Alabi v The Minister For Justice, Cardoso Seidler v The Minister For Justice

THE HIGH COURT JUDICIAL REVIEW Record No. 2024/959 JR [2026] IEHC 256 BETWEEN/ KAMOURU ABIODUN ALABI Applicant and THE MINISTER FOR JUSTICE Respondent _____________________________________________ THE HIGH COURT JUDICIAL REVIEW Record No. 2024/1305 JR BETWEEN/ FABRICIO CARDOSO SEIDLER Applicant and MINISTER FOR JUSTICE Respondent Judgment of Mr. Justice Cian Ferriter dated 29 April 2026 1 Introduction 1. In these two sets of judicial review proceedings, the applicants seek to quash decisions of the respondent ("the Minister") in which the Minister refused each applicant's application for a certificate of naturalisation. The applications were made pursuant to s.15 (in the case of Mr. Seidler) and s.15A (in the case of Mr. Alabi) of the Irish Nationality and Citizenship Act 1956 as amended ("the 1956 Act"). 2. As the decisions in issue raise substantively the same legal issues, the two cases were heard together by me and it was agreed that I would give a joint judgment on the two cases. 3. Before turning to the legal issues raised, I will set out the relevant factual background for each of the cases. Mr. Alabi’s proceedings – factual background 4. Mr. Alabi is a Nigerian national who entered the State in June 2002 and applied for international protection. He withdrew that application following the birth of a son in September 2002, who is an Irish citizen child. He and his wife have since had three more sons, all of whom are Irish citizens. His wife is also an Irish citizen, having been naturalised in 2013. 5. Mr. Alabi was sentenced in the Circuit Criminal Court on 2 December 2014 to three years’ imprisonment, with the final year suspended, for offences under the Criminal Justice (Theft and Fraud Offences) Act 2001. This conviction arose out of a series of withdrawals from a bank ATM at a time of the bank was experiencing technical problems which enabled him withdraw in excess of the money he had in his account. He had previously been charged with possession of a cloned shopping centre gift card in 2012 but these charges were struck out by the District Court in 2012 on the basis of a €100 payment to the poor box. He has been of good behaviour since his 2014 convictions. He ultimately served six months in a closed prison, six months in an open prison and was thereafter returned to the community on the Community Return 2 Scheme. His most recent permission to remain in the State is valid until March 2028. He is in steady employment. He applied for naturalisation in 2013 but that application was refused on the basis of the 2012 charges relating to his shopping centre gift card abuse. 6. Mr. Alabi submitted a fresh application for naturalisation on 17 February 2022. It is this application which is the subject of the refusal decision and challenge in these proceedings. In his application, Mr Alabi self-disclosed his 2012 and 2014 convictions. His application included character references and details as to his employment history, in addition to expressions of remorse for his convictions and details of his good behaviour since 2014. 7. Mr. Alabi was notified by letter from the Minister of 17 June 2024 of the decision to refuse his application for naturalisation. This letter stated “The Minister has considered your client’s application under the provisions of the Irish Nationality and Citizenship Acts 1956 and 1986 as amended and has decided not to grant a certificate of naturalisation. A copy of the submission that was prepared for the Minister, with her decision annotated thereon, is enclosed for your information. In reaching this decision the Minister has exercised her absolute discretion as provided by the Irish Nationality and Citizenship Acts 1956 and 1986.” 8. The accompanying "submission" (which I shall refer to for ease as the "recommendation") was signed by two officials in the Minister's Department. It does not appear to have had an annotation from the Minister as such. The submission was sent to Mr. Daragh Brennan, Head of Citizenship in the Minister's Department, and he replied by email of 14 June 2024 to one of the signatories of the recommendation saying that he had reviewed the file and agreed with its findings, adding "not recommended". 9. The recommendation is signed by two officials, one of whom signed and dated the recommendation on 8 May 2024 and the second (and more senior of which) signed and dated the recommendation on 10 May 2024. The conclusion under the heading 3 "Outcome" states:- "Not recommended. Files submitted for Minister's decision, please." 10. The recommendation is structured as follows. There is an introduction section which references s. 15 noting that the Minister “may, in his absolute discretion, grant the application where satisfied that the applicant fulfils the conditions for naturalisation specified in section 15… (‘The conditions for naturalisation’)”. 11. Under the heading "Facts and circumstances of the application", the recommendation details Mr. Alabi’s immigration history in the State. It notes that his application for naturalisation was made under s. 15A of the 1956 Act, as amended, based on his marriage to his Irish citizen wife. (The relevant provisions of s. 15A are materially identical to those of s. 15 for the purposes of the issues raised in these proceedings). 12. The recommendation then references the documentation considered in deciding upon the application and goes on to address "matters relevant to an assessment of the applicant's character". The recommendation then addresses the applicant's criminal convictions in some detail, noting that his two convictions were self-disclosed by Mr Alabi and that that this was a matter to his credit. The recommendation noted that the 2012 criminal matter was struck out by the District Court (and the fine discharged by Mr. Alabi) "and was considered by the Judge to be one of relatively low gravity". It goes on to state that Mr. Alabi: "…accepted responsibility for the matter which is of some antiquity, in that his conviction occurred over 12 years ago. Furthermore, it is acknowledged the penalty imposed on the applicant was relatively low." The recommendation noted that: "The commission of this offence, taking due account of the fine imposed by the District Court is a matter which reflects adversely on the applicant. This will be weighed in making a decision as to whether the applicant is ‘of good character’." 