594710 British Columbia Ltd. v. The Queen

594710 British Columbia Ltd. v. The Queen
Court (s) Database
Tax Court of Canada Judgments
Date
2016-12-15
Neutral citation
2016 TCC 288
File numbers
2013-4033(IT)G
Judges and Taxing Officers
Eugene P. Rossiter
Subjects
Income Tax Act
Decision Content
Docket: 2013-4033(IT)G
BETWEEN:
594710 BRITISH COLUMBIA LTD.,
Appellant,
and
HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN,
Respondent.
Appeal heard on May 9 to 12, 2016, at Vancouver, British Columbia
Before: The Honourable Eugene P. Rossiter, Chief Justice
Appearances:
Counsel for the Appellant:
Steven Cook
S. Natasha Reid
Counsel for the Respondent:
Robert Carvalho
Perry Derksen
Whitney Dunn
JUDGMENT
The appeal from the assessment made under the Income Tax Act for the 2006 taxation year is allowed and the decision of the Minister of National Revenue is vacated with costs to the Appellant.
Signed at Ottawa, Canada, this 15th day of December, 2016.
“E.P. Rossiter”
Rossiter C.J.
Outline of Reasons
I. Overview: 1
II. Facts: 2
A. General: 2
B. The Partnerco Reassessment: 14
C. The Appellant’s Reassessment: 14
III. Issues: 15
IV. Analysis: 16
A. Compliance with the Large Corporation Rules: 16
B. Compliance of Assessments with applicable limitation period: 19
C. Other Questions as to Validity of the Assessments: 22
D. Application of the GAAR: 24
(1) General Principles 24
(2) Partnerco Reassessment 28
(a) Existence of a Tax Benefit 28
(b) Existence of an Avoidance Transaction 30
(c) Misuse or abuse 30
(i) Section 111 31
(ii) Subsections 69(11) & 83(2.1) 36
(iii) Section 103 37
(iv) Other Provisions 38
(d) Reasonable tax consequences 41
(3) Holdco Assessment 43
(a) Existence of a Tax Benefit 43
(i) Issuance of stock dividends 44
(ii) Redemption of the preferred shares 45
(iii) Purchase of Partnerco and the Nuinsco Loan 47
(b) Existence of an Avoidance Transaction 50
(c) Misuse or abuse 50
(i) The Purpose of Section 160 50
(ii) Abuse of section 160 53
V. Conclusion 56
Citation: 2016 TCC 288
Date: 20161215
Docket: 2013-4033(IT)G
BETWEEN:
594710 BRITISH COLUMBIA LTD.,
Appellant,
and
HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN,
Respondent.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
Rossiter C.J.
I. Overview:
[1] This case concerns a tax plan allegedly straddling the line between astute and abusive tax avoidance.
[2] This tax plan involved a host of players. At the bottom was a partnership engaged in the business of real estate. The partnership had four corporate limited partners and one general partner. Each limited partner was wholly owned by a different holding corporation. The holding corporations in turn were wholly owned, each by a different member of the De Cotiis family. The Appellant is one of these holding corporations.
[3] In the absence of any planning, the partnership’s income would have been allocated to its corporate partners, who would have paid tax thereon. Instead, the plan allowed the cash from the partnership to be extracted tax-free to the holding corporations, while for tax purposes the partnership’s income was allocated almost entirely to an arm’s length corporation. This arm’s length corporation had accumulated losses and resource expenses sufficient to reduce the tax payable on that income.
[4] In deciding the outcome of this case, I have to determine the correctness of two applications by the Minister of the general anti-avoidance rule (“GAAR”), contained in section 245 of the Income Tax Act (“the Act”). [1] The first application occurred at the limited partner level, where the Minister applied the GAAR on the basis that the tax plan abused a general policy in the Act against “reverse loss trading” or “reverse resource deduction trading”. As a result, the Minister allocated the partnership income back to the limited partners. On the basis of the consequent tax debt arising in the hands of the limited partners, the Minister applied the GAAR at the holding corporation level, reassessing the Appellant under the GAAR on the basis that the Appellant circumvented and abused section 160 of the Act, which, had it applied, would have caused the Appellant to be jointly and severally liable for the tax debt of its wholly owned subsidiary (who was a limited partner). As a result, the Minister applied the GAAR to hold the Appellant so liable under section 160 of the Act.
[5] The Appellant’s tax liability under its GAAR reassessment is predicated on the GAAR having been applied correctly in the reassessment of the limited partner, of which it was the owner. The correctness of both reassessments is at issue. The Respondent must win on both in order for the appeal to be dismissed.
