Ozek v Minister For Justice, Home Affairs and Migration

APPROVED [2026] IEHC 253 THE HIGH COURT JUDICIAL REVIEW 2024 1282 JR BETWEEN ANAN OZEK APPLICANT AND MINISTER FOR JUSTICE, HOME AFFAIRS AND MIGRATION RESPONDENT JUDGMENT of Mr Justice Garrett Simons delivered on 30 April 2026 INTRODUCTION 1. This judgment addresses an aspect of the immigration rights which arise pursuant to the Agreement establishing an Association between the European Economic Community and Turkey. A Turkish national who has been legally employed within a Member State for a period of one year can accrue additional employment rights on a progressive basis. The employment rights carry a NO REDACTION REQUIRED 2 corresponding right of residence. The CJEU has held that these rights have “direct effect” in the domestic legal orders of the Member States. 2. The question which falls for determination in these judicial review proceedings centres on the nature of the immigration documentation which the Irish State is obliged to provide to a Turkish national who is in the process of accruing employment rights. More specifically, the question is whether the Irish State— having elected to require Turkish nationals to apply for and obtain a permission to work and reside in the State—is obliged to ensure that the permission, as issued, accurately records the date upon which the migrant worker acquired rights under EU law. 3. The Irish State’s practice, as disclosed in a decision dated September 2024, is to treat immigration permissions as prospective only, i.e. a permission to work and reside is only effective from the date upon which the decision to issue the permission is made, and not the earlier date upon which the rights accrued under EU law. On the facts of the present case, there was a delay of twelve months in processing the application for the relevant permission. The Irish State’s argument is that the permissions are merely “administrative in nature” and that the employment rights and corresponding right of residence are directly applicable as a matter of EU law. It is said, therefore, that a Turkish national does not require a permission under domestic law in order to exercise his rights under EU law. The implication of the argument being that there is no necessity for the permission issued under domestic law to acknowledge the actual date upon which the rights under EU law accrued. 3 TURKISH ASSOCIATION AGREEMENT 4. The Agreement establishing an Association between what was then the European Economic Community and Turkey was signed on 12 September 1963 in Ankara. The Turkish Association Agreement was concluded, approved, and confirmed on behalf of the EEC by Council Decision 64/732/EEC of 23 December 1963. Article 12 provided that the Contracting Parties would be guided by Articles 48, 49 and 50 of the EEC Treaty for the purpose of progressively securing freedom of movement for workers. The Additional Protocol of 23 November 1970 further developed this framework, with Article 36 tasking the Association Council with determining detailed rules for progressive implementation. Article 41(1) of the Additional Protocol contained a standstill clause regarding freedom of establishment and freedom to provide services. 5. On 19 September 1980, the Association Council adopted Decision No 1/80 on the development of the Association. 6. Article 6 of Decision No 1/80 provides as follows: (1) Subject to Article 7 on free access to employment for members of his family, a Turkish worker duly registered as belonging to the labour force of a Member State: — shall be entitled in that Member State, after one year’s legal employment, to the renewal of his permit to work for the same employer, if a job is available; — shall be entitled in that Member State, after three years of legal employment and subject to the priority to be given to workers of Member States of the Community, to respond to another offer of employment, with an employer of his choice, made under normal conditions and registered with the employment services of that State, for the same occupation; — shall enjoy free access in that Member State to any paid employment of his choice, after four years of legal employment. 4 (2) Annual holidays and absences for reasons of maternity or an accident at work or short periods of sickness shall be treated as periods of legal employment. Periods of involuntary unemployment duly certified by the relevant authorities and long absences on account of sickness shall not be treated as periods of legal employment, but shall not affect rights acquired as the result of the preceding period of employment. (3) The procedures for applying paragraphs 1 and 2 shall be those established under national rules. 7. Save where otherwise indicated, all references in this judgment to an “article” of a legal instrument are intended to refer to the corresponding article of Decision No 1/80. 8. The Court of Justice of the European Union (“CJEU”) has held that Article 6(1) has direct effect in the Member States (Sevince, Case C-192/89, EU:C:1990:322). The CJEU has also held that the right to employment necessarily implies a corollary right of residence, without which the employment right would be deprived of all effect (Kus, Case C-237/91, EU:C:1992:527). A Turkish national who fulfils the requirements of the first or third indent of Article 6(1) may rely directly on those provisions in order to obtain both the renewal of his work permit and of his residence permit (Kus, Case C-237/91, EU:C:1992:527). 9. It should be explained that the Member States retain competence to regulate both the entry into their territories of Turkish nationals and the conditions under which they may take up their first employment. Decision No 1/80 is intended merely to regulate the situation of Turkish nationals who are already integrated into the labour force of the host Member State. Once a Turkish national has been employed for more than one year under a valid work permit, he must be regarded 5 as fulfilling the conditions laid down in the first indent of Article 6(1). This is so notwithstanding that his residence permit may have been initially granted for a purpose other than that of engaging in paid employment (Kus, Case C-237/91, EU:C:1992:527). 10. Having regard to the factual background to the present proceedings, it is relevant to note that Turkish nationals who are initially permitted to enter a Member State for the purpose of education may nevertheless accrue employment rights under Article 6(1). This point has been decided in Payir, Akyuz and Ozturk, Case C- 294/06, EU:C:2008:36. The applicants in those joint cases comprised Turkish nationals who had been admitted to the United Kingdom as students and au pairs, respectively. Their immigration permissions were specifically limited: the students could work only part-time during term; the au pairs had conditions attached to their stay. The host Member State, the United Kingdom, had argued that persons admitted for study or as au pairs, with limited work entitlements, could not acquire Article 6(1) rights. 11. The CJEU dismissed this argument, holding that the decisive factor was whether the initial employment was “legal” in the sense of complying with the conditions laid down by the host Member State. Since the students had been permitted to work part-time and did so lawfully, they could accrue rights under Article 6(1). The restricted character of the initial immigration permission did not prevent the substantive right from arising. 12. The position is summarised as follows at paragraphs 44 and 45 of the judgment: “Consequently, in cases such as those before the referring court, the reasons for which leave to enter was granted to the Turkish nationals concerned – to enable them to pursue studies or gain experience as an au pair – cannot in themselves prevent the persons concerned from being able to rely on Article 6(1) of Decision No 1/80. The same applies 6 to statements of intention made by those nationals to the effect that they do not wish to remain in the host Member State for more than two years or that they intend to leave it on completion of their studies, and to temporal limitations attaching to their leave to remain. Provided that the conditions referred to in paragraphs 27 to 30 of the present judgment are met and provided, in particular, that the genuineness of the work performed by the Turkish nationals in question is confirmed, the fact that they have entered as students in order to pursue a course of studies or as au pairs with the aim of mastering the language of the host Member State is immaterial. If those Turkish nationals succeed, objectively, in fulfilling the conditions laid down in the three indents of Article 6(1) of Decision No 1/80, they cannot be deprived of the rights which that provision progressively grants them on the basis of the duration of their paid employment (see, to that effect, Günaydin, paragraph 37).” 13. The principles in Payir have been applied in this jurisdiction by the High Court (Burns J.) in Dogan v. Minister for Justice [2021] IEHC 692. There, the court rejected a suggestion, on behalf of the Minister, that the applicant in that case should be restricted to the entitlements of her student permission by reason of the fact that she had not indicated, when entering the State, that she would seek to rely on Decision No 1/80. 