Aurich & Anor v Conroy & Ors

APPROVED NO REDACTION NEEDED THE COURT OF APPEAL CIVIL Appeal Number: 2026 4 Neutral Citation Number [2026] IECA 70 Faherty J. Pilkington J. Allen J. BETWEEN MARLENA AURICH AND SCOTT MANNING PLAINTIFFS - AND – MICHAEL CONROY, MARTIN DUFFY, PATRICK MCCANN, JAMES CAPLIS AND THE MINISTER FOR AGRICUTURE, FOOD AND THE MARINE DEFENDANTS JUDGMENT of Mr. Justice Allen delivered on the 1st day of May, 2026 Introduction 1. This is an appeal against the judgment and order of the High Court (Farrell J.) delivered and made on 14th November, 2025 ([2025] IEHC 618) refusing an application by the plaintiffs for an injunction restraining the first and second defendants from using herbicides on their lands, which are adjacent to the plaintiffs’ property. 2. The application came before the High Court by motion on notice and was heard on affidavit evidence. By their notice of motion, the plaintiffs sought – all capitals – a PROHIBITIVE PERMANENT INJUNCTION. On the appeal, they were aggrieved that the judge dealt with the application as an application for an interlocutory injunction but that was in ease of the plaintiffs, whose application by motion on notice for a permanent injunction was misconceived. 3. The plaintiffs have convinced themselves that their and their daughter’s health has been damaged by the activities of these defendants. The High Court found that the plaintiffs had failed to establish that there was any even arguable causative link between these defendants’ activities – which were admitted – and the plaintiffs’ and their daughter’s medical complaints which, for the purposes of the interlocutory application, were accepted. Accordingly, the High Court refused the application on the ground that there was no bona fide issue to be tried. The High Court action 4. The plaintiffs are the owners of a house on about an acre of land at Hall Cottage, Kiltybranks, County Roscommon, which is their home. The plaintiffs’ property is bounded to the north by a house and farm yard owned by Mr. Michael Conroy, the first defendant; to the west by a field also owned by Mr. Conroy; to the east – across the public road – by a house owned by the second defendant, Mr. Patrick Duffy; and to the south by a field owned by the third defendant, Mr. Patrick McCann. 5. By plenary summons issued on 30th June, 2025, the plaintiffs – who act for themselves – commenced proceedings against Messrs. Conroy, Duffy and McCann, as well as Mr. James Caplis, who is an authorised officer in the Department of Agriculture, Food and the Marine, and Mr. Martin Heydon, who is the Minister for Agriculture, Food and the Marine. By the general indorsement of claim they sought the following reliefs:- 1. “ We, plaintiffs and parents of a Family seek the Rule of Law, which decides that the defendants Michael Conroy, Martin Duffy and Patrick McCann offend against us in Person and as a Family including a Child, by maliciously administering poisons, endangering our Lives and cause bodily harm in form of Personal Injuries. We plaintiffs. Seek therefore to prosecute under the Offences Against the Person Act, 1861, No. 23 endangering Life and inflicting bodily harm, and No. 24 with intent to injure, aggrieve and annoy any other person. 2. We, plaintiffs, prosecute Michael Conroy, under the Criminal Damage Act, 1991, for poisoning trees of our Private Property and killing two pet animals, dying from poisoning, when defendant Michael Conroy uses poisons, in the form of pesticides, maliciously over 6 years. 3. We, plaintiffs and parents of a Family seek the Rule of Law, which decides that defendant James Caplis in his role as authorised officer at the government DAFM and Martin Heydon in his role as Minister for Agriculture abuse their authority on use of pesticides, allowing and enabling an uncontrolled and unlimited use of pesticides, when this causes Personal Injury and Property Damage.” 6. Insofar as the plaintiffs claimed relief against the Minister for Agriculture, Food and the Marine, the correct defendant was the Minister rather than the holder of the office and the High Court judge substituted the Minister for Mr. Heydon. The High Court motion 7. By notice of motion issued on 15th July, 2025 the plaintiffs applied to the High Court for:- “…PROHIBITIVE PERMANENT INJUNCTION stopping the administration of Environmental Poisons in the form of pesticides and other agricultural toxins, endangering our Lives as a Family, at our Home address, pursuant to the Inherent jurisdiction of this High Court, the Rule of Law shall be enforced through Articles 40.3.2 and 42A.4.1.i of the Irish Constitution, in order to save our Lives immediately and IN URGENCY, guaranteeing the Protection of our Lives, Health and Property and enforcing the Prejudicial Right of our Child to Safety at Home.” 8. I pause here to say that the general indorsement of claim did not expressly seek an injunction restraining the use of pesticides and that the application – by interlocutory notice of motion – for a permanent injunction was misconceived. However, the High Court judge took the view that the case had been sufficiently pleaded and dealt with the motion as an application for interlocutory relief. 