Pembina County Water, Resource District v. Manitoba

Pembina County Water, Resource District v. Manitoba
Court (s) Database
Federal Court Decisions
Date
2016-06-02
Neutral citation
2016 FC 618
File numbers
T-745-04
Notes
A correction was made on June 21, 2016.
Decision Content
Date: 20160602
Docket: T-745-04
Citation: 2016 FC 618
Ottawa, Ontario, June 2, 2016
PRESENT: The Honourable Mr. Justice Russell
BETWEEN:
PEMBINA COUNTY WATER
RESOURCE DISTRICT, NORTH DAKOTA,
CITY OF PEMBINA, NORTH DAKOTA,
TOWNSHIP OF PEMBINA, NORTH DAKOTA,
TOWNSHIP OF WALHALLA, NORTH DAKOTA,
CITY OF NECHE, NORTH DAKOTA,
TOWNSHIP OF NECHE, NORTH DAKOTA,
TOWNSHIP OF FELSON, NORTH DAKOTA,
TOWNSHIP OF ST. JOSEPH, NORTH DAKOTA, TIMOTHY L. WILWAND,
DENNIS K. SCHALER,
RICHARD MARGERUM AND
VERLINDA MARGERUM
Plaintiffs
and
GOVERNMENT OF MANITOBA, AND
RURAL MUNICIPALITY OF RHINELAND
Defendants
ORDER AND REASONS
I. THE MOTIONS [1] The Defendant, Rural Municipality of Rhineland [Rhineland], is seeking an order that the Plaintiffs’ Amended Statement of Claim be struck out as against Rhineland on the grounds that the Federal Court does not have jurisdiction over the subject matter of the Amended Statement of Claim.
[2] The Defendant, Government of Manitoba [Manitoba], is also seeking an order that the Amended Statement of Claim be struck out as against Manitoba on the grounds that the matters in the Amended Statement of Claim are not within the jurisdiction of the Federal Court. In addition, Manitoba also seeks to amend its Statement of Defence to add the following defence:
13. In response to the allegations in paragraph 15 of the Amended Statement of Claim and in reply to the Amended Statement of Claim as a whole, Manitoba states that section 4 of The International Boundary Water Treaty Act applies only to waters which in their natural channels would flow across the international boundary from Canada to the United States. The allegations in the Amended Statement of Claim involve only waters which are alleged to flow in their natural channels across the international boundary from the United States to Canada. Accordingly, the Federal Court does not have jurisdiction over the claims in this action. Manitoba pleads and relies on sections 4 and 5 of The International Boundary Water Treaty Act.
[3] It is clear that the purpose and focus of both motions is the termination of this action on the grounds that the subject matter of the Plaintiffs’ claim does not fall within the jurisdiction of the Federal Court.
II. BACKGROUND [4] This action was commenced in April 2004 and involves certain embankments within the road allowance that comprises the southern boundary of Rhineland to the north of the international boundary between Manitoba and North Dakota. In essence, the Plaintiffs allege that, beginning around 1940, portions of the road allowance have been built up to serve as a dike that blocks the natural flow of water across the international border north into Manitoba and is the cause – at least in part – of extensive flooding and damage to the Plaintiffs’ lands on the American side of the international border. The Plaintiffs are seeking injunctive relief to have the dike removed as well as damages to compensate them for certain losses they allege to have suffered as a result of the blockage of water by the dike, and the consequent flooding.
[5] The Plaintiffs’ claims are predicated on s 4(1) of the International Boundary Water Treaty Act, RSC, 1985, c I-17 [IBWTA] and the jurisdiction expressly conferred on the Federal Court by s 5 of the IBWTA.