14. The CJEU has also addressed the question of whether the issuance of a specific administrative document—such as a work permit or residence permit—is a prerequisite to the assertion of the directly applicable rights. This question arose in Bozkurt, Case C-434/93, EU:C:1995:168. Mr Bozkurt had been employed as an international lorry-driver on routes to the Middle East by a company incorporated under Dutch law, with its head office in the Netherlands. Mr Bozkurt’s contract of employment had been concluded under Dutch law. In the periods between his journeys and during his periods of leave, Mr Bozkurt had lived in the Netherlands. Crucially, Dutch law did not treat international 7 lorry-drivers as foreigners or aliens. Accordingly, Mr Bozkurt required neither a work permit nor a residence permit under domestic law. 15. In the circumstances, the CJEU answered the question of whether the existence of legal employment can be established in the absence of a work permit or a residence permit issued by the authorities of the host State, as follows (at paragraphs 29 to 31 of the judgment): “Article 6(1) of Decision No 1/80 does not subject recognition of those rights to the condition that Turkish nationals must establish the legality of their employment by possession of any specific administrative document, such as a work permit or residence permit, issued by the authorities of the host country. It follows that the rights conferred under Article 6(1) on Turkish nationals who are already duly integrated into the labour force of a Member State are accorded to such nationals irrespective of whether or not the competent authorities have issued administrative documents which, in this context, can only be declaratory of the existence of those rights and cannot constitute a condition for their existence. The answer to the second and third questions must therefore be that the existence of legal employment in a Member State within the meaning of Article 6(1) of Decision No 1/80 can be established in the case of a Turkish worker who was not required under the national legislation concerned to hold a work permit or a residence permit issued by the authorities of the host State in order to carry out his work and that the existence of such employment necessarily implies the recognition of a right of residence for the person concerned.” 16. The question of administrative documents has also been addressed in Ergat, Case C-329/97, EU:C:2000:133. The CJEU held that, for the purposes of the recognition of a right of residence, a residence permit can only have “declaratory and probative value”. The CJEU drew an express analogy with the position of EU citizens exercising free movement rights, citing Sagulo, Case 8/77, EU:C:1977:131. 8 17. The judgment in Sagulo implies that it would represent a breach of European law to issue a residence permit which has a scope which is different from the substantive rights it is intended to evidence (at paragraphs 4 and 5): “The rights of nationals of a Member State to enter the territory of another Member State and to reside there for the purposes mentioned in the Treaty follows, as the court making the reference rightly states, directly from the Treaty or, as the case may be, from the provisions adopted for its implementation. Nevertheless Community Law has not deprived Member States of the power to adopt measures to enable the national authorities to have precise information of movements of population in its territory. To enable the Member States to obtain such data and at the same time to put those concerned in a position to prove their legal position with regard to the application of the provisions of the Treaty two formalities are provided for in Articles 2 and 4 of Directive No 68/360: the persons in question must have a valid identity card or passport and be able to prove their right of residence by a document entitled ‘residence permit for a national of a Member State of the EEC’ which must include the statement set out in the annex to the Directive. Under the third paragraph of Article 189 of the Treaty it is for the Member States to choose the form and methods to implement the provisions of the Directive in their territory either by the adoption of a special law or regulations or by the application of appropriate provisions of their general regulations on aliens . The Member States are also competent to lay down penalties or to apply the penalties provided for in their general regulations in order to secure observance in their territory of the formalities provided for in Directive No 68/360. If a Member State executes the Directive on the basis of its general regulations on the legal status of aliens, it must naturally not adopt administrative or judicial measures which would have the effect of limiting the full exercise of the rights which the community law guarantees to the nationals of other Member States. In particular it would be incompatible with Community Law for a general residence permit to be required or issued having a different scope from the proof of the right of residence by the issue of the special ‘residence permit’ provided for in Article 4 (2) of Directive No 68/360.” 18. The CJEU has consistently held that what were then Articles 48 and 49 of the EEC Treaty must be extended, so far as possible, to Turkish nationals who enjoy 9 the rights conferred by Decision No 1/80 (Bozkurt, paragraphs 14, 19 and 20). The analogy is limited—“so far as possible”—and does not assimilate Turkish nationals to EU citizens. The Turkish Association Agreement confers rights only as against the host Member State; it does not confer a right to free movement between the Member States. Nevertheless, in the context of the host Member State, the CJEU tends to favour the interpretation which preserves the migrant worker’s progress towards integration over an interpretation that would interrupt or fragment it. IRISH STATE’S IMPLEMENTING MEASURES Requirement to obtain immigration permission 19. The Irish State requires Turkish nationals, who wish to avail of the employment rights and corresponding right of residence, to obtain a form of immigration permission. This entails the making of an application to the Department of Justice, Home Affairs and Migration. A decision on an application is made by a departmental official as the alter ego of the Minister pursuant to the Carltona principle. 20. In the event that such an application is successful, one of two outcomes will occur: (1). A migrant worker, who has completed less than three years’ legal employment, will be issued with a permission which allows him to continue to work for his current employer, and to reside in the Irish State, without the need for a work permit under the Employment Permits Act 2024; or (2). A migrant worker, who has completed three years’ legal employment, will be issued with a permission which allows him to work for any employer, 10 and to reside in the Irish State, without the need for a work permit under the Employment Permits Act 2024. 21. As appears, the timeline under domestic law is more accelerated than that stipulated under EU law. Here, a migrant worker obtains the right to work for any employer after only three years’ legal employment, rather than four. The reason for this has been explained as follows in the affidavit filed on behalf of the Minister. 22. The permissions issued by the Minister in respect of the Turkish Association Agreement have been modelled on the general system of numbered “stamps” used in other immigration contexts. This is an ad hoc numbering system whereby the bundle of rights attaching to a particular type of immigration permission has been allocated an individual identifying number. For example, an immigration permission issued to a student will be governed by “Stamp 2” conditions. These conditions allow the student to undertake paid employment, subject to a ceiling of 20 hours per week during term time, and 40 hours per week outside term time. The numbering system is capable of change in that the stamps are not defined in statute. 23. The rights progressively acquired under Decision No 1/80 do not map precisely to those allowed under the current numbering system. Relevantly, there is no numbered stamp with conditions equivalent to the status accorded, under the second indent of Article 6(1), to a migrant worker with more than three years, but less than four years, of legal employment. This status allows a migrant worker to be employed in a particular occupation, without being limited to a particular employer. This (second) step in the progression is, in effect, by-passed under domestic law. A migrant worker with three years’ legal employment is, 11 instead, issued with an immigration permission subject to stamp conditions which accord with the rights consonant with those granted under the third indent of Article 6(1). Legal basis for issuing immigration permission 24. Section 5(1) of the Immigration Act 2004 provides that no non-national may be in the State other than in accordance with the terms of any permission given to him or her by or on behalf of the Minister. It is further provided that a non- national who is in the State in contravention of subsection (1) is for all purposes unlawfully present in the State. There are a number of express exceptions to this requirement to hold a permission, but none of these pertain to a non-national who has rights under the Turkish Association Agreement. 25. It follows that, as a matter of domestic law, a migrant worker exercising his rights under the Turkish Association Agreement is required to hold a permission which is cognisable for the purposes of section 5 of the Immigration Act 2004. There are, in principle, three mechanisms by which such a permission may be granted. First, the Minister or an immigration officer acting on his behalf may issue a permission pursuant to the Immigration Act 2004. Second, a permission may be issued, pursuant to other domestic legislation, which authorises a non-national to be in the State. An example of this is provided by the judgment in Ahmed v. Minister for Justice (discussed below). Third, the executive branch of government, as an incident of sovereignty, has a residual power to regulate the entry of non-nationals into the State. This allows for the possibility of the Minister issuing a non-statutory permission in certain circumstances. However, this residual power must yield to legislative intervention in the field: see paragraphs 37 to 42 below. 