The Minister for Justice v Puk

Approved No Redaction Required THE COURT OF APPEAL CRIMINAL Neutral Citation No.: [2026] IECA 45 Court of Appeal Record No.: 2025/204 High Court Record No.: 2025 No. 30 EXT s Edwards J. McCarthy J. Hyland J. IN THE MATTER OF THE EUROPEAN ARREST WARRANT ACT 2003 AS AMENDED BETWEEN/ THE MINISTER FOR JUSTICE APPLICANT/ RESPONDENT - AND – JACEK GRZEGORZ PUK RESPONDENT/ APPELLANT JUDGMENT of Ms Justice Hyland delivered on the 25th day of March 2026 SUMMARY 1. This is an appeal from a decision of the High Court (McGrath, Patrick J. [2025] IEHC 295) whereby he ordered the surrender of Mr. Puk (the “Appellant”) to the Republic of Poland under a European Arrest Warrant (“EAW”) issued by Judge Tomasz Białek at the Circuit Court in Świdnica, Poland, on 23 August 2022. The Appellant was -2- found guilty of two offences in his absence and sentenced to one year’s imprisonment, which was conditionally suspended. I refer to this as the “substantive trial”, i.e. where both his guilt and his sentence were determined. Eighteen months later, at a second hearing, again in the absence of the Appellant, the Polish court held that the suspended sentence of imprisonment was activated by the Appellant's failure to comply with the conditions of the suspension. I refer to this as the “sentence activation hearing”. 2. The core of the Appellant’s appeal was that this was a situation of “double absentia” i.e. where he was absent on both occasions, and as a result, the sentence activation hearing had to be treated as the “trial resulting in the decision” as referred to in Article 4a(1) of the Council Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA of 13 June 2002 on the European Arrest Warrant and the surrender procedures between Member States, as amended by Council Framework Decision 2009/299/JHA of 26 February 2009 (the “Framework Decision”), (implemented in Irish law by the European Arrest Warrant Act 2003 and the European Arrest Warrant Act 2024 (the “EAWA”)). As such, certain safeguards were required. On his case, the absence of those safeguards meant he should not be surrendered. 3. The Appellant conceded that, following the decision of the CJEU in Case C-571/17 PPU, Ardic, EU:C:2017:1026, the activation of a suspended sentence is not normally considered as part of the trial resulting in the decision but he argued that Ardic only applied where the person requested had been present for the substantive trial, although absent for his sentence activation hearing. 4. I am satisfied that the Appellant’s interpretation of Ardic is incorrect. The core finding in Ardic, set out at paragraph 77 of the judgment, is that, for the purposes of Article 4a(1) of the Framework Decision, the concept of the “decision” does not -3- cover a decision relating to the execution of a custodial sentence previously imposed, except where the decision modifies either the nature or quantum of that sentence, and the authority has a discretion in that respect. That statement of principle is not made conditional on the person requested having been present at the trial where the custodial sentence was imposed. 5. My conclusion in that respect is reinforced by the fact that Article 4a(1) of the Framework Decision and the case law of the CJEU and the ECtHR provide for the surrender of persons who were not present when a custodial sentence was imposed, provided the rights of the defence are protected. Nonetheless, the Appellant argues that because he was not present at the substantive trial, he cannot be treated as being aware of the potential consequences if the conditions relating to suspension are breached and thus the sentence activation hearing in his case must be treated as a trial resulting in the decision. 6. Whether the reasoning in Ardic applies to a person who was absent from the substantive trial may depend on the circumstances of their absence from that trial. Here, the Appellant had been notified of the consequences of not being contactable at the address he gave, including that the trial could go ahead in his absence. The mere absence of the person at the substantive trial, where such absence does not undermine the rights of the defence, cannot be used as a springboard to re- characterise a sentence activation hearing as the trial resulting in a decision. 7. Finally, contrary to the Appellant’s arguments, I do not consider there is any lack of clarity in the law such as to require a reference to the CJEU under Article 267 TFEU. FACTUAL BACKGROUND -4- 8. On 22 March 2017, the Appellant was found guilty of two offences in his absence in Poland. A custodial sentence of one year’s imprisonment was imposed, the execution of which was conditionally suspended. As noted by the High Court, in the course of pre-trial proceedings in Poland, the Appellant had admitted his guilt and gave an explanation to the authorities, provided an address for service of any documentation in relation to the case following his release after pre-trial interrogation, and was advised of his obligations to appear when summonsed and of his obligation to inform the authorities of any change of address. He was also informed of the possible consequences of non-compliance: any document sent to his last known address would be deemed served; a procedural step or court hearing could proceed in his absence; and he might then be unable to file any request, objection, or appeal within time. 9. The High Court was satisfied that the Appellant had left the address he had provided to the Polish authorities and did not provide any other address, with full knowledge that documents served at that address would be deemed served upon him and that the trial could thereafter proceed in his absence. It was in those circumstances that the trial went ahead in his absence. 