G. [Angola] [Assessment Of Credibility] v International Protection Appeals Tribunal

APPROVED [2026] IEHC 143 THE HIGH COURT JUDICIAL REVIEW 2024 1047 JR IN THE MATTER OF SECTION 5 OF THE ILLEGAL IMMIGRANTS (TRAFFICKING) ACT 2000 IN THE MATTER OF THE INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION ACT 2015 BETWEEN G. (ANGOLA) (ASSESSMENT OF CREDIBILITY) APPLICANT AND INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION APPEALS TRIBUNAL MINISTER FOR JUSTICE RESPONDENTS JUDGMENT of Mr. Justice Garrett Simons delivered on 11 March 2026 INTRODUCTION 1. These judicial review proceedings relate to a decision to refuse to recognise the Applicant as a refugee or as a person entitled to subsidiary protection. The NO FURTHER REDACTION REQUIRED 2 decision was made, on appeal, by the International Protection Appeals Tribunal (“IPAT”). The IPAT held, in effect, that the Applicant’s claim lacked “general credibility”. This finding was grounded, principally, on supposed inconsistencies in the detail of the claim for international protection as outlined by the Applicant at the oral hearing before the IPAT as compared to that outlined by him at earlier stages in the immigration process. EXTENSION OF TIME 2. Section 5 of the Illegal Immigrants (Trafficking) Act 2000 (as amended) stipulates that an application for leave to apply for judicial review of a decision of the IPAT shall be made within the period of twenty-eight days commencing on the date on which the person was notified of the decision concerned unless the High Court considers that there is good and sufficient reason for extending the period within which the application shall be made. Under Order 84 of the Rules of the Superior Courts (as amended in 2024), an application for leave is now treated as having been “made” on the date upon which papers are filed in the Central Office of the High Court. 3. The IPAT’s decision was notified to the Applicant on 14 June 2024. The statement of grounds and verifying affidavit were not filed in the Central Office of the High Court until 15 August 2024. Leave to apply for judicial review was granted by the High Court on 9 December 2024. The order recites that the matter of an extension of time remains standing with the trial judge. Put otherwise, leave had been granted without prejudice to the determination, at the substantive stage, of any point in relation to time-limits. 3 4. The twenty-eight day period expired on 11 July 2024. The application for leave was not “made” until 15 August 2024. This is some five weeks after the expiration of the time-limit. It is necessary, therefore, for the Applicant to seek an extension of time. 5. The explanation given on affidavit for the delay is as follows. The first counsel instructed by the solicitor was unable to assist. A second counsel was instructed on 1 July 2024. There was a delay in his replying due to ill health. Counsel raised certain queries and sought copies of certain documents relating to the international protection application. The draft judicial review papers were received from counsel on 12 August 2024. The Applicant had been in regular, often daily, contact with the solicitor’s office seeking information on the progress of the intended proceedings. 6. The principles governing an extension of time under the original version of section 5 of the Illegal Immigrants (Trafficking) Act 2000 were considered by the Supreme Court in G.K. v. Minister for Justice [2002] 2 IR 418. The judgment emphasises that the statute does not say that time may only be extended if there were “good and sufficient reason for the failure to make the application within” the prescribed period. The Supreme Court has recently reiterated, in the context of the similarly worded time-limit under the Planning and Development Act 2000, that the provision does not say that time may only be extended if there is good and sufficient reason for the failure to make the application within the prescribed period, which would focus exclusively on the reasons for the delay, but instead refers to “good and sufficient reason” for extending the period, which involves a broader discretion: Thomson v. An Bord Pleanála [2025] IESC 31 (at paragraphs 67 to 69). This is an important distinction in a case such as the 4 present where, if considered in isolation, the explanation for the delay within the twenty-eight day period might not have been enough to justify an extension of time. The judgment in Thomson goes on to state (at paragraph 79) that it may of course be very important for an applicant to seek to explain the entire period of delay, and that a failure to do so may normally put the applicant at serious risk of not getting an extension or even give rise to a presumption against the grant of an extension. However, the Supreme Court rejected a submission that any such failure was per se fatal to an application for an extension of time. 7. It is also instructive to consider the analogous principles governing an extension of time under Order 84, rule 21. These have recently been summarised by the Court of Appeal in Arthropharm (Europe) Ltd v. Health Products Regulatory Authority [2022] IECA 109 (at paragraph 87). The factors of which account may be taken will include the nature of the order or actions the subject of the application, the conduct of the applicant, the conduct of the respondent, the effect of the decision it is sought to challenge, any steps taken by the parties subsequent to that decision, and the public policy that proceedings relating to the domain of public law take place promptly except where good reason is furnished. The “blameworthiness” of an applicant is relevant, albeit as only one such factor to be weighed in the balance. 8. It should be observed that the threshold under Order 84, rule 21 for an extension of time is a higher threshold, insofar as the court, in addition to being satisfied that “good and sufficient” reason exists for an extension of time, must also be satisfied, as a matter of fact, that the circumstances which resulted in the delay were outside the control of the applicant. There is no equivalent requirement under section 5 of the Illegal Immigrants (Trafficking) Act 2000 (as amended). 5 9. For the reasons which follow, this court is satisfied that there is “good and sufficient reason” for extending time in this case. 10. First, the failure to make the leave application within the twenty-eight day period has not caused any actual delay to the proceedings coming on for substantive hearing. This is significant: the legislative intent underlying the imposition of a short time-limit is to ensure that any legal challenge to the implementation of an immigration decision, which meets the leave threshold, be heard and determined promptly. The twenty-eight day time-limit is complemented by a statutory provision to the effect that the High Court shall give such priority as it reasonably can, having regard to all the circumstances, to the disposal of specified immigration proceedings (Section 5(7) of the Illegal Immigrants (Trafficking) Act 2000 (as amended)). The time-limit does not exist in a vacuum, nor is it intended to penalise applicants. Rather, the time-limit is intended to facilitate the prompt hearing and determination of legal challenges to immigration decisions. If non-compliance with the time-limit has not caused any actual delay, then it would be disproportionate to dismiss proceedings on this basis. 