12 26. The Minister submits that the immigration permissions which are provided to a Turkish national are not issued pursuant to the Immigration Act 2004. The submission runs as follows: (A). Section 2(2) of the Immigration Act 2004 provides that nothing in the Act shall derogate from, inter alia, any of the obligations of the State under the treaties governing the European Communities within the meaning of the European Communities Acts 1972 to 2003, or any act adopted by an institution of those Communities. This proviso is said to extend to an international agreement, such as the Turkish Association Agreement, which has been held to have “direct effect” in the legal orders of the Member States. (B). The substantive rights, i.e. the employment rights and the corresponding right of residence, arising under the Turkish Association Agreement have “direct effect” as a matter of EU law. (C). Where a permission to work and reside in the Irish State is acquired under directly applicable EU law, there is no separate requirement to obtain permission under section 4 of the Immigration Act 2004. However, there remains an obligation on individuals holding such permissions to register their (separately derived) permission in accordance with section 9 of the Act. 27. This submission is premised on a misunderstanding of the practical consequences of the doctrine of “direct effect”. As discussed in detail at paragraphs 78 to 98 below, the doctrine is intended to provide a remedy to address the contingency where a Member State has failed in its obligation to take 13 appropriate implementation measures. It does not absolve a Member State from having to take the necessary steps to fulfil its obligation. 28. The Irish State is obliged, under Article 6(3) of Decision No 1/80, to adopt such national legislation and to take such administrative measures as may be necessary for the implementation of the substantive rights. This could have been achieved by the introduction of dedicated legislation which addresses the specific case of Turkish nationals (as has been done in the case of EU citizens under the European Communities (Free Movement of Persons) Regulations 2015). Alternatively, the Irish State might, in principle, have exempted Turkish nationals from the requirement to hold any immigration permission. 29. The Irish State has not adopted either of the foregoing approaches. Rather, the Irish State insists that Turkish nationals apply to the Minister for a permission and register that permission thereafter. In the absence of any dedicated legislation for these specific purposes, the only domestic legislation which allows for the imposition of such requirements is the Immigration Act 2004. It follows that the immigration permissions can only have been issued pursuant to section 4 of the Immigration Act 2004. Indeed, the very fact that the Applicant in the present case was directed to register the permission pursuant to section 9 of the Act is a tacit recognition of this legal reality. There is only one definition of “permission” provided for under the Act, and this suggests that only permissions which have been issued under the Act are subject to mandatory registration. 30. The Minister’s reliance on the proviso under sub-section 2(2)(a) and (b) of the Immigration Act 2004 is misplaced. The proviso reads as follows: “Nothing in this Act shall derogate from— 14 (a) any of the obligations of the State under the treaties governing the European Communities within the meaning of the European Communities Acts 1972 to 2003, (b) any act adopted by an institution of those Communities, […]” 31. The use of the phrase “shall not derogate from” is significant and is to be contrasted with the language used elsewhere in the Immigration Act 2004, which speaks of the non-application of the Act to certain classes of person, such as, for example, refugees. The phrase “shall not derogate from” does not create a blanket exemption whereby an individual who has accrued immigration rights under directly applicable EU law is automatically exempt from the requirement to hold an immigration permission. Rather, the provision exists as a failsafe which ensures that there is no conflict between domestic law and EU law. 32. The proper interpretation is that a Turkish national is required, as a matter of domestic law, to obtain and register an immigration permission under the Immigration Act 2004. Of course, these statutory requirements cannot be operated in such a way as to diminish the EU law rights. Where a Member State implements EU immigration law through its own general immigration legislation, it must not adopt administrative measures which would have the effect of limiting the full exercise of the rights which EU law guarantees to the relevant individual. See, by analogy, Sagulo (discussed at paragraphs 16 to 18 above). It follows, therefore, that in deciding whether to grant an immigration permission under the Immigration Act 2004 to a Turkish national, who is claiming rights by reference to Decision No 1/80, the decision-maker is confined to assessing whether the criteria under Article 6(1) are satisfied. The decision- 15 maker does not have a general discretion to refuse to grant an immigration permission to an otherwise qualified applicant. 33. The Minister’s reliance on Ahmed v. Minister for Justice [2024] IEHC 412 is misplaced. That judgment concerned the interaction between the European Communities (Free Movement of Persons) Regulations 2015 and the Immigration Act 2004. The question was whether a non-national who had a temporary right to remain in the Irish State by dint of the 2015 Regulations, pending determination of an application for a residence card as a permitted family member, might be in contravention of section 5(1) in the absence of having applied for a parallel permission under the Immigration Act 2004. 34. Phelan J. held that such a person is not in contravention. This conclusion was reached by reference to two alternative bases: either the temporary right to remain under the 2015 Regulations represents a form of immigration permission cognisable under section 5(1) of the Immigration Act 2004, or, alternatively, the derogation under sub-section 2(2)(f) is engaged and obviates any necessity to hold a parallel permission under the Act. Sub-section 2(2)(f) expressly names the European Communities (Free Movement of Persons) Regulations 2015. 35. It should be emphasised that Ahmed addresses the relationship between two domestic legislative instruments, in circumstances where the temporary right to remain was expressly characterised as arising “as a matter of domestic rather than EU law”. Phelan J. was careful to distinguish the position of a permitted family member—whose entitlement to remain pending determination is a creature of the 2015 Regulations, not of the Citizenship Directive (Directive 2004/38/EC)—from that of a qualifying family member, whose right of residence derives directly from EU law. Phelan J. held that sub-sections 2(2)(a) 16 and (b)—the limbs concerning EU law obligations—were not engaged by the case before her. 36. The judgment in Ahmed does not stand as authority for the proposition that a migrant worker whose substantive right of residence is directly effective under EU law is exempt from any domestic requirement to hold an immigration permission which is declaratory and probative of that right. 37. For completeness, it is appropriate to consider whether the executive branch of government’s residual power might be called in aid as the source of the power to grant immigration permissions to Turkish nationals. 38. It is well established that the Irish State, as an aspect of sovereignty, has an inherent power both to regulate the entry of non-nationals into the Irish State and to impose conditions upon the employment, if any, which they may undertake. In the absence of legislation, this power may be exercised by the executive branch of government. 39. Article 15.2.1° of the Constitution of Ireland vests “sole and exclusive” law making power in the Oireachtas. In principle, once the Oireachtas enacts legislation regulating an aspect of immigration, the residual power of the executive branch of government must yield to the legislative encroachment. As explained in N.H.V. v. Minister for Justice and Equality [2017] IESC 35, [2018] 1 IR 246, the executive power in a constitution which recognises a separation of powers does not extend to the repealing or overriding of legislation. 40. Whereas there may be a debate as to whether some core executive powers might be immune from legislative encroachment, no such considerations arise here. It has been accepted by the Supreme Court that the legislative branch may “grasp” the power to regulate immigration from the executive branch. 17 41. This logic extends to legislative encroachment by the institutions of the European Union. The domestic legal order is subject to the supremacy of the EU legal order which occupies an analogous—but superior—position within that hierarchy. Article 29.4 of the Constitution of Ireland does not merely represent an undertaking to comply with EU obligations as a matter of policy or comity. Instead, the Article operates to reallocate, in defined fields, what was once purely domestic law-making authority to the EU legal order. The supremacy of EU law enters the domestic legal order through the Constitution, not independently of it. 42. The immigration rights of Turkish nationals are now regulated as a matter of EU law. The legislative branch of government is inhibited from legislating inconsistently with directly applicable EU law. The executive branch of government cannot assert the existence of a residual inherent power to regulate an area which is regulated by directly applicable EU law to the exclusion of the legislative branch. The only function remaining to the Member States is to adopt such national legislation and to take such administrative measures as may be necessary for the implementation of the substantive rights. This has been achieved by the Immigration Act 2004, leaving no room for executive discretion. PROCEDURAL HISTORY 43. The Applicant is a Turkish national. The Applicant first entered the Irish State in November 2018 pursuant to a student immigration permission (Stamp 2). This immigration permission allowed him to undertake paid employment, subject to a ceiling of 20 hours per week during term time, and 40 hours per week outside term time. 18 44. The Applicant commenced work at a restaurant in Dublin on 7 January 2019. Having completed one year’s continuous legal employment with the same employer, the Applicant applied for an immigration permission (Stamp 1) by reference to the Turkish Association Agreement. This application is noted as having been received on 27 January 2020. 