M.G. [Georgia] v The International Appeals Tribunal and Anor

[2026] IEHC 151 THE HIGH COURT JUDICIAL REVIEW [2024/1139JR] BETWEEN: M.G. (GEORGIA) Applicant AND THE INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION APPEALS TRIBUNAL and THE MINISTER FOR JUSTICE Respondents JUDGMENT of Mr. Justice Barry O’Donnell delivered on the 10th day of March, 2026 INTRODUCTION 1. The applicant is a Georgian national who sought asylum and/or subsidiary protection in this State on the basis that she feared persecution or was at risk of serious harm arising from domestic violence perpetrated by her ex-partner. In these proceedings the applicant seeks orders by way of judicial review quashing a decision dated the 7 August 2024 made by the first respondent (the Tribunal) affirming a decision of the International Protection Office (the IPO) which recommended that the second respondent (the Minister) should refuse the applicant’s claims for asylum and subsidiary protection. As the case arises from matters regulated by the International Protection Act 2015 (the 2015 Act), the identity of the applicant and matters that could identify her have been anonymised and presented in a manner which minimises the risk for the applicant to be identified. 2. In broad terms, the applicant’s account of events and her general credibility were accepted by the IPO and the Tribunal. It was accepted that her experiences of violence and abuse amounted to persecution and that her fears of further persecution were well founded. It was also accepted that the necessary Convention nexus was present. The decisions recommending that the Minister refuse her claims were rooted in findings relating to the state protection available to the applicant if she was returned to Georgia. As will be seen, there was a considerable volume of country-of-origin information (COI) material available to the Tribunal which addressed the history and current status of state protection against domestic violence in Georgia. While other grounds were advanced by the applicant, the primary focus for her challenge related to the analysis and treatment by the Tribunal of that COI. 3. For the reasons explained in this judgment the court is satisfied that the applicant is entitled to an order quashing the Decision of the Tribunal on one of the four main grounds that were advanced on her behalf, which relates to the treatment of the COI by the Tribunal and the resulting finding that there was effective state protection available to the applicant if she was returned to Georgia. EVIDENCE 4. The primary source of evidence was in the form of a translation of an affidavit sworn by the applicant which exhibited the material relevant to her claims. In summary, the applicant moved to a city in Georgia in 2003 to attend university and lived with an aunt. Her now ex- partner was the son of a neighbour. In November 2006 the applicant was abducted by a group of men, including her ex-partner, and she was physically and sexually assaulted by her ex- partner. Due to pressure from her family and the mother of her ex-partner she stayed with the ex-partner. Between 2006 and 2015 she remained with her ex-partner, and they had two children. During that period, she stated that her ex-partner used alcohol and illegal drugs and engaged in gambling. The applicant was subjected to assaults and intimidation and was pressured to fund the ex-partner’s lifestyle. The applicant provided accounts of violent incidents. After an incident in 2015 when she was assaulted with broken glass, she left her partner and Georgia, moving to Turkey where she worked as a child minder. 5. Between 2015 and 2022, with the assistance of her ex-partner’s mother, she maintained phone contact with her children. Her ex-partner was aware of the phone calls and conditioned them on the applicant sending him money. In addition, in that period the applicant made some visits to Georgia during which she hid from her ex-partner. She stated that her ex-partner made a number of specific threats to kill her during that period, and these were communicated to her directly and via her children. The applicant was afraid that Turkey was too close to Georgia and was advised by friends to move to Ireland. The applicant stated that she had not sought the assistance of the police in Georgia because she was too afraid. THE IPO PROCESS 6. The applicant arrived in Ireland in March 2022 and sought international protection. She underwent the regular process of filling a questionnaire, and, on the 25 July 2023, she attended for an interview with the IPO, with the assistance of an interpreter. 7. The consequent IPO report was sent to the applicant under cover of letter dated the 22 September 2023. In essence, the IPO accepted the applicant's account of events and accepted both that she had experienced persecution and that there was a reasonable chance of persecution if she was returned to her country of origin. It was determined that persecution experienced by the applicant had a Convention nexus: she was a victim of domestic abuse and belonged to a particular social group, namely victims of domestic violence. 8. The IPO rejected the applicant’s claim for asylum and subsidiary protection on the basis of the availability of state protection. In that regard, emphasis was placed on the fact that the applicant had not been in Georgia since 2015 and it was considered that the applicant had not made sufficient efforts to seek state protection prior to leaving the country. The IPO considered that the COI reflected that domestic abuse remained a problem within Georgia and that there were some deficiencies within the system for the prevention of domestic abuse. However, there was an effective legal system for the detection, prosecution and punishment of the acts that constituted the serious harm, and the applicant had access to that protection. In terms of the subsidiary protection analysis, the IPO found that the applicant would face the risk of serious harm if returned to Georgia, but, for similar reasons to those explained in the asylum claim section of the report, the IPO considered that state protection would be available at to the applicant if she returned to Georgia. THE APPEAL TO THE TRIBUNAL 9. On the 23 September 2023, the applicant appealed to the Tribunal. Among the grounds of appeal were assertions that the IPO failed to have proper regard to the COI in relation to the appellant’s claim. The applicant sought an oral hearing based on the specific circumstances of the case and the nature of the findings made against the applicant. The applicant submitted a medico-legal report which noted that the applicant had scarring which was described as consistent with the accounts she had given. In addition, the medico-legal report noted a wide range of overlapping psychological symptoms including depression and generalised anxiety; they were found to be highly consistent with the account of traumatic experiences given by the applicant. 10. Through her lawyers, the applicant made detailed legal and factual submissions prior to the Tribunal’s consideration. There was a considerable emphasis on the question of state protection, and the argument was that state protection for victims of domestic violence was not effective in Georgia. Reliance was placed on the 2022 United States Department of State (USDOS) country report on human rights practices in Georgia. That report noted that domestic violence remained a significant problem, and, although steps had been taken by the government and law enforcement, shortcomings were identified. It was also stated that issues with rule of law and corruption in Georgia significantly undermined the effectiveness of state protection. 