11. On the facts of the present case, the time-limit expired on 11 July 2024, i.e. a date shortly before the commencement of the long vacation. Even had the judicial review papers been filed in the Central Office on that date, the leave application would not have been listed for hearing until the new legal term. Whereas leave applications are now listed for hearing in September, this had not been the position as of 2024. This had the practical consequence that cases initiated shortly prior to or during the long vacation were not listed before a judge until the new legal term. Put shortly, in this case compliance with the time-limit would not have made any material difference to the date upon which leave was granted 6 nor the date of the first directions hearing. The delay in the case coming on for substantive hearing was contributed to by the failure on the part of the Respondents to deliver their opposition papers within the time stipulated in the order granting leave by reference to Order 84, rule 22(4). The opposition papers should have been filed in January 2025; in the event, they were not filed until the end of June 2025. This delay is in excess of that of the Applicant in instituting the proceedings. As explained in the case law discussed above, regard may be had to the conduct of a respondent in deciding whether to extend time. 12. Second, the lack of prejudice to the Respondents must be weighed against the potential prejudice to the Applicant. The practical effect of the refusal of an extension of time would be to preclude the Applicant from challenging what he says is an invalid decision refusing him international protection. This is a significant prejudice and occurs in circumstances where the Applicant himself is not to blame for the failure to comply with the time-limit. 13. The third reason is closely related to the second. In the present case, the application for an extension of time and the substantive judicial review were heard together, i.e. as part of an omnibus hearing. (It will be recalled that the grant of leave had not determined the time-limit point conclusively). The practical consequence of this procedural history is that this court has had the benefit of full argument on the substantive judicial review prior to its ruling on the time-limit point. 14. There is some debate as to the extent, if any, to which the court is entitled to have regard to the underlying merits of the judicial review proceedings in deciding whether to extend time. Certainly, in a case where an application for an extension of time is addressed in advance of the trial of the action, the merits 7 will generally only be relevant if the claim for judicial review lies at either end of a spectrum, i.e. the claim is either unarguable or unanswerable. Were it otherwise, an application for an extension of time would be converted into a trial of the merits, defeating at least part of the purpose of the rule giving rise to the necessity to seek an extension of time in the first place (Arthropharm (Europe) Ltd v. Health Products Regulatory Authority (cited above)). 15. Different considerations pertain in cases, such as the present, where the application for an extension of time has been heard in tandem with the substantive judicial review. It would be artificial for the trial judge, having heard the proceedings in full, to close his or her mind to the underlying merits of the case. It would be disproportionate to refuse an application for judicial review in immigration proceedings, which the court has determined to be well founded on the merits, on the basis that the leave application was out-of-time by a number of weeks. The disbenefit to the applicant, i.e. the loss of an opportunity to a proper determination of their claim for international protection, would be out of all proportion to any benefit to the public interest in the expeditious resolution of legal challenges. This is especially so where the non-compliance did not cause any actual delay. 16. This is illustrated by the circumstances of the present case. The objective which the statutory time-limit had been intended to achieve, namely the prompt resolution of legal challenges to immigration decisions, has not been realised. A legal challenge to an immigration decision, which had been made in June 2024, has only been resolved by March 2026. This court has concluded, for the reasons outlined in the balance of this judgment, that the IPAT’s decision to refuse international protection is invalid. The refusal of an extension of time would 8 only serve to penalise the Applicant by denying him a lawful determination of his application for international protection. There would be no countervailing benefit to the public interest. 17. For completeness, it is necessary to refer to the main precedent relied upon by the Respondents in relation to an extension of time, namely, the judgment of the High Court (Barr J.) in G.K. v. International Protection Appeals Tribunal [2022] IEHC 204. The precedent is distinguishable from the circumstances of the present case on the grounds that this court has concluded that the application for judicial review is well founded. LEGISLATIVE CONTEXT 18. The procedure under the International Protection Act 2015 (“IPA 2015”) involves a number of different stages. The first stage consists of what is described as a “preliminary interview” pursuant to section 13 of the Act. The stated purpose of a preliminary interview is to establish, among other things, whether the interviewed person wishes to make an application for international protection, and, if so, the general grounds on which the application is based. The second stage of the procedure entails the completion of a written questionnaire described as an “Application for International Protection Questionnaire”. The third stage in the procedure consists of a “personal interview” with an applicant pursuant to section 35 of the International Protection Act 2015. LEGAL TEST FOR ASSESSING “GENERAL CREDIBILITY” 19. The IPAT is required, in co-operation with an applicant, to assess the relevant elements of their application for international protection (IPA 2015, section 28). 9 The assessment shall be carried out on an individual basis and shall include taking into account, inter alia, the general credibility of the applicant. 20. Section 28(7) of the IPA 2015 relieves an applicant of having to confirm certain aspects of their claim where prescribed criteria are fulfilled. This is often referred to as affording an applicant the “benefit of the doubt”. This is a concept derived from the UNHCR Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status and Guidelines on International Protection. 21. This concept is reflected under section 28(7) of the IPA 2015 as follows: “Where aspects of the applicant’s statements are not supported by documentary or other evidence, those aspects shall not need confirmation where the international protection officer or, as the case may be, the Tribunal, is satisfied that— (a) the applicant has made a genuine effort to substantiate his or her application, (b) all relevant elements at the applicant’s disposal have been submitted and a satisfactory explanation regarding any lack of other relevant elements has been given, (c) the applicant’s statements are found to be coherent and plausible and do not run counter to available specific and general information relevant to the applicant’s case, (d) the applicant has applied for international protection at the earliest possible time, unless the applicant can demonstrate good reason for not having done so, and (e) the general credibility of the applicant has been established.” 