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High Court· 2026

Benevicius v The Director of Public Prosecutions and Ors

[2026] IEHC 191

OSCOLA Ireland citation

Benevicius v The Director of Public Prosecutions and Ors [2026] IEHC 191

Decision excerpt

Ms. Justice Mary Rose Gearty delivered 26th March, 2026 A. Introduction 1. The Applicant was arrested on 4th February, 2025, in a house in which cannabis plants were growing. He was interviewed by gardaí on the same day and told them that although he lived in the house and was interested in what was contained in the relevant rooms, he did not own the cannabis. He pleaded guilty to an offence under the Misuse of Drugs Act, 1977 and was sentenced to 3 years and 6 months in prison, with the final 6 months suspended, on the 7th of November 2025. In January 2026, the Applicant sought immediate release under Article 40, but could not establish any ground on which to open an enquiry and there was no reason to enquire into the lawfulness of his detention. 2. On 10th March 2026, the Applicant sought leave to judicially review the criminal trial process that led to his sentence. He has not attempted to vacate his plea of guilty, nor has he entered an appeal.…

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THE HIGH COURT JUDICIAL REVIEW 2026 JRP 1 [2026] IEHC 191 BETWEEN ROBERTAS BENEVICIUS APPLICANT AND THE DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS AND OTHERS RESPONDENTS JUDGMENT of Ms. Justice Mary Rose Gearty delivered 26th March, 2026 A. Introduction 1. The Applicant was arrested on 4th February, 2025, in a house in which cannabis plants were growing. He was interviewed by gardaí on the same day and told them that although he lived in the house and was interested in what was contained in the relevant rooms, he did not own the cannabis. He pleaded guilty to an offence under the Misuse of Drugs Act, 1977 and was sentenced to 3 years and 6 months in prison, with the final 6 months suspended, on the 7th of November 2025. In January 2026, the Applicant sought immediate release under Article 40, but could not establish any ground on which to open an enquiry and there was no reason to enquire into the lawfulness of his detention. 2. On 10th March 2026, the Applicant sought leave to judicially review the criminal trial process that led to his sentence. He has not attempted to vacate his plea of guilty, nor has he entered an appeal. His grounds can be listed under three broad headings: his legal team was ineffective and the plea of guilty was entered into under duress, the book of evidence does not accurately record certain information and there was insufficient disclosure before he entered his plea of guilty. None of these matters was raised before the Trial Judge. 3. The Court of Trial is better suited to determine these issues and is the venue identified by our legislators to hear such cases. If the Applicant wants to vacate his plea of guilty, he must apply to the Circuit Court. 4. In the event that he is not permitted to vacate his plea of guilty, he has the right to appeal against any such ruling, should he disagree with the Circuit Court Judge’s analysis. This Court, while it has full original jurisdiction, cannot simply interfere with other judges or decision makers on request. 5. As there has been no evidence of bias on the part of the Trial Judge, nor any suggestion that the court process itself was unfair, the case must continue, if it continues at all, before that Court. The argument that the prosecution lawyers, his own lawyers, or the gardaí have breached his rights, making this an exceptional case, has not been substantiated by any evidence. The Applicant’s only criticism of the Judge arose after the plea of guilty was entered and could not be relevant in considering a motion to vacate the plea. There is no basis to suggest that the Court of Trial is not the appropriate venue. B. Leave to Review a Criminal Conviction 6. The burden of proof is on the Applicant to establish that he has a sufficient interest in the case, that he has an arguable case, and that there is no alternative remedy open to him. If he can do so, he is entitled to leave to seek judicial review: G. v. Director of Public Prosecutions [1994] 1 IR 374. As to what may be arguable, see O’Donnell C.J. in O’Doherty & Anor v. The Minister for Health & Ors [2022] IESC 32, [2022] 1 ILRM 421: the test is that there must be a prospect of success. It is not necessary to establish a reasonable prospect of success. 7. The law regarding review of the criminal trial process is well settled. The Applicant must show that there has been an unfair trial process and that an appeal is not the appropriate remedy. If he cannot establish that he has exhausted his remedies, he is not entitled to leave to review his prosecution. 8. The Applicant cites one case to support his arguments: Gormley v. D.P.P. [2014] IESC 17. There, standards for a fair trial are discussed but is not a judicial review case. The case was an appeal against conviction, heard in the Court of Appeal and then in the Supreme Court. Gormley does not assist in making the argument that events in the Trial Court should be reviewed by the High Court. 