11. Reference was also made to previous Tribunal decisions from 2019 to 2022, addressing state protection in Georgia, where findings had been made that the protection was not effective in gender-based violence cases. The submission referred to the UNHRC guide from the 7 May 2022 dealing with gender related persecution, and the Tribunal was also directed to the decision of WS v. Intervyuirasht organ na Darzhavna agentsia za bezhantsite pri Ministerskia savet C- 621/ 21, ECLI:EU:C:2024:47, 16 January 2024 (W.S.). A detailed summary of the COI relied on by the applicant was appended. 12. Following the commencement of the Tribunal’s consideration of the case, the applicant was invited to comment on a number of matters by way of an e-mail dated the 23 July 2024. The applicant was requested to identify any additional COI or additional law that should be considered by the Tribunal in respect of the Convention nexus issue. The e-mail also sought further details in relation to the criticism in the grounds of appeal about the interpreter at the IPO interview. The e-mail also indicated that the Tribunal intended to consider the USDOS Human Rights Report for Georgia for 2023. 13. The 2023 USDOS report indicated that, with regard to rape and domestic violence, the Georgian government did not enforce the law effectively. This had been observed by the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe in a December 2022 assessment. In relation to domestic violence, it was noted that “domestic and gender-based violence remained a significant problem that the government took several steps to combat”; but it also noted that existing laws and practice “failed to provide effective, survivor centred, gender sensitive legal solutions to combat sexual violence”. 14. In response to the request from the Tribunal, the applicant made further submissions and appended further materials. THE TRIBUNAL DECISION 15. The Tribunal decision (the Decision) was dated the 7 August 2024 and was sent to the applicant on the 8 August 2024. The Tribunal had decided that the appeal could be dealt with on a “papers only” basis. It was of the view that credibility issues could be resolved without an oral hearing and that it had raised matters in correspondence that would have been raised if there was an oral hearing. 16. The Tribunal provided a summary of the core facts, and in a passage that was the subject of submissions at the hearing, noted: “8. … All of the documents submitted in this case were fully assessed by the Tribunal. However, the Tribunal will only refer to such evidence and information within this decision as is necessary to explain the Tribunal’s findings and conclusions.” 17. The Tribunal went on to accept the “core elements” in the claim, and these were stated to be: • The Appellant’s ex-partner, abuses alcohol and illegal drugs, was violent to her on a number of occasions between 2006 and 2015. • The Appellant suffers from depression and anxiety. 18. In relation to the claim that the applicant had a fear of persecution, the Tribunal stated that because the ex-partner was violent to her in the past, this engaged the presumption in section 28(6) of the 2015 Act that he would assault her in the future, noting that repeated assaults are capable of reaching the level of persecution. The Tribunal accepted that serious assaults could result in death, and that the risk in this case was “that of a reasonable chance”. The Tribunal accepted there was a Convention nexus, as the applicant was a member of a particular social group: “as a woman in a long term relationship with a violent ex-partner she shares a common background that cannot be changed”. 19. The Tribunal noted that Georgia had been designated as a safe country, and in the light of the facts and submissions, noted the following at para. 18: “However, the Appellant’s circumstances need to be considered in a careful and nuanced manner. While her fear is not of the paradigmatic case of domestic violence because she no longer lives with the man she fears; nonetheless the Appellant’s ex-partner lived with her in the past and, as a result of their both being the parents of school-age children, can reasonably be presumed to be aware of her movements. Her fear shares features of a fear of domestic violence and so state protection in the case of domestic violence is relevant to her particular circumstances.” 20. The Tribunal considered COI and found that Georgia was not a safe country of origin in the applicant’s particular circumstances and in terms of her eligibility for international protection. Hence, “it is necessary to analyse State protection without the overlay of Georgia being a safe country of origin”. 21. The Tribunal considered the summary given by Barrett J. in B.C. v. IPAT [2019] IEHC 763 of the tests set out in s.31 of the 2015 Act; and it highlighted that the necessary analysis should be conducted with a focus on the particular circumstances of the applicant. In that regard the Tribunal compared older COI with more recent reports. 22. The Tribunal traced developments in Georgian law dealing with domestic violence, noting that the law changed in 2017 after the ratification by the Council of Europe Convention on Preventing and Combatting Violence against Women and Domestic Violence (“the Istanbul Convention”). The Tribunal referred to a 2017 Human Rights Watch report and 2017 conference papers prepared by the Georgian Young Lawyers Association, the Gender Equality Department of the Public Defender of Georgia, and the Anti-Violence Network of Georgia. 23. The Tribunal referred to more recent reports. It was noted that the 2023 Freedom House Report observed that while there was an increase in reporting and some improvements in enforcement in recent years, “Domestic violence remains a problem in Georgia, and the response from police is often inadequate.” The 2022 Amnesty International Report for Georgia noted concerns that gender-based violence “continued to be on the rise”. The 2023 Human Rights Watch report noted, in the context of femicide and attempted murders of women by family members that “courts often release on bail abusive partners, who continue to threaten the survivors”. 24. The Tribunal described the 2023 USDOS Human Rights Report for Georgia as providing a comprehensive account of the law and practice surrounding violence against women. The Tribunal quoted from a section of the report that described steps taken by the government to combat domestic violence. Notwithstanding the various steps that were described in the report, the authors noted that a “number of survivors reported instances of insensitive attitudes from police, such as asking women what they had done to prompt domestic violence against them”. 25. As the Tribunal’s analysis of the availability to the applicant of state protection was the subject of analysis at trial it is worthwhile setting out precisely what the Tribunal stated: “37. The country of origin information presents a mixed picture. The older country of origin information from 2016 and 2017 showed a trend of improvements since 2006 in the law relation to domestic violence in Georgia, although there remained mistrust of the police by victims of domestic violence. The more recent country of origin information shows continuing improvements. Although “shortcomings remain”, there are a number of procedures in place to combat domestic violence and there have been improvements in recent years. The extract from the State Department Report above shows that the police have developed systems of electronic surveillance and communication via text message, witness on survivor advocates are employed, and the police have received specialised training. The impression given in the country of origin information is that considerable improvements have been made in the policing of domestic violence and violence against women. 