10. On 13 November 2018, a sentence activation hearing took place – again in the absence of the Appellant – where the Polish court determined that the suspended sentence of imprisonment imposed on 22 March 2017 was activated by the Appellant's failure to comply with the conditions of the suspension. 11. The High Court considered first whether the rights of the defence of the Appellant were protected, given that he was not present for his substantive trial. It is well established that, even where a case does not fall within the conditions in Article -5- 4a(1)(a)(i) of the Framework Decision, a requested person may nonetheless be surrendered provided the rights of defence are not breached. 12. As observed in Case C-108/16 PPU, Dworzecki, EU:C:2016:346, the right to a fair trial enjoyed by a person summoned to appear before a criminal court requires that he or she has been informed in such a way as to allow him to organise his defence effectively. Article 4a(1)(a)(i) of the Framework Decision is designed to achieve that objective but does not constitute an exhaustive list of the means that can be used to that end (paragraph 43). The CJEU noted that the scenarios in Article 4a(1)(a)(i) were conceived as exceptions to an optional ground for non-recognition. If the executing judicial authority finds they do not cover the situation at issue, it may nonetheless consider other circumstances that enable it to be assured that the surrender of the person concerned does not mean a breach of their rights of defence (paragraph 50). 13. In this case, the trial judge concluded that there was a manifest absence of diligence on the part of the Appellant in receiving notification of the documents concerning the proceedings, as he had simply left the address he provided and did not provide any other address to the Polish authorities, with full knowledge that documents served at this address would be deemed served upon him in such circumstances and that the trial could proceed thereafter in his absence (paragraph 39). In the circumstances, the trial judge found it had been unequivocally established that the Appellant made an informed choice not to exercise his right to attend, being fully aware of the consequences of such non-attendance i.e. that the trial could proceed in his absence and in those circumstances, the trial judge concluded that the rights of the defence were not breached in relation to the substantive trial in 2017. 14. Although the trial judge's conclusion in this respect is part of the grounds of appeal, I think it is fair to say that in the written legal submissions and the oral submissions -6- of the Appellant made at the hearing, the Appellant’s sole focus was what was described as the double absentia argument, i.e. that he was neither present nor aware of the 2017 trial at which a fully suspended one-year custodial sentence was imposed, nor of the 2018 hearing at which that suspended sentence was activated. Accordingly, as no substantive reason was advanced as to why the trial judge was incorrect in concluding that the rights of defence were protected despite the Appellant not having been present at his substantive trial, I will treat this ground of appeal as having been abandoned. 15. Turning next to the Appellant’s absence at the sentence activation hearing, having considered the decision in Ardic (discussed below), the trial judge noted that the activation of a suspended sentence is not normally considered part of the trial resulting in the decision as referred to in Article 4a(1) of the Framework Decision, and that surrender is the rule even where the person requested was not made aware in advance of the activation hearing. Accordingly, the trial judge directed the surrender of the Appellant. 