4 13. The recommendation goes on to set out extracts from the representations made on Mr. Alabi's behalf by his solicitors in relation to the 2014 conviction. It notes Mr. Alabi’s acceptance of the fact that the 2014 conviction resulted in him serving a custodial sentence and that the seriousness of these offences was reflected in the fact that his conviction was on indictment before the Circuit Court. The recommendation notes his submission that he was released early and spent the majority of the custodial part of his sentence either in an open prison or on community release and that the offences occurred more than ten years ago. Representations from his solicitors as to the circumstances in which the offences were committed are then set out. The recommendation goes on to note that:- "It is acknowledged that Mr Alabi is extremely remorseful in relation to his actions and that he does not seek to minimise the impact of his behaviour on those around him. The applicant's legal representative wishes to highlight that his convictions occurred a number of years ago and he is a reformed character." 14. The recommendation then states the author's view that it is considered that Mr Alabi’s 2014 conviction: “…constitutes a relatively serious matter which reflects adversely on the applicant, given the fact that Mr Alabi’s case was heard in the Circuit Court and he received a custodial sentence, notwithstanding the mitigating circumstances proposed by the applicant's legal representative. Accordingly, Mr Alabi’s 2014 conviction falls to be weighed in arriving at the decision as to whether the applicant is ‘of good character’.” 15. The recommendation goes on to note that: "Taking into account the above facts in relation to his 2012 and 2014 convictions, it is acknowledged that Mr Alabi's most recent conviction is almost 10 years ago. However, Mr Alabi has displayed a degree of dishonesty that weighs negatively in an assessment of his character under section 15(1) and the magnitude of the 2014 offence is evidenced by the sentence imposed by the Circuit Court." 5 16. The recommendation then goes on to address matters which weighed to Mr. Alabi's credit and constituted evidence in favour of his good character including his history of employment in the State, the fact that he has resided in the State since 2002 with his wife, a naturalised Irish citizen, and that he has four children all of whom are Irish citizens and that he therefore has strong ties to the State. The recommendation notes a positive character reference and a letter from his family testifying to his positive qualities and noting his acknowledgement of his remorse for his actions and how the incidents had affected him both mentally and emotionally and caused difficulty for him and his family when travelling as a family as he is not an Irish citizen. 17. The recommendation document then sets out the author’s recommendation in the following terms:- “I have carefully considered the entirety of the case and the submissions provided by Mr Alabi’s legal representatives when formulating this recommendation, including the vetting disclosure received from the National Vetting Bureau, An Garad Síochána, the submissions in relation to the convictions and the length of time that has elapsed since the commission of his most recent offence. I have also considered the applicant’s immigration history in the State, the applicant’s remorse, his employment record, the positive reference letters submitted in support of his application attesting to Mr Alabi’s good character and dependability. Additionally I have considered Mr Alabi’s ties to his immediate family members who are all Irish citizens. While Mr Alabi has expressed remorse for his offending, the applicant has shown a level of offending and disregard for the laws of the State which is at odds with societal norms in respect of his 2012 and 2014 offence. Having considered the full facts of the case, on balance, the remorse shown does not mitigate, in particular, against the seriousness of the 2014 offence committed by the applicant and does not merit a finding that the applicant satisfied the good character criteria specified in the Irish Nationality and Citizenship Act 1956 as amended. The minister does not demand an exalted standard of behaviour for naturalisation applicants. By any objective assessment of the 6 applicant’s 2014 conviction for which he received a custodial sentence demonstrates that the applicant does not have a sufficiently responsible attitude to the civic responsibilities of Irish society. Weighing in the balance all of the relevant factors identified above, both positive and negative - I am not satisfied that the applicant meets the criterion in section 15(1)(b) of the INCA 1956 as amended that he be “of good character”. By reason of all of the foregoing I would not recommend that the minister grant a certificate of naturalisation in this case.” Mr. Seidler’s proceedings – factual background 18. Mr. Seidler is a national of Brazil, who is 45 years of age. He arrived in the State in May 2012 on a study visa. He is currently in the State on foot of a residence card valid until May 2028. 19. On 1 July 2020, he applied for a certificate of naturalisation to the Minister. Correspondence was engaged in over the course of 2023 and 2024 relating to two separate convictions for no insurance, one in December 2016 and one in November 2017. He issued judicial review proceedings in 2024 seeking mandamus, with a view to compelling a decision on his application. These proceedings were compromised and struck out. 20. Mr. Seidler was written to on 21 May 2024 by the Minister inviting his submissions on the second offence of no insurance (being the February 2017 conviction). Further correspondence ensued. 21. By letter of 29 July 2024, the Minister notified him of the decision to refuse his application for naturalisation. The letter was in materially identical terms to that sent to Mr. Alabi, and was in the following terms: 7 “The Minister has considered your client’s application under the provisions of the Irish Nationality and Citizenship Acts 1956 and 1986 as amended and has decided not to grant a certificate of naturalisation. A copy of the submission that was prepared for the Minister, with her decision annotated thereon, is enclosed for your information. In reaching this decision the Minister has exercised her absolute discretion as provided by the Irish Nationality and Citizenship Acts 1956 and 1986.” 