22. The legal effect of this provision has been explained as follows by the High Court (Ferriter J.) in A.H. v. International Protection Appeals Tribunal [2022] IEHC 84 (at paragraph 17): “In short, it is clear that before the benefit of the doubt can be given in relation to undocumented aspects of an 10 applicant’s claims, the applicant’s general credibility must be established (see s. 28(7)(e)). Once the applicant’s general credibility has been established, undocumented aspects of the applicant’s case do not need to be confirmed i.e. can get the benefit of the doubt where, but only where, the four other factors in s. 28(7)(a) to (d) are satisfied.” 23. The parties are agreed that the principles governing the assessment of general credibility are as stated in I.R. v. Minister for Justice and Equality [2009] IEHC 510, [2015] 4 IR 144. The judgment cautions against the temptation for the court of judicial review to substitute its own view for that of the primary decision-makers. Rather, the function and jurisdiction of the High Court is confined to ensuring that the process by which the immigration decision was made was legally sound, and not vitiated by any material error of law, or by an infringement of any applicable statutory provision or of any principle of natural or constitutional justice. 24. The following three principles enunciated in I.R. v. Minister for Justice and Equality (at paragraph 10) are of the most immediate relevance to the issues which arise in the present proceedings: (a). The assessment of credibility must be made by reference to the full picture that emerged from the available evidence and information taken as a whole, when rationally analysed and fairly weighed. It must not be based on what the decision‑maker perceives to be a correct instinct or gut feeling as to whether the truth was or was not being told. (b). A finding of lack of credibility must be based on correct facts, untainted by conjecture or speculation, and the reasons drawn from such facts must be cogent and bear a legitimate connection to the adverse finding. 11 (c). The reasons must relate to the substantive basis of the claim made and not to minor matters or to facts which were merely incidental in the account given. 25. The European Union Agency for Asylum has published a guide entitled Practical Guide on Evidence and Risk Assessment (2024). The guide states (at page 103) that “general credibility” is understood as a reference to the “credibility record” of an applicant as an asylum seeker and concerns “all important factual elements related to the actions of the applicant that become known in the asylum procedure”. 26. It is stated further as follows (at page 103): “These elements can comprise, among others, behaviour or statements indicating that the applicant does not fear returning to their home country or, on the contrary, behaviour or statements that underline their fear; actions or omissions of the applicant in relation to their duty to substantiate the application, such as concealing information or duly offering all information, giving misleading information or being straightforward, submitting falsified documents or supporting their case with authentic documentation; obstructing the handling of their case or complying with the obligation to cooperate. […]” *Footnotes omitted 27. Relevantly, the threshold to be met is stated as follows (at page 104): “The negative actions listed above need to be sufficiently serious in nature, either on their own, or in repetition or in combination with other actions before they can be considered to affect the general credibility of the applicant. It is thus not because one of them may be identified in the applicant’s file that this would ipso facto have a negative impact on their general credibility. Information about the applicant that is not related to the asylum procedure is not relevant to the establishment of the applicant’s general credibility. In all cases, before reaching any conclusion on the general credibility of the applicant, you should consider all individual and contextual factors that could explain the 12 considered behaviour of the applicant and give the applicant an opportunity to provide an explanation.” 28. As to the reliance which may be placed on inconsistencies in reaching a finding on general credibility, the guide states as follows (at pages 70 and 72): “The level of coherence and consistency that can reasonably be expected from the applicant will vary depending on their personal and contextual circumstances, specifically the factors that may lead to distortion. Before making any findings on the coherence and consistency, ensure that the applicant was aware as to what level of coherence and consistency was expected from them during the personal interview and that the interview was conducted in a manner that enabled the applicant to provide such statements. The applicant also needs to have been provided with an opportunity to clarify any inconsistencies or incoherence that are central to the assessment of a material fact. Therefore, a lack of consistency does not affect credibility in all situations.” […] “Similar to assessing internal credibility, not all inconsistencies will lead to a negative credibility finding. It needs to be considered whether the inconsistencies relate to the central elements of a material fact and what level of consistency can be expected from the applicant. This should be considered in light of factors that may lead to distortion and the context around statements. If there is evidence that contradicts the applicant’s statements, you should address this and give the applicant an opportunity to explain the inconsistencies and consider this explanation in the credibility assessment.” 29. There is a qualitative difference between an inconsistency in an individual’s evidence, on the one hand, and the disclosure of additional evidence subsequently, on the other. It is, in principle, open to the IPAT to rely on an inconsistency, in relation to material matters, to ground a finding of lack of credibility. It is also, in principle, open to do so by reference to the belated disclosure of additional information. The decision-maker must, however, be alive to the fact that the disclosure of additional information may simply be as a 13 result of an applicant having been asked more specific questions at a different stage of the immigration process or of an applicant having been afforded more time and space within which to describe the circumstances of their claim for international protection. For example, the initial form which is completed by an intending applicant is short and the mere fact that additional information is subsequently provided in the context of the more detailed questionnaire or the personal interview under section 35 of the IPA 2015 may not necessarily support an inference of lack of credibility. CREDIBILITY V. PLAUSIBILITY 30. Having regard to the finding reached by the IPAT in relation to the plausibility of one aspect of the Applicant’s claim, it is necessary to say something about the two related concepts of credibility and plausibility. 31. The issue has recently been considered by the Court of Appeal (per Butler J.) in M. v. International Protection Appeals Tribunal [2025] IECA 208 (at paragraph 172): “I acknowledge that credibility and plausibility are distinct concepts although, in my view, there is a significant overlap between them. In international protection cases the credibility of an applicant relates to their inherent trustworthiness – in other words, can they be believed? The same can be said of other material relied on in support of a claim. Material emanating from bodies such as Amnesty International or Human Rights Watch is regarded as generally credible because of the international standing of those bodies over a lengthy period and their expertise in the analysis of human rights conditions in various countries. Material emanating from other sources may have to be scrutinized more closely because the decision maker is not familiar with the source itself. Plausibility relates to the extent to which the account given is likely to be true which will frequently depend on the extent to which it is consistent with what is generally known about the country in question. In very broad terms, credibility is concerned with the source 14 of the information whereas plausibility is concerned with its content. An otherwise credible witness might give evidence which is untrue because of flaws in their memory, understanding or perception of what they have witnessed. I accept that something might be implausible but nonetheless true and that something might be perfectly plausible and yet untrue.” 