9. The plaintiffs’ motion was grounded on a joint affidavit of the plaintiffs which ran to 52 pages, to which was attached 42 pages of exhibits, mostly photographs. It is not necessary to deal with all of the detail. The plaintiffs asserted that their health and property was being violated and damaged by what they described as environmental poisoning stemming from the application by Messrs. Conroy and Duffy of “poisonous chemicals in the form of pesticides” and by Mr. McCann having spread slurry on his land on 5th March, 2025. 10. The first plaintiff described that she had suffered severe pesticide poisoning from November, 2019 to February, 2020 and that she had attended Castlebar hospital in February, 2020 and undergone a number of tests. The respiratory clinic of Castlebar hospital, she said, ignored her “statement and truth about [her] health condition.”. Her conclusion that she had suffered severe and life threatening pesticide poisoning was not supported by the hospital doctor, the respiratory clinic, or her GP. The first plaintiff’s case was that by writing what she described as the Case File and looking into EU legislation she was enabled her to see aspects of her sickness and situation which – she said – confirmed her intuition that she suffered pesticide poisoning and that her family suffered environmental poisoning. 11. The second plaintiff described that he had suffered specific endocrine problems since being exposed to slurry spreading which had been applied on 5th March, 2025. Under the heading “No Medical Care for Poisoning” the plaintiffs described that their GP had refused to complete the forms which they had filled in for the purpose of an application to the Injuries Resolution Board, and that attempts to obtain medical care for poisoning for the first plaintiff and her family remained unsuccessful. The plaintiffs – they said – had sought protection from An Garda Síochána, Roscommon County Council, the Pesticide Services Division of the Department of Agriculture, Food and the Marine, and others: none of whom had provided them with protection. 12. In a replying affidavit filed on 15th October, 2025 Mr. Conroy – who was represented by solicitors and counsel – deposed that he is a suckler beef farmer. He was – he said entitled as a registered Professional User under the Sustainable Use of Pesticides Directive to use pesticides as part of his farming enterprise: which he did. He used Mortone to control rushes, Roundup to control weeds and Grazone to control briars and other weeds. He said that he had had a number of inspections by the Pesticide Control Division of the Department of Agriculture, which had found nothing of concern. He deposed that his use of pesticides was very limited and vouched this by exhibiting the receipts from his supplier. Mr. Conroy made the point that there was no medical evidence linking the plaintiffs’ medical complaints – or the death of their two pets – to any form of poisoning. Mr. Conroy took particular exception to a section of the plaintiffs’ affidavit, under the heading “Neighbours Sickness” in which the plaintiffs suggested that members of his family had health problems which were attributable to his use of pesticides. 13. On 29th October, 2025 Mr. Duffy filed a short replying affidavit on his own behalf. He confirmed that he used a pesticide called Gallup for weed control on his own property and on the roadside verge at the brow of the hill to improve sightlines for his property. He confirmed that he used the product in line with the legislation and guidelines for amateur users, and did not overuse it. By the time he files his replying affidavit – he said – the roadside verge was being maintained by his son, by strimming. Mr. Duffy, too, took exception to references in the plaintiffs’ grounding affidavit to his family’s health conditions and to what he said were unsupported inferences that these were attributable to the use of pesticides. And he, too, made the point that the plaintiffs’ assertions were based on personal opinions, unsupported by any medical evidence. 