38. The Appellant’s personal circumstances must be considered. She did not report her negative experiences to the police in the past. She gave three reasons in her answer to question 16 of her interview: (a) his mother is an old person, (b) I was alone with nobody beside me, and (c) I was scared of my [ex partner]. Even if the last of those could be considered to relate to the effectiveness of state protection, she was last abused by her ex-partner in 2015, before the improvements set out in the country of origin information. Further, the Appellant’s health circumstances must be considered. The medical documents submitted do not indicate that her medical conditions would stop her from accessing state protection. (h) Conclusion on state protection 39. Taking everything into consideration in the context of the individual circumstances of the Appellant’s claim, and having regard to the four-part test set out in B.C. v. International Protection Appeals Tribunal [2019] IEHC 763, the Tribunal is satisfied by the country of origin information that Georgia takes reasonable steps to prevent the kind of persecution feared by the Appellant arising from possible future violence from her ex partner. Georgia operates an effective legal system for the prosecution and punishment of violent acts. That protection is effective and of a non-temporary nature. The Appellant has access to that protection. Therefore, the Tribunal concludes that effective state protection would be available to the Appellant should she return to Georgia.” 26. With respect to the analysis of serious harm, the Tribunal was satisfied that in light of the findings on the availability of state protection there were not substantial grounds for believing that the applicant faced a real risk of serious harm if she was returned to Georgia. THE PROCEEDINGS 27. In the statement of grounds dated the 11 September 2024, the primary relief sought was an order of certiorari quashing the Decision of the Tribunal, along with an order remitting the matter for fresh consideration to a different tribunal member. The legal grounds upon which the applicant was granted leave to apply for judicial review are set out in detail in the statement of grounds, and were reduced to the following four questions in the applicant’s written legal submissions: i. Whether the Tribunal failed to take account of relevant information / made a material error of fact. ii. Whether the Tribunal erred in the manner in which undertook the assessment of state protection and country of origin information. iii. Whether elements of the assessment where internally inconsistent. iv. Whether the Tribunal failed to give adequate reasons. 28. The respondents delivered a statement of opposition dated the 19 February 2025, grounded on an affidavit sworn on the 25 February 2025 by Tony Dalton, a Higher Executive Officer in the Immigration Service Delivery unit of the Minister’s department. The respondents opposed the granting of relief and took issue with the arguments made by the applicant. THE ARGUMENTS AT HEARING 29. The applicant predicated her argument by reference to observations made by the CJEU in W.S. and I will address that case below. 30. In relation to the proposition that the Tribunal failed to take account of relevant information or that the Decision contained a material error of fact (grounds e(iii) and (iv) in the statement of grounds) the applicant argued that the Decision did not engage with any consideration of the issues raised by her about matters that occurred after 2015, and that this amounted to a material error. 31. This argument proceeded from an assertion that the impugned Decision did not take issue with the applicant’s account of her interactions with her ex-partner but only appeared to treat her account as addressing the period between 2006 and 2015, when she left Georgia. The Decision records at para 38 that the applicant “was last abused by her ex partner in 2015, before the improvements set out in the country of origin information.” The applicant argued that the Decision simply did not address or take into account the various threats to which she was subjected between 2015 and 2022. These included threats to harm her children, threats to kill her, and the extortion of money from her. In that regard, the applicant highlighted that section 7(2) of the 2015 includes acts of mental violence as matters that may amount to acts of persecution. Further, having regard to the nature of the inquiry required in a consideration of state protection, the applicant argued that the approach of the Tribunal did not take account of the context and dynamics of domestic and gender-based violence, referring to the ECtHR decision in Gaidukevich v Georgia (Application No. 38650/18, 15 June 2023). 32. In relation to the complaint that the Tribunal erred in the application of the legal test concerning state protection (grounds e(i) and (ii)) the applicant drew an analogy with the situation that was addressed in FM & RM v IPAT [2021] IEHC 817, and argued that the Tribunal misdirected itself by eliding the concept of a state endeavouring to address domestic violence of the type faced by the applicant with the effectiveness of the system of state protection. The applicant went on to argue that the extracts from the COI quoted by the Tribunal did not properly reflect a full reading of the COI, and that the conclusions reached could not have flowed properly from that material. 33. The applicant also argued that there was some internal inconsistency in the Decision. This was said to flow from the Tribunal noting that there had been improvements in Georgia since 2006 and at the same time stating that the applicant had been last abused in 2015 “before the improvements set out in the country of origin information”. 34. Finally, the applicant argued that the Decision was not adequately reasoned, in the sense that it was unclear why the Tribunal found that state protection would be effective in her circumstances based on the available COI. 35. The respondents argued that the Decision acknowledged that the applicant was threatened by her ex-partner after 2015, and there was no actionable failure to take account of relevant matters. Insofar as the Decision stated that the applicant was last abused in 2015, this part of the Decision had to be read in the context of the overall Decision. Finally, the argument was that if there was an error it was not the type of error that could lead to the Decision being vitiated. 