32. The plausibility finding in the present proceedings is addressed at paragraphs 62 to 64 below. THE APPLICANT’S CLAIM FOR INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION 33. The International Protection Act 2015 requires that all practicable steps be taken by the IPAT to ensure that the identity of applicants is kept confidential. In the same spirit, details which might lead to the jigsaw identification of the applicant have been redacted in the summary which follows. 34. The Applicant is a national of Angola. His father had been an activist with FLEC (Front for the Liberation of Cabinda). The Applicant had also joined FLEC and had been involved, for a time, in distributing leaflets and party materials. This involvement predates the key events by [number of years redacted]. 35. The essence of the Applicant’s claim for international protection relates to a violent incident at the family home. The core contention of the claim has been summarised as follows in the questionnaire completed by the Applicant: “Three (3) men went to the back of the house, with a bottle of fuel and set fire to the house I lived in with my family. Of the soldiers whom were inside the house, two took my mother and wife to my father’s room. They kept asking for help because they were being brutally raped. That’s when my father managed to get up went into the room with his hand tied, bust the door open of the room where they were being raped. One of the soldiers shot my father in the stomach and he fell right there. 15 My mother lost conscience when she saw my father being killed, passed out for some time. The man from the MPLA party ordered someone to pour some water on her face to wake her up. He got up told to leave my father’s body in the room took my mother the children and my wife outside the house. On their way out, my mother grabbed a glass vase from the table and tried to throw it at the head of the soldier who killed my father. The other soldier was faster, he shot her. I tried to attack the soldier but they knocked me out by hitting me with a gun on my head, I blacked out. When I woke up, I was inside a military vehicle, our house was on fire. My wife children and brothers were in a different vehicle from the MPLA party. […] [Name redacted] told me about my parents’ bodies, which were found burnt inside the house.” 36. The Applicant subsequently attended for his section 35 interview (“the statutory interview”). The essence of the claim for international protection is summarised as follows (in response to questions 39 and 40): “[…] Around seven men entered the house and started hitting my father. They entered the house and they took the phone devices we had. They start hitting my father and me as well and we were the only two men in the house so they tied myself and himself up. At that stage the whole house was in panic and the kids were there and my mother was there. She tried to intervene and they hit her as well. You are begging for help and screaming but nobody could help us. One of the members of MPLA got a phone call and all you could hear was and you could not hear what he was saying but you could hear the reply and the guy who answered the phone said we are already here on [details redacted] house and we are going to be carrying out your request as soon as possible. So when he hung up the phone they took my mother and my wife to the back of the house where the bedroom were and myself and my father were tied down and we heard my wife and mother screaming and they were violating my mother and even though my father was tied down he still made his way to the bedroom and someone shot him and he fell. 16 What is it you fear specifically about returning to Angola? I am trying to be brief but on the same night they killed my father and my mother and I tried to intervene and I got a knock on the back of my neck. The way I came around I was inside a police car and I saw the house burning and my kids screaming and I was made prisoner. […]” 37. The first instance decision of the International Protection Officer had been to recommend that the claim for international protection be dismissed. The Applicant lodged a notice of appeal, together with grounds of appeal and submissions, with the IPAT. The IPAT convened an oral hearing. The IPAT issued a decision, refusing the claim for international protection, on 12 June 2024. Same was received by the Applicant’s solicitor on 14 June 2024. 38. The IPAT summarised the Applicant’s oral evidence in relation to the violent incident at the family home as follows: “In his evidence before the Tribunal the Appellant said that five men who were armed came in to the house and started torturing his father, that in the middle of all that before they kicked the door in his father had called [name redacted]. He said that the men started torturing his father, his mother asked about why they were doing this and they said they had superior orders. The Appellant said that were very violent and aggressive and his mother was begging them to stop they tied the Appellant beside his father and the men locked his mother and wife in a room upstairs and were beating them too. The Appellant said that the men were hitting the Appellant’s father to the point where he nearly passed out. He said that while the Appellant and his father were tied in the living room the men were rooting for papers. The Appellant said that he said that in the middle of all of this his father tried to get up because of his mother and wife screaming and the men hit his father in the head with the firearm and he passed out. The Appellant then tried to help his father and they hit him in the back with the firearm the Appellant’s mother escaped and came to his father and they shot his mother. The Appellant said that when they shot his mother she was lying on the ground, the men grabbed his children and wife and sister and put them in military cars and brought them to a different place. The Appellant was brought to a place of detention and two days later a man from 17 FLEC visited him and gave him the news that his father and mother were dead and that his house has been set on fire.” IPAT’S DECISION 39. Insofar as relevant to these judicial review proceedings, the IPAT made three principal findings as follows. 