The Director of Public Prosecutions v Ramamoorthy

APPROVED JUDGMENT NO REDACTION NEEDED THE COURT OF APPEAL [2026] IECA 60 Record No: 101/2025 Edwards J. McCarthy J. Burns J. BETWEEN/ THE PEOPLE (AT THE SUIT OF THE DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS) RESPONDENT V DANIEL RAMAMOORTHY APPELLANT JUDGMENT of the Court delivered by Mr. Justice Edwards on the 21st day of April, 2026. Introduction 1. This is an appeal brought by Mr. Daniel Ramamoorthy (i.e., “the appellant”) against the severity of the sentence imposed on him by the Dublin Circuit Criminal Court on the 24th of March 2025. 2. The appellant came before the Dublin Circuit Court in respect of Bill No. 890/2022. The appellant applied successfully to sever the indictment, and as a result a second Bill No. was generated, namely Bill No. 890A/2022. 3. The appellant entered a plea of guilty on the 29th of April 2024 to the offence contained in Bill No. 890/2022, being possession of child pornography contrary to s. 6(1) of the Child Trafficking and Pornography Act 1998, as amended by s. 14 of the Criminal Law (Sexual Offences) Act 2017. 4. Bill No. 890A/2022 contained an offence of sexual exploitation of a child contrary to s. 3(2)(a) of the Child Trafficking and Pornography Act 1998, as amended by s. 6 of the Criminal Law (Sexual Offences) Act 2007 and by s. 3 of the Criminal Law (Human Trafficking) Act 2008. The appellant was found guilty of this offence by a jury on the 13th of February 2025. 5. On the 24th of March 2025, the judge in the Court below passed sentence ordering that the appellant serves a sentence of two years and four months imprisonment on Bill No. 890A/2022, and a concurrent sentence of one year and six months imprisonment on Bill No. 890/2022. Factual Background 6. At the sentencing hearing of the 3rd of March 2025, the Court heard evidence from a Detective Inspector White in respect of the appellant’s offending. Bill No. 890A/2022 7. The complainant had a date of birth of the 1st of December 2003, and he was 13 years of age at the time of the offending. 8. The complainant attended a Scripture Union Easter camp, organised by a Christian Organisation in County Wicklow, and he returned home on the 6th of April 2018. Upon returning home, he disclosed to his sister that an adult volunteer group leader had inappropriately communicated with him. An Garda Síochána were contacted, and the complainant took part in a specialist interview on the 12th of April 2018. 9. At trial, this interview was put before the jury in the form of a video played pursuant to s. 16 of the Criminal Evidence Act 1992. 10. In the course of this interview, the complainant stated that there was a leader at the Scripture Union Easter camp who was very friendly, and that he had given the children at the camp his social media details, namely his Instagram and Snapchat details, when asked. The complainant named the appellant as this leader. 11. The complainant described a Snapchat conversation he had had with the appellant, where the appellant invited him to play Truth or Dare. The complainant described that during this game the appellant asked him “how big is your dick?” before requesting him to send a photograph of his penis. He also described that during this game, the appellant sent him a photograph of his pubic region, with his pubic hair showing and facing downwards. 12. The complainant further stated that during this game the appellant disclosed to him that he was addicted to pornography. Bill No. 890/2022 13. An Garda Síochána subsequently obtained a search warrant for the appellant’s home which was executed on the 17th of July 2018. A mobile phone and an Acer laptop were seized. This laptop was submitted for analysis to the Garda National Cyber Crime Bureau, which yielded three images and one video which were deemed to constitute child pornography. 14. A Detective Garda Cullen outlined that the three images related to the same male, who in his view was between 9-11 years of age. The images depicted this child masturbating or performing sexual acts on an unknown male’s erect penis. The video found on the appellant’s laptop showed two males who appeared to be between 10-13 years of age engaging in masturbation and oral sex upon each other. 15. D/Garda Cullen gave evidence that these images and video were in an area of the hard disk of the laptop that would not be viewable by a user without specialist forensic software to access. He stated that they would have been deleted, but since it was not yet written over by new data on the hard drive, it was still recoverable by specialists. 16. The appellant was arrested on the 10th of December 2019, on which occasion he was interviewed several times and nothing of evidential value arose. Victim Impact Statement 17. In relation to the offence on Bill No. 890A/2022, the complainant prepared a victim impact statement which D/Inspector White read into evidence at the sentencing hearing. 18. Under a heading, “Psychological or Psychiatric Effects and Treatment”, the complainant stated: “I have a lack of trust. I have found the entire process stressful, and I’ve had to relive the events through two trials, which has added to the anxiety. These trials also affected my ability to move on with my life. The first trial coincided with exams that I had and I could not sit. This meant that I had to take re-sits, but this of course denied me the ability to take a further re-sit, adding to the stress of the exams many months after the trial. For the most recent trial, I returned to Ireland from New York and as part of my course, I was to travel to Australia for an internship as part of my course work. I’ve had to delay this internship and remain in Ireland for the trial again. Again, I was moving my life around to facilitate. The trial itself was also very stressful when the defence, who were doing their job, attempted to discredit me in claiming that my account was a lie and the whole thing did not happen. To have to re-live this twice was very stressful.” 