22. The letter enclosed a submission document signed by three officials in the Minister's Department, two of whom signed and dated the recommendation on 26 July 2024 and a third (more senior) of whom signed and dated the recommendation on 29 July 2024. For ease, I shall refer to this submission document as Mr. Seidler’s "recommendation". The recommendation in Mr. Seidler’s case was structured in the same way as the recommendation in Mr. Alabi’s case. 23. In Mr. Seidler’s case, the recommendation set out that all of the documentation that was sent by Mr. Seidler to include vetting documentation was considered. The recommendation noted that Mr. Seidler had been convicted of an offence of driving without insurance on 8 December 2016 and that he had self-disclosed this on his application form, which was to his credit. 24. It was noted that vetting searches conducted by the Garda National Vetting Bureau detailed records of conviction for further offences on 23 February 2017. This related to road traffic offences and specifically a further offence of no insurance. 25. The recommendation noted that the first offence in time (for ease, “the December 2016 offence”) resulted in disqualification for a period of one year and a fine of €1,500. It stated that “a conviction of no insurance is considered to lie at the more serious end of the spectrum of road traffic offences and constitutes a relatively serious matter which reflect adversely on the Applicant.” 26. The recommendation then went on to note that on 23 February 2017, Mr Seidler was before the Circuit Criminal Court charged with 8 motoring infractions including driving without 8 insurance (“the February 2017 offence”). The offence of driving a vehicle without insurance resulted in a disqualification period of 4 years and a fine of €500 which was “indicative of a view on the part of the District Judge that the offence was located towards the more serious end of the spectrum of gravity”. Other more minor offences were taken into consideration. 27. The recommendation stated that an opportunity was given to Mr. Seidler to provide any information he wished in relation to the Garda vetting report, and in particular the December 2016 and February 2017 offences. 28. The recommendation then noted that Mr. Seidler sent four letters dated 2nd February 2023, 8th February 2023, 9th February 2023 and 7th February 2024 setting out detailed submissions as to why the offences occurred, including his personal circumstances at the time. Mr. Seidler identified and acknowledged the offences and that they were unjustified but could be explained. The recommendation notes that it appears that Mr Seidler maintained that he was unaware of the December 2016 offence but by way of explanation for his offending generally set out that he had purchased the car the same week and had been travelling to obtain particular dietary requirement supplies for his wife who had been pregnant and was under a severe diet and medication. He was stopped at a Garda checkpoint, and this was how he was apprehended. He sets out that he moved house and had no knowledge of letters received from the Court notifying him of his offences. Mr. Seidler explained: “For this reason, I have visited the Court Office to collect more information such as any pending fines in my name. This is all cleared and sorted receipts enclosed. I would also like to express that the mistake does not define my character and conduct.” Mr Seidler contended that he only attended one Court date which related to the February 2017 offences. He attributes any confusion in respect of the December 2016 offences to him moving house and not obtaining any letters from the Court until he attended his Court date in February 2017. 29. The recommendation notes that Mr. Seidler also sets out that he had a family with two children who are living in Ireland and studying and that he has been in Ireland for 11 years working. 9 30. The recommendation considered all of the information provided and acknowledged the mitigating factors in Mr. Seidler’s personal statements. It noted that not all traffic offences should debar an application for naturalisation. However, in the circumstances, the author of the recommendation stated “I have also carefully and fully considered the extent of representations submitted by the Applicant’s legal representative when formalising this recommendation.” 31. The recommendation stated that in May 2024, the Minister notified the National Vetting Bureau of the matters raised by Mr. Seidler in respect of the two charges of no insurance, i.e. that the two charges related to the same incident. However, it had been confirmed by the dispute section of the National Vetting Bureau that the Applicant was prosecuted and received convictions for two separate offences of no insurance. This was conveyed to Mr Seidler’s solicitor and further representations were made by him dated 18th June 2024 and 21st June 2024 which were considered by the Minister’s officials in the recommendation document. The recommendation noted that there was no reason to doubt Mr. Seidler’s submission that he was moving house when the relevant summons issued, therefore Mr. Seidler’s initial failure to understand that he had committed two offences and to disclose the February 2017 offence was weighed “as a neutral factor in the assessment of his character. However, a failure to regularise one’s affairs such as a arranging for the post to be redirected does not mean that the fact of the offence itself should be disregarded when assessing whether it should have a bearing on the Applicant’s character.” 32. The Minister’s official found that the offence of driving with no insurance “is considered to lie at the more serious end of the spectrum”, and given that Mr. Seidler received fines and a disqualification and taking into account the mitigating circumstances referenced, the author maintained the view that these constituted serious matters which reflect adversely on Mr. Seidler. She also noted that these offences were committed over a short period of time which makes them of “relatively greater relevance to a current assessment of the Applicant’s character ensuring compliance with all road traffic regulations in the State when driving a vehicle remain fully in the Applicant’s control. Mr. Seidler has a pattern of non-compliance with the road traffic regulations of the State which reflects adversely on the Applicant and accordingly will be weighed in coming to a decision on whether the Applicant is of good character”. 