40. First, the IPAT made a finding that the Applicant had been inconsistent in his description of the incident at his family home. See §4.32 to §4.34 of the IPAT’s decision as follows: “The Tribunal asked the Appellant about a number of inconsistencies between his evidence to the Tribunal and his previous account of the incident [redacted]. In his evidence to the Tribunal he said that his father had been hit in the head with a fire arm whereas in his section 35 interview the Appellant said his father had been shot. The Appellant was asked why they were different accounts and he said that it was misinterpreted, he said that they shot at his mother. The Tribunal notes that the Appellant mentioned that his mother was shot in his questionnaire but not in his section 35 interview. The inconsistency was again put to the Appellant who said that he believed what he said in the section 35 interview was that one of his parents had been shot. The Tribunal has read the questionnaire in section 35 interview and that is not the detail provided by the Appellant at that interview. That unexplained inconsistency is significant because firstly it represents a core detail of the Appellant’s claim and secondly the Appellant has confused at various stages which parent was shot. In respect of his mother, he mentioned her shooting at his questionnaire and appeal hearing but not his section 35 interview. In respect then of the Appellant’s father, he mentioned that he was shot in his questionnaire and section 35 interview but not his appeal hearing. The Appellant was then asked why he told the Tribunal that his mother was shot but made no mention of that important detail in his section 35 interview. The Appellant said he was psychologically shocked and that it was some time ago. This is a significant detail and an inconsistency that has not been explained by the Appellant. 18 A further significant inconsistency arose where the Appellant told the Tribunal that he was brought to a place of detention and visited there by a member of FLEC who told him that his house had been set on fire. This is different from his account at first instance where both his questionnaire and section 35 interview the Appellant said that he woke up in a police car and saw his house on fire. There was no mention of the Appellant’s loss of consciousness at the appeal hearing, a detail noted in his questionnaire and section 35 interview. The Tribunal asked the Appellant to explain this significant inconsistency. In the view of the Tribunal, the omission of the experience of regaining consciousness to see one’s family home being burned down is a significant inconsistency. The Appellant said in reply that some things that are written down is not what he had said. The Tribunal does not accept this explanation where first, the Appellant himself provided the account in his questionnaire and second the Appellant has not explained his failure to provide this detail when asked about the events at his appeal hearing. He has not provided any reasonable explanation for this extraordinary inconsistency in his account.” 41. Second, the IPAT made a finding that the Applicant was not a member of FLEC. See §4.23 of the IPAT’s decision as follows: “What leads the Tribunal to the findings that on balance the Appellant was not a member of FLEC is the detail about the party in general which was without any depth assessed alongside the dearth of detail about the Appellant’s participation in the party where on his own claim he was employed for a number of years. The Appellant claimed to have been involved in a marketing role, it is difficult to consolidate that claim with his lack of depth of knowledge about the party. While the Appellant provided some detail about FLEC it was broad and generalised. The Appellant was similarly vague when asked specifically about his activities in the party were, he said he distributed T-shirts and flyers. He was asked in a follow up question where he did that and he said around the city. His evidence about his father’s involvement provided no greater depth of detail, the Appellant was vague in particularising his father’s participation stating that he was involved in the party’s commercial activities. The detail overall, when provided, was very superficial and does not represent a person involved at the level or duration as claimed by the Appellant.” 19 42. Third, the IPAT treated the Applicant’s claim to have resided in a Named Location as a material fact of which it was “uncertain”, and did not accept that residence as established. See §4.17 of the IPAT’s decision as follows: “The Tribunal has considered the information provided by the Appellant about [a Named Location]. While the Appellant provided some level of detail about [a Named Location] it was not at a level indicative of a person having lived in that location as claimed by the Appellant. This finding is made with particular regard to the fact that the Appellant claims to have been involved in the marketing department of FLEC which included distributing flyers throughout the city. The level of detail reasonable to expect of the Appellant, as a person who lived in [a Named Location] for over […] years [details redacted] and moved throughout the city in the distribution of fliers as part of his work, was not provided by the Appellant. It is however noted that some detail was been provided by the Appellant, it is insufficient to meet the threshold of credibility and this is material fact of which the Tribunal is uncertain. The Tribunal will consider the benefit of the doubt in due course.” DISCUSSION VIOLENT INCIDENT AT THE FAMILY HOME 43. The IPAT made a finding that the Applicant had been inconsistent in his description of the incident at the family home. In particular, the IPAT identified supposed discrepancies as between the details of the narrative provided in the questionnaire, the statutory interview, and the oral hearing, respectively. 44. One of the supposed discrepancies identified was in respect of which parent had been shot by the members of the MPLA. The IPAT noted in its decision that the Applicant had mentioned, in his questionnaire, that his mother was shot, but had not mentioned this in his statutory interview. With respect, this is not a full and accurate characterisation of the report on the statutory interview. The Applicant had stated, in response to Question 40, that both his father and mother had been 20 killed the same night. (See paragraph 36 above). This crucial reference to the death of both parents has been omitted by the IPAT in its summary of the response to Question 40: see §4.30 of the decision. 45. It is correct to say that the Applicant, in response to Question 40, did not describe the method by which his mother had been killed, i.e. by shooting. It is incorrect, however, for the IPAT to infer that the Applicant “has confused at various stages which parent was shot”. Such an inference is simply not supported by a fair reading of the report of the statutory interview. The Applicant has been consistent throughout the immigration process in stating that both his parents had been killed in the incident at the family home. 46. As explained in I.R. v. Minister for Justice and Equality (cited above), a finding of lack of credibility must be based on correct facts, untainted by conjecture or speculation, and the reasons drawn from such facts must be cogent and bear a legitimate connection to the adverse finding. The findings in the present case do not fulfil these criteria. The IPAT erred in law in purporting to draw an inference that the Applicant has been inconsistent in relation to a crucial detail of his core claim, namely, which family members had been killed at the incident in the family home. This inference is predicated on a material error of fact and it was unreasonable for the IPAT to draw this inference. 47. Moreover, the Tribunal Member, when questioning the Applicant, did so on the basis of an incomplete summary of what the Applicant had actually said at the statutory interview. In particular, the Applicant had been questioned by the Tribunal Member on the inaccurate assumption that the Applicant had made no mention, in his answers at his statutory interview, of his mother having been shot and killed. Whereas a Tribunal Member is, of course, entitled to closely question 21 a claim for international protection, it must be done on the basis of an accurate portrayal of what the claimant actually said at an earlier stage. It is unfair and contrary to the scheme of the legislation to put a partial account of the claimant’s previous statements to him, and then seek to rely on the claimant’s understandable confusion in response to the questioning to reach an adverse finding on credibility. The court of judicial review is entitled to set aside an immigration decision where same has been reached through an unfair procedure. 