45. There was an inordinate delay in processing the application: a decision was only issued some twelve months after the application had been submitted. The decision is dated 5 January 2021. The operative part of the decision reads as follows: “An examination of the papers in relation to your case indicates that you have completed one year of legal employment in the State. Following consideration of all the circumstances in your case, it is accepted that you are entitled to remain on Stamp 1 conditions for a period of one year from the date of this letter. These conditions will allow you to continue to work with your current employer and reside in the State without the need for a work permit. Your permission is subject to your compliance with certain conditions which are set out below. This permission begins from the date of this letter.” 46. The decision stipulated that the Applicant was required to register the immigration permission: “It should be noted that you are required by law under section 9(2)(a) of the Immigration Act, 2004 to register this permission with your local Immigration Registration Officer as soon as may be. […] Please note that a failure to register promptly will be considered to constitute a failure to comply with the laws of the State and may constitute in itself a ground for revoking your permission to be in the State. In order to register, you are required under section 9(2)(a) of the Immigration Act, 2004 to produce a passport issued by an authority recognised by the Irish government which 19 establishes your identity and nationality, unless you can give a satisfactory explanation of the circumstances which prevent you from doing so. You should also bring this letter with you when you attend to register. Please note that a person who contravenes subsections 2, 3 or 4 of section 9 of the Immigration Act, 2004 is guilty of an offence and liable on summary conviction to a fine not exceeding €3,000 or to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 12 months or both. Provided that the Garda National Immigration Bureau is satisfied that you have met the necessary requirements for registration, upon payment of the appropriate fee, you will be issued with a certificate of registration. The Certificate of Registration, together with this letter granting you temporary permission will show which stamp you have received and the conditions attached to your permission. Please see above. The Certificate is an important document and you should keep it safely along with your original permission letter from the Immigration Service Delivery.” 47. The Applicant made a subsequent application for an immigration permission (Stamp 4) in January 2022. This application was successful: the Minister issued an immigration permission on 9 March 2022. The operative part of the decision reads as follows: “An examination of the papers in relation to your case indicates that you have completed three years of legal employment in the State. Following consideration of all the circumstances in your case, it is accepted that you are entitled to remain with Stamp 4 conditions for a period of one year from the date of this letter. These conditions will allow you to reside and work in Ireland without the need for a work permit.” 48. One can infer from this decision, by carrying out the necessary mathematical exercise, that the Minister must have treated the Applicant’s employment during the interregnum between January 2020 and January 2021 as counting towards the three-year threshold. The Minister’s stance for the purpose of the judicial 20 review proceedings is that the Applicant is not entitled to an immigration permission which expressly acknowledges this. 49. The Applicant now wishes to apply to acquire Irish citizenship by naturalisation pursuant to the Irish Nationality and Citizenship Act 1956. To that end, he instructed his solicitors to write to the Minister seeking to have the immigration permission of 5 January 2021 reissued to reflect the fact that his period of reckonable residence had commenced on 7 January 2020. The solicitors’ letter is dated 26 August 2024 and reads as follows: “Having regard to the first indent of article 6(1) of Decision 1/80, our client became entitled to a work permit to be employed by the same employer for whom he had worked for the previous twelve months, once that twelve-month period expired. Thus, our client became entitled to Stamp 1 permission on 7th January 2020 and not on 5th January 2021. In this regard, we refer to and rely on the enclosed Employment Detail Summary 2019 and 2020 for our client. As outlined above, while the name of his employer changed in 2019, he continued to be employed by this employer. Our client wishes to apply for naturalisation and as part of that process, it will be necessary for him to demonstrate his periods of reckonable residence in the State. In circumstances where his period of reckonable residence in fact commenced on 7th January 2020, we request that the Minister issues a corrected letter, confirming that his entitlement to Stamp 1 permission commenced on that date.” 50. The reply sent on behalf of the Minister is dated 13 September 2024 and reads as follows: “In this correspondence, you have requested that your client’s Stamp 1 permission, pursuant to the Turkish Association Agreement, be backdated to 7 January 2020. You submit that this was the date from which your client was eligible for Stamp 1 permission under the Agreement. In relation to applications pursuant to the Turkish Association Agreement, where an application is successful and permission is granted, it commences from the date of the decision letter. As such, this office is not in a position to 21 backdate your client’s permissions and your request has been refused.” 51. It is this decision, i.e. the refusal to revise the earlier immigration permission, which is challenged in these judicial review proceedings. CHRONOLOGY 52. The key events in the chronology are summarised in tabular form below: November 2018 Applicant enters Irish State on student permission 7 January 2019 Applicant commences part-time employment 27 January 2020 Application for permission (1 year’s employment) 5 January 2021 Stamp 1 permission issues 12 January 2022 Application for permission (3 years’ employment) 9 March 2022 Stamp 4 permission issues 26 August 2024 Applicant seeks confirmation of Stamp 1 permission 13 September 2024 Minister’s refusal 16 October 2024 Judicial review proceedings filed in the High Court 9 December 2025 High Court hearing ORDER 84: TIME-LIMIT 53. Order 84, rule 21 of the Rules of the Superior Courts provides that an application for leave to apply for judicial review shall be made within three months from the date when grounds for the application first arose. 54. The Minister makes the objection that the application for judicial review is inadmissible by reason of the Applicant’s failure to commence the proceedings within the three-month time-limit prescribed. It is said that the proceedings entail a collateral challenge to the decision made by the Minister on 5 January 22 2021 and that the proceedings should have been commenced within three months of that date. It is further said that the Applicant had been aware that the Stamp 1 conditions were only operative from the date of that decision. The Minister’s letter of 13 September 2024 is characterised as having “simply re-iterated” the previous decision. Counsel submits that the Applicant is not entitled to circumvent the time-limit by requesting the Minister, years later, to revisit the previous decision and then seeking to rely on the Minister’s confirmation of that decision as resetting the clock for the purposes of the time-limit. 55. Having regard to the peculiar circumstances of the present case, I have concluded that the Minister’s objection that the proceedings are out of time is not well founded. It is correct to say, at the level of general principle, that a decision which is merely a reiteration of the original decision is not a “new” decision, and that the time-limit runs from the date of the original decision. This general principle has recently been restated by the Court of Appeal (per Murray J.) in Arthropharm (Europe) Ltd v. Health Products Regulatory Authority [2022] IECA 109 (at paragraphs 140 to 142). The judgment observes that it would make a nonsense of the time-limit imposed by Order 84, rule 21 if an applicant could, under the guise of a challenge to a subsequent decision, obtain the invalidation of an earlier decision for which time had run and expired. 56. The judgment goes on to explain (at paragraph 144) that the application of the general principles to a particular decision depends, in any given case, on the relevant facts and issues viewed in the light of the proper construction of the relevant regulatory regime: “[…] In any given case, accordingly, the court must ask whether in substance the decision which it is sought to challenge, and the responses issued by the decision maker in reply to subsequent objections to the impugned 23 determination, are the same ‘decision’ or a new decision and, if the latter, whether the grounds of challenge are in substance a challenge to a decision the entitlement to review which has expired by effluxion of time.” 57. It follows, therefore, that in order to resolve the Minister’s objection in the present case, it is necessary for this court to assess whether the response issued on behalf of the Minister in September 2024, in reply to the letter from the Applicant’s solicitors, determined an issue which had not been addressed in the decision of January 2021. For ease of exposition, I will refer to these as “the first decision” and “the second decision”, respectively. 