[6] For the reasons that follow, I would allow the appeal and vacate the assessment of the Appellant.
II. Facts:
A. General:
[7] The parties filed an Agreed Statement of Facts on April 28, 2016, which was supplemented during the course of the trial by brief viva voce evidence and a few discovery read-ins.
[8] Onni Halifax Development Limited Partnership (“HLP”) was a limited partnership created on July 16, 2003, to carry out a strata development project called the Marquis Grande.
[9] The Marquis Grande was a project of the Onni Group, a group of companies in business of real estate development. The principals of the Onni Group are the four De Cotiis siblings and their father. One of the siblings, Rossano De Cotiis, wholly owned the Appellant, a Canadian-controlled private corporation (“CCPC”) incorporated in 1999. The Appellant in turn wholly owned 671705 British Columbia Ltd., incorporated on June 17, 2003. 671705 British Columbia Ltd. held a 24.975 percent limited partnership interest in HLP, entitling it to a corresponding percent of HLP’s income or loss. It had three other limited partners, each indirectly owned by another sibling using an analogous ownership structure to Rossano’s. The sole business of each of the partner corporations was participation in HLP.
[10] The general partner of HLP was Onni Development (Halifax) Corp (“GPCo”). GPCo was wholly owned by Rossano and held a 0.1 percent general partnership interest in HLP.
[11] In summary, there were four separate limited partners, each owning a 24.975 percent limited partnership interest in HLP. “Partnercos” in the plural refers to these limited partners collectively, while “Partnerco” in the singular refers to 671705 British Columbia Ltd. Each of the Partnercos was wholly owned by a separate holding corporation, one of which was the Appellant. “Holdcos” in the plural refers to these holding corporations collectively. The ownership structure may be described as follows:
Ownership structure
Individual owners
Sibling 1
↓
Sibling 2
↓
Sibling 3
↓
Sibling 4
↓
Holding corporations (“Holdcos”)
594710 BC Ltd. (Appellant)
↓
↓
594702 BC Ltd
↓
594705 BC Ltd
↓
594708 BC Ltd
↓
Partner corporations
(“Partnercos”)
671705 BC Ltd. (Partnerco)
↓
GPCo
↓
Onni Deal
671711 BC Ltd
↓
671709 BC Ltd
↓
671706 BC Ltd
↓
Limited partnership
HLP
[12] 0757588 B.C. Ltd. (“Onni Newco”) was incorporated on May 12, 2006 and its shares were held equally by the Holdcos.
[13] Nuinsco Resources Limited (“Nuinsco”) is a Canadian public corporation that eventually purchased all the shares of the Partnercos. Nuinsco’s business was mining. The parties are agreed that it dealt at arm’s length with the Holdcos at all material times. At the beginning of its taxation year ending December 31, 2006, Nuinsco had non-capital losses of approximately $3.4 million and resource‑related deductions of approximately $18.85 million available from prior taxation years. Nuinsco’s resource-related deductions were from Canadian exploration expenses (“CEE”) and Canadian development expenses (“CDE”). During its 2006 taxation year, Nuinsco incurred additional CEE of $3.6 million. These amounts are collectively referred to as the “tax pools”.
[14] The fiscal year ends of the entities involved were as follows:
Holdcos December 31
Partnercos April 30
HLP May 31
Nuinsco December 31
[15] As of May 25, 2006, six of the strata units developed in the Marquis Grande remained unsold. HLP’s income for the 2006 fiscal period as of May 25, 2006 was projected to be $12,999,076. These projections were made up of accrued income of $12,136,180, plus projected income of at least $863,546 from the sale of six remaining units. If this income was allocated directly to the Partnercos at HLP’s fiscal year end, then each Partnerco would have realized $3,246,694 of income, resulting in tax payable of $1,107,772. In other words, net of tax, each Partnerco would have received $2,138,922.
[16] Instead, the following transactions were undertaken: [2]
Step 1: On May 25, 2006 the Appellant subscribed for ten additional common shares of Partnerco for $15,391, paid for by set-off against a debt owed by Partnerco to the Appellant.
The Appellant
Partnerco
Partnerco
Additional common shares issued in payment of debt owing $15,931
But for the application of the GAAR, the tax consequence arising from the capitalization of the $15,931 debt owing by Partnerco to the Appellant would have been to increase the ACB of the common shares held by the Appellant in Partnerco by $15,931.