14. On 30th October, 2025 the plaintiffs filed a further affidavit, this time running to 56 pages, with 86 pages of exhibits. Many of the exhibits were photographs with extensive narratives as to what it was suggested the photographs showed. Some were transcripts of audio visual recordings. The terms of the orders sought were modified to an injunction restraining the application of pesticides within 100 metres of their boundaries to provide a “100 meter pesticide free Safety Zone”. The plaintiffs had a good deal to say about the legislation governing the use of pesticides, to which I will return. The plaintiff exhibited death notices for two other of their immediate neighbours and asked, “What was the cause of death?”. If, inferentially, the plaintiffs believed that these deaths were linked to the use by the defendants of pesticides, they did not unequivocally say so; and there was not a shred of evidence which could have supported any such belief. The plaintiffs dealt at great length with what had been deposed to by Messrs. Conroy and Duffy: emphasising their admission that they had used pesticides; repeating their insistence that this was the cause of their – the plaintiffs’ – medical complaints; but not really engaging with the absence of any medical or scientific evidence suggestive of any causative link. 15. While the focus of the plaintiffs’ application was very much on the use by the first and second defendants of pesticides and the spreading of slurry by the third defendant, the affidavits also complained that Mr. Conroy had damaged the plaintiffs’ trees, and that those defendants had been swearing and shouting at the plaintiffs, engaging in social disorder, verbally assaulting the plaintiffs. The High Court judgment 16. The plaintiffs’ interlocutory motion was heard by Farrell J. on 5th November, 2025. The judge then reserved judgment and on 14th November, 2025 delivered a short and focussed written judgment. 17. I should say at this point that Mr. McCann, the third defendant, did not engage with the application. Save for the first occasion on which the motion was from time to time listed for directions there was no appearance by or on behalf of Mr. McCann. When the motion came on for hearing, Mr. Conroy was represented by solicitors and counsel, Mr. Duffy appeared in person . The plaintiffs could not prove service on Mr. McCann and so the judge could make no order against him. 18. The judge, at paras. 9 and 10, summarised the application as it had evolved by the time it came on for hearing. Consistently with what had been said in the plaintiffs’ second affidavit, the application was for an injunction restraining the use of pesticides within 100 metres of their property. The plaintiffs then accepted that the products which the first and second defendants were using could be lawfully purchased and used, including on the verge of the road which – they acknowledged – was in public ownership. The plaintiffs then acknowledged that the defendants’ use of the relevant pesticides was authorised by the European Communities (Sustainable Use of Pesticides) Regulations, 2012 (S.I. No. 155) as amended. 19. At para. 16, the judge recorded that she accepted – as the first and second defendants had accepted, for the purposes of the interlocutory application– that the plaintiffs suffered from the medial conditions described in their affidavits. She noted that hearsay evidence was admissible on an interlocutory application, provided that the person said to have made the statement was identified, and provided the party relying on it deposed to their belief that the statement is true. Critically, the judge said that opinion evidence was admissible only if given by an appropriately qualified expert. I pause here to say that there is no suggestion on the appeal that the judge erred in law in so finding. 20. At para. 21, the judge addressed the issues before the court as being first whether it was possible that the plaintiffs might obtain a permanent injunction at trial; then to consider whether there was a fair issue to be tried; and then, if there was a fair issue to be tried, to consider the balance of convenience or balance of justice, which included an assessment of the adequacy of an award of damages if the plaintiffs made out their case at trial. 21. As to the first relief sought in the general endorsement of claim, the judge – noting in passing that the Offences Against the Person Act, 1861 had been repealed by the Non-Fatal Offences Against the Person Act, 1997 – held that it was not open to a litigant to institute criminal proceedings by issuing a plenary summons. No fair question to be tried could be identified by reference to that relief. 22. As to the third relief claimed by the summons, the judge noted that that was relevant only to the fourth and fifth defendants, who were not party to the interlocutory application. I pause here to observe – perhaps by the way – that there was no evidence of “uncontrolled and unlimited use of pesticides”. The plaintiffs could say no more than that the first and second defendants had used pesticides. That was admitted. On the uncontested evidence of Mr. Conroy, the Minister has established a register of professional users to regulate the professional use of plant protection products and carries out inspections. 