58. The stance adopted on behalf of the Minister for the purpose of his time-limit objection is to contend that the permission conferring the benefit of Stamp 1 conditions was only operative from the date of the first decision (5 January 2021). This is so notwithstanding that the rights under EU law had accrued some twelve months earlier. It is further contended that the Applicant should have understood as much and should have commenced any judicial review proceedings within three months of the date of the first decision. 59. For the reasons which follow, I cannot agree with the foregoing characterisation of the first decision. 60. The operative part of the first decision reads as follows: “An examination of the papers in relation to your case indicates that you have completed one year of legal employment in the State. Following consideration of all the circumstances in your case, it is accepted that you are entitled to remain on Stamp 1 conditions for a period of one year from the date of this letter. These conditions will allow you to continue to work with your current employer and reside in the State without the need for a work permit. 24 Your permission is subject to your compliance with certain conditions which are set out below. This permission begins from the date of this letter.” 61. As appears, the decision opens with a finding of fact, namely, that the Applicant has completed one year of legal employment in the State. It is common case between the parties that this milestone was reached on 7 January 2020. The decision goes on then to record the Minister’s acceptance that the Applicant is entitled to remain on Stamp 1 conditions for a period of one year and that these conditions will allow the Applicant to continue to work with his current employer and reside in the State without the need for a work permit. 62. The use of the phrases “to remain on Stamp 1 conditions” and “to continue” to work and reside is significant. The phrases imply that the decision is intended to allow for the continuation of an immigration status which has already accrued. The decision does not purport to endow the Applicant, for the first time, with the benefit of the enhanced rights referable to Stamp 1 conditions, as compared to the Stamp 2 conditions governing his initial student permission. Rather, the decision provides that the Applicant is to remain on Stamp 1 conditions. This benefit is to be continued for a period of one year from the date of the decision. 63. Upon the expiration of that period, it would become necessary for the Applicant to apply to renew the immigration permission. The one-year period is properly characterised as fixing the end point by reference to which the Applicant has to apply to renew the permission. It will be recalled that it is incumbent upon the Member States, under Article 6(3), to adopt such national legislation and to take such administrative measures as may be necessary for the implementation of the substantive rights. The permission is properly characterised as a single iteration of a series of administrative documents issued by the national competent 25 authority which declare and evidence the rights already accrued by the direct effect of the first indent of Article 6(1). 64. There is nothing in the first decision which indicates that, up and until the date of the decision, the Applicant remained bound by the Stamp 2 conditions governing his initial student permission. Indeed, had the first decision purported to do so, this would have entailed precisely the type of encroachment upon a migrant worker’s rights which has been condemned in the case law discussed earlier. As explained at paragraphs 10 to 13 above, Turkish nationals who are initially permitted to enter a Member State for the purpose of education as students may nevertheless accrue employment and residence rights under Article 6(1). A decision by a national competent authority to hold a migrant worker, who has achieved the milestone of one year’s legal employment, to the conditions of a student permission is contrary to EU law. 65. The natural and ordinary meaning of the first decision is that the Minister acknowledged that the Applicant had already accrued rights under the first indent of Article 6(1), and that those rights were to continue. The immigration permission was declaratory of, and probative of, those rights. The first decision emphasised that the Applicant was required to register the immigration permission, and the reference to “one year” fixed the date after which it would become necessary to renew the immigration permission and the associated registration. It cannot be read as intended to negate the finding of fact that the Applicant had completed one year of legal employment in the State on 7 January 2020. 66. The Applicant cannot, therefore, be criticised for not seeking to challenge the first decision. To do so would have involved the Applicant attributing an 26 intention to the Minister to breach EU law in circumstances where there was nothing on the face of the decision to evince such an intention. 67. The fact that the solicitors subsequently retained by the Applicant sought confirmation of the temporal limit of the permission issued by the first decision does not gainsay this. This confirmation was sought in circumstances where the question of the Applicant’s immigration status in the twelve-month interregnum had become a live issue because he intended to apply for naturalisation. The Applicant wishes to rely on the twelve-month period as part of his overall period of reckonable residence. 68. This approach of seeking confirmation might be characterised as overly cautious. The fact of his having sought confirmation does not, as appears to be suggested on behalf of the Minister, give rise to some sort of estoppel whereby the Applicant should be taken as acknowledging that the first decision should have been challenged at the time. As explained, the natural and ordinary meaning of the first decision is that the Minister acknowledged that the Applicant had already accrued rights under the first indent of Article 6(1). The proper interpretation of the first decision is a question of law for the court. The fact, if fact it be, that the Applicant’s solicitors may have read the decision as operating prospectively only is not conclusive. The subjective view of the solicitors is largely irrelevant. 69. The response issued on behalf of the Minister in September 2024, in reply to the letter from the Applicant’s solicitors, determined that the immigration permission did not encompass the period between the date upon which the Applicant accrued rights under the first indent of Article 6(1), and the date upon which his application had been belatedly determined. The Minister’s position 27 has since been elaborated upon in his opposition papers. In the verifying affidavit, it is said that while their application for a Stamp 1 is being processed, Turkish nationals remain entitled to renew their existing permission which allows them to continue employment in the State. On the facts of the present case, this would have entailed the Applicant having to renew his student permission, with its limited working hours, notwithstanding that he had already accrued rights under the first indent of Article 6(1). 70. The Minister’s second decision appears to be inconsistent with that recorded in his first decision. The Minister seems to have moved from a position of accepting the Applicant’s accrued rights, to suggesting that he should have been confined to a student permission pending the tardy processing and determination of his application. This would have entailed an additional period of twelve months. Certainly, it cannot be said that the second decision is merely a reiteration of the first decision. At best, the second decision determines an issue of substance which had not been conclusively determined by the first decision; at worst, it contradicts the first decision. In either event, the second decision represents a “new” decision in the sense that the term is used in Arthropharm (Europe) Ltd v. Health Products Regulatory Authority. The substance of the second decision is different and the grounds upon which it is challenged simply do not apply to the first decision. It could not have reasonably been anticipated in January 2021 that the Minister would take the stance of refusing to acknowledge that the Applicant’s residence and employment during the period between January 2020 and January 2021 were in accordance with domestic law. 28 71. Accordingly, time only began to run for the purpose of the three-month time- limit under Order 84 from the date of the second decision. The judicial review proceedings were commenced well within time of that date. 72. For completeness, it should be observed that the CJEU has held that it would be incompatible with the principle of effectiveness to rely on a domestic time-limit if the conduct of the national authorities, in conjunction with the existence of the time-limit, had the effect of totally depriving an individual of the opportunity to enforce his rights before the national courts (Flausch, Case C-280/18, EU:C:2019:928). Here, the Minister cannot rely on the lack of clarity in his first decision to defeat the Applicant’s claim by reference to the three-month time- limit. DETAILED DISCUSSION OVERVIEW 73. The principal question for determination in these proceedings is whether the Irish State—having elected to require Turkish nationals to apply for and obtain a permission to work and reside in the State—is obliged to ensure that the permission, as issued, accurately records the date upon which the individual acquired the relevant rights under EU law. 74. The resolution of this question necessitates consideration of the interaction between the substantive rights, i.e. the employment rights and the corresponding right of residence, and the procedures established under national law for applying those substantive rights. 