Step 2: On May 25, 2006, HLP lent $2,118,510 in cash to each Partnerco (the “Partnerco Loan”). The four Partnerco Loans totalled $8,474,040.
Step 3: Partnerco declared and paid a series of sequential stock dividends to the Appellant, totalling 2,118,510 Class A Preferred Shares to the Appellant, each with paid-up capital and redemption amount of $1.00 per share (the “First Stock Dividend”).
The aggregate amount of the First Stock Dividend ($2,118,510) represented the estimated after-tax value of the issued shares of Partnerco and was approximately equal to Partnerco’s after-tax share of HLP’s projected income.
The parties agree that the Partnerco Loan was made before the First Stock Dividend was issued. [3] The parties also agree that at the time the assessment of the Appellant, the Minister accepted that the fair market value of the First Stock Dividend was $2,118,510, which was equivalent to the estimated fair market value of the issued common shares of each Partnerco as of May 25, 2006.
Before After
The Appellant
The Appellant
The Appellant
The Appellant
p/s c/s p/s
Partnerco
Partnerco
Partnerco
Partnerco
But for the application of the GAAR, the tax consequences arising on the payment of the First Stock Dividend were as follows:
a) the issuance of Class A Preferred Shares resulted in a dividend to the Appellant of $2,118,510;
b) the amount of the dividend was includable in the taxable income of the Appellant, but also deductible in computing taxable income as an intercorporate dividend;
c) the Appellant was deemed to have acquired the Class A Preferred Shares at an ACB of $2,118,510.
Step 4: On May 25, 2006 Partnerco used the proceeds from the Partnerco Loan to redeem the Class A Preferred Shares issued in the First Stock Dividend for $2,118,510.
Before After
The Appellant
The Appellant
The Appellant
The Appellant
Redemption of 2,118,510
Class A shares by payment of
$2,118,510
Partnerco
Partnerco
Partnerco
Partnerco
c/s p/s c/s
HLP
HLP
Loan of $2,118,510
But for the application of GAAR, the tax consequences of redemption of the Class A Preferred shares were as follows:
a) there was no deemed dividend received by the Appellant;
b) the Appellant disposed of its Class A Preferred shares with ACB of $2,118,510 for proceeds of disposition of $2,118,510, resulting in no gain or loss.
Step 5: The following additional transactions were undertaken:
a) On May 25, 2006, Onni Development loaned $3,051,400 to HLP (the “ODC Loan”). The unsold strata units held by HLP were provided as security for the ODC Loan.
b) On May 25, 2006, HLP entered into a management agreement with Onni Property Management, a member of the Onni Group, under which Onni Property Management would provide certain marketing and management services to HLP relating to, inter alia, the sale of the unsold strata units and remedial work.
c) On May 29, 2006, HLP entered into a Put Agreement (the “Put Agreement”) with Onni Newco, under which HLP acquired an option to sell its remaining inventory of strata units to Onni Newco at an aggregate price of $3,051,400.
Step 6: On May 26, 2006, Partnerco declared a stock dividend to the Appellant, paid by issuing 851,863 Class A Preferred Shares with aggregate paid-up capital and a redemption amount of $851,863 (the “Second Stock Dividend”).
Similar to the issuance of the First Stock Dividend, the tax consequences but for the application of the GAAR were as follows:
a) the issuance of the Second Stock Dividend resulted in a dividend to the Appellant of $851,863. This amount was includable in the income of the Appellant, but also deductible in computing taxable income as an intercorporate dividend;
b) the Appellant was deemed to have acquired the Class A Preferred Shares at an ACB of $851,863.
Step 7: The Nuinsco Acquisition
On May 29, 2006, each Holdco (including the Appellant) sold all of the shares of its respective Partnerco to Nuinsco (the “Nuinsco Acquisition”). In particular, each Holdco sold its Class A Preferred Shares received from the Second Stock Dividend for $851,863 and the common shares of its Partnerco for $15,391. Concurrently, Nuinsco acquired all of the shares of GPco for $1.
The aggregate cost to Nuinsco of the share purchases was $3,469,017. [4]
Step 8: At the time of the Nuinsco Acquisition, Halifax LP had cash on hand of $4,443,957. On May 29, 2006, HLP agreed to loan this amount to Nuinsco, and on May 30, 2006, advanced such amount (the “Nuinsco Loan”).
At all material times, Nuinsco was not related to, and dealt at arm’s length with, the Holdcos for the purposes of the Act.