16. The double absentia argument does not appear to have been made before the trial judge, or certainly not in the detailed way it was presented to this Court at the appeal hearing and is accordingly not addressed in the decision of the trial judge. Nonetheless, following submissions, the trial judge agreed to grant a certificate of leave to appeal under s. 16(11) of the EAWA in the following terms: “Where a party has not appeared in person in criminal proceedings that result in a judicial decision which definitively finds him guilty of an offence and, as a consequence, imposes a custodial sentence the execution of which is subsequently suspended in part, subject to certain conditions, should the concept of ‘trial resulting in the decision’, as referred to in Article 4a(1) of Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA of 13 June 2002 on the European arrest warrant and the surrender procedures between Member States, as amended by Council Framework Decision 2009/299/JHA of 26 February 2009, be interpreted as not including subsequent proceedings in which that -7- suspension is revoked on grounds of infringement of those conditions during the probationary period?” TRIAL RESULTING IN THE DECISION 17. To put the double absentia argument in context, it is necessary to explain the concept of the trial resulting in the decision. Article 4a provides, in relevant part, as follows: “Decisions rendered following a trial at which the person did not appear in person 1. The executing judicial authority may also refuse to execute the European arrest warrant issued for the purpose of executing a custodial sentence or a detention order if the person did not appear in person at the trial resulting in the decision, unless the European arrest warrant states that the person, in accordance with further procedural requirements defined in the national law of the issuing Member State: …” 18. Article 4a then proceeds to identify specific grounds that, if present, mean the executing judicial authority is required to execute an EAW despite the fact that the person concerned did not appear in person at his trial. Those circumstances derive from the case law of the European Court of Human Rights and present situations where a court could conclude that the person could be surrendered without infringing the rights of the defence, despite their non-appearance at the trial. The CJEU has considered the correct interpretation of the term “the trial resulting in the decision”, notably in the following trilogy of cases, all delivered on the same day, that consider it in a number of different fact contexts – Ardic; C‑270/17 PPU, Tupikas, EU:C:2017:628; and C‑271/17 PPU, Zdziaszek, EU:C:2017:629. 19. I consider Ardic in greater detail below given the very heavy reliance placed upon it by the Appellant. In summary, the Court held in its judgment that the reference to the trial resulting in the decision refers only to proceedings that determine guilt and impose or alter the custodial sentence. As revocation merely enforces an already final -8- sentence, the Court confirmed that activation hearings fall outside the scope of Article 4a(1) and cannot constitute grounds for refusing surrender. 20. Tupikas concerned the meaning of a trial resulting in the decision in a situation where a number of judicial decisions were handed down in the Member State issuing the EAW, at least one of which was issued without the person appearing. The referring court had asked whether it was the appeal proceedings that must be regarded as decisive for the purposes of the application of that provision. The Court noted that where the trial took place at two successive instances – namely a first instance followed by appeal proceedings – it is the decision on appeal that constitutes the trial resulting in the decision within the meaning of Article 4a(1). The reasoning at paragraph 88 of the judgment is significant; the Court held that allowing decisions taken prior to the final decision to trigger the application of Article 4a would inevitably prolong, or even seriously impede, the surrender procedure. 21. In Zdziaszek, the Court held that the concept of trial resulting in the decision was to be interpreted as covering the appeal proceedings that led to the decision finally determining the guilt and penalty. It observed that there was a distinction between measures and hearings modifying the quantum of the penalty and those related to the methods of execution of a custodial sentence, and that it was apparent from the case law of the ECtHR that Article 6(1) of the ECHR did not apply to questions concerning the methods for executing a sentence, in particular those relating to provisional release. The judgment of the ECtHR of 3 April 2012, Boulois v. Luxembourg (CE:ECHR:2012:0403JUD003757504) was cited in this regard (paragraph 85). The Court noted that, where further proceedings concern the imposition of a cumulative sentence, they determine the ultimate quantum of the sentence to be served. In such circumstances, the person must be able to effectively -9- exercise his rights of defence to influence the decision in his favour (paragraph 91). Therefore, on the facts of that particular case, both decisions had to be taken into account for the purposes of Article 4a(1) of the Framework Decision. SUBMISSIONS OF THE PARTIES 22. The Appellant submits that the High Court erred in ordering the surrender to Poland, emphasising that his case involves a double absentia situation: he was neither present nor aware of the 2017 trial at which a fully suspended one-year custodial sentence was imposed, nor of the 2018 hearing at which that suspended sentence was activated. He argues that the High Court misinterpreted the reach of Ardic and that Ardic is expressly directed at a situation where a person attended in person at his first instance hearing. On this basis, he submits that the 2018 revocation hearing should properly be treated as part of the trial resulting in the decision for the purposes of Article 4a(1), thereby triggering the protections associated with in absentia proceedings. 