10 33. The remainder of Mr. Seidler’s personal circumstances were then considered including his employment, his family life and the vouching documentation in respect of same to include his charity work, all of which were stated to reflect positively on his character. 34. The Minister’s official, in conclusion, found that: “I have carefully considered the entirety of the case and extensive submissions in formulating this recommendation, including the vetting disclosures received from the National Vetting Bureau, An Garda Siochána, the detailed representations submitted by his legal representative and Mr. Seidler’s personal testimony of the facts as disclosed to the Minister during the course of his application. I have also considered all the exculpatory information, the Applicant’s immigration history in the State, his steady employment, Mr. Seidler’s remorse and the detailed reference letter attesting to his good character.” “All of the relevant factors were then weighed in the balance, both positive and negative, and concluded that the Applicant was not of good character, given that on two separate occasions within a short time of each other, Mr Seidler failed to demonstrate respect for the laws of the State.” 35. The recommendation went on to acknowledge that there were some mitigating circumstances, and in particular that Mr. Seidler has not come to the attention of An Garda Siochána over the last 7 years. However, “taken cumulatively”, it was found that the evidence demonstrates that Mr. Seidler “does not have a sufficiently responsible attitude to the civic responsibilities of Irish society”. It was also noted that the Minister does not demand an exalted standard of behaviour for naturalisation applicants, and by any objective assessment the pattern of offending and range of convictions accruing to Mr. Seidler falls outside Irish societal norms. The recommendation was that a certificate of naturalisation be refused. Relevant legal principles 36. Section 15(1) of the 1956 Act (described in the marginal note as “Conditions for issue of certificate”) provides in material part that “Upon receipt of an application for a 11 certificate of naturalisation, the Minister may in his absolute discretion, grant the application, if satisfied that the applicant is …(b) of good character”. 37. Section 15A deals with naturalisation of spouses of Irish citizens. Section 15A(1) provides that “Notwithstanding the provisions of section 15, the Minister may, in his or her absolute discretion, grant an application for a certificate of naturalization to the non-national spouse or civil partner of an Irish citizen if satisfied that the applicant is …(b) of good character.” 38. It will be seen that in both cases a precondition to the grant of a certificate of naturalisation is that the applicant is of good character. 39. In the cases before me, Mr Alabi’s application for naturalisation was pursuant to section 15A and Mr Seidler's application was pursuant to section 15. Nothing turns on this for the purposes of the issues in the proceedings as both were subjected to a good character evaluation to which the same legal test applies. 40. Authoritative guidance as to the principles to be applied in an assessment of good character in a naturalisation context was provided by Power J in her judgement in MNN v. Minister for Justice [2020] IECA 187 (“MNN”), where she stated as follows (at para 52): "The following emerges from the case law: i. in describing the Minister's discretion as 'absolute', the Oireachtas intended to emphasise that the grant of a certificate of naturalisation involves the conferring of a privilege; ii. the fact that naturalisation is the grant of a privilege does not mean that an applicant enjoys inferior legal protection when pursuing such an application; iii. the Minister's absolute discretion to grant naturalisation only arises if satisfied that an applicant is of 'good character' and, extensive as that 12 competence may appear, it does not release the Minister of the obligation to operate within the rule of law and his determination is amenable to judicial review; iv. in determining the criteria to be considered when assessing 'good character' an applicant's character and conduct must be assessed against reasonable standards of civic responsibility gauged by reference to contemporary values; v. the connection between character and criminality can only be established when the Minister has all relevant information, including, context and mitigating factors, in connection with a crime; vi. information that is presented to the Minister in a Submission or recommendation must be accurately recorded, complete and seen in context and considered in full by the decision maker before reaching a determination; and vii. in deciding whether an applicant fulfils the 'good character' requirement of the Act, the Minister must undertake a comprehensive assessment of an applicant as an individual and must consider all aspects of character.” 41. As Power J notes, the Minister's absolute discretion to grant naturalisation only arises if satisfied that an applicant is of 'good character'. O’Donnell J (as he then was) held to the same effect in AP v The Minister for Justice [2019] 3 IR 317 at para. 85. Hyland J in M v The Minister for Justice [2025] IECA 1 (“M”) (at para 47) described this as a two-step process: “The first step is the question of whether the Minister is satisfied that the applicant has met the conditions for naturalisation. The second is the grant of the application – a decision in respect of which the Minister has absolute discretion.” 