Before After
The Appellant
The Appellant
$851,863 + $15,391
Nuinsco
Nuinsco
Sale of common and Class A
Preferred Shares
Partnerco
Partnerco
Partnerco
Partnerco
Halifax LP
Halifax LP
$4,443,397 cash on hand $4,443,397 cash on hand
6 strata units 6 strata units
But for the application of the GAAR, the following tax consequences arose:
a) The Appellant realized proceeds of $851,863 for its Class A Preferred Shares of Partnerco and proceeds of $15,931 for its common shares of Partnerco, but no gain or loss was realized since the ACB equaled the proceeds of disposition for both classes of shares;
b) There was an acquisition of control of Partnerco by Nuinsco on May 29, 2006 such that Partnerco had a deemed year end on May 28, 2006; and,
c) No income from HLP was allocable to Partnerco for its taxation year now ending May 28, 2006.
Step 9: On May 30, 2006, each Partnerco was wound up into Nuinsco. Consequently, Nuinsco assumed the liabilities of each Partnerco and was admitted as the sole limited partner of HLP. Nuinsco’s indebtedness to HLP totalled $12,917,997. [5]
Step 10: On May 31, 2006, HLP allocated its net income of $12,136,180 to Nuinsco and GPCo in accordance with their partnership interests.
But for the application of GAAR, the tax consequences would be as follows:
a) $12,124,045 or 99.9% would be allocated to Nuinsco;
b) Nuinsco would be entitled to deduct CEE of $9,198,443 when determining income and also entitled to deduct available non-capital losses of $3,398,699 when computing taxable income for its 2006 year.
c) $12,136 or 0.1% would be allocated to GPCo.
Nuinsco
a) May 30 Wind up of Partnercos into Nuinsco
Partnerco
Partnerco
671709
671709
671708
671708
671706
671706
99.9%
b) May 31 Nuinsco is
HLP
allocated HLP income:
$12,124,045 (99.9% of $12,136,180)
Step 11: On June 1, 2006 each Partnerco was dissolved.
Step 12: On June 1, 2006, HLP declared distributions to Nuinsco and GPCo as follows:
$12,041,997 was distributed to Nuinsco, satisfied by set-off against the debt owing by Nuinsco to HLP, which would reduce the debt to $876,000; and,
$12,054 was distributed to GPCo, satisfied by assigning a portion of Nuinsco’s indebtedness to GPCo (this would further reduce Nuinsco’s indebtedness to HLP to $863,946)
Step 13: Between June 14 and 16, 2006, HLP sold its remaining six units by transferring one unit to an arm’s length purchaser and exercising its option to sell the other five units to Onni Newco. Consequently, HLP realized net income of $863,546, as projected, in its fiscal year starting June 1, 2006.
HLP allocated the net income of $863,546 to Nuinsco and GPCo in accordance with their partnership interests (99.9% to Nuinsco and 0.1% to GPCo).
Step 14: On June 26, 2006, HLP declared the following distributions:
· $400 to Nuinsco as a return of capital contribution
· $862,683 to Nuinsco, satisfied by set-off against Nuinsco’s indebtedness to the HLP
· $863 to GPCo, satisfied by assigning to GPCo Nuinsco’s indebtedness to HLP.
The result of these distributions was to reduce Nuinsco’s debt to HLP to nil, and to increase Nuinsco’s debt to GPCo to $12,917.
Step 15: On June 28, 2006, GPCo declared a dividend to Nuinsco of $8,483, paid by set-off against Nuinsco’s debt of $12,917. The remaining $4,434 owed to GPCo represented GPCo’s estimated tax liability on its 0.1% share of the HLP income.
Step 16: On June 28, 2006, HLP was dissolved.
[17] The Minister assumed that these transactions formed a pre-ordained series of transactions. Additionally, the Minister assumed that all of the aforementioned steps were avoidance transactions. [6] The parties agree that the following steps formed a series of transactions for the purposes of the GAAR: steps 1, 2, 3, 4, 5a, 5b, 5c, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, the exercise of the Put Agreement and the allocation of HLP’s income from the sale of its remaining inventory in step 13, 14, and 16.
[18] Evidence was given by Mr. Les Fovenyi, the current Chief Operating Officer of the Onni Group, in relation to the strategies of the Onni Group before 2000 and after 2011, those being the periods of time during which he was involved with the Onni Group. He was not employed by the Onni Group during the period of time during which the transactions occurred.