19. In addition, under a heading, “Life Changes”, the complainant stated: “Since I disclosed what happened to my sister, I’ve had many sleepless nights thinking of what could have happened if I had’ve engaged further and provided the requested pictures. I am more suspicious of people’s motivations now, and I find it difficult to trust role models and mentors, both in my personal life, in sport and in my professional life.” 20. Further, under a heading “Additional Information” the complainant stated: “I have no objection to Daniel Ramamoorthy being named. I don’t think I can be identified by his name being made public.” Personal Circumstances of the Appellant 21. The appellant is an Indian national, who was residing in Ireland at the time of the offending. His father was a diplomat who operated through various Indian embassies and various Indian consulates, and as a result the appellant travelled for a number of years from country to country. 22. The appellant has a date of birth of the 5th of April 1986, and he was 38 years of age at the time of sentencing. 23. A number of character references were provided to the sentencing judge, whose authors had sworn affidavits to the effect that they were the author of the respective letters, and that they were aware that the appellant was before the Court on offences of sexual exploitation of a child and possession of child pornography. Among these letters, a Dr. Sony Mathews Lukose, a psychiatrist, provided a letter dated the 27th of February 2025. Dr. Lukose outlined that he has 15 years’ experience in clinical psychiatry, and he is currently employed as a specialty doctor in psychiatry in Essex Partnership University NHS Trust. He confirmed that he was a consultant psychiatrist at Christian Fellowship Hospital in India when the appellant sought his professional help. Dr. Lukose detailed that the appellant discussed his challenges with sexuality and pornography in their sessions, and that he brought to his notice the instant offending. 24. D/Inspector White confirmed that the appellant has no previous convictions. 25. In addition, D/Inspector White confirmed under cross-examination that the appellant had not come to garda attention prior to this offending, that he co-operated with An Garda Síochána during the search of his home, co-operated in returning to Ireland for interview and charge after he left the jurisdiction. Sentencing Judge’s Remarks 26. On the 24th of March 2025, the judge in the Court below passed sentence on the appellant. The sentencing judge noted the factual background of the case as described in evidence by D/Inspector White. 27. The sentencing judge first dealt with the offending the subject matter of Bill No. 890A/2022 and identified the relevant aggravating factors at play in this case as follows: “Firstly, in relation to the child sexual exploitation charge, the harm caused is obviously serious harm. I have heard the victim impact statement of [the complainant], and there is -- it's beyond question that these types of offences do cause harm to victims. And it is to be hoped that [the complainant] can now take some comfort from the finalisation of matters today and can begin to move forward again with his life. The real issue in terms of culpability here from my point of view is a breach of trust, and here Mr Ramamoorthy was in the position of a role of mentor, or a leader to these children and they should have been safe with him, and he did breach their trust, and that is a very serious matter that the court must take into consideration. In terms of gravity, I am also taking into account the fact that [the complainant] was a very young teenager at the time, he was just 13 years of age. And there is a very significant age disparity between [the complainant] and Mr Ramamoorthy, of I think over 18 years or so. He was 13 years at the time of the offending, and Mr Ramamoorthy was 31 years of age.” 28. In relation to mitigation, the sentencing judge made the following remarks: “Looking at mitigation, obviously Mr Ramamoorthy did not plead guilty, and that's never an aggravating factor, he is perfectly entitled to run a trial, but it does mean that he cannot benefit from the greatest source of mitigation open to anyone that comes before the courts, which is a guilty plea. I am also told that he does not accept the verdict of the jury, and that means that I cannot factor in remorse as a mitigating factor. However, I have had sight of, as I have said before, this booklet of mitigation which is extremely impressive. It's clear that Mr Ramamoorthy is a very talented person, and intelligent, and energetic, who's done much good in the community and for charity, and it's hoped that in the future he will turn his talents to pro-social activities and continue to do so into the future. I note the report of his psychiatrist, I have read it again and he has had certain personal difficulties and struggles that I need to factor in also when looking at mitigation. And, I have as I've said taken into account the constraints this conviction or these convictions will have on his ability to continue his businesses but more importantly to visit his family members who are all over the globe, in particular his elderly parents. And I note the particular importance that his culture places on the duties of adult children to look after their parents beyond retirement.” 29. The sentencing judge referred to People (DPP) v. D.C. [2015] IECA 256 and observed that the appellant’s offending fell into the lower end of the sexual exploitation spectrum. The sentencing judge identified a headline sentence of three years which she then reduced to two years and four months imprisonment. 