48. More generally, the IPAT’s approach fails to appreciate the very different circumstances under which the narrative had been elicited from the Applicant in each instance, i.e. via questionnaire, statutory interview, and oral hearing. As explained in the UNHCR report, Beyond Proof: Credibility Assessment in EU Asylum Systems (May 2013), the circumstances can influence the narrative: “Memory is influenced by the nature of a question or cue used to elicit information, such as closed or open-ended questions, as well as the way the question is asked. Memories are susceptible to suggestion, more so when the interviewee feels under stress, has low self-esteem, or perceives the interviewer to be critical or negative. Research has also shown that there is variation in reporting when information is elicited in face-to-face interviews compared with self-completing forms. The behaviour and perceived intentions of the interviewer influence the recall of memories. Thus, it is very possible for repeated interviews, or statement writing, to yield discrepancies that result from the form and process of the interrogation, which have no bearing on the credibility of the person or their account. There is, therefore, ample research on the functioning of memory to show that ‘stories can change for many reasons and such changes do not necessarily indicate that the narrator is lying.’ Indeed, the research shows that it is highly unusual for recall to be accurately reproduced and that, instead, variations are more common.” *Footnotes omitted 22 49. A broadly similar point is made at page 75 of the Practical Guide on Evidence and Risk Assessment (cited at paragraph 25 above): “The interview techniques that are used during the personal interview can affect the applicant’s statements: whether questions are asked in a manner that considers the personal circumstances; whether the applicant is provided with an explanation as to what is expected from them; whether questions are asked in an order that is easy to understand. For this reason, it is important to consider the way the personal interview was conducted when considering how the factors that may lead to distortions may affect the statements. […]” 50. The various information-eliciting processes to which the Applicant was subjected, as part of the statutory procedure, were all very different. For example, the “personal interview” conducted pursuant to section 35 of the International Protection Act 2015 had been very much guided by the interviewing officer. The interviewing officer determined the course of the interview and the areas of discussion. It appears from the report that the interviewing officer, by interposing Question 40, interrupted the flow of the Applicant’s narrative of the incident at the family home. The Applicant had not yet reached the death of his mother in his narrative. The Applicant has always located the death of his mother chronologically as occurring after the shooting of his father. In response to the interruption by the interviewing officer, the Applicant compressed his narrative, saying that he was “trying to be brief”, and skipped to a point in the chronology subsequent to the death of his mother. (See paragraph 36 above). It was inappropriate for the IPAT to seek to draw inferences from the content of the interview, without having any regard to the process by which that narrative was elicited. The error of law was compounded by the Tribunal Member’s failure to acknowledge that, even in the compressed version, the Applicant had expressly stated, in response to Question 40, that his 23 father and mother had been killed the same night. See also the answer to Question 61. 51. The IPAT also attached decisive weight to the account given as to when the Applicant first learned of the deaths of his parents and the destruction, by fire, of the family home. The account given by the Applicant, both in his questionnaire and in his statutory interview, had been to the effect that he had lost consciousness as a result of being hit in the head by a member of the MPLA and that when he came around, he was in the back of a police or military vehicle. The Applicant’s respective accounts record that “our house was on fire” and that he “saw the house burning”. The IPAT records that his evidence at the oral hearing had been to the effect that, two days after the incident at the family home, a man from FLEC visited him in his place of detention and gave him the news that his father and mother were dead and that his house had been set on fire. 52. The Tribunal Member sought to characterise this supposed discrepancy as an “extraordinary inconsistency” in the Applicant’s account. With respect, this finding is not supported by the record. The summary of the evidence at the oral hearing does not indicate that the Applicant denied regaining consciousness in a military vehicle and observing the fire. Rather, it appears that this detail was omitted from his direct evidence. This omission was then raised by the Tribunal Member of their own volition. 53. The Tribunal Member appears to have treated the earlier narrative as being irreconcilable with the Applicant’s statement at the oral hearing that the “news”, i.e. that his father and mother were dead and that his house had been set on fire, had been given to him by a visitor at his place of detention. The Applicant’s earlier narrative is that he had been aware, on the night of the incident, that both 24 of his parents had been shot and that the family home had been set on fire. The “news” confirmed that his parents had died. Whereas the Applicant might well have assumed from what he had seen on the night of the incident that his parents would die as a result of their injuries, it is not necessarily inconsistent to say that he only received confirmation of their deaths two days later. Put otherwise, the Applicant’s evidence at the oral hearing is properly understood as indicating that he received confirmation of matters which he had earlier assumed or partly observed, rather than as a repudiation of those earlier observations. 54. Moreover, the significance of any potential inconsistency on the question of whether or not the Applicant regained consciousness in time to observe that the family home had been set on fire has to be seen in context. The core of the claim for international protection is that the Applicant and his family had been the victims of a violent attack by State actors. The Applicant’s parents were both murdered, his wife sexually assaulted, his family home destroyed by fire, and the Applicant himself rendered unconscious in the attack. Against this background, the question of the precise date upon which the Applicant became aware that his family home had been destroyed is peripheral. In particular, the supposed discrepancy in timing, i.e. whether he regained consciousness on the night of the incident and witnessed the fire, or, alternatively, received confirmation two days later, is peripheral. 55. It is salutary to recall the guidance in Chapter 3 of the UNHCR’s Report, Beyond Proof: Credibility Assessment in EU Asylum Systems (2013) (§2.2) (cited by IPAT in the impugned decision): “When people experience traumatic events, they tend to remember some details at the expense of others. They are likely to have better recall of central details, on which they have focused, with reduced recall of peripheral details. 