[19] Based on his testimony and supporting documentary evidence, it appears that the limited partnership structure was adopted from the beginning and throughout the years in question for several reasons:
A. The use of a corporation instead of a partnership in the past was problematic because dissenting shareholders could cause severe financial problems;
B. There was a desire to mitigate the risk as to which parties would participate in which project;
C. A general Partnerco could exercise a fair degree of control over the development and ensure the project was finished.
D. There were nuances put into the limited partnership agreement, since the partners were family. There was a provision regarding excess capital, whereby any partner who refused to put up additional capital that might be required for a project, agreed to allow other partners to contribute that capital for them and to earn a 20 percent return on that excess capital injection. There was a provision prohibiting any partner from placing any lien on the project at any time for any reason prior to its completion.
E. The individual principals held shares of the Partnercos through a holding corporation to mitigate risk, since the principals were very hands-on throughout their participation in various development projects.
F. Capital preservation, financing, and flexibility was important. There were multiple risks involved in projects, from market risk to financing risk, so there was a need for a structure known in secondary lending markets in case capital needed to be raised quickly.
[20] As the Appellant has sought to argue that both the reassessment of Partnerco and the assessment of the Appellant were statute-barred, I will set out the facts relating to both reassessments.
B. The Partnerco Reassessment:
[21] The parties agree that there was an acquisition of control of Partnerco by Nuinsco on May 29, 2006. But for the application of the GAAR, Partnerco would have had a shortened taxation year from May 1, 2006 to May 28, 2006 (the “Initial Period”) pursuant to subsection 249(4) of the Act.
[22] Partnerco duly filed a tax return for the Initial Period, reporting no income. The Minister initially assessed this fiscal period on December 21, 2006. The parties agree that, but for the application of GAAR, the normal reassessment period for this fiscal period expired on December 21, 2009.
[23] As Partnerco was dissolved on June 1, 2006, a tax return was also filed for the period from May 29, 2006 to June 1, 2006 (the “Second Period”), in which no income was reported. The Minister initially assessed this fiscal period on February 27, 2007.
[24] Throughout the Second Period, Partnerco was no longer a CCPC, as it was owned by Nuinsco, a public corporation.
[25] The Minister reassessed Partnerco on February 23, 2011 (the “Partnerco Reassessment”). In it, the Minister applied GAAR to include what would have been Partnerco’s share of HLP’s income had the tax plan not been carried out. This income inclusion totalled $3,246,694. This income was included for a notional taxation period purporting to span from May 1, 2006 to June 1, 2006.
C. The Appellant’s Reassessment:
[26] In its tax return for the year ending December 31, 2006, the Appellant reported nil income from the First and Second Stock Dividends and from the disposition of its shares of Partnerco to Nuinsco.
[27] The Appellant was initially assessed on August 15, 2007. Consequently, the normal reassessment period expired on August 15, 2010.
[28] On August 3, 2010, the Appellant filed a waiver of the normal reassessment period pursuant to subparagraph 152(4)(a)(ii) of the Act.
[29] On November 7, 2011, the Appellant filed a notice of revocation of waiver, and the Minister acknowledged receipt of such notice on November 14, 2011. Pursuant to subsection 152(4.1) of the Act, the revocation became effective on May 7, 2012.
[30] The Minister assessed the Appellant again on July 11, 2013 (the “Holdco Assessment”). It is this assessment that is under appeal. In it, the Minister applied GAAR on the basis that the Appellant abused section 160 of the Act. In the result, section 160 was applied to the Appellant to hold it jointly and severally liable for Partnerco’s tax debt under the Partnerco Reassessment. The Appellant’s Reassessment assessed an aggregate amount of $1,801,406.62 of tax, interest, and penalties.
[31] The Appellant filed a Notice of Objection on July 23, 2013. The Appellant was a large corporation during its 2006 taxation year.
III. Issues:
[32] The issues that I must decide are:
· Whether the Appellant’s failure to raise the issue of the validity of the Partnerco Reassessment or the Holdco Assessment in its Notice of Objection precludes it from raising this issue before the Court;
· If not, whether the Partnerco Reassessment or the Holdco Assessment is statute-barred;
· Whether the GAAR was applied properly in the Partnerco Reassessment to include $3,246,694 in Partnerco’s income; and,
· If so, whether the GAAR was applied properly in the Holdco Assessment to cause the Appellant to be liable under subsection 160(1) for Partnerco’s tax liability.
[33] If the Appellant wins on any of the last three issues, the appeal must be allowed and the Holdco Assessment vacated.
IV. Analysis:
A. Compliance with the Large Corporation Rules:
[34] The Appellant has raised the question of whether the Partnerco and Holdco assessments were issued outside the normal reassessment period for their respective taxpayers. If so, the Appellant submits that they would be void absent compliance with subsection 152(4).