23. Although the endorsement of claim had not explicitly sought an injunction, the judge found that it was open to the court to grant interlocutory relief if the test for the grant of such relief was met. 24. At para. 29 the judge identified the core of the claim advanced by the plaintiffs as being that their health and life were at risk by reason of the first and second defendants’ use of pesticides, and to a lesser extent by spreading slurry. She noted that the allegation in relation to the spreading of slurry was confined to the third defendant and that there was no evidence that he had been served. 25. At para. 30 the judge listed the various medical conditions of which the plaintiffs complained, noting that these were not – for the purposes of the application – contested by the first or second defendants. “However”, she said, “there is no evidence before the court to demonstrate, or even suggest, a causal link with asthma or the reported abnormal blood test results with pesticides.” Neither, she said, was there any evidence to support the plaintiffs’ assertions that the trees on their land which had fallen during storms had been weakened by the defendants’ use of pesticides. 26. At para. 34, the judge recalled that in the course of the hearing she had struck out the plaintiffs’ allegations regarding the health of the first and second defendants’ family members which, she found, were clearly speculative. 27. For the reasons given – to those of which are relevant to the appeal, I will return – the High Court judge refused the motion and awarded the first defendant his costs and the second defendant his outlay and expenses. The appeal 28. By notice of appeal filed on 5th January, 2026 the plaintiffs appealed against the judgment and order of the High Court on seven numbered grounds, each broken down into a number of sub-grounds. With no disrespect, the grounds of appeal are unfocussed. 29. The first ground is, more or less, that the plaintiffs’ rights, including their Constitutional rights were violated, and their continued survival continues to be at risk, by the refusal of the High Court to grant the injunction sought. The premise of this, of course, is that the plaintiffs made out a case that their lives or health were at risk – or at least that they had made out a fair issue to be tried that their lives or health would be at risk if the injunction was not granted: so that the issue is whether the judge erred in finding that they had not made out a fair question to be tried. 30. The second ground is that the plaintiffs contended that they never stated that the first, second and third defendants use pesticides and slurry lawfully. 31. As far as the third defendant is concerned, and insofar as the plaintiffs motion was based on the spreading of slurry, the appeal can immediately be disposed of. The complaint in relation to the spreading of slurry was only made against the third defendant. The High Court judge had no evidence that the third defendant had been served. That was an essential proof if the High Court was to be asked to make orders against him and in the absence of such proof the judge was unquestionably correct in declining to deal with the application as far as he was concerned. It follows that although the appeal is unopposed by the third defendant, it must nevertheless fail as far as he is concerned. 32. At the oral hearing of the appeal, the plaintiffs emphasised that they are litigants in person and that they had conducted the proceedings to the best of their ability. I accept that the plaintiffs have done their best but the requirement to prove service cannot depend on whether a litigant is represented or unrepresented. Nor, as the plaintiffs seemed to contend, can the requirement to prove service be dispensed with by reason of the nature of the case. Proof of service is not a merely procedural or technical requirement. It is a fundamental principle of the administration of justice that both sides are entitled to be heard. To that end, any plaintiff who seeks orders against someone who has not appeared must prove service in accordance with the rules. 