25 Scientific studies reveal that discrepancies may arise more frequently with regard to peripheral details.” 56. It should also be recalled that the incident occurred [number redacted] years prior to the oral hearing. This lapse of time will inevitably have affected the Applicant’s ability to recall peripheral details in relation to the sequencing of events. The Tribunal Member’s own reliance on UNHCR and EUAA materials acknowledges that traumatic events can impair verbal memory and produce inconsistencies even regarding important details, especially where the person’s focus was on the “gist” of survival rather than on precise sequences. A reasoned analysis on the part of the IPAT, consonant with that guidance was required, but is not evident. 57. The Applicant’s explanation—trauma, lapse of time, and interpretation difficulties—was rejected summarily on the basis that the same interpreter was used at the appeal hearing and the statutory interview. This reasoning elides two distinct issues: (i) whether a witness who has experienced a violent, chaotic attack might inconsistently recount a peripheral issue; and (ii) whether comprehension difficulties can vary over time, setting, and question‑framing even with the same interpreter. WHERE THE APPLICANT HAD RESIDED 58. The IPAT considered whether or not the Applicant had lived in a Named Location. The Tribunal Member concluded that the Applicant’s overall level of detail about the Named Location was not at a level indicative of a person who had lived there, especially given his claimed role of having distributed flyers city-wide on behalf of a political party. Although minor spelling variants were attributed to translation or phonetics, and although he supplied a full address for 26 the first time at the hearing, the Tribunal Member was not persuaded by his explanation for earlier omissions. The Tribunal Member, therefore, treated the Applicant’s residence in the Named Location as a material fact of which she was “uncertain”, and did not accept that residence as established. 59. These findings are predicated on confusion as to the precise area being referred to. References to the Named Location may, depending on context, signify either the enclave or the municipality. The confusion was further compounded by what appears to have been an error in translation: the report of the statutory interview refers, in particular at Questions 14 and 15, to [name of area redacted], which is located to the [cardinal point redacted] of the enclave. The Applicant has averred that this should properly have read [name of area redacted] which is to the [cardinal point redacted] of the enclave. All the replies given by the Applicant at his statutory interview related to [name of area redacted]. 60. The details of the precise areas within Angola have been redacted to avoid the risk that the Applicant’s right to anonymity would be undermined by jigsaw identification. The parties are both aware of the precise areas in question. It should be explained to the reader that the names of the two areas are very similar in spelling, and this contributed to the confusion. 61. The IPAT’s failure to resolve the confusion in respect of which area the Applicant had resided in represents a material error of fact. WHETHER APPLICANT HAD WORKED FOR FLEC 62. The IPAT rejected the Applicant’s claim that he (and his late father) had been members of, and that he personally had worked for, FLEC, for the following reasons. The IPAT considered that the Applicant’s knowledge of the party was 27 “broad and generalised” and that there was a “dearth of detail” about the Applicant’s participation in the party by which, on his own claim, he had been employed for a number of years. 63. The IPAT made two errors of law in reaching these findings. First, the Tribunal Member purported to reach a finding of fact, based on conjecture or speculation, as to what she personally considered was the level of knowledge to be expected from an individual employed to distribute flyers on behalf of a political party. The EASO’s Judicial Analysis on Evidence and Credibility Assessment (2018), which had been cited by the IPAT, cautions against the considerable risk that a decision-maker will be over-influenced by their views on what is or is not plausible, and those views will have inevitably been influenced by their own background in this country and by the customs and ways of our own society (§4.5.4, Plausibility). (Similar sentiments are to be found in the second edition published by EUAA in 2023). Here, the IPAT made no attempt to seek out objective information in relation to this issue. 64. Second, the Tribunal Member failed to engage at all with the evidence the Applicant had given as to the close connection between his father and the FLEC leader. Similarly, the Tribunal Member fails to engage with the country of origin information which described the manner in which the Angolan Armed Forces (“FAA”) treated members of FLEC. COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION / “COI” 65. Section 28(4) of the International Protection Act 2015 provides, inter alia, that the assessment by the IPAT shall be carried out on an individual basis and shall include taking into account all relevant facts as they relate to the country of 28 origin at the time of taking a decision on the application, including laws and regulations of the country of origin and the manner in which they are applied. 66. The proper approach to be adopted in the assessment of country of origin information has been explained by the Court of Appeal in R.A. v. Refugee Appeals Tribunal [2017] IECA 297. That judgment was delivered in the context of the domestic legislative regime prior to the International Protection Act 2015, but the principles apply equally to that Act. This is because the domestic legislation, in each instance, reflects the relevant EU legislation. 67. The Court of Appeal held that the obligation on the part of the decision-maker is to consider only relevant country of origin information. There is no need for the decision-maker to consult country of origin information in a ritualised or mechanistic fashion in every single case, regardless of the personal circumstances of the applicant or the nature of the claim made by the applicant. 68. In most cases, however, country of origin information will be of use in ascertaining whether the social, political and other conditions in the country of origin are such that the events recounted, or the mistreatment claimed to have been suffered, may or may not have taken place. 69. The Court of Appeal approved of the following passage from Goodwin-Gill, The Refugee in International Law (Clarendon Paperbacks, Oxford) (which had been cited by the High Court (Kelly J.) in Camara v. Minister for Justice Equality and Law Reform, unreported, 26 July 2000): “Simply considered, there are just two issues. First, could the applicant’s story have happened, or could his/her apprehension come to pass, on their own terms, given what we know from available country of origin information? Secondly, is the applicant personally believable? If the story is consistent with what is known about the country of origin, then the basis for the right inferences has been laid. 29 Inconsistencies must be assessed as material or immaterial. Material inconsistencies go to the heart of the claim, and concern, for example, the key experiences that are the cause of flight and fear. Being crucial to acceptance of the story, applicants ought in principle to be invited to explain contradictions and clarify confusions.” 