36. In relation to the question of the effectiveness of state protection, the respondents argued that what was required was evidence that Georgia took reasonable steps to prevent persecution of the type feared by the applicant and that no system can be perfect or offer absolute protection. The respondents argued that in this case the Tribunal had conducted a lawful assessment of state protection, weighed the various matters set out in the COI, and formed a reasonable view on the conclusion. The respondents disputed that properly considered there was an internal inconsistency in the Decision and contended that the reasoning pathway was clear and apparent. DISCUSSION 37. Counsel for the applicant framed the arguments by reference to observations in CJEU case law addressing the significance to be attached to claims for protection based on concerns of what broadly can be described as domestic or gender-based violence. Ultimately the court’s view is that the Tribunal in large part accepted the accounts of domestic violence and found that the applicant had a well-founded fear of persecution. The proper focus of these proceedings was on the treatment of the issue of state protection, and there was no sense from the Tribunal Decision that issues of domestic violence or gender-based violence were underestimated or downplayed. The W.S. case 38. The W.S. case concerned a Turkish national whose claim for protection was processed in Bulgaria. Her claim was based on an account that she had been forcibly married at the age of 16 years and was subjected to domestic violence. She fled the family home in 2016 and had fears that if she was returned to Türkiye she would be killed by her ex-husband’s family. In 2019, the relevant Bulgarian agency (the DAB) rejected the application for protection on the basis that domestic violence and threats were not linked to reasons for persecution identified in the relevant Bulgarian law. 39. A second application was made for protection in 2021 based on new evidence and grounded on a claim that the applicant was a member of a particular social group – women who are victims of domestic violence and women who are particular victims of “honour killings” – and that the Turkish State was not able to defend her. The DAB refused to reopen the case, and on an appeal the Bulgarian court referred questions to the CJEU, focused on whether gender-based violence against women in the form of domestic violence or threats of honour killings was a ground for protection. 40. In his opinion, AG de la Tour framed the overarching issue presented by the referring court as follows: “1. The issue of acts of violence against women in the family context has become a major concern of our societies after the gravity and the consequences of such acts had long been underestimated by the authorities. Killing of women in the family circle, now called ‘femicide’ in everyday language, have been publicly denounced. The public authorities have become aware of the need to provide better protection for women victims of violence in their family setting and to take a stricter approach towards the authors of such violence. Must that protection which must be guaranteed within a state also be afforded to women who have fled their countries and who cannot or do not wish to return because they fear that they will suffer violence in the family circle? More precisely, may women faced with such a situation be recognised as having refugee status, within the meaning of Article 2(e) of Directive 2011/ 95/ EU? If they are not recognised having such status, to what extent may acts of gender-based violence, committed against a third-country national within the restricted circle of her family life, justify granting subsidiary protection within the meaning of Article 2(g) of that directive?” 41. The CJEU, in the context of Directive 2011/95/EU, noted that the UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) and the Istanbul Convention, were treaties in accordance with which the Directive must be interpreted, even if Bulgaria had not ratified the Istanbul Convention. 42. The Court next identified that the Istanbul Convention provided that gender based violence against women was to be recognised as a form of persecution within the meaning of Article 1A(2) of the Geneva Convention. The Court went on to find that women as a whole may be regarded as belonging to a “particular social group” where it is established that in their country of origin they are, on account of their gender, exposed to physical or mental violence including sexual violence and domestic violence. It falls to the Member State to ascertain whether the person relying on membership of a particular social group has a well-founded fear of being persecuted in their country of origin by reason of that membership. The Court then observed: “60. In that regard, in accordance with Article 4(3) of that directive, the assessment of whether an applicant’s fear of being persecuted is well-founded must be individual in character and be carried out on a case-by-case basis with vigilance and care, solely on the basis of a specific evaluation of the facts and circumstances, in accordance with the rules set out not only in paragraph 3 but also in paragraph 4 of that article, in order to determine whether the established facts and circumstances constitute such a threat that the person concerned may reasonably fear, in the light of his or her individual situation, that he or she will in fact be the victim of acts of persecution if he or she were to return to his or her country of origin (see, to that effect, judgment of 21 September 2023, Staatssecretaris van Veiligheid en Justitie (Political opinions in the host Member State), C-151/22, EU:C:2023:688, paragraph 42 and the case-law cited). 61. To that end, as stated in point x of paragraph 36 of the HCR Guidelines on International Protection No 1, country of origin information should be collected that has relevance for the examination of women's applications for refugee status, such as the position of women before the law, their political rights, their social and economic rights, the cultural and social mores of the country and consequences for non-adherence, the prevalence of such harmful traditional practices, the incidence and forms of reported violence against women, the protection available to them, any penalties imposed on those who perpetrate the violence, and the risks that a woman might face on her return to her country of origin after making such a claim.” 43. In October 2024, the CJEU reiterated the above points in requests for preliminary rulings in AH and FN v. Bundesamt fur Fremdenwesen und Asyl, cases C-608/22 and S-609/22, ECLI:EU:C:2024:828. 44. The court observes that the Tribunal in this case proceeded on the basis that it accepted the factual basis of the applicant’s claim, accepted that there was a well-founded fear of persecution and that the claims made had the necessary Convention nexus. As such it cannot be said that the findings and underlying concerns expressed in the CJEU case law in that regard were ignored or afforded insufficient weight. The main issue of concern, as will be set out, is the Tribunal’s treatment of the COI that was considered in connection with the question of effective state protection in Georgia. DISCUSSION OF SUBSTANTIAL ISSUES 45. I will address the substantial grounds upon which the applicant sought to impugn the Tribunal’s decision in a different order to that presented at trial. Adequacy of reasons 46. The first issue is the question of the adequacy of reasons, and I consider that this issue can be disposed of briefly. The parties were in large part agreed as to the applicable legal principles, which are very well established. 47. I am satisfied that the Tribunal’s decision was properly reasoned, and it is clear why the Decision was made. This, of course, is different to the question of whether the Decision was properly and lawfully made. There are two elements to this aspect of the claim. First, there is the well-established general proposition that that the reasons to be given by a decision-maker such as the Tribunal do not have to be discursive or engage in a narrative way with each and every point made by the applicant; see for instance, G.K. v IPAT [2022] IEHC 204. That requirement has to be adjusted where the Tribunal is addressing what could be described as a core claim made by the applicant, and, in that regard there is a need to ensure that there has been proper engagement with a core claim. The second element is that a person affected by the decision and the court should be given sufficient information and explanation to allow it to understand the reasoning process of the decision-maker; see for instance YY v Minister for Justice and Equality [2017] IESC 61, and Middelkamp v Minister for Justice and Equality [2023] IESC 2. 