33. As to the first and second defendants’ use of pesticides, the notice of appeal correctly summarised the plaintiffs’ case as being based – all in one breath – on the unlawful use of pesticides causing life-endangering personal injuries, significant property damage and the plaintiffs’ unemployment. While the plaintiffs complained of the “unlawful” use of pesticides, there was no evidence of use otherwise than in accordance with the 2012 Regulations. The fundamental proposition was and is that the defendants’ use of the products has and will continue to endanger the plaintiffs’ health and property. In circumstances in which the judge found that they had not established a fair question to be tried that there was any causal link between the plaintiffs’ admitted medical complaints and the defendants’ admitted use of the pesticides, the issue again becomes whether the High Court judge erred in finding that they had not made out a fair question to be tried. 34. The notice of appeal asserts, at para. 2a, that the overuse and abuse of pesticides is unlawful as per EU pesticide legislation. Accepting that that it so, the case was never made by the plaintiffs that the defendants were overusing or abusing pesticides or – as the High Court judgment records – that the defendants were using the pesticides otherwise than in accordance with the 2012 Regulations. As the plaintiffs put it, their case was based on the “permitted unlawful use of pesticides”. Doing the best I can, their case is that their health has been damaged and is at risk of further damage by the defendants’ use of pesticides in accordance with the 2012 Regulations. 35. According to the notice of appeal, the plaintiffs’ appeal, in bold type, “…is based on the breach of EU pesticide legislation through the Irish State authorities, permitting the harm pesticides cause through overuse and abuse to us plaintiffs, which is a violation of our Constitutional rights.” This is extremely vague, but the suggestion here appears to be that the European Communities (Sustainable Use of Pesticides) Regulations, 2012 (S.I. No. 155) did not achieve the declared object of giving effect to Directive 2009/128/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 October 2009. This complaint is directed to the State authorities rather than the first and second defendants. 36. Leaving aside the absence of any precision as to any alleged shortcomings in the 2012 Regulations, and any issue as to whether any challenge to the validity or sufficiency of the Regulations has been adequately pleaded – which it is not – the underlying factual premise of the action and of the motion is that the 2012 Regulations permit the use of pesticides at a level or in a manner which – contrary to the requirements of the Directive and/or of Regulation EC No 1107/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council concerning the placing of plant protection products on the market – expose the plaintiffs to a risk of harm. This, for present purposes, leads inexorably back to the same proposition: that the High Court judge erred in finding that the plaintiffs had not made out a fair question to be tried as to the causal connection between their medical complaints and the defendants’ use of pesticides. 37. The third ground of appeal – paraphrased – is that the judge erred in not enforcing art. 12 of the 2012 Regulations, which – they allege – prohibits the use of pesticides “in a public space”. This ground is inconsistent with the case made below, which was that the defendants are using products which may be lawfully purchased and used, including on the verge of the road, which is in public ownership. That apart, art. 12 of the 2012 Regulations is directed to the use of pesticides “in areas used by the general public” which the banked grass verge along the public road outside the plaintiffs’ house is not. 38. The fourth ground of appeal is that the order under appeal “does not discuss and acknowledge Breach of EU pesticide legislation carried out by the Irish [S]tate authorities, reason to this appeal.” Again the sub-grounds are very confused but the peroration of this ground is that no law or legislation was enforced protecting the plaintiffs’ life, health and property resulting from breach of EU pesticide legislation. The first point to be made in relation to this ground is that the judge found, at para. 10, that the validity of S.I. No. 155 of 2012 was not challenged in these proceedings. That is clear from the general indorsement of claim. That apart – and leaving aside any question as to whether the Directive or Regulation (EC) No 1107/2009 concerning the placing of plant protection products on the market had direct effect – the lynchpin of the plaintiffs’ case is that the defendants’ use of the of the pesticides was endangering and damaging their health. Thus – as identified by the judge – the critical question on the interlocutory motion was whether the plaintiffs’ had made out a fair question to be tried that this was so. 39. The substance of the fifth ground of appeal is that the judge erred in failing to afford sufficient weight to the photographs exhibited by the plaintiffs. These are said to show the use of pesticides – which they do – and the unlawful use of pesticides – which they do not. The photograph of the gnarled apple gives no clue as to why it is gnarled. The photographs of the dead pets give no clue as to why they died. The demonstrated – and admitted – repeated use of the pesticides does not prove overuse or abuse. Any failure on the part of the Pesticides Control Division of the Department of Agriculture, Food and the Marine to carry out the soil and air tests which the plaintiffs asked should be carried out does not establish that the plaintiffs’ health or property were damaged. 