[35] The Respondent has objected to the Appellant’s raising this argument on the basis that it did not form part of the issues raised in its Notice of Objection. As the issue in question was not provided for in the manner stipulated by subsection 165(1.11) of the Act, the Appellant is alleged to be precluded from raising on appeal whether the reassessments were statute-barred, pursuant to subsection 169(2.1).
[36] The relevant provisions of the Act read as follows:
Assessment and reassessment
152(4) The Minister may at any time make an assessment, reassessment or additional assessment of tax for a taxation year, interest or penalties, if any, payable under this Part by a taxpayer or notify in writing any person by whom a return of income for a taxation year has been filed that no tax is payable for the year, except that an assessment, reassessment or additional assessment may be made after the taxpayer’s normal reassessment period in respect of the year only if
(a) the taxpayer or person filing the return
(i) has made any misrepresentation that is attributable to neglect, carelessness or wilful default or has committed any fraud in filing the return or in supplying any information under this Act, or
(ii) has filed with the Minister a waiver in prescribed form within the normal reassessment period for the taxpayer in respect of the year; or
(b) the assessment, reassessment or additional assessment is made before the day that is 3 years after the end of the normal reassessment period for the taxpayer in respect of the year and
(i) is required pursuant to subsection (6) or would be so required if the taxpayer had claimed an amount by filing the prescribed form referred to in that subsection on or before the day referred to therein,
(ii) is made as a consequence of the assessment or reassessment pursuant to this paragraph or subsection (6) of tax payable by another taxpayer,
(iii) is made as a consequence of a transaction involving the taxpayer and a non-resident person with whom the taxpayer was not dealing at arm’s length,
(iii.1) is made, if the taxpayer is non-resident and carries on a business in Canada, as a consequence of
(A) an allocation by the taxpayer of revenues or expenses as amounts in respect of the Canadian business (other than revenues and expenses that relate solely to the Canadian business, that are recorded in the books of account of the Canadian business, and the documentation in support of which is kept in Canada), or
(B) a notional transaction between the taxpayer and its Canadian business, where the transaction is recognized for the purposes of the computation of an amount under this Act or an applicable tax treaty.
(iv) is made as a consequence of a payment or reimbursement of any income or profits tax to or by the government of a country other than Canada or a government of a state, province or other political subdivision of any such country,
(v) is made as a consequence of a reduction under subsection 66(12.73) of an amount purported to be renounced under section 66, or
(vi) is made in order to give effect to the application of subsection 118.1(15) or (16).
…
Objections by large corporations
165(1.11) Where a corporation that was a large corporation in a taxation year (within the meaning assigned by subsection 225.1(8)) objects to an assessment under this Part for the year, the notice of objection shall
(a) reasonably describe each issue to be decided;
(b) specify in respect of each issue, the relief sought, expressed as the amount of a change in a balance (within the meaning assigned by subsection 152(4.4)) or a balance of undeducted outlays, expenses or other amounts of the corporation; and
(c) provide facts and reasons relied on by the corporation in respect of each issue.
…
Limitation on appeals by large corporations
169(2.1) Notwithstanding subsections (1) and (2), where a corporation that was a large corporation in a taxation year (within the meaning assigned by subsection 225.1(8)) served a notice of objection to an assessment under this Part for the year, the corporation may appeal to the Tax Court of Canada to have the assessment vacated or varied only with respect to
(a) an issue in respect of which the corporation has complied with subsection 165(1.11) in the notice, or
(b) an issue described in subsection 165(1.14) where the corporation did not, because of subsection 165(7), serve a notice of objection to the assessment that gave rise to the issue
and, in the case of an issue described in paragraph (a), the corporation may so appeal only with respect to the relief sought in respect of the issue as specified by the corporation in the notice.
[37] In Blackburn Radio [7] and in Canadian Marconi [8] the FCA confirms that an out of time assessment is void. Section 169.1 is only aimed at precluding the TCC from doing anything but vacating or varying an assessment or reassessment. The TCC cannot vary or vacate an assessment or reassessment if it is void because it is void from the beginning and does not exist – the assessment or reassessment is simply not given effect.
[38] Also subsection 152(8) does not apply to an out of time assessment as per Lornport Investments. [9]
B. Compliance of Assessments with applicable limitation period:
[39] The Appellant would contend that the Partnerco reassessment is statute‑barred. The issue is a relatively straight-forward matter of statutory interpretation and its application to the facts.