48. The applicant here asserted that the reasoning process was unclear, particularly on the issue of whether state protection would be effective in her circumstances. I disagree. The court’s view is that the Tribunal set out its reasons on this and the other main claims in a way that provided sufficient clarity to understand why the Decision was made. That is not the same as the court necessarily accepting the separate issue of whether the outcome rationally flowed from the evidence or was reasonably open to the decision-maker. Internal inconsistency 49. The second issue that can be dealt with briefly is the assertion that the Decision contained an internal inconsistency such that the Decision should be quashed. This is connected to the assertion that the Tribunal’s Decision was flawed by reason of a material error of fact. In turn, that proposition related to the observation by the Tribunal that the applicant was last abused in 2015, when in fact she was subjected to threats of violence between 2015 and 2022. The internal inconsistency was said to be that the incident of abuse occurred in 2015 before the improvements set out in the COI. The applicant noted that the Tribunal had noted that the older COI from 2016 and 2017 showed a “trend of improvements” since 2006. 50. The court’s view is that, taken in isolation, the Tribunal’s observations are somewhat inconsistent or hard to follow. However, as noted by the respondents, the relevant paragraph in the Decision involves a more detailed focus on what the Tribunal saw as the overall pattern of improvements that could be observed in a consideration of the COI up to the most recently available material. In the premises I do not consider that this element in the applicant’s claim is made out and that the issue is better considered the overall context of the treatment of the state protection issues. Material error issue 51. The third issue was the question of whether there was a material error of fact in the Decision such that the Decision should be quashed. By way of recap, the asserted error was the Tribunal’s statement that the applicant was last abused by her ex-partner in 2015. The applicant was concerned – correctly when taken on its own – that this statement was incorrect, and that the Tribunal had not taken issue with the account of the threats made to her between 2015 and 2022. In those premises, the argument was that the Tribunal either made a material error of fact or that it had failed to take account of or address significant evidence. This meant, according to the applicant, that the Tribunal had failed to understand or appreciate the applicant’s case or attach proper weight to the significance of repeated threats to the applicant and her children following her departure from Georgia. 52. The respondents argued first that the Decision had to be read in a way that, if possible, rendered it valid; and second, that following the line of authority stemming from G.K. v Minister for Justice [2002] 2 IR 418, the court should accept that the Tribunal had considered the relevant materials where, as occurred here, it makes a statement to that effect. The respondents also noted that at para. 7 of the Decision the Tribunal noted that the ex-partner “had threatened to kill her”. This, it was argued, meant that the reference to the applicant last being abused in 2015 should be understood as a reference to the last incident of physical abuse. Moreover, the respondents argued that if there was an error it was not material in circumstances where the Tribunal had accepted the applicant’s credibility and identified that the nature of the persecution feared was that she would be killed if she returned to Georgia, and accepted that the applicant faced a real risk of suffering serious harm by way of inhuman and degrading treatment in form of assault by her ex-partner. In that sense, the respondents did not understand how the error impacted on the issue of the availability of effective state protection. 53. In my view the Tribunal’s approach to the applicant’s evidence of threats between 2015 and 2022 introduced an avoidable level of confusion as to precisely what fact matrix was being considered; and, it was liable to give rise to a reasonable apprehension on the part of the applicant that her account may not have been fully understood. Nevertheless, I am not satisfied that this flaw warrants quashing the Decision. 54. The question of the nature of the threats faced by the applicant primarily was relevant to the initial question of whether she had a reasonable fear of persecution. That issue was resolved in the applicant’s favour by the Tribunal, and neither her account nor her credibility were questioned by the Tribunal. The issue of the nature of the threats faced by the applicant also was relevant to the question of state protection insofar as that part of the analysis necessarily required a consideration of whether there was an effective and non-temporary system of protection available to the applicant in the context of the particular harm that she feared. In that regard, the Tribunal in its Decision at paragraphs 18 to 20 framed the concern as relating to domestic violence and expressly noted that, while she no longer resided with the ex- partner, he could reasonably be presumed to be aware of her movements. 55. In those circumstances, although the Tribunal’s comments did not reflect the full import of the applicant’s evidence – which seemingly had been accepted in its entirety – that error did not in and of itself contaminate the reasoning in the analysis of the state protection issues. State protection issues 56. In respect of the question of how the Tribunal addressed the COI for the purposes of the state protection analysis, the applicant drew heavily on case law that involved the High Court quashing Tribunal decisions on the basis of a failure to engage properly with COI, or on the basis that the COI was treated selectively. For their part, the respondents highlighted that the caselaw that focussed on the role of the Tribunal in appraising COI, and which emphasised that the court should not accept invitations to substitute its own view on the COI for that of the Tribunal. 57. I will address the relevant case law in more detail below. It is clear that the case law proceeds on the basis that the court must acknowledge that the Oireachtas has assigned to the Tribunal the task of engaging with and appraising the evidence and materials before it, in cooperation with the applicant. The task of the court in a judicial review is not to consider whether it would reach a different view on the materials to that reached by the Tribunal but instead to be satisfied that the views and decisions of the Tribunal were reached lawfully. In the context of its appraisal of the COI for the purposes of considering the question of state protection, this means that the view reached by the Tribunal on the COI must have been one reasonably open to it on a fair reading of all the relevant material having proper regard to the factors identified in section 31 of the 2015 Act. 58. In that sense, if the view reached simply is not open to the Tribunal because it cannot be seen to be supported by the COI, the decision cannot be said to be lawful. Similarly, if the COI is appraised fairly, but, objectively, cannot satisfy the criteria set out in section 31 of the 2015 Act, it follows that the Tribunal will have misdirected itself as to the proper legal test. If the Tribunal view is based on only some of the COI – which points in one direction – and, without good reason or proper explanation, ignores or discounts elements in the COI that point in the other direction, the decision likewise cannot stand. 