40. The proposition, at ground 5.i, that “the matter of evidence at scientific level is not our responsibility” is wrong in law. The onus was on the plaintiffs to establish that there was a fair question to be tried that the defendants’ use of pesticides was damaging their health and property. This could only have been done by scientific or medical evidence of a causal connection between the two. The suggestion that the Minister did not carry out such testing and assessment of the products as was required by the Directive prior to granting approval was a mere assertion. The photographs of “personal injuries” did show to some extent that the first plaintiff and her daughter had medical conditions but they did not show, and they did not go to show, that those conditions were related to exposure to pesticides or slurry. 41. The sixth ground of appeal is that the judge erred in her interpretation of the case law on which the plaintiffs’ relied. 42. In the High Court, and on the appeal, the plaintiffs relied on two cases. The first was a judgment of the High Court (Barr J.) in John Donnelly & Son Ltd. v. Hoey [2024] IEHC 52, and the second a judgment of the Court of Appeal of ’s- Hertogenbosch in a case reported as Dutch Lilly Farmer ECLI:NL:GHSHE:2025:2043. Both were considered by the High Court judge, who found that they were not of assistance in determining the issues before her. 43. John Donnelly & Son Ltd. was a case in which, following a full trial, the High Court found that apples growing in the plaintiff’s orchard were damaged by spray drift of a herbicide applied to the defendant’s potato crop which was growing in a field across the road from the orchard. That decision was based on a detailed analysis of extensive scientific evidence which Barr J. found established that the damage to the plaintiff’s crop was attributable to spray drift from the defendant’s field. It does not go to the issue in this case as to whether there was spray drift of the pesticides used by the defendants, or, if there was, to whether there was any causal connection between those pesticides and the plaintiffs’ and their daughter’s medical conditions, or the alleged damage to the plaintiffs’ trees. 44. Dutch Lilly Farmer was a case in which the Netherlands court found, on the evidence which had been adduced, that people living in the vicinity of a field which was to be used for growing lilies – and which the farmer proposed to spray weekly with various crop protection products – had established that they would be exposed to a risk of harm from an imminent unlawful act. Before coming to that conclusion, the Court “stated first and foremost that the burden of proof of the existence of an infringement of a (fundamental) right to health, or of an intended act by [the farmer] … rests with the local residents.” The judgment shows that the conclusion was based on extensive expert evidence, including the evidence of an Emeritus Professor of Toxicology, a Professor of Human and Ecological Risk Assessment of Chemical Substances, and a Professor of Environmental Health and Toxicology. 45. This is a case, as Dutch Lilly Farmer was a case, which was based on the apprehension of the plaintiffs that their health would be endangered by the use of pesticides on neighbouring property. But there the similarity ends. If anything, Dutch Lilly Farmer is a case against the plaintiffs in this case because it shows – as the High Court judge found in this case – that the onus of proof is on the plaintiffs, and – as the High Court judge found in this case – that an apprehended risk must have a factual foundation, which factual foundation can only be demonstrated by expert evidence. 