III. RELEVANT RULES, LEGISLATION AND TREATY PROVISIONS [6] Both motions to strike are brought under Rule 221(1)(a) of the Federal Courts Rules, SOR/98-106 [Federal Court Rules] which reads as follows:
Motion to strike
Requête en radiation
221 (1) On motion, the Court may, at any time, order that a pleading, or anything contained therein, be struck out, with or without leave to amend, on the ground that it
221 (1) À tout moment, la Cour peut, sur requête, ordonner la radiation de tout ou partie d’un acte de procédure, avec ou sans autorisation de le modifier, au motif, selon le cas :
(a) discloses no reasonable cause of action or defence, as the case may be,
a) qu’il ne révèle aucune cause d’action ou de défense valable;
…
…
[7] Manitoba’s motion to amend is governed by Rule 75 of the Federal Courts Rules which reads as follows:
Amendments with leave
Modifications avec autorisation
75 (1) Subject to subsection (2) and rule 76, the Court may, on motion, at any time, allow a party to amend a document, on such terms as will protect the rights of all parties.
75 (1) Sous réserve du paragraphe (2) et de la règle 76, la Cour peut à tout moment, sur requête, autoriser une partie à modifier un document, aux conditions qui permettent de protéger les droits de toutes les parties.
Limitation
Conditions
(2) No amendment shall be allowed under subsection (1) during or after a hearing unless
(2) L’autorisation visée au paragraphe (1) ne peut être accordée pendant ou après une audience que si, selon le cas :
(a) the purpose is to make the document accord with the issues at the hearing;
a) l’objet de la modification est de faire concorder le document avec les questions en litige à l’audience;
(b) a new hearing is ordered; or
b) une nouvelle audience est ordonnée;
(c) the other parties are given an opportunity for any preparation necessary to meet any new or amended allegations.
c) les autres parties se voient accorder l’occasion de prendre les mesures préparatoires nécessaires pour donner suite aux prétentions nouvelles ou révisées.
[8] Sections 4 and 5 of the IBWTA read as follows:
Interference with international waters
Altération des eaux internationales
4 (1) Any interference with or diversion from their natural channel of any waters in Canada, which in their natural channels would flow across the boundary between Canada and the United States or into boundary waters, as defined in the treaty, resulting in any injury on the United States side of the boundary, gives the same rights and entitles the injured parties to the same legal remedies as if the injury took place in that part of Canada where the interference or diversion occurs.
4 (1) Toute altération, notamment par détournement, des voies navigables du Canada, dont le cours naturel coupe la frontière entre le Canada et les États-Unis ou se jette dans des eaux limitrophes, au sens du traité, qui cause un préjudice du côté de la frontière des États-Unis, confère les mêmes droits et accorde les mêmes recours judiciaires aux parties lésées que si le préjudice avait été causé dans la partie du Canada où est survenue l’altération.
Exception
Exception
(2) Subsection (1) does not apply to cases existing on January 11, 1909 or to cases expressly covered by special agreement between Her Majesty and the Government of the United States.
(2) Les cas survenus jusqu’au 11 janvier 1909 inclusivement et ceux qui sont expressément régis par la convention spéciale intervenue entre Sa Majesté et le gouvernement des États-Unis sont soustraits à l’application du paragraphe (1).
Federal Court jurisdiction
Compétence de la Cour fédérale
5 The Federal Court has jurisdiction at the suit of any injured party or person who claims under this Act in all cases in which it is sought to enforce or determine as against any person any right or obligation arising or claimed under or by virtue of this Act.
5 La Cour fédérale peut être saisie par toute personne lésée ou se constituant en demandeur sous le régime de la présente loi, dans tous les cas visant la mise à exécution ou la détermination de quelque droit ou obligation découlant de la présente loi ou contesté sous son régime.