30. The sentencing judge then turned to the offending the subject matter of Bill No. 890/2022 and stated: “I am now looking at the possession of child pornography. There is a maximum sentence here of five years. I am looking at the gravity of that and obviously the young age of the children involved is an aggravating factor. There were two victims here, they were young children from I think 10 to 13 years of age, and the nature of the material is something that I need to factor in also. They were engaged not only in sexual acts with each other but also engaged in non-penetrative sexual acts on an adult. And the Court cannot lose sight of the fact that child pornography, or what's more appropriately really nowadays described as images of child sexual abuse is a direct product of child abuse, and these are horrifying images of child abuse which involve the exploitation of the innocence of children, with devastating consequences for those children. The Court must take into account that if people like the accused didn't exist, if there wasn't a market for such images, well then the images and the devastating consequences would not happen for these children. There is a need for general and specific deterrents in relation to child pornography offences. Here however, I do have a low number of images. Three images and one video here. And courts often deal in these cases with persons coming before the courts with many thousands of images. I'm also factoring in as an aggravating factor the fact that these images were found in the context of an investigation into child sexual exploitation. Having said that, it wasn't the same victim and that is something that I have to take into consideration.” 31. The sentencing judge continued: “However, Mr Ramamoorthy did plead guilty to this offence. He did it as soon as the indictment was severed. And I do take the point that that effectively must be considered as an early plea in circumstances where there was an application to sever an indictment. This was also a possession count, there is no evidence of any commercial gain or distribution, or anything of that nature.” 32. The sentencing judge identified a headline sentence of two years imprisonment which she then reduced to one year and six months imprisonment. This sentence was imposed concurrent to the sentence imposed on Bill No. 890A/2022. Notice of Appeal 33. By a Notice of Appeal lodged the 17th of April 2025, the appellant now appeals to this Court against the severity of the sentence imposed by the Circuit Criminal Court. In support of this application the appellant has advanced three grounds which are as follows: 1. “The Learned Trial Judge erred in fact and/or in law in giving excessive weight to the aggravating features and/or in arriving at a headline sentence that was excessive in all the circumstances. 2. The Learned Trial Judge erred in fact and/or in law in failing to give sufficient weight to the mitigating factors. 3. The Learned Trial Judge erred in law and/or in principle in imposing a sentence which was excessive and disproportionate in the particular circumstances arising.” Submissions on Appeal Appellant’s Submissions Headline Sentence on Bill No. 890A/2022 34. Counsel for the appellant has submitted that the sentencing judge correctly identified that the offending behaviour was at the lower end but argues that the sentencing judge erred in arriving at a headline sentence of three years imprisonment. 35. The appellant has referred this Court to the cases of People (DPP) v. Hussain [2015] IECA 22; People (DPP) v. D.C. (previously cited); and People (DPP) v. D.M. [2019] IECA 147 here. 36. The appellant has submitted that the sentencing judge failed to consider the headline sentence in light of the specific acts of the appellant’s offending behaviour. In particular, the appellant argues that the sentencing judge did not afford sufficient weight to the following when considering the gravity of the offending behaviour: i. “The offence in question comprised a single incident; ii. There was no physical contact between the injured party and the appellant; iii. No images were exchanged by the injured party iv. There was no evidence of grooming over an extended period of time.” Weight Attached to Mitigating Factors 37. Counsel for the appellant has submitted that the sentencing judge failed to attach sufficient weight to the mitigating factors present in this case. It is argued that this failure is apparent in the sentencing judge’s refusal to suspend any portion of the sentences imposed. 38. The appellant has referred to People (DPP) v. P.M. [2016] IECA 49 and submitted that there are significant parallels between the remarks of Edwards J. in P.M. and the instant case. 39. The appellant has submitted that the sentencing judge failed to attach sufficient weight to the mitigating factors as outlined, in particular, the appellant’s previous good character and work record. Bill No. 890/2022 40. The appellant has submitted that in considering Bill No. 890/2022 in isolation, the sentencing judge arrived at a headline sentence which was disproportionate in all of the circumstances. The appellant has referred us to People (DPP) v. Loving [2006] 3 IR 355 in support of this. 41. It has been submitted that while the sentencing judge did accurately identify the aggravating factors, the headline sentence of two years imprisonment was disproportionate. The appellant has argued that the sentencing judge failed to factor into the calculation of the headline sentence that the appellant would be subject to the Sex Offenders Register. 42. Further, the appellant has submitted that a reduction of six months from the headline sentence failed to add sufficient weight to the appellant’s mitigating factors. Failure to Suspend 43. Counsel for the appellant has submitted that the imposition of a wholly custodial sentence was disproportionate. It is argued that the sentencing judge failed to give sufficient weight to the mitigating factors in her failure to suspend a portion of the sentences imposed. 