[40] The Appellant’s position on this issue is that subsection 152(4) limits the Minister’s power to raise a reassessment “after the taxpayer’s normal reassessment period in respect of the year”. The Appellant submits that the Partnerco reassessment is in respect of Partnerco’s two taxation periods up to June 1, 2006. While the Appellant’s arguments seek to interpret the phrase “in respect of” so as to show that the Partnerco reassessment is in respect of the Initial Period, this approaches the question without the full context of subsection 152(4).
[41] Subsection 152(4) reads as follows:
Assessment and reassessment
(4) The Minister may at any time make an assessment, reassessment or additional assessment of tax for a taxation year, interest or penalties, if any, payable under this Part by a taxpayer or notify in writing any person by whom a return of income for a taxation year has been filed that no tax is payable for the year, except that an assessment, reassessment or additional assessment may be made after the taxpayer’s normal reassessment period in respect of the year only if
(a) the taxpayer or person filing the return
(i) has made any misrepresentation that is attributable to neglect, carelessness or wilful default or has committed any fraud in filing the return or in supplying any information under this Act, or
(ii) has filed with the Minister a waiver in prescribed form within the normal reassessment period for the taxpayer in respect of the year; or
(b) the assessment, reassessment or additional assessment is made before the day that is 3 years after the end of the normal reassessment period for the taxpayer in respect of the year and
(i) is required pursuant to subsection (6) or would be so required if the taxpayer had claimed an amount by filing the prescribed form referred to in that subsection on or before the day referred to therein,
(ii) is made as a consequence of the assessment or reassessment pursuant to this paragraph or subsection (6) of tax payable by another taxpayer,
(iii) is made as a consequence of a transaction involving the taxpayer and a non-resident person with whom the taxpayer was not dealing at arm’s length,
(iii.1) is made, if the taxpayer is non-resident and carries on a business in Canada, as a consequence of
(A) an allocation by the taxpayer of revenues or expenses as amounts in respect of the Canadian business (other than revenues and expenses that relate solely to the Canadian business, that are recorded in the books of account of the Canadian business, and the documentation in support of which is kept in Canada), or
(B) a notional transaction between the taxpayer and its Canadian business, where the transaction is recognized for the purposes of the computation of an amount under this Act or an applicable tax treaty.
(iv) is made as a consequence of a payment or reimbursement of any income or profits tax to or by the government of a country other than Canada or a government of a state, province or other political subdivision of any such country,
(v) is made as a consequence of a reduction under subsection 66(12.73) of an amount purported to be renounced under section 66, or
(vi) is made in order to give effect to the application of subsection 118.1(15) or (16).
[42] The numerous references to "the year" in this provision all refer to the same year; specifically, "the year" takes its meaning from the beginning of the subsection, which refers to the "taxation year" for which the Minister may otherwise "at any time make an assessment, reassessment […, etc.]". Thus, when the subsection refers to a “year” in respect of which the Minister may be precluded from assessing after the normal reassessment period, it is referring to this taxation year (in our case, the Partnerco taxation year ending June 1, 2006).
[43] The question then becomes whether the Partnerco reassessment is also a reassessment for the Initial Period. The language “in respect of” may only be of use to the Appellant if it is first demonstrated that the Partnerco reassessment amounts to a reassessment of both the Initial Period and the Notional Period.
[44] The Partnerco reassessment is unquestionably a reassessment for Partnerco’s taxation year ending June 1, 2006. In invoking the GAAR to determine the tax consequences to Partnerco as if that taxation year had begun on May 1, 2006, was the Minister assessing for a different taxation year than that assessed on February 27, 2007?
[45] The Partnerco reassessment is a reassessment for the taxation year ending June 1, 2006, and this is not altered by the fact that the Minister has reassessed Partnerco to include the tax consequences of transactions that would have otherwise fallen outside of the taxation year.
[46] The Partnerco reassessment is not a reassessment of Partnerco’s taxation year ending May 28, 2006. As a result, the issuance of the Partnerco reassessment, if it is a reassessment for the year ending June 1, 2006, and not an additional assessment, nullifies the assessment dated February 27, 2007. [10] It does not have the effect of nullifying the assessment of Partnerco made December 21, 2006, for the taxation year ending May 28, 2006. As there was no income declared by Partnerco in that period, it is not necessary to consider how the Minister ought to take into account taxes owing under another assessment in determining the reasonable tax consequences of a proper GAAR reassessment.
[47] I would have therefore concluded that the Partnerco reassessment was valid and timely.