23. The Appellant emphasises that the rationale of Ardic is that a person who attended at his trial will be aware of the conditions upon which any sentence is suspended and cannot then complain if that sentence is later activated due to a breach of those conditions. By contrast, he argues that where he received no notification of the 2017 trial, did not attend, was not legally represented, and was not informed of the outcome, he cannot, as a matter of fundamental fairness, be expected to comply with conditions he never knew existed. Nor can he be liable, without further notice, to serve a custodial sentence activated solely on the basis of breaching the conditions that were never brought to his attention. - 10 - 24. The Appellant maintains that the legal issue certified by the High Court requires clarification from the CJEU pursuant to Article 267 TFEU as it concerns an autonomous concept of EU law that must be interpreted uniformly throughout the EU. Therefore, the Appellant disagrees with the Minister’s contention that the concept of what constitutes a trial resulting in a decision is acte clair. The Appellant further relies on Minister for Justice v. Radionovs [2023] IESC 37, arguing that the Supreme Court recognised that the interaction between s. 45 of the EAWA and the CJEU’s decision in Ardic is not acte clair. He submits that the same interpretative difficulty arises in his case and that the correct approach cannot be derived from existing CJEU case law. On that basis, he contends that a preliminary reference under Article 267 TFEU is required to resolve the uncertainty. 25. The Minister argues that the 2018 sentence activation hearing does not form part of the trial resulting in the decision within the meaning of Article 4a(1). Relying on Ardic; Tupikas; Zdziaszek; and LU & PH, Joined Cases C-514/21 and C-515/21, EU:C:2023:235, the Minister submits that there is no suggestion that the activation hearing amended the nature or quantum of the sentence previously imposed at the custodial sentence hearing sincethere was a revocation of the suspension (not an alteration of sentence), and no additional penalty was imposed. 26. The Minister maintains that the High Court was correct, based on the evidence before it, in finding that the Appellant made an informed choice not to exercise his right to attend at his trial, fully aware of the consequences of such non-attendance and therefore there was no breach of the Appellant’s defence rights and no fundamental unfairness that would prohibit surrender under the EAWA. The Respondent argues that, consistent with established Irish authorities such as Minister for Justice v. Zarnescu [2020] IESC 59 and Minister for Justice v. Szamota [2023] IECA 143, the - 11 - Appellant demonstrated a clear and informed waiver of the right to be present and an absence of diligence that cannot be held against the issuing State. 27. The Minister submits that no reference to the CJEU is required because the existing CJEU jurisprudence already has articulated the applicable principles under Article 4a(1). The issues raised are therefore acte clair and the High Court correctly applied the European and domestic authorities. The Minister relies on Case C-561/19, Consorzio Italian Management, EU:C:2021:799, submitting that the national court can determine the point of law without making a further reference. ANALYSIS 28. In his submissions, the Appellant accepts as a general proposition that surrender is the rule even where a party was not made aware in advance of the activation hearing having regard to Ardic. But he seeks to enter the following caveat: that this proposition is only applicable where the specific circumstances identified in Ardic exist i.e. that the requested person had been present at the substantive trial. He argues that because he was not present at either the substantive trial or the sentence activation hearing, then the rationale in Ardic does not apply. In other words, the Appellant argues that the determining factor in whether an activation hearing should be treated as the trial resulting in the decision is whether the requested person was present at the hearing where guilt and sentence are determined. 29. Having regard both to the terms of the Ardic decision, and to the case law on the entitlement of a State to surrender a person who was tried in absentia where the rights of defence are respected, I cannot accept the Appellant’s argument. 