44. The appellant has referred to People (DPP) v. Loving [2006] 3 IR 355 wherein the Court considered the imposition of suspended sentences generally. In addition, the appellant refers to People (DPP) v. D.W. [2020] IECA 145, in which Loving was considered. The appellant places reliance on the following extract from D.W.: “[51.] Since the enactment of the Act of 2006, a sentencing court may have recourse to the statutory option of suspending a sentence, either in whole or in part, in any case where the sentencing judge considers it appropriate. In practice, what that means in terms of the constitutional imperatives underpinning Irish sentencing law is that a sentence suspended in whole or in part may be imposed if to do so represents a proportionate response to the particular offence, considered both in terms of its gravity and having regard to the personal circumstances of the offender. In that regard, a suspended sentence is in every respect a sentence, and the conditions upon which the sentence is to be suspended form part of that sentence. The latter part of the observation just made is a critical one in the context of the particular issue in this case and it is a matter to which we will be returning to later in this judgment. [52.] The type of circumstances that might merit the imposition of a suspended sentence would include cases in which the sentencing judge considers that a proportionate response to the particular offence requires that it be marked by the imposition of a custodial sentence, so as to communicate the necessary degree of censure and societal deprecation of the crime, but that it is not essential that the offender should have to suffer all (or, in an appropriate case, any) of the hard treatment associated with the sentence imposed. In such a case the fact that a custodial sentence has been imposed, even if submission to actual incarceration for all or any of the relevant period is not required, is considered sufficient, coupled with the prudential incentive of the required bond and the condition or conditions associated therewith, to appeal to the offender in question as a moral agent and influence him/her towards future desistance. It may be particularly useful used in that way, in cases involving first- time offenders, in cases where the need for custodial disposition at all is considered marginal, and also in cases where there is an evidence-based earnest to reform or rehabilitate. In relation to the former the suspended sentence has been characterised as: “an almost ideal punishment for generally law-abiding persons who have committed a serious out of character crime. The prison sentence can express strong censure while the suspension spares unnecessary expense to the state and unnecessary damage to the low-risk offender and his or her loved ones.” (Reform and Punishment: The Future of Sentencing (2002) Rex S., and Tonry M., (eds) Chpt 1, 12, Cambridge: Willan Publishing) [53.] Section 99(1) of the Act of 2006 provides that where a person is sentenced to a term of imprisonment (other than a mandatory term of imprisonment) by a court in respect of an offence, that court may make an order suspending the execution of the sentence in whole or in part, subject to the person entering into a recognisance to comply with the conditions of, or imposed in relation to, the order. Accordingly, the statute envisages a recognisance (which may be nominal or substantial at the discretion of the court) and conditions.” Respondent’s Submissions Ground No. 1 45. Counsel for the respondent has submitted that it is well established that a sentencing judge is under no obligation to robotically delineate or repeat facts or mitigatory factors while passing sentence and has referred to People (DPP) v. Ouachek [2015] IECA 221 in support of this. 46. In response to the appellant’s argument that the sentencing judge did not afford sufficient weight to the fact that the offence of child exploitation comprised one incident and that there was no evidence of grooming, the respondent has submitted that the sentencing judge clearly acknowledged this when she stated: “So, these are serious matters clearly and, however, this was not a sustained period of offending that one sometimes gets in cases of sexual exploitation. It didn’t result in multiple incidents. It was a one off that thankfully didn’t go any further and that is something also that I need to factor into my assessment of gravity in this case.” 47. The respondent has submitted that the relationship between the complainant and the appellant did not take place entirely in the digital realm, and in this regard the prior context of their acquaintance is important, and aggravating. The respondent notes that the complainant knew and respected the appellant as a camp leader, at a sleepover camp which he had previously attended. The complainant and appellant were 13 and 31 years of age respectively at the time of the offending. Further, the appellant engaged in a breach of trust of his mentorship position when he exchanged social media details with the complainant. 48. The respondent has referred to People (DPP) v. J. McD. [2021] IECA 31 and has submitted that dominion and exploitation as described in that case are inherent in the instant case by virtue of both the age disparity, and on foot of the appellant’s actual position of trust. The respondent has submitted that in such circumstances, the sentencing judge did not err in setting a headline sentence of three years imprisonment. Ground No. 2 49. Counsel for the respondent has submitted that the sentencing judge engaged at length with the available mitigating factors and attached significant weight to same when imposing sentence on the child pornography offence. 