[9] The following Boundary Waters Treaty [Treaty] provisions are also relevant:
Article II
Article II
Each of the High Contracting Parties reserves to itself or to the several State Governments on the one side and the Dominion or Provincial Governments on the other as the case may be, subject to any treaty provisions now existing with respect thereto, the exclusive jurisdiction and control over the use and diversion, whether temporary or permanent, of all waters on its own side of the line which in their natural channels would flow across the boundary or into boundary waters; but it is agreed that any interference with or diversion from their natural channel of such waters on either side of the boundary, resulting in any injury on the other side of the boundary, shall give rise to the same rights and entitle the injured parties to the same legal remedies as if such injury took place in the country where such diversion or interference occurs; but this provision shall not apply to cases already existing or to cases expressly covered by special agreement between the parties hereto.
Chacune des Hautes parties contractantes se réserve à elle-même ou réserve au Gouvernement des différents États, d’un côté, et au Dominion ou aux gouvernements provinciaux, de l’autre, selon le cas, subordonnément aux articles de tout traité existant à cet égard, la juridiction et l’autorité exclusive quant à l’usage et au détournement, temporaires ou permanents, de toutes les eaux situées de leur propre côté de la frontière et qui, en suivant leur cours naturel, couleraient au-delà de la frontière ou se déverseraient dans des cours d’eaux limitrophes, mais il est convenu que toute ingérence dans ces cours d’eau ou tout détournement de leur cours naturel de telles eaux sur l’un ou l’autre côté de la frontière, résultant en un préjudice pour les habitants de l’autre côté de cette dernière, donnera lieu aux mêmes droits et permettra aux parties lésées de se servir des moyens que la loi met à leur disposition tout autant que si telle injustice se produisait dans le pays où s’opère cette ingérence ou ce détournement; mais cette disposition ne s’applique pas au cas déjà existant non plus qu’à ceux qui ont déjà fait expressément l’objet de conventions spéciales entre les deux parties concernées.
It is understood, however, that neither of the High Contracting Parties intends by the foregoing provision to surrender any right, which it may have, to object to any interference with or diversions of waters on the other side of the boundary the effect of which would be productive of material injury to the navigation interests on its own side of the boundary.
Il est entendu cependant, que ni l’une ni l’autre des Hautes parties contractantes n’a l’intention d’abandonner par la disposition ci-dessus aucun droit qu’elle peut avoir à s’opposer à toute ingérence ou tout détournement d’eau sur l’autre côté de la frontière dont l’effet serait de produire un tort matériel aux intérêts de la navigation sur son propre côté de la frontière.
Article III
Article III
It is agreed that, in addition to the uses, obstructions, and diversions heretofore permitted or hereafter provided for by special agreement between the Parties hereto, no further or other uses or obstructions or diversions, whether temporary or permanent, of boundary waters on either side of the line, affecting the natural level or flow of boundary waters on the other side of the line, shall be made except by authority of the United States or the Dominion of Canada within their respective jurisdictions and with the approval, as hereinafter provided, of a joint commission, to be known as the International Joint Commission.
Il est convenu que, outre les usages, obstructions et détournements permis jusqu’ici ou autorisés ci-après, par convention spéciale entre les parties, aucun usage ou obstruction ou dé- tournement nouveaux ou autres, soit temporaires ou permanents des eaux limitrophes, d’un côté ou de l’autre de la frontière, influençant le débit ou le niveau naturels des eaux limitrophes de l’autre côté de la frontière, ne pourront être effectués si ce n’est par l’autorité des États-Unis ou du Dominion canadien dans les limites de leurs territoires respectifs et avec l’approbation, comme il est prescrit ci-après, d’une commission mixte qui sera désignée sous le nom de « Commission mixte internationale ».
The foregoing provisions are not intended to limit or interfere with the existing rights of the Government of the United States on the one side and the Government of the Dominion of Canada on the other, to undertake and carry on governmental works in boundary waters for the deepening of channels, the construction of breakwaters, the improvement of harbors, and other governmental works for the benefit of commerce and navigation, provided that such works are wholly on its own side of the line and do not materially affect the level or flow of the boundary waters on the other, nor are such provisions intended to interfere with the ordinary use of such waters for domestic and sanitary purposes.
