the basis of mootness. The mootness arose where the Order had been discharged a number of months previously, and, therefore, if 7 the questions were answered by the court and returned to the District Court they would be of no practical use in the immediate proceedings in which the case was stated. 16. At that preliminary hearing, the court heard from all of the represented parties, and it was clear that all the parties were of the view that the court should proceed to hear and determine the consultative case stated. The arguments were grounded in the well-established jurisprudence summarised by the Supreme Court in Lofinmakin v. Minister for Justice [2013] 4 I.R. 274, and which describes the court’s discretion to hear and determine a point even if it is considered moot. 17. The court agreed that this was a case which was moot but that ought to be determined. The immediate issues that led to C.M.’s detention in June 2025 had passed, but in light of their psychiatric history there was concern that the same situation could arise again. On a broader level, the issue of the powers of the District Court under the 2001 Act to provide for the involuntary admission of a child to an approved centre is a significant legal issue that arises on a regular basis in District Courts throughout the State, and the issue affects the rights and treatment of a vulnerable cohort of children. The statutory provisions, which will be described in more detail below, for entirely understandable and legitimate reasons provide that initial admission orders can only be of a short duration. This means that challenges to the exercise of those powers are unlikely to be resolved in the High Court before the initial orders expire. 18. The issues raised in the consultative case stated fall into the category of a case which is of systemic importance but where, if the strict rules relating to mootness were observed, there is every likelihood that important legal issues would not be determined. This was described in Goold v. Collins [2004] IESC 38 by the Supreme Court as situations that are “capable of repetition, yet evading review”. 8 19. In all the circumstances, and where all the parties were agreed, the court was satisfied that this was a matter that needed to be determined. The court agreed with the characterisation of the situation by HSE in their submissions, “[t]he lawfulness of managing a mental health discharge in a manner that promotes the best interests of a child (who is also under a Child Care Act order) and protects them from a deterioration in their mental health is clearly a matter of general importance.” CONSIDERATION OF RELEVANT STATUTORY PROVISIONS 20. The questions referred by the District Court require a consideration of the interaction between provisions in the 2001 Act and the 1991 Act. Three initial matters can be noted. 21. First, both the 2001 Act and the 1991 Act are instruments that fall to be interpreted purposively. This has been made clear in the case of the 1991 Act in cases such as Western Health Board v. K.M. [2002] 2 I.R. 493; and for the purposes of the 2001 Act in E.H. v. Clinical Director of St Vincent’s Hospital [2009] 3 I.R. 774. 22. Second, the statutory schemes each operate by reference to certain guiding principles: a. First, as applied by operation of s. 25(14) of the 2001 Act, s. 24 of the 1991 Act makes clear that in proceedings before the District Court for the admission and detention of child in an approved centre, the court shall regard the best interests of the child as the paramount consideration in the resolution of such proceedings. In determining what is in the best interests of a child, the court must have regard to all of the factors or circumstances that it considers relevant to the child, including as set out at s. 24 (2)(d) “the physical, psychological and emotional needs of the child”. 9 b. Second, by s. 4 of the 2001 Act: “4. – (1) In making a decision under this Act concerning the care or treatment of a person (including a decision to make an admission order in relation to a person), the best interests of the person shall be the principal consideration with due regard being given to the interests of other persons who may be at risk of serious harm if the decision is not made. … (3) In making a decision under this Act concerning the care or treatment of a person (including a decision to make an admission order in relation to a person) due regard shall be given to the need to respect the right of the person to dignity, bodily integrity, privacy and autonomy.” 23. As the Oireachtas used the word “person” and not “patient” in s. 4 of the 2001 Act, I agree with the submissions that were made in this application that this leads to the conclusion that the guiding principle for the 2001 Act applies equally to adults and children. The significance of s. 4 of the 2001 Act was highlighted by Charleton J. in TO’D v. Kennedy [2007] 3 I.R. 689, when he stated that s.4 “infuses the entire of the legislation with interpretative purpose.” 