[48] The Appellant also contends that the Holdco Assessment was a reassessment of its 2006 taxation year and not an assessment under section 160. As such, the Appellant submits that it was issued outside of the normal reassessment period, which it submits is contained in section 152. For reasons elaborated in the next section, I find this argument linked to the “stacking” of GAAR assessments on top of each other, and I deal with it below.
C. Other Questions as to Validity of the Assessments:
[49] The Appellant has submitted that the reassessment made of it is invalid for several additional reasons. Among other reasons, it has submitted that it cannot be assessed for liability under GAAR as a consequence of an amount of tax owing due to the invocation of the GAAR against another taxpayer.
[50] More specifically, the Appellant points to the wording of subsection 245(2) of the Act, noting that the tax consequences to be determined as a result of its operation should deny a tax benefit that, “but for this section, would result, directly or indirectly, from that [avoidance] transaction or from a series of transactions that includes that transaction.” The Appellant is of the view that this mandates the Court to apply the GAAR to it in a manner that ignores the application of section 245 to Partnerco (or, presumably, any other taxpayer).
[51] I disagree. The Appellant overlooks the fact that the Minister is to assess or reassess each taxpayer separately under the Act, even related parties. While the Minister cannot stack GAAR assessments with respect to the same taxpayer, the Appellant’s interpretation would require the Court to take notice of how the Act applies to a third party to the proceeding in interpreting how the Act applies to the taxpayer before the Court without any explicit mandate to do so. Simply because the Appellant is entitled in this derivative liability assessment to contest the validity of the Partnerco reassessment does not mean that the Appellant is thereby entitled to conflate the two assessments in interpreting the Act.
[52] The Supreme Court of Canada, in Copthorne, identified the framework through which the GAAR should be applied, as follows: [11]
72 The analysis will then lead to a finding of abusive tax avoidance: (1) where the transaction achieves an outcome the statutory provision was intended to prevent; (2) where the transaction defeats the underlying rationale of the provision; or (3) where the transaction circumvents the provision in a manner that frustrates or defeats its object, spirit or purpose (Trustco, at para. 45; Lipson, at para. 40). These considerations are not independent of one another and may overlap. At this stage, the Minister must clearly demonstrate that the transaction is an abuse of the Act, and the benefit of the doubt is given to the taxpayer.
[53] The question is therefore whether, read without reference to subsection 245(2) of the Act, there would be a tax benefit accruing to the Appellant as a result of an avoidance transaction or as a result of a series of transactions of which an avoidance transaction is part. The Appellant’s interpretation could result in the Minister being unable to prevent abusive tax avoidance so long as it is subsidiary to and arising out of another abusive tax avoidance transaction.
[54] The phrase “but for this section” contained in section 245 provides that the assessment of any tax benefit is done without factoring in the automatic application of subsection 245(2). This avoids the internal contradiction that would otherwise arise.
[55] Furthermore, I accept that the tax consequences of the application of the GAAR to the Appellant may only be determined through the methods cited in subsection 245(7) of the Act. One of them can conceivably be an assessment under subsection 160(2) of the Act. By invoking the GAAR, the Minister is able to ensure that the Appellant is rendered liable under subsection 160(1) for the tax debt of Partnerco as part of the reasonable tax consequences designed to prevent the abusive tax avoidance in question. Following the recognition of this liability, the Minister may properly assess the Appellant under subsection 160(2). This is what the Minister did in this case.
D. Application of the GAAR:
(1) General Principles
[56] One of the most recent concise summaries of the applicable principles involving the GAAR is contained in the decision of the Ontario Court of Appeal in Inter-Leasing: [12]
49 For the GAAR to apply, there must be:
(1) a tax benefit resulting from a transaction or part of a series of transactions;
(2) an avoidance transaction in the sense that the transaction cannot be said to have been reasonably undertaken or arranged primarily for a bona fide purpose other than to obtain a tax benefit and
(3) abusive tax avoidance in the sense that it cannot be reasonably concluded that a tax benefit would be consistent with the object, spirit or purpose of the provisions relied on by the taxpayer.
50 The onus is on the Respondent to establish that the tax avoidance was abusive. If the existence of abusive tax avoidance is unclear, the benefit of the doubt goes to the taxpayer.
51 As explained at para. 66 of Canada Trustco, courts must apply a purposive approach in interpreting the provisions giving rise to the tax benefit:
4. The courts proceed by conducting a unified textual, contextual and purposive analysis of the provisions giving rise to the tax benefit in order to determine why they were put in pla