Les stipulations ci-dessus ne sont pas destinées à restreindre ou à gêner l’exercice des droits existants dont le gouvernement des États-Unis, d’une part, et le gouvernement du Dominion, de l’autre, sont investis en vue de l’exécution de travaux publics dans les eaux limitrophes, pour l’approfondissement des chenaux, la construction de briselames, l’amélioration des ports, et autres entreprises du gouvernement dans l’intérêt du commerce ou de la navigation, pourvu que ces travaux soient situés entièrement sur son côté de la frontière et ne modifient pas sensiblement le niveau ou le débit des eaux limitrophes de l’autre, et ne sont pas destinées non plus à gêner l’usage ordinaire de ces eaux pour des fins domestiques ou hygiéniques.
Article IV
Article IV
The High Contracting Parties agree that, except in cases provided for by special agreement between them, they will not permit the construction or maintenance on their respective sides of the boundary of any remedial or protective works or any dams or other obstructions in waters flowing from boundary waters or in waters at a lower level than the boundary in rivers flowing across the boundary, the effect of which is to raise the natural level of waters on the other side of the boundary unless the construction or maintenance thereof is approved by the aforesaid International Joint Commission.
Les Hautes parties contractantes conviennent, sauf pour les cas spécialement prévus par un accord entre elles, de ne permettre, chacun de son côté, dans les eaux qui sortent des eaux limitrophes, non plus que dans les eaux inférieures des rivières qui coupent la frontière, l’établissement ou le maintien d’aucun ouvrage de protection ou de réfection, d’aucun barrage ou autre obstacle dont l’effet serait d’exhausser le niveau naturel des eaux de l’autre côté de la frontière, à moins que l’établissement ou le maintien de ces ouvrages n’ait été approuvé par la Commission mixte internationale.
It is further agreed that the waters herein defined as boundary waters and waters flowing across the boundary shall not be polluted on either side to the injury of health or property on the other.
Il est de plus convenu que les eaux définies au présent traité comme eaux limitrophes non plus que celles qui coupent la frontière ne seront d’aucun côté contaminées au préjudice des biens ou de la santé de l’autre côté.
IV. ARGUMENTS A. Defendants [10] The essence of both motions to strike is that the Federal Court does not have the jurisdiction to deal with the claims advanced by the Plaintiffs. This is because s 5 of the IBWTA only grants jurisdiction to the Federal Court in cases “in which it is sought to enforce any right or obligation arising or claimed under or by virtue of this Act.” The rights and obligations which the Plaintiffs seek to enforce are contained in s 4 of the IBWTA.
[11] The Defendants say that, on a plain reading of s 4 of the IBWTA in its full context, it is plain and obvious that it is only directed at waters in natural channels in Canada that would normally flow into the United States, but which have been prevented from doing so as a result of some interference or diversion in Canada. This means, say the Defendants, that s 4(1) of the IBWTA has no application to, and is not meant to address, the interference with or diversion of waters that would otherwise cross the international boundary from the United States into Canada, which is the basis of the allegations contained in the Plaintiffs’ Amended Statement of Claim.
[12] The Defendants say that when the full legislative context of s 4(1) of the IBWTA is examined, it is plain and obvious that s 4(1) has nothing to do with the alleged interference with, or diversion of, waters in their natural channels flowing from the United States into Canada. Subsection 4(1) only deals with the opposite situation, namely, the interference with waters in Canada which, in their natural channels, would flow across the international boundary from Canada into the United States.
[13] The Defendants say that, in their Amended Statement of Claim, the Plaintiffs allege that water flowing in natural watercourses from the United States into Canada has been blocked by a dike or dikes that have been constructed on parts of the road allowance on the Canadian side of the international boundary. The Plaintiffs also allege that the dike or dikes were constructed for the purpose of blocking water flowing in natural watercourses from entering Canada in the knowledge that water that would otherwise flow into Canada would be turned back into the United States. The Defendants say that there is nothing in s 4(1), or any other provision of the IBWTA, that gives the Plaintiffs rights and remedies they can enforce in Canada or “any right or obligation arising or claimed under or by virtue of” the IBWTA over which the Federal Court has jurisdiction.