59. None of those scenarios contemplate the court quashing a decision on the basis that the court disagrees with the outcome or would have come to a different conclusion. The decision is quashed because the legally flawed process leads to a conclusion that cannot be permitted to stand. The case law cited by the parties, to my mind, illustrates those principles. 60. D.V.T.S. v. The Minister for Justice [2008] 3 IR 476 was a judicial review in which the applicant successfully sought orders quashing the decision of the Refugee Appeals Tribunal. Edwards J. analysed the manner in which the Tribunal treated COI regarding the arrest, detention and torture of political opponents of the government in Cameroon at the relevant time. The argument made by the applicant was that the COI, when viewed as a whole, made clear that torture was endemic in Cameroon and that the evaluation of that information by the Tribunal was selective. 61. Edwards J. read the entirety of the COI that was before the Tribunal and agreed that it was relied upon in a selective manner. The court highlighted that there was a significant body of up-to-date information before the Tribunal which did not appear to have been at the subject of any consideration. The court highlighted, in particular, that, while the Tribunal indicated that it had regard to all the relevant facts, the COI contained conflicting information, and there was no indication in the decision as to how or on what basis conflicts in the information had been resolved. The court acknowledged that it was up to the Tribunal to determine the weight if any to be attached to any particular piece of COI; but explained at para. 44 of the judgment: “In the case of conflicting information, it was incumbent on the second respondent to engage in a rational analysis of the conflict and to justify its preferment of one view over another on the basis of that analysis. The difficulty in the present case is that the second respondent firstly, does not allude to the fact that the information is conflicting and secondly, does not give any indication as to why he was inclined to prefer the information contained in the United States State Department report on Cameroon, 2004 and the United Kingdom fact finding mission Report 2004 to that contained in the reports submitted by or on behalf of the applicant.” 62. Accordingly, it can be seen that the difficulties presenting in D.V.T.S. were (a) the lack of recognition that there was conflicting COI, (b) and the consequent failure to explain or indicate how that conflict came to be resolved. 63. A similar situation presented itself in B.A. v. IPAT [2020] IEHC 589. In that case, the applicant claimed international protection on the basis of her fear that she would be killed by her ex-partner if she returned to Nigeria. She asserted that she been victim of various sexual offences in Nigeria and feared future attacks from her assailants. Those fears were presented in a situation where the applicant continued to be threatened by phone by her ex-partner after she had left Nigeria, despite changing her phone number. 64. The Tribunal in that case accepted there was a reasonable chance that if the applicant was returned to her country of origin she would face a well-founded fear of persecution from her ex-partner. Hence, the focus of the judicial review was on the treatment of the question of state protection by the Tribunal. The manner in which the Tribunal considered the COI in the context of state protection was treated in some detail by Burns J. in the High Court. In brief summary, the Tribunal had summarised the COI, noting that there was no law of nationwide applicability to criminalise gender-based violence; only certain states had enacted domestic violence laws; and, where such laws did exist, they were often not effectively implemented in practice and there was widespread under-reporting. It was also noted that the police were perceived as reluctant to take violence against women seriously and pursue allegations. Notwithstanding that analysis, the Tribunal determined that “Nigerian authorities are willing and able to provide protection from non-state agents, albeit that women face greater difficulties in seeking and obtaining protection then men for gender-based violence”. 65. Burns J. expressed her difficulty in understanding how the Tribunal determined that the criteria set out in s. 31 of the 2015 Act had been met. The court was very clear that this was not a situation in which the court effectively was substituting its views for that of the Tribunal or coming to a different conclusion. Rather the court determined that the Tribunal erred in its assessment of the COI, because the finding it made regarding state protection did not reflect the summary of the COI information which it itself had compiled. In essence, the court was not persuaded that the Tribunal's summary – which was negative regarding the existence of domestic protection laws in the applicant's region, negative regarding the implementation of such laws, and negative regarding police investigation into allegations of domestic violence – could rationally lead into a positive finding that the Nigerian authorities were willing to provide protection to women facing gender-based violence. Accordingly, the court determined that the finding was irrational. 66. The final case relied upon by the applicant and in which the High Court quashed a decision based on the approach to the question of COI relating to state protection is F.M. and R.M. v. International Protection Appeals Tribunal and Minister for Justice [2021] IEHC 817. The applicants in that case had sought international protection and claimed that if they were returned to South Africa, they were likely to face xenophobic violence on the basis that they originally came from the Democratic Republic of Congo. This also was a case in which the Tribunal had accepted that the applicants faced a real risk of persecution in the event they were returned to South Africa, and the focus was on the Tribunal's treatment of the state protection issue and the question of COI. The conclusion of the Tribunal was that the COI indicated that the level of state protection available to the applicant was less than perfect but on balance it was effective protection for potential victims of violence. 