46. The seventh ground of appeal complains – I paraphrase – that the judge failed to take into account the fact that Mr. Conroy – according to the plaintiffs – lied in his replying affidavit. This is something that was addressed by the judge, at para. 38, when she said that the plaintiffs appear to be under the misapprehension that their disputing averments of the defendants amounts to proof that the defendants are lying and that the court should discount those averments as untruthful. It is not necessary to attempt to untangle the sub-grounds or to dwell on the detail. The premise of the sub-grounds is that the plaintiffs established that they were exposed to poisoned air and that the Minister permits the overuse and abuse of pesticides. As the High Court judge said, the basis of the allegation of perjury against Mr. Conroy is simply that he disputed the plaintiffs’ allegations. On an interlocutory application such as this, the High Court is not in a position to resolve contested issues of fact. The judge dealt with the core issue by taking the plaintiffs’ evidence at its height. She did not – nor was it necessary to – undertake a microscopic examination of each of the allegations as to the alleged interaction between the plaintiffs and the defendants, specifically the first defendant. As in the High Court, so on the appeal, it is not possible to resolve any contested questions of fact but what can be said is that there is no basis for the plaintiffs’ assertion that Mr. Conroy lied. 47. At the oral hearing of the appeal, the plaintiffs presented their case passionately. The injunction which they sought, they argued, is a matter of life and death; an award of damages would be a wholly inadequate remedy; the balance of hardship was entirely in their favour; and the case they made – which concerned “the permitted unlawful use of pesticides” – was a matter of public interest and public importance. 48. In reply to question from the Court as to where they said the judge had erred in setting out the relevant legal test and then applying it, the plaintiffs contended that the judge had erred in applying the test for an interlocutory injunction when they had applied for a prohibitive permanent injunction. It is true that the order sought by the notice of motion was a prohibitive permanent injunction. That was misconceived. The plaintiffs were not entitled to ask for a summary disposal of their action. The fact that the judge dealt with the motion on the only basis that she legally could have gave the plaintiffs the benefit of the doubt. 49. The photographs exhibited by the plaintiffs did not establish that there was a fair question to be tried that their medical complaints or the complaints about the alleged damage to their trees were attributable to the defendants’ use of pesticides. 50. At the hearing of the appeal the plaintiffs relied in particular on three of the recitals to Regulation (EC) No 1107/2009, namely recital 24 – which requires that when granting authorisation for plant protection products the objective of protecting human health, animal health and the environment should take priority over the objective of improving plant production – recital 35 – that plant protection products should be used properly, in accordance with their authorisation, to ensure a high level of protection of human and animal health and of the environment – and recital 45 – that control and inspection arrangements should ensure correct, safe and harmonised implementation of the requirements laid down in the Regulation in order to ensure a high level of protection of both human and animal health and of the environment. There was – it was said – a huge problem with the 2012 Regulations which were in breach of Regulation 1107/2009 by not prioritising human health. 51. Leaving aside the fact that the ground had not been laid in the pleadings for any such argument, the factual premise of any complaint as to the transposition of the EU Regulation was that the defendants were using the herbicides in accordance with the 2012 Regulations, and so, lawfully. No less, the factual premise of any assertion that either the 2012 Regulation or anything done or not done by the Minister did not prioritise human health, must be that the use of the products properly and in accordance with the authorisation gave rise to a risk to human and animal health and the environment. Absent evidence – as opposed to apprehension or mere assertion – of any risk, the plaintiffs had not established that there was a fair question to be tried. I am satisfied that the High Court judge was quite correct in her conclusion that they had not. 52. In accordance with the directions given as to the filing of submissions, the plaintiffs filed written legal submissions on 26th February, 2026 entitled “Essence of Appeal”. Contrary to Practice Direction CA06 they included in the books of appeal a 48 page submission which strayed far beyond the grounds of appeal but which effectively acknowledged that they had adduced no medical or scientific evidence in support of their claims. Contrary to the plaintiffs’ contention, whatever difficulties they may have encountered in obtaining supportive medical evidence does not absolve them from the onus of proof or give rise to an obligation on the part of the State to undertake testing. Nor does the fact that the plaintiffs may have encountered difficulties in obtaining evidence have the consequence that the onus might somehow have shifted to the defendants to disprove the plaintiffs’ allegations. Nor does it have the effect of transforming an adversarial inter partes hearing into an inquisition by the High Court as to whether or not there might be some basis for what are presented as unsubstantiated apprehension. 