24. Third, the 2001 Act distinguishes between adults and children in important respects and certain terms are defined in a way that confirms that distinction. Subject to specific instances in s.69 (which deals with seclusion and restraint) and s.26 (which deals with absence without leave), the word “patient” is defined as a person in respect of whom orders are made under 10 section 14, “admission orders”. Those orders cannot be made in respect of a child, who may only be admitted to an approved centre through the mechanism of section 25. 25. However, the different routes and differences in regime cannot lead to any conclusion that children are treated less favourably than adults in terms of procedural safeguards. In Y(X) (a minor) v. Health Service Executive and Others [2013] 1 I.R. 592, Birmingham P. found that s. 25 of the 2001 Act when read in the context of the imported provisions of the 1991 Act provides significant safeguards, noting that: “ …viewed in the round, I am not at all convinced that the position of children is inferior. The provisions of the Child Care Act which I regard as being of real and substantial value have no application to adults. The role of the District Court is specific to children. It seems to me that the role played by the District Court and the option of an appeal to the Circuit Court and, indeed, the possibility of judicial review, are at least the equal of what is provided in the case of adults through the Mental Health Tribunals. This is a case where a diversity of arrangements has been provided and that that should be so is not at all surprising. Indeed, it is entirely to be expected that different arrangements would be provided for children, given that the children that we are dealing with are particularly vulnerable because of their young age and their mental health difficulties.” 26. Turning to the substantive provisions, for the purposes of this application the relevant parts of s. 25 of the 2001 Act are as follows: “25.(1) Where it appears to the Health Service Executive that – (a) a child is suffering from a mental disorder, and 11 (b) the child requires treatment which he or she is unlikely to receive unless an order is made under this section, then, the Health Service Executive may make an application to the District Court (“the court”) in the district court district where the child concerned resides or is found for an order authorising the detention of the child in an approved centre. (2) Subject to subsection (3), the Health Service Executive shall not make an application under subsection (1) unless the child has been examined by a consultant psychiatrist who is not a relative of the child and a report of the results of the examination is furnished to the court by the Health Service Executive … (6) Where the court is satisfied having considered the report of the consultant psychiatrist referred to in subsection (1) or the report of the consultant psychiatrist referred to in subsection (5), as the case may be, and any other evidence that may be adduced before it that the child is suffering from a mental disorder, the court shall make an order that the child be admitted and detained for treatment in a specified approved centre for a period not exceeding 21 days. … (9) Where, while an order under subsection (6) is in force, an application is made to the court by the Health Service Executive for an extension of the period of detention of the child the subject of the application, the court may order that the child be detained for a further period not exceeding 3 months. (10) On or before the expiration of the period of detention referred to in subsection (9), a further order of detention for a period not exceeding 6 12 months may be made by the court on the application of the health board and thereafter for periods not exceeding 6 months. (11) A court shall not make an order extending the period of detention of a child under this section unless - (a) the child has been examined by a consultant psychiatrist who is not a relative of the child and a report of the results of the examination is furnished to the court by the Health Service Executive on the application by it to the court under subsection (9) or (10), as the case may be, and (b) following consideration by the court of the report, it is satisfied that the child is still suffering from a mental disorder. … (14) The provisions of sections 21, 22, 24 to 35, 37 and 47 of the Child Care Act, 1991, shall apply to proceedings under this section as they apply to proceedings under those sections with the modification that references to proceedings or an order under Part III, IV or VI of that Act shall be construed as references to proceedings or an order under this section and with any other necessary modifications. (15) References in sections 13(7), 18(3) and 19(4) of the Child Care Act, 1991, to psychiatric examination, treatment or assessment do not include references to treatment under this Act.” 27. The clear legislative intention is that applications for the involuntary admission and detention of a child to an approved centre can only be made by the HSE, and that the necessary orders can only be made by the District Court. Put another way, a child may not be admitted and detained in an approved centre other than by an order made by the District Court. A child 13 may only be made the subject of orders under s. 25 of the 2001 Act where the District Court is satisfied not only that the child suffers from a mental disorder but also that the child requires treatment for that mental disorder which they are unlikely to receive under the section. As Birmingham P. put it in Y(X) v Health Service Executive, an “order cannot be made if an alternative treatment programme which meets the child’s needs can be delivered. The order can be made only if that is required. In effect the order can be made only if there is no alternative.” 