42. The appropriate approach to dealing with prior convictions in the context of assessing good character under s.15 was set out by Haughton J in Talla v. Minister 13 for Justice and Equality [2020] IECA 135 (“Talla”). In his judgment in that case (at para 37), he adopted the principles set out by Lang J. in Hiri v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2014] ETHIC 256 in the context of the test of “good character” under the equivalent English statute, including the following: "Plainly, criminal convictions are relevant to the assessment of character, but they are likely to vary greatly in significance. depending upon the nature of the offence and the length of time which has elapsed since its commission. as well as any pattern of repeat offending. So, in order to conduct a proper assessment, the Defendant ought to have regard to the outline facts of any offence and any mitigating factors. She ought also to have regard to the severity of the sentence within the sentencing range as this may be a valuable indicator of the gravity of the offending behaviour in the eyes of the sentencing court.” 43. Furthermore, Haughton J. noted in Talla (at para 43) that “the Minister is entitled to have regard to what would otherwise be ‘spent convictions’ in considering ‘good character’ for the purposes of assessing an application for a naturalisation certificate.” 44. In my judgment in Akande v Minsiter for Justice [2025] IEHC 679 (“Akande”) (at para 39), I referred to the statement of Haughton J. in Talla (at para. 71) that “offences become increasingly historical with the passage of time” and I observed that “this statement of Haughton J. is qualified by the remainder of the relevant sentence in that section of his judgment where he says “that it is a matter for the Minister to consider alongside the entirety of an applicant's history up to the point of any future decision.” In short, long passage of time may not have quite the same weight where the original offence was a very serious or grave one.” 45. This is consistent with the statement of Hyland J. in M (at para 17) that “there is no established principle that convictions must be given an assigned weight based on their proximity in time to the date of the decision. Each situation must be considered on its own facts.” 14 Summary of issues arising in the proceedings 46. While I will come to the detail of the submissions advanced by the parties shortly, in broad terms the applicants complain that the refusal decisions are vitiated by material error insofar as the decisions were arrived at by a purported exercise by the Minister of her absolute discretion, in circumstances where such discretion cannot be reached where the good character condition has not been met. Alternatively, they say that if the good character condition was regarded as met, the refusal to grant naturalisation in exercise of absolute discretion was unreasoned and irrational. 47. The applicants further contend that there was a failure by the Minister to have adequate regard to the passage of time since the relevant convictions were made and that the decisions are flawed in not indicating a time period within which the convictions would no longer operate to prevent the applicants from establishing good character. Discussion Minister’s reliance on “absolute discretion” Parties’ submissions 48. As we have seen, in both cases, the letter informing the applicant of the Minister's decision to refuse to grant a certificate of naturalisation was in the same terms. The letters note that the Minister has considered the applicant's application under the provisions of the 1956 Act, as amended, and "has decided not to grant a certificate of naturalisation". The letter then states that "A copy of the submission that was prepared for the Minister, with her decision annotated thereon, is enclosed for your information. In reaching this decision, the Minister has exercised her absolute discretion, as provided for by the [1956 Act, as amended]". 49. In the case of each applicant, a copy of the submission/recommendation document was enclosed with the letter notifying the applicant of the Minister's decision. 15 50. The applicants contend that the letter constitutes the operative decision in both cases, although they fairly accept that the accompanying submission document must be read with the decision letter. 51. The applicants then build their case as follows. They say that, in accordance with the analysis of the correct approach under s. 15 as contained in the judgment of Hyland J in the Court of Appeal in M (at para. 47, as noted above at para 41 of this judgment), naturalisation is a two-step process, the first step being the question of whether the Minister is satisfied that the applicant has met the conditions for naturalisation (including the statutory condition of good character), the second being the grant of the application, “a decision in respect of which the Minister has absolute discretion". They rely on the statement of Power J, to the same effect, in her judgment in MNN, that "The Minister's absolute discretion to grant an application for naturalisation only arises if he is satisfied that an applicant is of good character". 52. The applicants submit that there is a disconnect between the decision letter and the accompanying submission/recommendation document in each case. The decision letters invoke the Minister's exercise of her absolute discretion under s. 15, which can only be reached if the good character condition is satisfied, whereas the accompanying submissions state her officials’ conclusion that the applicant had not satisfied the good character criterion in s. 15(1)(b); these two rationales are contradictory and cannot be lawfully reconciled. They submitted that the Minister acted ultra vires and/or in breach of s. 15 by refusing the application in exercise of her absolute discretion in circumstances where the underlying submissions recommended the refusal of the applications on the basis that the applicants were not of good character. 53. The applicants contend that there is a lack of clarity as to the proper basis of the decisions. The applicants lay emphasis on the dictum of Baker J in the VK v Minister for Justice [2021] 1 IR 724 that "Words do matter, and if the language of the Minister departed in its emphasis, tone, and possible import from that in the case law" it was appropriate to grant certiorari. The applicants submit that it could not be the case that good character was refused on absolute discretion grounds as the Minister does not have absolute discretion to decide on good character. Counsel for the applicants submitted that there was simply no clear answer in either case before the court to the question 16 "What is the decision?" It was submitted that the confused, and confusing, basis for the Minister's decision was contrary to law and the principles of good administrative decision-making. It was submitted that it was not clear and unavoidable that the real basis of the Minister's decisions was that of the applicants' failure to satisfy the good character criterion. 