67. In his judgment, Ferriter J. identified a series of errors in the process of reasoning. Firstly, the COI material noted that the government sometimes responded quickly and decisively to xenophobic instance but at other times the responses were slow and inadequate. This did not demonstrate that there was non-temporary and effective protection. In addition, the Tribunal had relied on an extract from a part of a USDOS 2018 report, but the court considered that when the extract was considered in the context of the entirety of that part of the report it gave quite a different complexion to the meaning of the extract. Secondly, the court found that the question was not whether the COI material demonstrated a real effort on the part of the authorities to address xenophobic violence but rather whether there was an effective response to that challenge. As Ferriter J. noted at para. 30 of his judgment, what s. 31 requires is that there is an effective system of protection in place which is non-temporary in nature and which involves the taking of reasonable steps to protect those who otherwise faced a real risk of persecution or serious harm including through the operation of an effective legal system for the detection persecution and punishment of acts constituting persecution or serious harm. As noted by the court: “It is no answer that ‘a state is doing its incompetent best if it nevertheless falls below the appropriate standard [of protection]’ (to adopt the phrase used by Baker LJ in the English Court of Appeal in R (Atkinson) v. Secretary of State for the Home Department [2004] all England Reports (D) 14 at paragraph 22).” 68. In that regard, the court noted that while there was some material before the Tribunal, which was cited in its decision, which could form the basis of the conclusion that some steps were taken by the authorities to seek to address xenophobic violence, there was unequivocal evidence in the COI material that there was not an effective legal system in place in the sense required by s. 31(4) of the 2015 Act. 69. In all the circumstances the court was of the view that the Tribunal failed to ask itself the correct legal questions arising from the application of the provisions of s. 31 to the issue of whether state protection would exist for the applicant and her daughter if returned to South Africa. The COI material before the Tribunal, and relied upon by the Tribunal, demonstrated that it could not be said there was an effective legal system in place in South Africa for the detection, prosecution and punishment of xenophobic violent acts and certainly not one that could be said to be non-temporary in nature. 70. In contrast with the decisions cited above, it can be noted that in X.S. and J.T. v. IPAT and Minister for Justice and Equality [2022] IEHC 100, Ferriter J. refused an application to quash a decision of the Tribunal where that application was grounded in the Tribunal's assessment of the question of state protection in Albania against the backdrop of the applicants assertion that they found themselves in a blood feud involving violence against women and a form of forced marriage. In that case, the Tribunal had considered the COI regarding the approach in Albanian criminal law towards blood feuds and noted a number of reports. The Tribunal noted that the COI information in an EASO COI Report on Albania from 2016 presented “a mixed picture”. The Tribunal also considered reports from the USDOS in 2019 which likewise identified a mixed picture, and a report described as the “CEDOCA report” from June 2017. The Tribunal explained that it found the CEDOCA report particularly helpful because of its specificity to blood feuds together with its compliance with best standards on COI, and preferred it to the more general authorities which did not have a focus on blood feuds. 71. The court considered that this was an appropriate approach to be adopted by the Tribunal. The court found that the Tribunal acted lawfully in looking at the general COI in relation to the adequacy of police functioning in Albania which presented a mixed picture, but relying principally on the CEDOCA report because of its specificity to blood feuds. That approach was described as a “cogently reasoned approach”. 72. The court reiterated that it was not a function of the court on a judicial review application to substitute its own view of the COI for that of the decision-maker. The court considered that the conclusion of the Tribunal on the CEDOCA report – that it was indicative of state protection when considered in the round notwithstanding some misgivings – was a conclusion that was open to the Tribunal to reach in light of the contents of the report as a whole. In those circumstances, the court considered that the Tribunal had approached the issue of state protection on the basis of asking itself the correct legal question and thereafter arrived at a decision on the state protection issue which was properly reasoned and open to it on the basis of the COI. 73. Similarly, in W.P.L. and BP v. The Minister for Justice and Equality, The International Protection Appeals Tribunal Ireland and The Attorney General [2024] IEHC 184, Phelan J. considered the question of the proper approach to state protection issues. The court noted at para. 179 that there was authority to the effect that a failure to make a complaint to the police may legitimately be considered in assessing state protection. The key consideration when assessing whether state protection is available was whether the applicants through their testimony and considering all the documentary evidence established that they have a prospective well-founded fear of persecution on a convention ground if they were to return, in that case, to South Africa. The court also noted that a high level of crime generally committed by non-state actors does not necessarily lead to a conclusion that state protection is unavailable where the Tribunal is satisfied “reasonable steps are being taken to deal with same.”. The court at para. 182 noted it was mindful that the obligation to provide state protection is to provide “effective protection” not “perfect protection”. The court subsequently noted: “184. The key consideration for the Tribunal when assessing whether State Protection is available is whether the applicants through their testimony and considering all the documentary evidence established that they have a prospective well-founded fear of persecution on a Convention ground if they were to return to South Africa. On this key consideration I am satisfied that it was open to the Tribunal to conclude on the case made and the material available that they had not. I am satisfied that in this case COI had been considered in terms of whether the material constituted clear and convincing proof that State Protection was not available to the Applicants. The reasons given adequately explain the Decision that it was not established that State Protection was available, even though a contrary decision might also have been supported by some of the material before the Tribunal. 185. It has been repeatedly held in cases such as H.O. v. Refugee Appeals Tribunal and Anor [2007] IEHC 299 (Hedigan J.), E.G. (Albania) v. IPAT and Anor [2019] IEHC 474 (Humphreys J.), E.D. (a minor) v. Refugee Appeals Tribunal [2017] 1 IR 325 (Clarke J.) and B.A. v. IPAT [2020] IEHC 589 (Burns J. ), that courts should not interfere with findings which were within the range of conclusions which would be open to a Tribunal properly directed as to the law, on the basis of the materials available. Whether one agrees or not with the conclusion that State Protection is available is not the test in judicial review proceedings.” 74. Accordingly, it is clear that the test to be applied by the court in a challenge of this type is to consider whether the Tribunal considered all of the relevant COI, and, where differences in the analyses of state protection were identified, explained rationally why one analysis was preferred over another. 75. In this case I have considered the COI that was made available to the Tribunal and considered the manner in which the COI was addressed and appraised by the Tribunal. 76. In the first instance, the Tribunal correctly identified the relevant test contained in section 31 of the 2015 Act, and noted the four-question formulation from B.C. v IPAT [2019] IEHC 763. The Tribunal noted that the test to be applied must focus on the particular circumstances of the applicant. 