30. Dealing with Ardic first, the justification for the conclusion as to activation hearings is set out clearly in the judgment. At paragraph 67 of Ardic, the CJEU concluded that - 12 - Article 4a(1) of the Framework Decision must be interpreted as meaning that the concept of ‘decision’ referred to therein relates to the judicial decision or decisions concerning the criminal conviction of the interested person, namely the decision or decisions that definitively rule after an assessment of the case in fact and in law, on the guilt of that person and where relevant on the custodial sentence imposed on him. At paragraph 77, the Court held as follows: “… for the purposes of Article 4a(1) of Framework Decision 2002/584, the concept of ‘decision’ referred to therein does not cover a decision relating to the execution or application of a custodial sentence previously imposed, except where the purpose or effect of that decision is to modify either the nature or quantum of that sentence and the authority which adopted it enjoyed some discretion in that regard”. 31. The Court observed that decisions to revoke the suspension of the execution of previously imposed custodial sentences such as those at issue in Ardic do not affect the nature or the quantum of custodial sentences imposed by final conviction judgments of the person concerned. This is because they were not intended to review the merits of the cases but only concerned the consequences of the fact that the convicted person had not complied with those conditions during the probationary period (paragraph 79). The Court observed that the competent court only had to determine if such a circumstance justified requiring a convicted person to serve in part or in full the custodial sentences that had initially been imposed and the execution of which had been suspended (paragraph 80). The margin of discretion did not concern the level or nature of the sentences imposed but only whether they should be revoked or maintained with additional conditions if necessary. 32. At paragraph 85, the Court returns to a point made earlier in the judgment i.e. that the concept of a trial resulting in the decision is an autonomous concept of EU law - 13 - and any interpretation of decision broader than that set out at paragraph 77 would risk undermining the effectiveness of the EAW. 33. The Court concludes at paragraph 88 as follows: “It should also be added that the Court’s interpretation in paragraph 77 of this judgment merely implies that a decision, which relates solely to the execution or application of a custodial sentence finally imposed at the conclusion of criminal proceedings and which does not affect either the finding of guilt or the nature or level of that sentence, does not fall within the scope of Article 4a(1) of Framework Decision 2002/584, so that the absence of the person concerned during the proceedings leading to that decision cannot constitute a valid ground for refusing execution of the European arrest warrant.” 34. Despite the clarity of that ruling, the Appellant focuses on two aspects of Ardic which he argues demonstrate that, where a person was not present at the substantive hearing, the activation hearing must instead be treated as the trial resulting in the decision: first, the answer given by the Court to the question referred; and second, the reference to the knowledge of the person about the consequences of non-compliance with the suspension conditions at paragraphs 83 and 84. 35. Taking the answer to the question referred first, it is necessary to consider it in the context of the actual question referred by the District Court of Amsterdam, which was in the following terms: “If the requested person has been found guilty in final proceedings conducted in his presence and has had imposed on him a custodial sentence, the execution of which has been suspended subject to certain conditions, do subsequent proceedings, in which the court, in the absence of the requested person, orders that suspension to be revoked on the ground of non-compliance with conditions and evasion of the supervision and guidance of a probation officer, constitute a “trial resulting in the decision” as referred to in Article 4a of Framework Decision [2002/584]?” 36. The answer was as follows: “Where a party has appeared in person in criminal proceedings that result in a judicial decision which definitively finds him guilty of an offence and, as a consequence, imposes a custodial sentence the execution of which is subsequently suspended in part, subject to - 14 - certain conditions, the concept of ‘trial resulting in the decision’, as referred to in Article 4a(1) of Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA of 13 June 2002 on the European arrest warrant and the surrender procedures between Member States, as amended by Council Framework Decision 2009/299/JHA of 26 February 2009, must be interpreted as not including subsequent proceedings in which that suspension is revoked on grounds of infringement of those conditions during the probationary period, provided that the revocation decision adopted at the end of those proceedings does not change the nature or the level of the sentence initially imposed.” 37. The Appellant lays heavy emphasis on the reference in the answer to the party “appeared in person in criminal proceedings” and argues this limits the scope of the Ardic finding to such persons. In my view, that argument is unpersuasive for the following reasons. In Ardic, the requested person had been present at the substantive trial. That was recorded in the question asked. As is common, the Court answered the question in terms similar to those in which the question had been asked. The Court is not always in a position to do this because of the way that the question is formulated, but where it is possible, the Court will generally take this approach. 