54. Counsel for the applicants also contended that it was simply not clear who had made the decisions, noting that in each case there was an email prior to the Minister's decision letter from Mr. Daragh Brennan, Head of Citizenship in the Minister's Department, who in the case of Mr. Alabi, having been sent on the file (with the relevant recommendation) "for a decision", in an email of 14 June 2024 stated that he had:- “…reviewed the attached file and agree with its findings. Not recommended” and who sent an email in similar terms in relation to the recommendation in Mr. Seidler’s case. Counsel for the applicants contended that the Statements of Opposition did not rely on these emails as part of the decisions. 55. The Minister, for his part, contended that the applicants' submissions on this point were “overblown”. It was submitted that there was in fact no confusion – and could not reasonably have been any confusion - as to the basis of the decisions, as evidenced by the applicants' solicitors’ correspondence post-decision and pre-litigation in each case which sought to take issue, not with the apparent "absolute discretion" basis of the decisions, but rather with the alleged failure of the Minister to have proper regard to the passage of time since the convictions when assessing whether the applicants had satisfied the good character criterion. It was submitted on the Minister's behalf that the basis of the decisions was very clear from the detailed terms of the submission documents which correctly outlined the terms of s. 15 and correctly approached the question of good character on the basis that it was a mandatory condition that needed to be satisfied before the question of the grant of naturalisation could be reached. 56. Counsel for the Minister also pointed to para. 49 of the judgment of Hyland J in M which stated (in the context of a consideration by Hyland J of the question of an argument made by the appellant in that case that the Minister acted unlawfully in delegating the decision not to grant citizenship under s. 15 to the Minister’s officials) as follows:- 17 “It is certainly true that the letter to the appellant of 28 October 2022 referred to the Minister’s decision not to grant a certificate of naturalisation, and that, in reaching her decision, the Minister has exercised her absolute discretion under the Act. However, the submission identifies that on the basis of not satisfying the good character criterion, it is not recommended that the Minister grant a certificate of naturalisation. Therefore, the decision was clearly referable to the failure to satisfy an identified criterion under the Act, and should not be treated entirely as the exercise of absolute discretion without any consideration of the role of good character in the decision.” 57. The Minister also pleaded, in the case of Mr. Alabi, that the applicants' complaint that the Minister referred to discretion in the letter of 17 June 2024 is "semantic, tactical, futile, demonstrates no prejudice and would not result in a different outcome for the applicant". Analysis 58. On the facts of the two cases before me, where identical letters were issued to Mr Alabi and Mr Seidler, it is clear that the Minister’s decision was in each case not to grant naturalisation and that the reasons and rationale for that decision were set out in the accompanying recommendation documents. Any objective reading of those recommendation documents made clear that the basis of refusal of the applications was the failure of each applicant to satisfy the good character criterion. While it was loose of the covering letters to refer to the Minister exercising her “absolute discretion” in reaching the decisions, I do not think that any reasonable reading of the cover letter and recommendation documents together (and they clearly had to be read together) could lead to the conclusion that the Minister arrived at the decisions other than by reference to the good character criterion; there is simply no objective basis in the materials to believe that the Minister rejected the good character analysis of the recommendations and accepted that each applicant was of good character but nonetheless went on to refuse the naturalisation applications in an unreasoned exercise of her absolute discretion. 18 59. The letters in each case commence by stating that the Minister had considered the applications under the provisions of the 1956 Act, as amended, and had decided not to grant a certificate of naturalisation, and a copy of the submission prepared for the Minister was enclosed in each case. The decision letters stated that the enclosed submissions had the Minister's decision "annotated thereon". It is clear from a consideration of the submission documents that the recommendation to refuse the applications for naturalisation on the grounds of a failure to make out good character were prepared by departmental officials and approved by a senior departmental official. This is confirmed by the affidavit evidence before me. Although there does not appear to be evidence of the Minister annotating her decision on the submission documents, in my view, it is clear from the terms of the decision letters that what was being conveyed was that the Minister agreed with the analysis and recommendation contained in the submission documents. Any other reading of the decisions would strain common sense to breaking point. 60. It may be technically correct to say that the decision letters are in error insofar as they suggest, without reading the accompanying recommendation documents, that the decisions were based solely or principally on the exercise by the Minister of her absolute discretion under s. 15/s.15A, in circumstances where the authorities make clear that the question of exercise of absolute discretion is not reached as a matter of law until the statutory preconditions, including satisfaction of good character, have been met. However, reading the decision letters and accompanying submissions/recommendations as a whole, any objective reader would be left in no doubt that the basis of the decision to refuse naturalisation in each case was the failure of the applicant to satisfy the good character requirement, because of the weight attached to their previous convictions. 