70. The Court of Appeal also approved of the following statement of principle: “It is our view that credibility findings can only really be made on the basis of a complete understanding of the entire picture. It is our view that one cannot assess a claim without placing that claim into the context of the background information of the country of origin. In other words, the probative value of the evidence must be evaluated in the light of what is known about the conditions in the claimant’s country of origin.” 71. The IPAT erred in its understanding of what the requirement to take into account country of origin information entails. The IPAT, mistakenly, treated the absence of any contemporaneous media reports of the murder of the Applicant’s parents as indicating that the claim for international protection was not supported by country of origin information. This inference is incorrect. As the authorities discussed above demonstrate, the purpose of referring to country of origin information is to ascertain whether the social, political and other conditions in the country of origin are such that the events recounted, or the mistreatment claimed to have been suffered, may or may not have taken place. The absence of media or NGO reportage of a household‑level incident is not indicative of a claim not being supported by country of origin information. Here, the IPAT’s reasoning transitions from the Applicant’s earlier suggestion that a cousin had located an online item (later retracted as mistranslation) to a general credibility deficit grounded on the supposed lack of any country of origin information “whatsoever”, without any analysis of whether the pattern—night raids, 30 ill‑treatment of political opponents’ families, arson—has COI support even if the particular incident has not been publicly reported. CONCLUSION AND PROPOSED FORM OF ORDER 72. The judgment in I.R. v. Minister for Justice and Equality properly cautions against the temptation, for the court of judicial review, to substitute its own view for that of the primary decision-makers. The judgment also emphasises that a mistake as to one, or even more, facts will not necessarily vitiate a conclusion as to lack of general credibility, provided that the conclusion is tenably sustained by other correct facts. 73. Applying these principles to the present proceedings, I hold that the IPAT’s decision is vitiated by error of law. The IPAT failed properly to apply the principles governing the assessment of the Applicant’s general credibility. The detail of these failings is set out above and what follows next is a summary only. 74. First, the IPAT erred in law in purporting to draw an inference that the Applicant has been inconsistent in respect of a crucial detail of his core claim, namely, which family members had been killed at the violent incident at the family home. This inference is predicated on a material error of fact as to what the Applicant said in his statutory interview and it was unreasonable for the IPAT to draw this inference. 75. Second, the IPAT erred in law in finding a supposed inconsistency in relation to the timing of when the Applicant first became aware that the family home had been set on fire. This finding is not supported by the evidence, relates to a peripheral issue, and makes no proper allowance for the effect of trauma on memory. 31 76. Third, the IPAT erred in its understanding of what the requirement to take into account country of origin information entails. 77. Fourth, the IPAT’s failure to resolve the earlier confusion in respect of which area the Applicant had resided in represents a material error of fact. 78. Fifth, the IPAT erred in law in purporting to reach a finding based on conjecture or speculation as to what the Tribunal Member personally considered was the level of knowledge to be expected from an individual employed to distribute flyers on behalf of a political party. 79. Counsel for the Respondents had made a fallback submission to the effect that even if the court were to hold—contrary to counsel’s principal submission—that there had been some errors, then same were severable. The IPAT’s decision should be treated as based on a number of independent grounds capable of supporting the result. Counsel cited, in particular, B.W. (Nigeria) v. Refugee Appeals Tribunal [2017] IECA 296, [2018] 2 ILRM 56 (at paragraph 69): “However, even where there is a single fact, which is incorrect, within a decision as to credibility reached on a cumulative basis, or where the decision maker has failed to take into account some material fact, or where no opportunity was provided to the applicant to comment upon some matter of material concern to the decision maker upon which in part the adverse credibility finding was based that may not of itself be sufficient to justify setting aside the overall decision as to credibility. It may be that the flawed fact is simply overwhelmed by the other correct facts such that the decision remains tenably sustained when read in the round, and therefore ought not to be quashed. […]”. 80. I have carefully considered this submission. Had the only errors made by the IPAT been those summarised as the fourth and fifth items above, it might have been possible to sever same and for the decision to survive. However, the errors summarised as the first, second, and third item above are so serious that the cumulative effect of same is to vitiate the decision. The finding that the 32 Applicant had been inconsistent in his narration of which family members had been killed and in respect of the timing of his knowledge of the fire are treated in the IPAT’s decision as crucial to the finding on credibility. The misdirection as to the proper function of country of origin information is also a serious failing which is not only directly related to the finding on membership of the political party, but had also been relied upon in support of the findings in respect of the violent incident at the family home. These errors each contributed significantly to the credibility assessment, shaped the manner of questioning at the oral hearing, and directly informed the refusal to afford the benefit of the doubt. Once these pillars are removed, the remaining matters (including residence detail and the speculative expectation as to the knowledge of a low‑level party worker) do not independently support the adverse credibility conclusion. 81. It would not be safe to allow the outcome stand having regard to the number and gravity of the failings in the credibility assessment. Accordingly, an order will be made setting aside the IPAT’s decision of 12 June 2024. The international protection appeal will be remitted, pursuant to Order 84, rule 27 of the Rules of the Superior Courts, for reconsideration by a differently constituted panel of the IPAT. 82. The court’s order will recite that an extension of time has been granted pursuant to section 5 of the Illegal Immigrants (Trafficking) Act 2000 (as amended). (Paragraphs 2 to 17 above). 83. As to legal costs, this court’s provisional view is that the Applicant, having been “entirely successful” in the application for judicial review, is entitled to recover his costs as against the Respondents in accordance with the default position under section 169 of the Legal Services Regulation Act 2015. If the Respondents 33 wish to contend for a different form of costs order, then their solicitor should contact the registrar within fourteen days and arrange to have this matter relisted before me in the new legal term. Appearances Garry O’Halloran for the applicant instructed by Trayers & Company Solicitors James Kane for the respondents instructed by the Chief State Solicitor