[14] As regards its proposed amendment, Manitoba points out that the amendment is intended to formally raise the jurisdiction issue and does not involve any new facts. No further discovery will be necessary because it involves a pure issue of law and, in any event, the jurisdiction of the Federal Court to deal with this dispute must be addressed even if it was not specifically raised in the pleadings.
B. Plaintiffs [15] The Plaintiffs say that the Defendants’ arguments are based upon an overly narrow and strict interpretation of the IBWTA. They say that such an interpretation leads to absurd results and cannot be reconciled with the IBWTA, the Treaty, or other federal legislation.
[16] The Plaintiffs say that a plain and purposive reading of the Treaty and the IBWTA makes it clear that the Federal Court does have the jurisdiction to deal with this matter. In addition, all extrinsic aids to interpretation reinforce that s 4 of the IBWTA grants the Plaintiffs recourse as a result of the Defendants’ conduct in Canada, and this recourse does not depend upon the direction of the flow of water across the international boundary.
V. ANALYSIS A. Introduction [17] This action was commenced in 2004, and yet the fundamental issue of jurisdiction has only now been brought before the Court for consideration. We have now had three weeks of trial and the Plaintiffs have entered the evidence for their whole case except for a few loose ends that will be dealt with when the Court reconvenes to complete the trial in October 2016.
[18] The Defendants raised the issue of jurisdiction in opening statements on the first day of trial. The Plaintiffs were taken by surprise and discussions took place as to whether evidence should be called before the Court made a decision on jurisdiction. In the end – and I think this was appropriate – the parties agreed that the Plaintiffs should be allowed to call their evidence and put in their case. A great deal of work has gone into the preparation for this trial and the Plaintiffs’ case could have been jeopardized if the trial was postponed for what could be a significant period of time to decide the issue of jurisdiction.
[19] In one way, the Plaintiffs’ surprise that the Defendants have now chosen to rely on jurisdiction to defeat the claim is understandable. Manitoba said nothing in its Statement of Defence about jurisdiction and is only now seeking an amendment to include it. Rhineland denies in paragraph 14 of its Statement of Defence that the IBWTA has any applicability but does not directly raise want of jurisdiction as a defence. It seems pretty obvious that the Defendants could have raised the issue of jurisdiction in the earlier stages of the proceedings so that it could have been dealt with before either side incurred the, no doubt, significant costs of bringing this matter all the way to trial. The Defendants say that they only became aware of the issue when they began to examine the legislation and the Treaty in detail in preparation for trial.
[20] The issue of jurisdiction could have been decided on the basis of the pleadings alone, and did not require discoveries and further evidence. The Court will be in no better position to decide this matter after a full trial than it would have been when the Statement of Claim was issued, or indeed, than it is at this juncture when the Plaintiffs have almost put in their whole case and the Court has yet to hear any evidence from the Defendants. Consequently, I see little point in allowing matters to go any further now that the Plaintiffs have put in their evidence and the risk of delay lies with the Defendants, who have yet to introduce any evidence at trial but who have now decided to move to strike.
[21] The jurisprudence seems clear that a motion to strike under Rule 221(1)(a) can be brought at any stage of the proceedings. See Dene Tsaa First Nation v Canada, [2001] FCJ No 1177; Safilo Canada Inc v Contour Optik Inc, 2005 FC 278 at para 21; Lebrasseur v Canada, 2006 FC 852 at para 19 [Lebrasseur]; Verdicchio v Canada, 2010 FC 117 at paras 19-20; Robertson v Beauvais, 2011 FC 378 at para 7 [Robertson].
[22] It also seems clear that the Defendants are not precluded from challenging the Court’s jurisdiction because they have delayed in bringing this motion, or because they have filed their Statements of Defence. See Robertson, above, at para 7.