50. The respondent notes that the sentencing judge in imposing sentence took into account the consequences of the convictions for the appellant; the mitigation bundle put forward on his behalf, which included multiple sworn affidavits and a psychiatric report; the appellant’s good character and community involvement; and the lack of a sustained period of offending. The respondent further notes that the sentencing judge when imposing sentence on the child pornography offence also specifically referenced the appellant’s early guilty plea, that it was possession only with no commercial gain, and the limited amount of material. Ground No. 3 51. Counsel for the respondent has submitted that it is clear that the sentencing judge, after identifying that the child exploitation offence fell within the lower end of the scale of offending, correctly and proportionately passed sentence commensurate with People (DPP) v. D.C. (previously cited), cognisant of the range of offending contemplated by the offence of child exploitation, and the spectrum of behaviour such an offence may cover. 52. The respondent has submitted that the level of this offending, while at the lower end, is of something more than the very low-level outlined in D.C. The respondent outlined that the appellant knew and interacted with the complainant at the camp, exchanged social media details with him and initiated and escalated conversation with the complainant. It is submitted that this was not purely “non-contact, voyeuristic conduct” or a situation where a victim was “not aware that they were being exploited”. Failing to Suspend 53. Counsel for the respondent has submitted that no error in principle occurred under this heading. The respondent has outlined that it is well established that the imposition of a fully or partly suspended sentence does not automatically follow based on the presence of mitigating circumstances but rather remains a discretionary measure open to a sentencing court where appropriate. 54. The respondent has noted the appellant’s reliance on Loving and has submitted that the sentencing judge clearly did consider such a suspension, but she did not see fit to do so for reasons which she outlined when delivering sentence, a decision which was within her jurisdiction, was lawful and proportionate. 55. Further, in reply to the appellant’s reliance on D.W. which considered Loving, the respondent has submitted that firstly, the sentencing judge in the instant case clearly set out her reasoning for not availing of an option to suspend part of the sentences imposed, and secondly, the appellant’s reliance on the extract from D.W. (set out at para. 44 above) fails to engage with the facts of the instant case where the appellant was being sentenced for possession of material found in the course of a child exploitation investigation. 56. The respondent has submitted that while it is accepted that this case involves possession only, the nature of the acts elevated this case from the more benign and purely private exception to custodial sentencing envisaged in People (DPP) v. Ryan [2024] IECA 321. Court’s Analysis & Decision 57. It is appropriate to consider the sentence imposed for the offence of sexual exploitation of a child in the first instance. The cardinal seriousness of the offence of sexual exploitation (by which expression sentencing scholars mean how the offence ranks in terms of its intrinsic seriousness compared with other offences in the criminal calendar) may be gauged by the fact that the Oireachtas has set a maximum penalty for the offence of imprisonment for life. The legislature has therefore indicated that as a matter of sentencing policy this offence falls within the same bracket, in terms of cardinal seriousness, as the offence of rape in its various forms, aggravated sexual assault, robbery and aggravated burglary, to give just some examples of other offences which also have a maximum potential penalty of life imprisonment. Sexual exploitation of a child is therefore to be regarded as being intrinsically a very grave offence. This Court has consistently taken that position, with Finlay Geoghegan J. stating in People (DPP) v. Hussain [2015] IECA 22 at [53]: “It is important to note that any offence of this nature involving a purpose of sexual exploitation of a child by a significantly older adult is, by definition, a serious and grave offence.” 58. That having been said, there may be wide ordinal variations in how the offence is actually committed. We have previously made this point in People (DPP) v. D.C. [2015] IECA 256, where we said: “19. The potential penalties in this case ranged from non-custodial options up to life imprisonment. That such a wide range of potential penalties was available to the sentencing judge is itself reflective of the fact that sexual exploitation of a child can take a myriad of forms, and cover a wide range of seriousness. 20. The term sexual exploitation is defined in the Child Trafficking and Pornography Act 1998 (as amended) in the following way: ‘sexual exploitation’ means, in relation to a child:- (a) inviting, inducing or coercing the child to engage in prostitution or the production of child pornography, (b) the prostitution of the child or the use of the child for the production of child pornography, (c) the commission of an offence specified in the Schedule to the Sex Offenders Act 2001 against the child; causing another person to commit such an offence against the child; or inviting, inducing or coercing the child to commit such an offence against another person, (d) inviting, inducing or coercing the child to engage or participate in any sexual, indecent or obscene act, or (e) inviting, inducing or coercing the child to observe any sexual, indecent or obscene act, for the purpose of corrupting or depraving the child. 