28. Sequentially, subject to the court being satisfied at each stage as to the necessary criteria having been established, s. 25 of the 2001 Act permits admission orders to be made for maximum periods of 21 days, then 3 months, and then 6 months. This generally reflects the position regarding adult patients and ensures that deprivations of liberty are subject to independent fixed periodic reviews. 29. While there was no application in this case to extend the initial 14 days admission order, where such orders are sought, the court is required to satisfy itself that there is evidence from a consultant psychiatrist before the court and that the court is satisfied that the child continues to suffer from a mental disorder. The District Court cannot at any stage make or extend an admission order unless the court is satisfied having heard evidence from a consultant psychiatrist that the child suffers from a mental disorder. 30. Aside from setting out that basic statutory structure, s. 25 of the 2001 Act does not make express provision either for more extensive or periodic court supervision and it does not expressly provide for applications to be made to vary or discharge orders during the currency of the specified periods of detention. Instead, those matters are addressed by making provisions 14 within the 1991 Act (subject to necessary modifications) applicable to proceedings under s. 25 of the 2001 Act. 31. In that regard, section 22 of the 1991 Act provides as follows:- “22. – The court, of its own motion or on the application of any person, may- (a) vary or discharge a care order or a supervision order, (b) vary or discharge any condition or direction attaching to the order, or (c) in the case of a care order, discharge the care order and make a supervision order in respect of the child.” 32. This is another instance of the general situation described in Y(X) by Birmingham P. as placing the District Court “at the heart of the detention for treatment at all stages.” 33. The application of s. 22 of the 1991 Act also points to another difference between the regimes for adults and children. In the case of an adult who is the subject of an involuntary admission, s. 28 of the 2001 Act provides that where the responsible consultant psychiatrist becomes of the opinion that a patient is no longer suffering from a mental disorder, they must revoke the relevant admission order or renewal order and discharge their patient. 34. The language of s. 28(1) of the 2001 Act refers specifically to “a patient”. As observed above, the word “patient” in that context has a specific meaning for the purposes of the 2001 Act, being a person in respect of whom an admission order or a renewal order is made pursuant to sections 14 and 15 of the 2001 Act. Orders pursuant to sections 14 and 15 of the 2001 Act cannot be made in respect of children. 15 35. Therefore, the reference to a “patient” in s. 28 is a reference to an adult patient, with the consequence that the only manner in which an admission order relating to a child can be discharged is through the use of the statutory powers, which necessarily involve the oversight and supervision of a District Judge set out in s. 25 of the 2001 Act. 36. Nevertheless it is relevant to note that, in setting out the requirement that a consultant psychiatrist must arrange for the discharge of a patient who no longer suffers from a mental disorder, the Oireachtas provided in s. 28(2):- “(2) In deciding whether and when to discharge a patient under this section, the consultant psychiatrist responsible for his or her care and treatment shall have regard to the need to ensure: (a) that the patient is not inappropriately discharged, and (b) that the patient is detained pursuant to an admission order or a renewal order only for so long as is reasonably necessary for his or her proper care and treatment.” [emphasis added] 37. I am satisfied that the clear purpose of s. 28(2) of the 2001 Act is to ensure, having regard to the guidance in s. 4, that a reasonable balance is maintained between, on the one hand, the need ensure that an admission for treatment only lasts for the time required to ensure that proper care and treatment is afforded to the patient, and, on the other hand, the need to ensure that patients are discharged in a properly planned or managed fashion. 