[23] Justice MacTavish also made clear in Lebrasseur, above, at para 19, that delay cannot confer jurisdiction on the Court where it does not exist. In fact, it would appear that jurisdiction is a matter that the Court itself must consider even if it is not raised in the pleadings. See Okanagan Helicopters Ltd v Canadian Pacific Ltd, [1974] 1 FC 465 at para 3. Hence, it seems to me that there is no real alternative to dealing with this issue at this time.
[24] The jurisprudence is also clear that the test for striking out a claim under Rule 221(1)(a) for want of jurisdiction is whether it is plain and obvious that the claim cannot succeed. See Siksika Nation v Siksika Nation (Council), [2003] FCJ No 911 at para 13; Robertson, above, at para 8; Lebrasseur, above, at para 14.
[25] It is trite law that the Federal Court cannot acquire jurisdiction over any action unless:
a) There is a statutory grant of jurisdiction by the federal Parliament;
b) There is an existing body of federal law which is essential to the disposition of the case and which nourishes the statutory grant of jurisdiction; and
c) The law on which the case is based must be a law of Canada in accordance with s 101 of the Constitution Act, 1867.
See Hodgson v Ermineskin Indian Band No 942, [2000] FCJ No 313, 180 FTR 285 (FCTD), aff’d (2000) FCJ No 2042 (FCA), leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada denied [2001] SCCA no 67 (QL) at para 11.
[26] In their Amended Statement of Claim, the Plaintiffs do refer to and rely upon common law rights to some extent, but it is clear that what brings them before the Federal Court is the IBWTA:
13. The plaintiffs say that in or around 1940, a dike or dikes were constructed on parts of the road allowance for the purpose of blocking or preventing water flowing in natural watercourses from flowing into Canada. Since 1940, the road allowance has been continually built up and extended as a dike so that the dike located on the road allowance extends westerly from a point at the southerly boundary at Emerson through Montcalm and Rhineland for approximately 30 miles, more or less, to a point on the southerly boundary of Stanley.
14. The plaintiffs say the said road allowance was constructed as a dike by the municipal defendants or with their knowledge and consent, either express or implied. Alternatively, the plaintiffs further say that the construction of the dike, as aforesaid, was done for the sole and explicit purpose of blocking water flowing in natural watercourses from entering Canada in the knowledge that water that would otherwise flow into Canada would be turned back into the United States and, more specifically, the lands located in the Townships of Pembina, Neche, Felson, St. Joseph, Walhalla, Joliette, Lincoln and Drayton and within the cities of Pembina, Neche, Walhalla and Drayton, with the certain result that damage would be caused to the owners and occupiers of land located therein, including the plaintiffs and to the real property owned by the plaintiffs.
15. The plaintiffs say that the dike constructed by the municipal defendants, or with their knowledge or consent, is illegal and contrary to established common law that prevents a landowner or occupier from interfering with flow of water in a natural watercourse.
16. Moreover, the plaintiffs plead and rely upon The International Boundary Water Treaties Act R.S.C. 1985, c. 1-17, s. 4 of which provides:
“4.(1) Any interference with or diversion from their natural channel of any waters in Canada, which in their natural channels would flow across the boundary between Canada and the United States or into boundary waters, as defined in the Treaty, resulting in any injury in .the United States side of the boundary, gives the same rights and entitles the injured parties to the same legal remedies as if the injury took place in that part of Canada where the interference or diversion occurs.”
[27] The Federal Court acquires jurisdiction over matters arising under s 4 by virtue of s 5 of the IBWTA:
Federal Court jurisdiction
Compétence de la Cour fédérale
5 The Federal Court has jurisdiction at the suit of any injured party or person who claims under this Act in all cases in which it is sought to enforce or determine as against any person any right or obligation arising or claimed under or by virtue of this Act.