21. Accordingly, the potential life sentence available covers cases that could range from non-contact voyeuristic conduct such as the opportunistic photographing of a child in a state of undress, engaged in for the purposes of producing a single child pornographic image, not for commercial use or dissemination, taken for the offender’s personal sexual gratification only, and involving a single victim who might not even be aware that he or she was being so exploited; to forms of exploitation involving grossly depraved and humiliating physical sexual conduct, associated with gratuitous physical or mental violence, torture, or degradation and causing profound suffering to the child or children concerned, involving outrages repeated many times, involving widespread dissemination, involving major commercial gain, and perhaps involving many concurrent victims.” 59. Accordingly, a sentencing court must ensure ordinal proportionality in sentencing an individual offender. Under Irish law the sentence in any individual case must be proportionate in the dual sense required by the Constitution. It must be proportionate on the one hand to the gravity of the offending conduct, assessed by reference to culpability and harm done, but also take account of the circumstances of the individual offender. As was stated by the former Court of Criminal Appeal in People (DPP) v. McCormack, [2000] 4 I.R. 356 at [359]: “Each case must depend upon its own special circumstances. The appropriate sentence depends not only upon its own facts but also upon the personal circumstances of the accused. The sentence to be imposed is not the appropriate sentence for the crime, but the appropriate sentence for the crime because it has been committed by that accused. The range of possible penalties is dependent upon those two factors.” 60. There is at present only limited guidance to assist sentencers in Ireland in sentencing for an instance of sexual exploitation of a child. There is no appellate guideline judgment and no sentencing guideline from the Judicial Council. Some limited assistance is to be gleaned from the small number of available comparators, which are cited in the appellant’s book of authorities. These include People (DPP) v. D.C. (previously cited); People (DPP) v. D.M. [2019] IECA 147; and People (DPP) v. Hussain (previously cited), subject always to the limitations associated with reliance on comparators which we have repeatedly emphasised in earlier judgments. 61. In the absence of any appellate guideline judgment or sentencing guideline a sentencing judge looking to locate a case on the range of available penalties, which runs from non- custodial disposals to life imprisonment, does not have the benefit of indicative sub-ranges into which an individual case might be placed, much less any indication of what factors or combination of factors might serve to cause a case to fall into one or another sub-range. In such circumstances the sentencing judge has to proceed from first principles, namely engage in an objective consideration of the offender’s culpability and the harm done, and in light of what the evidence is in that respect locate the case on the range of penalties on the basis of judicial instinct informed by experience. 62. The sentencing judge in this case stated that “while the offending behaviour in this case was absolute reprehensible and that goes without saying, I am of the view that it falls into the lower end of the sexual exploitation spectrum.” We think that this was an accurate assessment and statement of the position. The judge went on to state that she considered the appropriate headline sentence to be one of three years. 63. We are in no doubt that a headline sentence significantly above the custody threshold was required in this case notwithstanding that, on the evidence, the court was concerned with a single incident and there had been no physically abusive contact between the abuser and his victim. There were aggravating features to the offending, and it was nonetheless the case that the victim was significantly adversely impacted, as described in his victim impact statement. The principle aggravating factors were the young age of the child involved; the significant age difference between abuser and victim; the significant breaches of trust involved i.e., the trust of the child concerned, the trust of the child’s parents, and the trust of the Christian organisation running the event whose values and ethos he betrayed; the use of social media and technology for grooming the victim on a pre-text of a game of “Truth or Dare”, all leading up to the solicitation of intimate images of the victim (albeit that none were in fact provided by the victim), and for the inappropriate transmission to the victim of an unsolicited intimate image of the offender’s genital area. In the circumstances we think that the headline sentence of three years was within the sentencing judge’s legitimate margin of discretion in this case, albeit perhaps at the upper end of it. We find no error of principle in the setting of the headline sentence for the offence of sexual exploitation of a child. 64. Turning then to mitigation, the sentencing judge was faced with a situation in which the single most valuable potential mitigating factor, namely a plea of guilty, was not available to this offender because he had contested the trial. He was not to be penalised for that, as it was his right, but neither could he claim the mitigation, sometimes substantial, that is associated with having pleaded guilty. There was no taking of responsibility, no earnest of remorse, no acceptance of fault or criminal liability and no acknowledgment of the impact of his conduct on the victim. 