38. Accordingly, the answer alone does not establish that the presence of the requested person is so critical that the absence of the person at the substantive trial necessarily means that the principle established by Ardic cannot apply. To determine whether this is the case, it is necessary to consider the judgment in its entirety, as well as the Opinion of the Advocate General. 39. When one considers the totality of the ruling in Ardic, it is clear that the presence of the requested person at the substantive trial is not intrinsic to the reasoning: rather the Court focuses on the nature and purpose of the sentence activation hearing, observing that it is not a substantive evaluation of guilt and sentence and that it is of a quasi-automatic character. Those features mean it cannot be treated as the trial - 15 - resulting in the decision since the substantive evaluation has already taken place and remains intact, despite the sentence activation hearing. 40. The Appellant fails to engage with this core rationale of the Ardic decision, and instead focuses upon paragraphs 83 and, to a lesser extent, 84. These provide as follows: “83. While it cannot be denied that a suspension revocation measure is likely to affect the situation of the person concerned, the fact remains that that person cannot be unaware of the consequences that may result from an infringement of the conditions to which the benefit of such a suspension is subject. 84. Moreover, in the present case, it is precisely the fact that the person concerned left the German territory, in breach of an express condition of the grant of suspension, which made it impossible for the competent German authorities to notify him personally of the information relating to the introduction of proceedings seeking revocation of the suspension previously granted and, consequently, the adoption in his absence of the revocation decisions at issue in the main proceedings.” 41. The Appellant argues that a key element of Ardic is the Court’s observation that a person who infringes the conditions of a suspended sentence cannot be unaware of the potential consequences. In that situation, although revocation of the suspension may significantly affect the individual’s situation, such a measure does not constitute the trial resulting in the decision. However, he draws a distinction between that situation and his own situation where he was not present at the first trial and therefore may not be treated as being aware of the potential consequences if those conditions are breached. Accordingly, he says the sentence activation hearing in his case must be treated as a trial resulting in the decision, unlike that in Ardic. 42. As to whether the reasoning in Ardic applies to a person absent from the substantive trial may depend on the circumstances of that absence. Here, the Appellant had been notified of the consequences of not being contactable at the address he gave, including that the trial could go ahead in his absence. I have already concluded that - 16 - the High Court was correct in holding that, had he been apprehended before the sentence activation hearing, he could have been surrendered without his rights of defence being infringed despite the substantive trial taking place in his absence. That is because, as discussed earlier, an executing Court may surrender a person who has been tried in absentia once it is satisfied that the necessary safeguards are in place. 43. That system would be wholly undermined if the absence of the person at the substantive trial – where such absence does not undermine the rights of the defence - could be used as a springboard to re-characterise a sentence activation hearing as a trial resulting in a decision. In the context of deciding if a sentence activation hearing constitutes a trial resulting in a decision, persons convicted in absentia who nonetheless may be surrendered must be in the same position as a person who was present at the substantive trial. The fact that they did not know of the conditions of sentence is a result of their failure to participate in the substantive trial. They cannot avail of that failure to re-characterise the sentence activation hearing as a trial resulting in a decision. 44. Here, the Appellant relies upon his lack of knowledge of the sentence activation hearing to characterise it as a trial resulting in a decision. But that lack of knowledge is a result of his own decision to absent himself from the first trial - and to ensure that he could not be contacted - that left him unaware of the consequences that would result from an infringement of the suspension conditions. Had he been present, he would have known of the conditions governing the suspension. He chose not to be present, did so in full knowledge of the consequences, and unequivocally waived his right to be present. Indeed, a similar justification is used by the CJEU at paragraph 84 of the judgment in Ardic for not allowing the requested person’s absence at the sentence activation hearing to turn that hearing into a trial resulting in a decision. - 17 - 45. All of this leads me to the conclusion that paragraph 83, upon which the Appellant places such heavy reliance, was simply an additional justification by the Court for its decision given the facts of that case. It cannot be treated, as the Appellant seeks to do, as the dispositive paragraph in Ardic, particularly given the clarity of the Court’s ruling at paragraph 77, which does not refer to the necessity of the presence of the requested person at the substantive trial as a necessary condition. 