5 La Cour fédérale peut être saisie par toute personne lésée ou se constituant en demandeur sous le régime de la présente loi, dans tous les cas visant la mise à exécution ou la détermination de quelque droit ou obligation découlant de la présente loi ou contesté sous son régime.
[28] The Defendants say that it is plain and obvious that the Plaintiffs cannot acquire rights and remedies in Canada, and the Court cannot acquire jurisdiction in this action, because the Plaintiffs’ claim does not fall within the scope of s 4 or any other provision of the IBWTA. In other words, the Defendants say there is no statutory grant of jurisdiction to the Federal Court to deal with this claim.
[29] At this juncture in the proceedings, the issue before the Court is whether it is plain and obvious that the Plaintiffs’ claim does not fall within the scope of s 4 of the IBWTA so that it cannot constitute a reasonable cause of action because the Federal Court has no jurisdiction to deal with it.
B. Statutory Interpretation [30] I see no dispute between the parties that the principles to be applied in interpreting domestic legislation are clear and well established: the words of an act must be read in their entire context and in their grammatical sense harmoniously with the scheme of the act, the object of the act and the intention of Parliament. See, for example, Celgene Corp v Canada (Attorney General), 2011 SCC 1 at para 21:
The parties both relied on the approach used in Canada Trustco Mortgage Co. v. R., 2005 SCC 54, [2005] 2 S.C.R. 601 (S.C.C.), at para. 10, which confirmed that statutory interpretation involves a consideration of the ordinary meaning of the words used and the statutory context in which they are found:
It has been long established as a matter of statutory interpretation that “the words of an Act are to be read in their entire context and in their grammatical and ordinary sense harmoniously with the scheme of the Act, the object of the Act, and the intention of Parliament”: see 65302 British Columbia Ltd. v. Canada, [1999] 3 S.C.R. 804, at para. 50. The interpretation of a statutory provision must be made according to a textual, contextual and purposive analysis to find a meaning that is harmonious with the Act as a whole. When the words of a provision are precise and unequivocal, the ordinary meaning of the words play a dominant role in the interpretive process. On the other hand, where the words can support more than one reasonable meaning, the ordinary meaning of the words plays a lesser role. The relative effects of ordinary meaning, context and purpose on the interpretive process may vary, but in all cases the court must seek to read the provisions of an Act as a harmonious whole. [para. 10.]
The words, if clear, will dominate; if not, they yield to an interpretation that best meets the overriding purpose of the statute.
[31] In the present case, s 4 of the IBTWA is derived from Article II of the Treaty which reads as follows:
Article II
Article II
Each of the High Contracting Parties reserves to itself or to the several State Governments on the one side and the Dominion or Provincial Governments on the other as the case may be, subject to any treaty provisions now existing with respect thereto, the exclusive jurisdiction and control over the use and diversion, whether temporary or permanent, of all waters on its own side of the line which in their natural channels would flow across the boundary or into boundary waters; but it is agreed that any interference with or diversion from their natural channel of such waters on either side of the boundary, resulting in any injury on the other side of the boundary, shall give rise to the same rights and entitle the injured parties to the same legal remedies as if such injury took place in the country where such diversion or interference occurs; but this provision shall not apply to cases already existing or to cases expressly covered by special agreement between the parties hereto.
Chacune des Hautes parties contractantes se réserve à elle-même ou réserve au Gouvernement des différents États, d’un côté, et au Dominion ou aux gouvernements provinciaux, de l’autre, selon le cas, subordonnément aux articles de tout traité existant à cet égard, la juridiction et l’autorité exclusive quant à l’usage et au détournement, temporaires ou permanents, de toutes les eaux situées de leur propre côté de la frontière et qui, en suivant leur cours naturel, couleraient au-delà de la frontière ou se déverseraient dans des cours d’eaux limitrophes, mais il est convenu que toute ingérence dans ces cours d’eau ou tout détournement de leur cours naturel de telles eaux sur l’un ou l’autre côté de la frontière, résultant en un préjudice pour les habitants de l’autre côté de cette dernière, donnera lieu aux mêmes droits et permettra aux parties lésées de se servir des moyens que la loi met à leur disposition tout autant que si telle injustice se produisait dans le pays où s’opère cette ingérence ou ce détournement; mais cette disposition ne s’applique pas au cas déjà existant non plus qu’à ceux qui ont déjà fait expressément l’objet de conventions spéciales entre les deux parties concernées.