65. It is true that this was a first-time offence, and the sentencing judge took that into account. There was also evidence that the appellant had a good work record and further evidence, in the form of a large number of testimonials verified on affidavit, that in many respects the appellant has heretofore lived a pro-social life. This is important evidence because few individuals are one dimensional, few individuals are wholly good or wholly bad, and it is important that a court should have the full and rounded picture concerning the individual before them. It is clear that this appellant has done much good in his life, and has fund raised and engaged in philanthropy in support of many charitable and community-based organisations and ventures. He has also given of his time to working in church or faith- based initiatives, although sight cannot be lost of the fact that he used one of these as the opportunity and vehicle for committing the offending at the centre of this case. 66. The difficulty, however, with the evidence of previous pro-social living is that it can carry only modest weight on the mitigation side of the sentencing equation in the absence of acceptance by the offender of his wrong doing, of acknowledgement of the suffering caused to the victim, and of evidence of a desire and willingness on his part to work towards rehabilitation. It is part of the social contract that persons should abide by the law and live pro-social lives. There is therefore no entitlement to any special reward for doing so. It is simply what is expected of one. The real value of evidence of previous good character and of a history of pro-social living is that it may, in an appropriate case involving first time offending , support a suggestion that the offending is aberrational and truly out of character, and in such circumstances may weigh heavily in the balance in favour of a court affording greater priority to the penal objectives of rehabilitation and reform over those of retribution and deterrence, both specific and general, than it might otherwise be prepared to do on the basis that the offender is deserving of a second chance. We hasten to add that although this appellant is a first-time offender, we think that in fact there is little to support a suggestion that his offending was aberrational and truly out of character. On the contrary, and as we will elaborate upon presently, there are many “red flags” suggesting that this appellant has an abnormal sexual interest in children, and if this be the case it is a serious problem in respect of which he likely requires professional help. 67. Given the cardinal seriousness of the offence of sexual exploitation of a child a court will frequently adopt retribution and deterrence as its primary sentencing rationales, involving the expression of strong censure and the imposition of a deserved sentence involving some form of hard treatment (frequently involving some level of imprisonment) both to impress upon the offender that they are being punished for significant wrongdoing and also to deter both them and others from similar offending in the future. However, there will always be cases where a court would be justified on the evidence in adopting, to a greater or lesser extent, an alternative sentencing rationale which prioritises rehabilitation and/or reform. Thus, in People (DPP) v. O’Driscoll (1972) 1 Frewen 351, the court of Criminal Appeal, per Walsh J. said: “The objects of passing sentence are not merely to deter the particular criminal from committing a crime again but to induce him in so far as possible to turn from a criminal to an honest way of life and indeed the public interest would best be served if the criminal could be induced to take the latter course. It is therefore the duty of the Courts to pass what are the appropriate sentences in each case having regard to the particular circumstances of that case – not only in regard to the particular crime but in regard to the particular criminal.” 68. Accordingly, if there is evidence of a willingness to rehabilitate and reform, and it is coupled with other positive indicators a court might be more readily prepared to structure a sentence with rehabilitation and reform as its primary rationale, alternatively as a substantial concurrent rationale to other sentencing rationales to the extent admitted of by the overall circumstances of the case. In this context a history of previous pro-social living will often be very important and carry weight, as may acceptance of wrong doing and insight into the harm caused to the victim, and as indeed may evidence from a relevant professional witness of having assessed the appellant to be at low risk of re-offending, or at least as representing a manageable risk in that respect with appropriate supports. 69. The sentencing judge was quite right to point out that the difficulties the appellant may have with foreign travel arising from his conviction and sentence are effects that arise purely because of his own actions in engaging in criminal activity. These circumstances do not in any circumstances provide him with mitigation, and the sentencing judge was right to attach little weight to them. 70. We consider that the discount of eight months from the headline sentence of three years afforded by the sentencing judge was sufficient on the evidence, and find no error of principle in that regard. 71. We would further comment that a major difficulty faced by the sentencing judge in this case in terms of offering the appellant any further amelioration of the headline sentence was that there was no evidence of acceptance of wrongdoing by him in so far as the conviction for sexual exploitation of a child was concerned. Neither was there credible evidence of remorse, nor any evidence of appreciation of the harm that had been done to the victim. The evidence in the case was that the appellant self-admitted to his victim within the context of “Truth or Dare” that he is addicted to pornography. It is clear from his conviction of the sexual exploitation offence that he had an unhealthy interest in obtaining images of his child victim’s genitalia, albeit that this was not ultimately realised. While it appears from the narrative provided in one of the testimonials offered by a psychiatrist friend of