75. The answer offered on behalf of the Minister for Justice, Home Affairs and Migration is to invoke the doctrine of “direct effect”. There are two strands to 29 the argument. First, it is submitted that the Applicant did not require an immigration permission under domestic law in order to acquire his directly effective rights under EU law. It is said to follow from this that there is “no logical basis” upon which to contend that the accrual of the EU law rights and any permission granted by the Minister must be “temporally coterminous”. It is further submitted that the entitlements accruing to a Turkish migrant worker under EU law are “separate and distinct from a permission or immigration stamp from the Minister”. 76. Second, it is submitted that the Applicant’s exercise of his substantive rights has not been impaired or undermined by the commencement date of the immigration permission. 77. These submissions are addressed, in turn, below. DIRECT EFFECT AND OBLIGATION TO ADOPT ADMINISTRATIVE MEASURES 78. The CJEU has consistently held that Article 6(1) of Decision No 1/80 has direct effect in the Member States and that Turkish nationals who satisfy its conditions may therefore rely directly on the rights given them by the various indents of that provision. This is so irrespective of whether the host Member State has ever issued the migrant worker with a specific administrative document, such as a work permit or a residence permit. Any administrative document issued by the host Member State would merely be declaratory of and probative of rights which have accrued under EU law, rather than constitutive of those rights. 79. It is, however, a non sequitur to suggest that the issuance of administrative documents is entirely a matter of domestic law, untrammelled by any obligation under Decision No 1/80. The fact that an individual is, in principle, entitled to 30 rely on the direct effect of the substantive rights does not absolve a Member State from complying with its obligation to adopt such national legislation, and to take such administrative measures, as may be necessary for the implementation of the substantive rights. 80. This obligation is imposed upon the Member States by Article 6(3) of Decision No 1/80. This article provides that the procedures for applying the rights conferred on Turkish nationals are to be established under national rules. The CJEU has held that this article merely clarifies the obligation incumbent upon the Member States to adopt such national legislation and to take such administrative measures as may be necessary for the implementation of the substantive rights. Member States cannot, under the guise of implementing legislation or administrative measures, restrict the application of the precise and unconditional rights which EU law grants to Turkish nationals. 81. The position has been summarised as follows in Ertanir, Case C-98/96, EU:C:1997:446 (at paragraphs 30 to 33): “[…] Article 6(3) merely provides that the competent authorities of the Member States may adopt such national legislation as may be required for the application of the rights conferred on Turkish workers by paragraphs (1) and (2) of that provision. However, that provision cannot be construed as reserving to the Member States the power to adapt as they please the rules governing Turkish workers already integrated in their labour force, permitting them to adopt unilaterally measures preventing certain categories of workers who already satisfy the conditions of Article 6(1) from benefiting from the progressively more extensive rights enshrined in the three indents of that paragraph. The effect of such an interpretation would be to render Decision No 1/80 meaningless and deprive it of any practical effect. Likewise, its purpose would not be achieved if restrictions imposed by a Member State could result in denying Turkish workers the rights which the three indents 31 of Article 6(1) confer on them progressively once they have been in gainful employment in the host Member State for a certain time. Moreover, the wording of Article 6(1) is general and unconditional: it does not permit the Member States to deprive certain categories of Turkish workers of the rights which that provision confers directly on them or to restrict or attach conditions to such rights.” 82. The CJEU has considered, in a number of its judgments, the contingency of a host Member State refusing to issue an administrative document which accurately reflects the rights enjoyed by a migrant worker. The judgments typically address a scenario whereby a Turkish national has lawfully entered the Member State for a specific purpose, such as vocational training or study. This purpose is reflected in the initial administrative document issued to the migrant worker. The migrant worker then completes one year’s legal employment in the Member State and thus accrues the rights provided for under the first indent of Article 6(1). The Member State nevertheless seeks to deny or limit these rights by reference to the initial administrative document. 83. In Ertanir, for example, the Member State sought to rely on the fact that, under domestic law, foreign nationals employed in the relevant occupation (specialist chefs) were permitted to reside in Germany for no more than a total of three years. In Payir, the Member States submitted that Article 6(1) applies only to persons who have been admitted precisely as workers and that Turkish nationals who have been given leave to enter for the purpose of study, even if they carry on secondary activities, in principle do not fall within the scope of the article. 84. The CJEU held, in each case, that the reasons for which he was first granted the right to enter that territory or any temporal limitations attached to his right to work are not to be taken into account in determining whether a Turkish national 32 who has entered the territory of a Member State lawfully may, after working for a year in that territory, rely on the rights conferred by Article 6(1). Crucially, the case law indicates that the remedy is that the Member State must issue an administrative document in appropriate form. The CJEU held that the relevant migrant worker was able to rely on Article 6(1) for the purposes of obtaining renewed permission to work and a corollary right of residence. Put otherwise, the legal consequence of Article 6(1) being directly applicable is that the Member States must disapply any conflicting domestic law rules and issue an immigration permission which acknowledges the full extent of the rights which had accrued to the individual as a matter of EU law. 85. It follows that it is incorrect to contend that the direct effect of Article 6(1) obviates the necessity for the national competent authority to issue an immigration permission in proper form, where a permission is required under domestic law. Article 6(3) obliges Member States to adopt such national legislation, and to take such administrative measures, as may be necessary for the implementation of the substantive rights. As discussed further at paragraphs 92 to 98 below, it is a general principle of EU law that national implementation measures must be sufficiently clear and precise as to ensure that individuals concerned can ascertain the full extent of their rights. This is especially so in the present context where the rights accrue on a progressive basis. It is essential that an individual migrant worker know the extent of his rights at any particular point in time. 86. In circumstances where the domestic law of the host Member State requires a Turkish national to obtain an administrative document, such as a work permit or a residence permit, then a migrant worker who has completed the qualifying 33 periods of employment under one of the indents to Article 6(1) is entitled to be issued with an accurate administrative document. The administrative document must acknowledge the full extent of the rights which have accrued to the individual as a matter of directly applicable EU law. This is necessary to comply with the principles of legal certainty and effectiveness. The migrant worker needs to know the extent of his rights and to have a document which he can rely upon to demonstrate the existence of those rights to his employer. 87. The dates upon which the various indents are satisfied determine, in sequence, the migrant worker’s entitlement to renew his permission with the same employer, to respond to other offers of employment in the same occupation, and ultimately to have free access to any paid employment of his choice. The migrant worker must know, at any given point in time, where he stands in this progression. The administrative document issued by the host Member State is, in practice, the principal instrument by which he may do so. If the document misdates the accrual of the rights under the first indent, the dates upon which the rights under the second and third indents will accrue are displaced by the same amount of time. The defect is, therefore, not confined to the date which it misstates. It propagates throughout the migrant worker’s progression under Article 6(1). 