38. This means that the discharge does not have to happen immediately on the consultant psychiatrist forming the requisite clinical opinion. The decision that has to be made is whether and when to discharge. This is not surprising, as these are provisions that must operate in the real-world context of the treatment of persons who are unwell and in an approved centre. For 16 persons with mental illness, the definition of “mental disorder” in the 2001 Act requires not just the presence of the mental illness but also additional features that mean involuntary admission is warranted. It is entirely predictable from that definition and practical experience that a patient may still be suffering from a mental illness but no longer suffering from a “mental disorder” as defined. From a practical perspective, arrangements often will need to be made to ensure that discharges are properly planned and implemented in order to respect the best interests of the patient. 39. For the purposes of this case stated, the point is that when the responsible treating consultant forms the view that a child who is the subject of a s. 25 admission no longer suffers from a mental disorder, there is no power to discharge the child absent an order to that effect being made by the District Court. However, even with that important distinction, it can hardly have been the intention of the Oireachtas that the balance sought to be achieved with regard to adult patients in s. 28(2) of the 2001 Act would not be a factor to be taken into account when considering the discharge of a child. 40. In this case, the application to discharge was made prior to the expiration of the admission period set out in the Order. A critical feature of this application was that there was no application to extend the detention but instead an application to discharge an order during its currency. It is also very clear that the only mechanism to achieve that discharge was by an application to the District Court for an order through the application of s. 22 of the 1991 Act as applied by s. 25(14) of the 2001 Act. Such an application may be initiated by the court of its own motion or by any person. 41. The HSE suggested that there was an element of ambiguity in the factual account that formed part of this case stated. The facts rehearse that “Dr S. stated in her evidence that it was 17 her view that [CM] no longer meets the statutory criteria required for this Court to continue her detention …” This, it was said, could refer to the criteria for an extension of a detention order rather than a reference to the criteria for a discharge. It seems reasonably clear to the court, and I am proceeding on this basis, that the clinical view was that C.M. no longer suffered from a mental disorder and required treatment that she was unlikely to receive in the absence of an order. 42. Every case depends on its own facts. In this case, what was proposed by the treating clinicians was that, even though C.M. no longer required compulsory treatment, a short period of approximately 24 hours was required to allow for care planning meeting to occur and that an immediate discharge would be detrimental to C.M. 43. The only reasonable inference is that the clinicians wanted to make sure that the District Court was aware as soon as possible that a clinical view had been formed that C.M. no longer suffered from a mental disorder of the type that met the criteria for an order. Hence, whether C.M. should be discharged had been determined as a clinical matter, subject to the District Court. What remained to be decided was when the discharge should occur. 44. As the parties noted, the District Court has an inherent power to manage its own procedures. As explained by Murray J. in Kirwan v. Connors [2025] IESC 21, all courts enjoy powers of case management. However, particularly in the case of courts of local and limited jurisdiction, this should not be confused with the inherent jurisdiction that is exercised by the High Court. In addition, as Murray J. further noted, the case management powers of the courts may be “conditioned by legislation”. 18 45. Proceedings under s. 25 of the 2001 Act are supported by provisions in the District Court Rules, as provided for in the District Court (Mental Health) Rules 2007, S.I. No. 97/2007. However, these principally deal with the forms to be utilised and the notice that must be given to other parties. Insofar as the District Court enjoys a power to adjourn applications or place stays on orders the necessary conditioning is found by reference to the underlying statutes. 