77. As noted above, the Tribunal commenced by addressing older COI from 2016 / 2017, which was relevant to the time when the applicant left Georgia. The position at that time was fluid: the underlying State response to domestic violence was generally seen as ineffective but legal developments were progressing, with Georgia ratifying the Istanbul Convention in May 2017. 78. The Tribunal went on to consider the more recent COI. Here, the Tribunal described the COI as presenting a “mixed picture”. That description arose in the context of reports that identified advances but continuing difficulties. For instance, the Freedom House Report from 2023 noted improvements but also that “domestic violence remains a problem in Georgia, and the response from police is often inadequate.” Likewise, the Amnesty International Report from 2022 noted concerns that femicide and other forms of gender-based violence “continued to be on the rise.” Similar concerns were noted in the Human Rights Watch report from 2023. The Tribunal placed emphasis on a USDOS Human Rights Report for Georgia from 2023. This noted developments and improvements in the response to gender based violence, but noted reports of instances of insensitive attitudes from the police. 79. The applicant considered that the extract taken from the US DOS report was selective. It can be noted that the US DOS report dealt with domestic violence in the section of the report addressing “Discrimination and Societal Abuses”. The report identified that the law relating to rape was not enforced effectively, and that there was a lack of training for investigative authorities on effective procedures for case handling and evidence collection. The report noted that the Georgian Public Defenders Office had identified a lack of adequate preventative measures in relation to femicide and femicide attempts. The US DOS report then addressed domestic violence. The report expressed the view that there was a high rate of domestic violence which showed that reporting of incidents was increasing and the police were responding, but shortcomings remained. The report noted that the Georgian Young Lawyers Association described sexual violence as “one of the most serious, most hidden, and unpunished forms of gender-based violence.” The Association considered that current legislation and practice failed to provide effective solutions to combat sexual violence, despite an increase in detection rates. 80. Having noted the “mixed picture” presented by the COI, the Tribunal observed that there had been improvements but that shortcomings remained. The Tribunal then considered the position of the applicant. In effect, the Tribunal considered that from the reasons given by the applicant for not reporting the actions of her ex-partner to the police – (i) the intervention of his mother, (ii) her own isolated position, and (iii) fear of her ex-partner – only the last factor could be related to the issue of state protection. At this point the Tribunal made the observation that “she was last abused … in 2015, before the improvements set out” in the COI. This led to the conclusion that the Tribunal was satisfied that Georgia took “reasonable steps to prevent the kind of persecution feared by the Appellant arising from possible future violence from her ex-partner. Georgia operates an effective legal system for the prosecution and punishment of violent acts. That protection is effective and of a non-temporary nature.”. 81. Having considered the COI in detail, my finding is that this case falls into the category of case where the Tribunal can be seen to have made material errors. It must be noted that the situation described in the COI was challenging in the sense that clear improvements were noted and the materials were not directly concerned with the question of the effectiveness of the state protection for persons in the circumstances of the applicant. 82. I am not persuaded that the Tribunal engaged in any selectivity of the type criticised in D.V.T.S. v. RAT. However, in a similar way to the court in B.A. v IPAT, I have found it very difficult to find support for the proposition that the improvements meant that the level of state protection is effective. The respondents were correct to highlight, as observed in caselaw, that no state can provide absolute protection against the actions of non-state actors, such as a violent ex partner. The test is one of reasonableness. Nevertheless, there is very little in the COI that plainly supports the finding that state protection in cases of domestic violence is effective, and the general tenor of the COI is that the response more generally to gender based violence is inadequate. In those circumstances, the court is satisfied on balance that the applicant is correct in her contention that the finding relating to effective state protection was not reasonable. 83. In addition, by analogy with the observations of Ferriter J. in R.M. v IPAT, a Tribunal must go beyond finding that a state may be doing its best and assess whether what the state is doing reaches the threshold of effectiveness. Here, I consider that the Tribunal erroneously elided improvements with effectiveness. The Tribunal, as I read and understood the Decision, seems to have placed considerable emphasis on the elements within the COI that considered the undoubted improvements that have been observed over the years in Georgia’s response to gender based violence. That can be very important, particularly where, as in this case, an applicant asks the Tribunal to consider previous analogous decisions by differently constituted tribunals. The question of state protection is not fixed, and the situation may very well alter positively or negatively over a number of years. The difficulty that I apprehend in the Decision is that the focus on improvements did not progress to a proper analysis of whether the COI disclosed that there was effective state protection. In turn, this means that even though the Tribunal correctly identified the constituent elements in the test set out in section 31 of the 2015 Act, it did not apply the test correctly because what is required is not just whether there have been improvements, but whether in light of the improvements there is effective state protection. 84. By reference to the principles summarised above I am satisfied that the Tribunal erred (a) by reaching the conclusion that effective state protection was available to the applicant when that finding did not flow rationally from the COI; and (b) by conflating improvements with effectiveness, and thereby misdirecting itself as to the proper test in section 31 of the 2015 Act. 85. In those premises, I consider that the applicant should be granted the relief sought on this ground. To summarise, the applicant has not succeeded on the grounds relating to adequacy of reasons, material error or internal inconsistency, but relief will be granted on the errors relating to the Tribunal’s treatment of the COI concerning state protection. For these reasons, the Decision of the Tribunal will be quashed and the applicant’s appeal from the IPO decision will be remitted to a differently constituted Tribunal for reconsideration. 86. As this judgment is being delivered electronically, my provisional view is that having succeeded in obtaining the relief sought albeit only on some but not all of the grounds in the Statement of Grounds, the applicant should be entitled to an order for costs to be adjudicated in default of agreement. I will list the matter before me at 10.30am on Thursday, the 19 March 2026 for final orders.