88. The Minister’s attempted reliance on the judgment in Bozkurt in this context is misplaced. As explained earlier, on the facts of that case, the migrant worker (an international lorry driver) required neither a work permit nor a residence permit under the domestic law of the host Member State. The judgment does not stand as authority for the proposition that—in the counterfactual circumstances where a Member State does require a migrant worker to hold an administrative 34 document—it is legitimate to issue same in a form which misdates the accrual of rights. Where the host Member State chooses to operate an administrative system to record and evidence the migrant worker’s immigration status (whether or not such a system is strictly required by EU law), it cannot maintain that accuracy within that system is optional. 89. The Minister makes a specific argument predicated on the three-week gap between (i) the date upon which the rights under the first indent of Article 6(1) first accrued and (ii) the subsequent date upon which the application for a permission on Stamp 1 conditions was made to the Department. It is submitted that no immigration permission can properly be operative from a date prior to the date of application, and further submitted that the acceptance of the Applicant’s principle would permit a Turkish national to demand retrospective adjustment of his permissions at any point in time and for periods long past. 90. The rights conferred by the first indent of Article 6(1) accrue, as a matter of EU law, upon the completion of one year’s legal employment. The only legitimate function which an immigration permission, issued under domestic law, can perform is declaratory and evidential. The immigration permission cannot diminish the rights which have accrued under EU law. The immigration permission must accurately reflect the date of the accrual of the right. That is precisely what distinguishes a declaratory instrument from a constitutive one. 91. The Minister’s argument also appears to be inconsistent with Ergat, Case C-329/97, EU:C:2000:133. There, the CJEU held that the Member States do not have the power to restrict the right directly conferred on a Turkish national by EU law to have free access to all employment and, concomitantly, to reside in 35 the host Member State for that purpose, by refusing to extend his residence permit on the ground that he made his application late. 92. Finally, it should be explained that the foregoing analysis involves no more than the application of well-established principles of EU law to the specific context of the Turkish Association Agreement. The question of the implications of the doctrine of “direct effect” for a Member State’s obligation to take implementing measures has been settled in the analogous context of EU Directives. The CJEU has consistently held that a Member State cannot rely on the fact that a particular directive has direct effect as a justification for failing to implement the directive in the domestic legal order. This point is illustrated by the judgment in Commission v. Belgium, Case 102/79, EU:C:1980:120. There, the respondent Member State had contended that since the relevant directives were sufficiently clear, precise, and unconditional as to have direct effect, and were in fact being applied by the competent authorities, there was no need for formal transposition. 93. The CJEU rejected this argument as follows (at paragraph 12): “The justification based on the ‘direct applicability’ of the directives in question cannot be accepted either. The effect of the third paragraph of Article 189 is that Community directives must be implemented by appropriate implementing measures carried out by the Member States. Only in specific circumstances, in particular where a Member State has failed to take the implementing measures required or has adopted measures which do not conform to a directive, has the Court of Justice recognised the right of persons affected thereby to rely in law on a directive as against a defaulting member state (cf. on this subject, the judgment of 5 April 1979, Ratti, Case 148/78 ECR 1629). This minimum guarantee arising from the binding nature of the obligation imposed on the Member States by the effect of the directives under the third paragraph of Article 189 cannot justify a Member State’s absolving itself from taking in due time implementing measures sufficient to meet the purpose of each directive. […]”. 36 94. The case law also establishes that where a European Directive is intended to create rights for individuals, the implementation measures must ensure that individuals are able to ascertain their rights. The position is put as follows in Commission v. Germany, Case 29/84, EU:C:1985:229 (at paragraph 23): “It follows from that provision that the implementation of a directive does not necessarily require legislative action in each Member State. In particular the existence of general principles of constitutional or administrative law may render implementation by specific legislation superfluous, provided however that those principles guarantee that the national authorities will in fact apply the directive fully and that, where the directive is intended to create rights for individuals, the legal position arising from those principles is sufficiently precise and clear and the persons concerned are made fully aware of their rights and, where appropriate, afforded the possibility of relying on them before the national courts. That last condition is of particular importance where the directive in question is intended to accord rights to nationals of other Member States because those nationals are not normally aware of such principles.” 95. These sentiments have been reiterated in a series of judgments. By way of example, the position is put as follows in Commission v. Ireland, Case C-50/09, EU:C:2011:109 (at paragraph 46): “Whilst it is true that, according to settled case-law, the transposition of a directive into domestic law does not necessarily require the provisions of the directive to be enacted in precisely the same words in a specific, express provision of national law and a general legal context may be sufficient if it actually ensures the full application of the directive in a sufficiently clear and precise manner (see, in particular, Case C-427/07 Commission v Ireland [2009] ECR I-6277, paragraph 54 and the case-law cited), the fact remains that, according to equally settled case-law, the provisions of a directive must be implemented with unquestionable binding force and with the specificity, precision and clarity required in order to satisfy the need for legal certainty, which requires that, in the case of a directive intended to confer rights on individuals, the persons concerned must be enabled to ascertain the full extent of their rights (see, in particular, Commission v Ireland, paragraph 55 and the case-law cited).” 37 96. Properly understood, the doctrine of direct effect ensures that EU law rights are effective notwithstanding a failure in implementation on the part of the Member States. As the CJEU says, the doctrine is intended as a “minimum guarantee” to ensure that the individual can assert his rights notwithstanding the failure of the Member State. The doctrine is not intended to absolve the Member States of their obligation to take appropriate implementation measures. 97. The principles that pertain to European Directives with direct effect extend, by analogy, to the directly applicable rights under Decision No 1/80. In each instance, the fact that the substantive rights have direct effect does not absolve the Member States from their obligation to put in place the necessary implementation measures. Whereas the source of that obligation is different, arising under Article 6(3) of Decision No 1/80 rather than Article 288 TFEU, the logic is the same. 98. The fact that it becomes necessary for an individual to rely on the principle of direct effect to invoke their rights before the national courts is a consequence of the Member State’s failure in implementation, not a justification for it. The Member State’s obligation to implement is not discharged, suspended, or attenuated by the availability of direct effect as a remedy. U.M. (A MINOR) V. MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS 99. Counsel for the Minister placed reliance on the decision of the Supreme Court in U.M. (A minor) v. Minister for Foreign Affairs [2022] IESC 25, [2024] 1 IR 316. It is submitted that the judgment of Dunne J. is authority for the proposition that the use of the “immigration stamp nomenclature” is “administrative in nature”, particularly in circumstances where the non- 38 national’s permission to be in the Irish State derives otherwise than from section 4 of the Immigration Act 2004. 100. The applicant in U.M. had argued, somewhat ambitiously, that the revocation of his refugee status did not necessarily invalidate the immigration permission issued to him and registered under the Immigration Act 2004. More specifically, the applicant had argued that the permission to remain in the State and the granting of refugee status operate “distinctly and independently” from one another. The counterargument advanced by the Irish State had been to the effect that the immigration permission and the source of the right to remain in the Irish State were coextensive, with the consequence that if the latter failed, then so must the immigration permission. 101. It was not necessary for the Supreme Court to make a conclusive determination on the precise interaction between the declaration of refugee status and the immigration permission. The case was, instead, resolved on the ground that while a declaration of refugee status was in force, it was valid and effective for all purposes, and remained so unless and until it was revoked. 