61. The analysis in the submission/recommendation documents is detailed and considered. It correctly records in each case, in its opening paragraph, the terms of s. 15 that the Minister may “in his absolute discretion grant the application where satisfied that the applicant fulfils the conditions for naturalisation specified in section 15(1)(a)- (e)” ("the conditions for naturalisation"). The recommendation documents make clear in each case that the onus is on the applicant to satisfy the conditions for naturalisation including the good character condition. Each recommendation document considers 19 "matters relevant to an assessment of the applicant's character". In addition to "other matters relevant to an assessment of the applicant's character" in each case, in the recommendation section of the submission document, the good character requirement of s. 15 is again set out and a detailed explanation of the weighing exercise carried out in relation to the question of good character is set out and the conclusion reached is set out with the conclusion being the same in both cases, i.e. that the Minister's officials were not satisfied that the applicant met the good character criterion in s. 15(1)(b) and on that basis that the recommendation to the Minister was not to grant a certificate of naturalisation. 62. Neither of the applicants, in their affidavit evidence in these judicial review proceedings, made any averment to the effect that they were confused by the decision letter and accompanying submission or that they did not understand from those documents the basis of the Minister's decision. That is no surprise: any objective reader of the decision letters and the accompanying submissions would be left in no doubt but that the basis of the refusal of the applications was a failure to meet the good character criterion. 63. The fact that the basis of the Minister's decision in each case was clear to the applicants themselves and their legal advisors is borne out by the fact that, in each case, the applicant's solicitor followed up with a letter complaining about the decision on the basis that the decision was based on the applicant's failure to satisfy the good character criterion. 64. In Mr. Alabi’s case, following receipt of the Minister's refusal decision, Mr. Alabi's solicitors wrote to the Minister's Department on 4 July 2024 which referred to the decision "under cover letter of 17 June 2024" and went on to reference matters set out in the recommendation including the fact that it was accepted that Mr. Alabi’s most recent conviction is almost ten years ago and that he has no current or ongoing criminal proceedings in the State which reflects positively on his character. The letter stated that the decision of 17 June 2024 should be set aside on the basis, inter alia, of inadequate reasons provided. 20 65. Following receipt of the decision in his case, Mr. Seidler’s solicitors wrote to the Minister's Department by letter of 2 August 2024, noting that Mr. Seidler's "concluded criminal proceedings were a factor in his refusal". Submissions were made to the effect that the convictions were of less importance due to the passage of time since they were concluded. The letter clearly proceeded on the basis that the reasons for the refusal were set out in the recommendation document. 66. In my view, insofar as there was an error in the decision letters, it was an error which involved infelicitous phrasing and not any material error of law. It is not an error that should sound in certiorari. 67. Accordingly, I do not see that there is a basis to set aside the decisions in judicial review on this ground. Passage of time since convictions 68. The remaining grounds relate to the alleged failure of the Minister in each case to give proper weight to the passage of time since the convictions in issue when assessing the question of good character. 69. In both cases, the applicants pleaded that the recommendation documents, insofar as they stated that they were not satisfied that the applicants were of good character, were “unlawfully brief and vague in that no indication was given of when an adverse finding might be extinguished by the passage of time; if the passage of time is sufficient for the Minister to be satisfied that the applicant is considered to be of good character then the submission to the Minister should set out such a timeframe and if it is the case that the applicant may and/or is never entitled to a certificate to naturalisation then the applicant ought to be informed of that by the Minister”. 70. In both statement of grounds, it is pleaded that the convictions at issue were insufficient to impugn the character of the applicant in circumstances where the convictions in question in each case were more than seven years prior to the decision refusing naturalisation with seven years being the period in which a conviction is considered spent within the meaning of the Criminal Justice (Spent Convictions and Certain 21 Disclosures) Act 2016 (“the 2016 Act”) and that "regard should be had to the time frame as to when a conviction is considered spent" in the circumstances. 71. In the case of Mr. Alabi, it was also pleaded that, in circumstances where he had previously applied for naturalisation in 2011 and 2013, he ought to be entitled to greater reasons from the Minister in order to allow him challenge any refusal by way of judicial review proceedings and rectify any issues in future applications. This contention was not pressed at the hearing. 