46. In that regard, the provisions set out above all have a part to play. At the risk of unnecessary repetition, for the purposes of this case stated: i. The District Court power to vary or discharge a subsisting order under s. 25 of the 2001 Act is found in s. 22 of the 1991 Act, as made applicable by s. 25(14) of the 2001 Act. ii. There is no provision that expressly requires the automatic discharge of such an order immediately upon the relevant clinician forming the clinical view that the child no longer suffers from a mental disorder. iii. An application to discharge the order must be made to the District Court and should be made promptly. The need for expedition derives from (a) the fact that what is in issue is the deprivation of liberty of a vulnerable young person where the underlying statutory imperative is that persons should not be detained for any longer than is necessary to achieve the therapeutic objective which underpins the making of the order in the first place, and (b) the fact that the decision on whether and when the order should be discharged is a decision to be made by the Court. iv. The District Court must be satisfied, having regard to the evidence, that the discharge is warranted. Practically, in the absence of compelling clinical evidence to the contrary, it would be unusual for such an application to be refused; but this does not mean that the decision of the 19 court amounts merely to a rubber stamping of the clinical decision. The Court is subject to the statutory imperatives set out in s. 4 of the 2001 Act and s. 24 of the 1991, which in turn reflect the constitutional principles found in Article 42A of the Constitution. v. Proceedings under s. 25 of the 2001 Act involve procedures for the admission and detention of children that differ from the procedures for adults. However, the procedures must be operated in a way that, acknowledging the differences between treating adults and children, affords procedural safeguards to children and respects their rights. vi. Where a child suffered from a mental disorder and the District Court determined that an order for admission was required, this involved the carrying out of an exercise, guided by the statutory process, that balanced the various rights engaged. These include, but are not limited to, the rights to liberty, bodily integrity, life and general welfare. Those rights remain engaged at all stages of the process, including at the point when an application is made to discharge a subsisting order. The Oireachtas cannot be understood as having intended that, after undergoing treatment in order to vindicate their rights, a child would suffer harm at the conclusion of the process by being subject to an unplanned and unmanaged discharge. vii. I am satisfied that the express requirement in s. 28 that an adult should not be inappropriately discharged is a factor that can and should inform a decision about the discharge of an order for the admission and detention of a child. 47. Having regard to the above I am satisfied that (a) where the District Court was faced with an application under s. 22 of the 1991 Act to discharge the Order before the 14 day period 20 expired, and (b) where the uncontradicted clinical evidence was that an immediate discharge without proper care planning would not be in C.M.’s best interests and would be detrimental to her mental health, the District Court was entitled by virtue of its case management powers to defer discharge for a short reasonable period and was not obliged to discharge the order immediately. 48. What amounts to a reasonable period will depend on the facts. I do not think that it is within the scope of this case stated or appropriate for the court to seek to prescribe time limits of general applicability. In this case, I am satisfied that effectively postponing the discharge for approximately 24 hours in order to achieve the clinically advised objective was reasonable. 49. In relation to the question of whether the District Court has a power to review the welfare circumstances of a child once a s. 25 order was discharged, the first point to note is that this does not arise on the facts, and the court does not record that it was asked to or considered carrying out such a review. Even though it is outside the scope of the case stated, I consider that it would be helpful to address the question. 50. The GAL submitted that the District Court has a power to review the welfare circumstances of children who were but no longer are the subject of proceedings under s. 25 of the 2001 Act. That argument was premised on issues relating to the operation of the regime for special care provided for in s. 23 of the 1991. I disagree that, in this context, a proper analogy can be drawn between proceedings under s. 25 of the 2001 Act and special care proceedings under s. 23 of the 1991 Act. 51. First, s. 25(14) of the 2001 Act does not import or make applicable any of the provisions in s. 23 of the 1991 Act. Second, I am not persuaded that the position that obtains in High Court 21 special care proceedings, which is the subject of the judgment of Faherty J. in Child and Family Agency v. M.O’L [2019] IEHC 781, applies to s. 25 proceedings. The decision in that case was informed by the previous practice when civil detention orders were made for children on welfare grounds pursuant to the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court. In that regard, the court found that the later statutory intervention did not rule out the proposition that the High Court retained a power of review post discharge. The position in relation to mental health admissions is quite distinct and the statutory provisions are far more circumscribed. 