the appellant’s family, i.e., the aforementioned Dr Sony Matthews Lukose, that the appellant may have sought some counselling from this person “about his challenges with sexuality and pornography”; remarkably, no concrete details are provided. It is also clear from the concurrent charge of possession of child pornography, to which he has pleaded guilty, that his interest in pornographic images extends to pornographic images of children. However, notwithstanding all of these “red flags” so to speak, as to the likely existence of a serious problem in respect of which the appellant requires professional help, the sentencing court was provided with no assistance in the form of an expert report from any psychiatrist, psychologist, psychotherapist, or counsellor offering a professional assessment of the appellant’s sexual interests in so far as they concern children, and a suggested programme for his treatment or rehabilitation. There was no expert evidence one way or the other concerning whether the tendencies exhibited by the appellant properly qualify as being paedophilic, but even absent that the evidence was certainly sufficient to convey to any court dealing with the matter that this appellant has abnormal sexual interest in children which is likely to require being addressed through some expert professional intervention. However, no evidence was put before the sentencing court to suggest meaningful steps taken by the appellant to seek out necessary professional help, much less suggesting how his issues might be properly addressed or any concrete details concerning his embarkation upon or participation in any specific course of treatment, which might give the court confidence that this offender will desist from future sexual offending with children and again be a positive contributor to society and his community. 72. The submissions on behalf of the appellant complain that inadequate consideration was given by the trial judge to suspending all or part of the sentence for child exploitation in the interests of rehabilitation. We unhesitatingly reject that. There was simply no evidential foundation provided in this case on foot of which the sentencing judge could justifiably have suspended all or part of the sentence on that account. 73. Turning now to the complaints made in respect of the sentence on the charge of possession of child pornography, it is suggested that the headline sentence of two years was disproportionate, having regard to the nature and quantity of the images concerned. Reliance was placed on People (DPP) v. Loving [2006] 3 IR 355 in support of a suggestion that a suspended sentence would in all the circumstances, and in the absence of previous convictions, have been more appropriate. We disagree. The Loving judgment is perhaps best regarded as being of its time, when there was a less highly developed appreciation of the evil that is child pornography and the harm done by it. The more recent survey of sentencing practice in the field of child pornography conducted by this Court in People (DPP) v. A.M. [2021] IECA 322 suggests that wholly suspended sentences for possession of child pornography prosecuted on indictment are nowadays rare indeed (see para 205 of A.M.). The sentencing judge made the entirely valid point that it was significant that the child pornographic images and video material were found in the context of an investigation into child sexual exploitation, albeit that the children in the images and material at issue were not connected with the crime the subject matter of that investigation. Moreover, while the quantity of material was small, the children in the images and video were estimated to be between 10 and 13 years of age, there were two victims involved, and the nature of the abuse was Category 1 (per the classification explained by this court in People (DPP) v. A.M., previously cited). While the headline sentence nominated was perhaps towards the severe end of the sentencing judge’s margin of discretion, we are satisfied that she nonetheless acted within her legitimate range of discretion, and we find no error of principle. 74. On the mitigation side, we again find no error of principle. Overall, the appellant received a 25% discount on the headline sentence covering all mitigating circumstances. While it is true that there was an early plea of guilty, the evidence against the appellant was strong. Once again, there was little evidence of the appellant having insight into the wrongness of his offending conduct, of the harm caused to frequently anonymous child victims by the sexual abuses captured in child pornographic images and videos, or of any credible remorse on the appellant’s part. There was also no concrete evidence provided to the court suggestive of meaningful efforts being made by the appellant to seek help in addressing his self-admitted pornography addiction issue, beyond the oblique allusion within the previously mentioned character reference from Dr Lukose to discussions in the course of some counselling about challenges faced by the appellant “with sexuality and pornography”. However, neither this psychiatrist, nor any other relevant professional, was asked to provide the sentencing court with a formal report offering either a medical or psychological assessment of the appellant with specific reference to his alleged offending, offering a risk assessment in regard to future offending, and offering recommendations as to the appellant’s rehabilitation or treatment. 75. Absent such evidence, there was no foundation for a part suspension of the post-mitigation sentence, and the sentencing judge would not have been justified in going further than she did. We find no error of principle in her discounting for mitigating factors or in not suspending the sentence either in whole or in part. Conclusion 76. The appeals against severity of the sentences on both bills must be dismissed.