72. As I pointed out in my judgment in Akande (at para 35), an applicant has a very high bar to overcome in demonstrating that a decision of this nature is irrational: “he must demonstrate that no reasonable decision maker could have arrived at the decision based on the material before her. He must demonstrate that the decision flies in the face of fundamental reason and common sense. It is not for the court to substitute its view on the merits of the application, or to recalibrate the weight which the Minister attached to the various positive and negative factors weighing in the good character scales.” The grounds of challenge in these proceedings relating to the passage of time ultimately have to be assessed by reference to the irrationality test. 73. To take Mr Alabi’s recommendation document, it expressly considers the fact that the conviction on 5 December 2014 resulted in a 3-year custodial sentence (with the final year suspended); that the 2012 matter was “struck out,” was of some antiquity and that the penalty was relatively low; that he was given credit for self-disclosing his two convictions; detailed consideration was given to the submissions made on his behalf; his remorse was acknowledged; it was found that the 2014 conviction “constitutes a relatively serious matter which reflects adversely on the Applicant, given the fact Mr Alabi’s case was heard in the Circuit Court and he received custodial sentence, notwithstanding the mitigating circumstances proposed by the Applicant’s legal representative”; it was expressly acknowledged again that “Mr Alabi’s most recent conviction is almost 10 years ago”; it stated that “Mr Alabi has displayed a degree of dishonesty that weighs negatively in an assessment of his character under Section 15(1) and the magnitude of the 2014 offence is evidenced by the sentence imposed by the Circuit Court.”; positive credit was given for the fact that there are no other criminal 22 proceedings concerning Mr. Alabi. The conclusion was expressly stated to be reached “on balance” and having weighed all these factors. 74. Similarly, in Mr. Seidler’s case, the recommendation document noted that the December 2016 conviction resulted in a one year disqualification and a fine of €1500 represented “the first offence of no insurance having been committed by the applicant”. Credit is given for the fact that the matter was disclosed by the applicant. It is expressly noted that a conviction of no insurance is considered to lie at the more serious end of the spectrum of road traffic offences and constituted a relatively serious matter which reflected adversely on the applicant. 75. The recommendation then notes the February 2017 conviction which resulted in a four year disqualification and a fine of €500 “is indicative of a view on the part of the District Judge that the offence was located towards the more serious end of the spectrum of gravity”. It was noted that this represented the second offence of no insurance committed by the applicant. The decision goes on to state that minor offences would not necessarily reflect on a person's good character particularly when balanced against other matters in their favour; rather it is the nature of the offences and the circumstances in which they were committed which demanded particular attention. The recommendation, very reasonably, takes at face value the applicant’s submissions as to why he had believed that he only committed one offence of no insurance when he had committed two such offences. The analysis in the submission notes that the offences of driving with no insurance were considered to lie at the more serious end of the spectrum of road traffic offences and that the commission of the offences taking into account the mitigating circumstances “nonetheless constituted a serious matter which reflected adversely on the applicant”. The submission also noted that these offences were committed over a short period of time. This recommendation concluded that Mr Seidler had a pattern of non-compliance with the road traffic regulations of the State which reflected adversely on him. 76. The submission document did specifically have regard to the passage of time question by noting the fact that Mr Seidler had not come to the attention of An Garda Síochána in the previous seven years but the author did not believe that this tipped the balance on the good character scales. 23 77. Again, the conclusion weighed the identified negative factors against the identified positive evidence of good character on the part of Mr Seidler and considered that the overall balance “favoured a conclusion that the applicant is not of good character.” 78. In my view, the applicants simply cannot make out a case in irrationality in relation to the Minister’s decisions as to good character as regards the passage of time issue or more generally; the decisions took into account all relevant factors, carefully weighed the positive and negative and arrived at an evaluative judgment on the good character issue which it is not for this Court to second-guess. The lapse of time since the convictions was clearly weighed in the balance as was the good behaviour in each case since the convictions. 79. The argument that, when considering passage of time since convictions in an assessment of good character under s.15/s.15A, some regard should be had by analogy to the seven year period after which certain types of convictions are considered spent within the meaning of the 2016 Act, can be shortly dealt with. The spent conviction provisions of the 2016 Act expressly have no application to naturalisation applications under the 1956 Act and the authorities as set out earlier in this judgment make clear that the weight to be applied to prior convictions on the negative side of the scales in assessing good character under s.15/s.15A will be context-specific and that no “scale” of passage of time can be mechanically applied. 80. A further complaint is made by the applicants that no indication was given by the Minister in the impugned decisions as to what period would be sufficient before the prior convictions would not be regarded as constituting a continuing taint on character, given the passage of time. 81. It is clearly not for the Minister in deciding on a s.15/s.15A naturalisation application to stipulate what passage of time would be enough to satisfy the good character criterion in a future application; such an approach would potentially be ultra vires those statutory provisions and could involve an inappropriate fettering by the Minister of his statutory discretion in relation to further applications under those provisions. 24 82. The decision letters make clear that each applicant is free to re-apply for a certificate of naturalisation in the future; he may re-apply at any time. In accordance with the authorities, the Minister would obviously have to assess any future such application for naturalisation on its own terms including any further passage of time since the commission of the offences and any further good behaviour. Conclusion 83. For the reasons outlined above, I refuse each of the applicants his application for an order quashing the Minister's decision in his case and an order will be made in each case to that effect. 25