9. A more relevant case is E.R. v. D.P.P. [2019] IESC 86. There, the Supreme Court ruled against an applicant who tried to review a decision of the Circuit Court after she had pleaded guilty in that Court. The Supreme Court made it clear that the unitary nature of the criminal trial and the potential for unjustified disruptions of the trial process, together with the limitations on the jurisdiction of the High Court in judicial review proceedings, underpin the jurisprudence against interference in the trial process. The Supreme Court strongly endorsed the principle that the Court of Appeal is the appropriate remedy for an applicant dissatisfied with a trial judge’s ruling. Charleton J. concluded that judicial review of the criminal trial process will only succeed in the most exceptional cases. Following E.R., in Long v. D.P.P. [2020] IEHC 631, Simons J. denied relief to an applicant who was refused permission to vacate his plea. C. Circumstances of this Applicant’s Plea of Guilty 10. The Applicant’s main arguments (in his pleadings and in oral submissions) are that his legal team was incompetent and acted against his interests, investigators unlawfully tampered with evidence and with the Book of Evidence and that he did not obtain sufficient disclosure. These factors, he submits, rendered the whole trial process unfair and his plea involuntary. 11. The Applicant was assigned solicitor and counsel under the Legal Aid scheme. He met with his lawyers and was advised to plead guilty. He submitted that he would not have pleaded guilty if he had received disclosure of exculpatory evidence, namely footage from CCTV on the premises, which he describes as his “then residence”. At no point does he deny that there was a large number of cannabis plants in this property, nor does he state what CCTV would reveal. 12. The Applicant argues that he pleaded guilty on the basis that his legal team was ineffective, did not challenge the Book of Evidence and did not seek disclosure. He submits that this led to a position where a reasoned and informed defence was impossible. Therefore, he concludes, the plea was not free or voluntary but was induced by the breakdown of the legal process and the deprivation of his right to a trial in due course of law. The Applicant states that he was told that if he pleaded guilty, the Garda witnesses would not provide an adverse characterisation of his conduct. It was said that if he did not seek disclosure, there would be no additional evidence presented against him. This appears to be the height of the allegations in respect of duress. 13. The Applicant argues that his detention was oppressive, and his interviews obtained in breach of the right to communicate with his solicitor and his family, which rendered such interviews inadmissible. 14. The Applicant sent a copy of the Book of Evidence to the Court. He confirmed that at the time of his plea of guilty, he had access to the Book of Evidence in English and in his first language, Lithuanian. The specific examples of errors in the Book are references to the arrest and search processes, both of which he contests, and question marks which appear at pages 11 and 12 of the Book instead of the time of the interviews. The interview notes themselves record the relevant times, but the statements about the interviews do not. It is also argued that details in the Book about the packaging of the drugs are incorrect. 15. Regarding disclosure, the Applicant argues that CCTV cameras were damaged and footage that should have been available was never disclosed. He also seeks CCTV footage from the garda station in which he was detained. He does not say what, if anything, this footage (from the house or the station) would reveal. 16. All these matters are for the Trial Judge to consider if an application to vacate the plea of guilty is made. Here, there is no evidence of a denial by the Trial Judge of the Applicant’s fair trial rights. On the contrary, this Applicant pleaded guilty at a time when he was legally represented. Before any challenge to this case can be contemplated, a motion to vacate that plea must be heard and only the Court of Trial can hear that. This Applicant has an even weaker case than that of Long, noted above: he has yet to apply to the Trial Court. 17. The Applicant states that because the Trial Judge, at his public sentencing hearing, falsely and negligently remarked that he had provided “cooperation” to the police, the Applicant’s life and bodily integrity are now at risk both in prison and on release. If correct, this allegation refers to comments at sentencing, at a time when the Trial Judge had not heard any criticism of the legal team and there was no suggestion that the accused had reservations of any kind about pleading guilty. This is not a sound basis on which to argue that the Judge cannot fairly hear an application to vacate the plea and indeed, no such argument was made. D. Conclusions 18. For the reasons set out, the Applicant cannot succeed. He has an alternative remedy and the Court of Trial is the venue prescribed by law for this case. Thereafter, if he is unsuccessful, he has a right of appeal to the Court of Appeal. 19. The jurisdiction of this Court is to assess whether his trial was dealt with in a procedurally fair way. However, the Applicant has not let the Trial Judge deal with the case he now makes at all. 20. While he pleads that he has faced exceptional hurdles in accessing legal resources and seeking new representation, he does not state what these hurdles are, other than the fact that he is in prison. No such hurdle prevented him from making this application. The fact that the Applicant is in prison does not permit this Court to ignore the law in respect of appropriate alternative remedies. 21. There is no basis for any claim by way of judicial review in respect of damages, whether for violation of constitutional rights, false imprisonment, misfeasance in public offence or infliction of emotional distress as claimed, in circumstances where this Applicant pleaded guilty to an offence and was sentenced in accordance with law. Only if he successfully vacates that plea could questions of detention and destruction of property arise, let alone any claim for damages. 22. Leave to seek judicial review is refused on all grounds. The question of costs does not arise as the proposed Respondents were not on notice of the claim.

Source: BAILII Ireland — bailii.org/ie/· Source: Courts Service of Ireland — courts.ie/judgments. Reproduced under Crown / public-record fair use.