52. Once the District Court discharges an order for the admission and detention of a child that was made under s. 25 of the 2001 Act, there is no express power that provides the District Court with a power to direct or conduct a review of the general circumstances of a child. The 2001 Act, as it applies to children, restricts itself to individual fact and time specific interventions where a child is determined to require admission and detention for mental health treatment. While the overall best interests of the child are factors that inform decisions under s. 25, the court is not provided with powers to intervene more broadly in the life of the child or their parents. 53. S. 25(14) of the 2001 Act makes certain provisions in the 1991 Act applicable, but that does not equate to placing a child who requires mental health interventions in the same position as a child in the statutory care of the Agency. In the first instance, the moving party in a s. 25 application is the HSE and not the Agency. Second, the ancillary powers imported from the 1991 Act are applied in order to complement and give effect to the principal orders provided for in s. 25 of the 2001 Act; they do not operate to expand that targeted regime into a form of alternative statutory care regime. 22 54. If there is a concern that a child should be the subject of care or supervision orders pursuant to the provisions of the 1991 Act, that situation can be addressed readily and speedily by an application being made by the Agency if the necessary statutory criteria are met. However, there is no basis for interpreting s. 25 of the 2001 Act as providing for a more extensive regime than expressly set out. 55. S. 25(14) of the 2001 Act also makes s. 47 of the 1991 Act applicable. S. 47 of the 1991 Act provides the court with a general power relating to children in care that allows the court of its own motion or on the application of any person to make “such order on any question affecting the welfare of the child as it thinks proper”. 56. So far as can be ascertained from the setting out of the history of the application regarding C.M. in this case stated, there was no application for directions or orders by reference to s. 47 of the 1991 Act. In those premises, it would not be appropriate – in the absence of some real issue in these proceedings – to consider how s. 47 may operate in the context of proceedings concerning a mental health admission. This is particularly so where the court is satisfied that the pertinent questions posed in the case stated can be answered and understood by reference to the inherent case management power of the District Court when exercising the power in s. 22 of the 1991 Act, as conditioned by the general provisions of section 4 of the 2001 Act and s. 24 of the 1991 Act. 57. However, it may be of assistance to observe that s. 47 of the 1991 Act only applies where “a child is in the care of the Agency other than special care …”. The importation of that power to proceedings under s. 25 of the 2001 Act should be understood as meaning that the s. 47 power can only be utilised so long as the child remains the subject of those proceedings. I do not understand the Oireachtas as having made provision for any form of supervisory role 23 for the District Court in relation to children who were but no longer are the subject of orders providing for their admission and detention under s. 25 of the 2001 Act. 58. The question regarding the meaning and effect of s. 25(15) of the 2001 Act does not arise in this case stated. Aside from noting that s. 25 of the 2001 Act makes clear that the power to make orders for the admission and detention of children for treatment of a mental disorder can only be exercised on foot of an application to the District Court, the question of the power of the Agency to arrange psychiatric assessment and treatment short of admission and detention is a matter that should be addressed in the context of a concrete factual and legal dispute. THE QUESTIONS 59. In the premises, the court is satisfied that the answers to the questions in the case stated are: • Questions 1, 2 and 5: The power to discharge a detention order made under s. 25 of the 2001 Act arises from s. 22 of the 1991 Act. In considering such a discharge application, the District Court has a case management power, conditioned by s. 4 of the 2001 Act and s. 24(1) of the 1991 Act, to adjourn an application to discharge an order or to place a short stay on a discharge order, but that must be on foot of evidence supporting such a stay or adjournment and must only be for a short period to ensure that the child is not inappropriately discharged. • Questions 3: The District Court does not have a power to review the circumstances of a child following the expiration or discharge of an order made under s. 25 of the 2001 Act. • Questions 4 and 6: These do not arise in the circumstances of this case stated. 24 60. As this judgment is being delivered electronically, I will list the matter for final orders at 10.30am on Wednesday, the 18 March 2026. 25