53. While it was no part of the grounds of appeal that the hearing in the High Court was unfair or – as the plaintiffs would have it – “inhumane”, I nevertheless reject the suggestion that it was. Specifically, I would endorse the trial judge’s characterisation of the plaintiffs’ attempts to introduce the health conditions of the defendants’ families as frivolous and vexatious. Otherwise, I would disregard the 48 page submission as an impermissible attempt to circumvent the Practice Direction and the directions of the Court of Appeal list judge. 54. I would also disregard in its entirety a book which was filed with the books of appeal which is entitled “Book V: Extended Evidence Book A” which is a printout of 311 pages of copy correspondence, photographs and diary entries which appear to have been uploaded onto ShareFile after the application had been heard on 5th November, 2025. While the plaintiffs seem to attach some significance to the fact that the material was uploaded before the order – which was made on 14th November, 2025 – was perfected on 10th December, 2025, they are fundamentally mistaken. As was explained to the appellants at the hearing of the appeal, the High Court application was heard on 5th November, 2025 by reference to the evidence and arguments then before the court, and judgment was reserved in order that the High Court would decide the case on that basis. The plaintiffs were not thereafter entitled to attempt to adduce further evidence. 55. I would also reject the suggestion that the material which was uploaded onto ShareFile was evidence on the appeal. On an appeal against an interlocutory order it is open to a party to adduce additional evidence: but that must be done properly by filing an additional affidavit or affidavits; exhibiting whatever additional material it is proposed to rely on; and serving the evidence on the opposing party in order that the opposing party will have an opportunity to consider it and to make submissions in relation to it. 56. For completeness I note that the orders sought by the plaintiffs in the event that the appeal were to have been successful are misconceived. This was an interlocutory application and the judge – giving the plaintiffs the benefit of the doubt – dealt with it on that basis. There was no question either in the High Court or on the appeal that the plaintiffs might have been granted permanent injunctions. Similarly – leaving aside the fact that no such relief was sought in the High Court – there was no question of an award of damages or compensation on an interlocutory motion. 57. Finally, I note for the record that after the hearing of the appeal had concluded and the Court had reserved judgment, the plaintiffs attempted to file a 92 page document entitled “Legal Test”. Whatever about the material uploaded onto ShareFile between the date of the hearing before the High Court and the date of perfection of the High Court order, the plaintiffs were well aware before they attempted to file further material after the hearing of the appeal that this was not permissible. The plaintiffs were advised by the Court of Appeal Office that the Court declined to accept the 92 page document and the appeal has been determined without reference to it. 58. The plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate any error in the findings, analysis or conclusion of the High Court. The appeal must be dismissed and the order of the High Court affirmed. 59. The appeal was opposed by Mr. Conroy. While Mr. Duffy attended the oral hearing, he did not file a respondent’s notice and so was not entitled to be heard. If the notice of appeal was served on Mr. McCann, he did not file a respondent’s notice. Mr. Conroy, having been entirely successful in his opposition to the appeal, is presumptively entitled to an order for his costs of the appeal. If the plaintiffs wish to contend for any other costs order, they may notify Mr. Conroy’s solicitors and the Court of Appeal office within fourteen days of the electronic delivery of this judgment, in which event the panel will reconvene for a short costs hearing. 60. As this judgment is being delivered electronically Faherty and Pilkington JJ. have authorised me to say that they agree with it and with the orders proposed.