102. The decision in U.M. does not stand as authority for the proposition that an immigration permission is “separate and distinct” from the substantive immigration rights which it evidences. Indeed, such a proposition would appear to be at odds with the stance adopted on behalf of the Irish State for the purpose of the U.M. proceedings. PREJUDICE 103. It is a constant refrain of the Minister’s submissions that the Applicant has not suffered any “prejudice” by reason of the finding that he was only entitled to an 39 immigration permission subject to Stamp 1 conditions from 5 January 2021. Yet, the Minister fails to address the most obvious source of prejudice, namely, the consequence of the misdating for an application for citizenship by naturalisation. 104. It is common case that the Applicant initially entered the Irish State on a student permission (Stamp 2). The conditions attached to a student permission include a limit on the number of hours for which the non-national may work each week. Crucially, the Applicant should have been released from these temporal limits once he had been legally employed for one year. In the event, however, there was a delay of some twelve months in issuing the new immigration permission (Stamp 1). It is suggested in the affidavit filed on behalf of the Minister that the Applicant could have applied for a renewal of his student permission in the interregnum. With respect, this would represent an improper encroachment on the Applicant’s acquired rights. As of January 2020, the Applicant was entitled, as a matter of EU law, to work for the same employer without any temporal limitation (other than those pertaining to all workers under general employment law). This indicates that, even on the Minister’s own analysis, the misdating did breach the Applicant’s EU law rights. 105. The potential prejudice continues having regard to the statutory criteria governing an application for naturalisation under the Irish Nationality and Citizenship Act 1956. It is a condition precedent to a successful application for naturalisation that an applicant has had a period of one year’s continuous residence in the State immediately before the date of the application; and, during the eight years immediately preceding that period, has had a total residence in the State amounting to four years. It is expressly provided that a period of 40 residence in the State shall not be reckoned when calculating a period of residence for the purposes of granting a certificate of naturalisation if it is in accordance with a permission given to a person under section 4 of the Immigration Act 2004 for the purpose of enabling him or her to engage in a course of education or study in the State. Put shortly, residence pursuant to a student permission is not reckonable. 106. Having regard to the statutory definition of reckonable residence, the precise status of a migrant worker in the interregnum between the date of application and the date of decision assumes a critical significance in the context of a change from a Stamp 2 permission to a Stamp 1 permission. The Minister declined to address this issue in these proceedings. Instead, the Minister contends that in circumstances where the Applicant has not yet made an application for naturalisation, he has no standing to speculate upon the outcome of same in these judicial review proceedings. For the reasons which follow, this contention is incorrect. 107. Order 84, rule 20 requires that an applicant for judicial review have a “sufficient interest” in the matter to which the application relates. The concept has been described as follows by the Supreme Court in Grace v. An Bord Pleanála [2017] IESC 10, [2020] 3 IR 286 (at paragraph 31): “Therefore, the starting point is that the decision or measure under challenge must be said to give rise to an actual or imminent ‘injury or prejudice’ to the challenger or that the challenger has been or is in danger of being ‘adversely affected’. That can be described as the broad general principle. In order for a person to have standing to bring a judicial review challenge, ordinarily the person concerned will need to be in a position to demonstrate that the decision or measure which they wish to challenge either has or is imminently in danger of having adversely affecting their interests so as to cause or potentially cause injury or prejudice.” 41 108. The Applicant has “sufficient interest” to challenge the decision of September 2024 in circumstances where that decision gives rise to an imminent injury or prejudice. More specifically, the Applicant is at risk of having his intended application for naturalisation refused by reason of the Minister’s characterisation of his immigration status in the interregnum between January 2020 and January 2021. 109. On the Applicant’s analysis, he had four years’ reckonable residence for naturalisation purposes by the date of the institution of these judicial review proceedings. The correctness of the Applicant’s analysis turns on the proper characterisation of his immigration status in the interregnum between January 2020 and January 2021. The stance adopted by the Minister for the purpose of the judicial review proceedings is that the Applicant only obtained a permission subject to Stamp 1 conditions with effect from January 2021. The implication is, seemingly, that prior to that date the Applicant had been subject to Stamp 2 conditions referable to a student. 110. It follows, therefore, that there is a live controversy between the parties, the outcome of which is potentially decisive of the intended application for naturalisation. It is not necessary, in order to establish “sufficient interest”, that the Applicant must first have applied for and been refused citizenship by way of naturalisation. It is enough that the evidence establishes that he has a genuine intention to make such an application imminently and that the impugned decision of September 2024 has the potential to prejudice him by adversely affecting the outcome of the application. The Applicant is entitled to have his immigration status clarified in advance, without his having to incur the delay inherent in pursuing an application for naturalisation which, on the basis of the 42 Minister’s current stance, must likely fail. These judicial review proceedings have the force and urgency of reality: the rules on standing are designed to safeguard against proceedings which lack that quality. 111. Indeed, it seems likely that were the Applicant to have deferred challenging the decision of September 2024 until after the determination of an application for naturalisation, he would be met with the objection that he had not complied with the three-month time-limit under Order 84, rule 21. CONCLUSION AND PROPOSED FORM OF ORDER 112. In circumstances where the domestic law of the host Member State requires a Turkish national to obtain an administrative document, such as a work permit or a residence permit, then a migrant worker who has completed the qualifying periods of employment under one of the indents to Article 6(1) of Decision No 1/80 is entitled to be issued with an accurate administrative document. The administrative document must acknowledge the full extent of the rights which have accrued to the individual as a matter of directly applicable EU law. This is necessary to comply with the principles of legal certainty and effectiveness. The migrant worker needs to know the full extent of his rights and to have a document which he can rely upon to demonstrate the existence of those rights to his employer. 113. The Irish State imposes an obligation upon a Turkish migrant worker to apply to the Minister for an immigration permission and to register same thereafter. In the absence of any dedicated legislation for these specific purposes, the only domestic legislation which allows for the imposition of such requirements is the 43 Immigration Act 2004. It follows that the immigration permissions can only have been issued pursuant to section 4 of the Immigration Act 2004. 114. The immigration permission issued under domestic law is declaratory of and probative of the rights acquired under EU law. It is essential, therefore, that the immigration permission accurately reflect the full extent of the rights accrued. 115. The decision of September 2024 fails to meet these requirements. The decision holds that the Applicant was only entitled to the benefit of Stamp 1 conditions from January 2021. This represents a breach of the Applicant’s directly applicable EU law rights. The Applicant had accrued the right to work for his current employer, free from the temporal restrictions referable to a Stamp 2 permission. The Applicant is entitled to an immigration permission which accurately records his status in the period between January 2020 and January 2021. 116. The contention that the immigration permission is merely administrative in nature is circular. Article 6(3) provides that the procedures for applying the rights conferred on Turkish nationals are to be established under national rules. These procedures will, by definition, include the taking of administrative measures. It is no answer to the complaint made—that the administrative measures adopted, which involve the misdating of the accrual of the substantive rights, are inadequate—to say, well, those are merely administrative measures. That, with respect, is the entire point. The Irish State’s practice of misdating immigration permissions does not comply with its obligation under Article 6(3). 117. I will discuss with counsel the precise form of order required to achieve this result. My provisional view is that a declaration should be made to the effect that the Applicant had achieved the milestone of one year’s legal employment 44 by 7 January 2020, and that thereafter his permission to work and reside in the Irish State was as a migrant worker, and not for the purpose of enabling him to engage in a course of education or study. It is also proposed to make an order of certiorari setting aside the decision of 13 September 2024. 118. As to legal costs, my provisional view is that the Applicant, having been entirely successful in the proceedings, is entitled to recover his costs in accordance with the default position under section 169 of the Legal Serv