46. My conclusion is reinforced by considering the Opinion of Advocate General Bobek in Ardic. He emphasises that Article 4a of the Framework Decision protects only the specific right to appear at the trial which results in the final conviction, and not at later proceedings that merely concern the methods of execution of a custodial sentence, which also do not fall within the scope of Article 6(1) of ECHR. He explained that revocation decisions, even where they carry significant consequences for the individual, neither affect the finding of guilt nor alter the quantum of the penalty imposed and therefore do not fall within the autonomous EU‑law concept of the trial resulting in the decision. Extending Article 4a to such execution‑phase measures, he warned, would distort the balance struck by the Framework Decision and risk undermining the efficiency of the EAW system by transforming routine enforcement steps into potential grounds for refusal. Nowhere in his Opinion is there an insistence that his reasoning only applies where a person was present at the substantive trial. I suggest this is for obvious reasons: the reasoning in Ardic is based on the nature of the exercise being carried out by a court at a sentence activation hearing as opposed to any question of notification to the requested person. 47. Finally, the Appellant has sought a reference to the CJEU under Article 267, arguing that the law is not acte clair. He relies on Radionovs, pointing out that the Supreme Court recognised that the interaction between s. 45 of the EAWA and the CJEU’s - 18 - decision in Ardic is not acte clair. Radionovs concerned the imposition of a sentence of imprisonment coupled with police supervision. The Supreme Court decided to refer a question on whether proceedings imposing a custodial sentence were part of the trial resulting in the decision where the sentence was imposed as a result of violating the terms of police supervision and the national court had a discretion whether to impose a custodial sentence (though no discretion as to the duration of the sentence if imposed). The CJEU answered that question in the affirmative in its decision in Case C-798/23 Abbottly EU:C:2025:763 (where incidentally it reaffirmed the key findings in Ardic at paragraphs 77 and 88, referred to above). 48. But Radionovs does not assist the Appellant’s contention that a reference must be made. It concerns a different fact situation, one that the Supreme Court considered needed to be referred because of an uncertainty in the law in that situation. For the reasons set out above, I do not consider that an uncertainty exists in the instant case. The mere raising of an issue necessitating interpretation of a decision of the CJEU, in this case Ardic, does not mean that a reference is required. National courts are often required to resolve questions of interpretation of EU law without recourse to the Article 267 procedure. 49. Having considered the judgment in Ardic, and the other judgments of the CJEU discussed above, I am satisfied that the law is sufficiently clear in respect of the point raised by the Appellant and that there is no need to make a preliminary reference under Article 267. 50. For all those reasons, I cannot agree that the question posed by the trial judge should be answered in the way intended by the Appellant. Rather, I would answer it as follows: Where a party has not appeared in person in criminal proceedings that result in a judicial decision which definitively finds him guilty of an - 19 - offence and, as a consequence, imposes a custodial sentence the execution of which is subsequently suspended in part, subject to certain conditions, the concept of ‘trial resulting in the decision’ does not include subsequent proceedings in which that suspension is revoked on grounds of infringement of those conditions during the probationary period provided that (a) those subsequent proceedings are of the type described in Ardic, and (b) the judicial decision finding him guilty and imposing sentence in his absence does not undermine his rights of defence. CONCLUSION 51. In the circumstances, I will uphold the decision of the trial judge and make an order surrendering the Appellant. If there are any applications in respect of costs, they may be made in writing within 10 days of the date of this judgment, with any reply to be made within a further 10 days. Since this judgment is being delivered remotely, Edwards and McCarthy JJ. have authorised me to indicate their agreement with it.