It is understood, however, that neither of the High Contracting Parties intends by the foregoing provision to surrender any right, which it may have, to object to any interference with or diversions of waters on the other side of the boundary the effect of which would be productive of material injury to the navigation interests on its own side of the boundary.
Il est entendu cependant, que ni l’une ni l’autre des Hautes parties contractantes n’a l’intention d’abandonner par la disposition ci-dessus aucun droit qu’elle peut avoir à s’opposer à toute ingérence ou tout détournement d’eau sur l’autre côté de la frontière dont l’effet serait de produire un tort matériel aux intérêts de la navigation sur son propre côté de la frontière.
[32] The Defendants say that the words of s 4 of the IBWTA are precise and unequivocal and so must play a dominant role in the interpretation process. In their view, a plain reading of s 4 of the IBWTA shows that it is clearly directed at waters in natural channels in Canada that would normally flow into the United States, but which have been prevented from doing so as a result of some interference or diversion in Canada. This means that s 4 of the IBWTA can have no application to the present case which is clearly based upon the blockage of waters flowing from the United States into Canada. The principal purpose of this lawsuit is to remove the allegedly obstructive dike on the Canadian side of the international border so that waters are free to flow north into Canada.
[33] Section 4 of the IBWTA is based upon Article II of the Treaty, which was signed in Washington on January 11, 1909, and makes clear, say the Defendants, that s 4 only deals with waters flowing south across the international boundary, and so does not encompass the basic premise of the Plaintiffs’ claim.
[34] There is no dispute that the claim is based upon the interference or diversion of “waters in Canada.” But there is dispute as to whether these waters are being diverted “from their natural channels.” That issue is not presently before me so that, should I deny these motions to strike, the Plaintiffs could still face jurisdictional problems later in the process when the Court has heard and considered full evidence on point. In these motions, however, the jurisdictional focus is the direction of flow of the waters.
[35] The Defendants say it is plain and obvious that s 4 of the IBWTA only encompasses waters flowing from Canada into the United States and point to the words in the English version “which in their natural channels would flow across the boundary between Canada and the United States….” The Defendants say these words clearly refer to waters flowing from Canada into the United States. The Plaintiffs say “not so,” they clearly refer to waters that flow in both directions and so encompass a blockage of flow in Canada that prevents waters crossing the border from the United States into Canada, which is the basis of this action.
[36] Dealing with the English language version, in a plain and grammatical sense, it seems to me that under s 4 the “waters” have to be in Canada when the blockage occurs, and if the waters are being prevented from flowing north (which is the allegation in the claim) then they have already crossed the international boundary before they are blocked. Hence, they cannot be waters that “would flow across the boundary.” It is true that such a blockage could cause the waters to pool on the United States’ side of the border, but if they are pooled in the United States, then they cannot be “waters in Canada.”
[37] Section 4 of the IBWTA does not specifically say “which in their natural channels would flow across the boundary (from) Canada and (into) the United States….” But it is clear that s 4 only encompasses “waters in Canada.” It is not waters in Canada that are the alleged source of the damage to the Plaintiffs’ property in this case. It is waters that remain in the United States and do not flow north across the border. The Plaintiffs allege that these waters do not flow across the border because their natural channels have been blocked on the Canadian side. Even if this can be substantiated in evidence, such waters are not “waters in Canada.” If they were waters in Canada, they could not be flooding the Plaintiffs’ lands. It might be alleged that it is the interference or diversion of “waters in Canada” that is causing waters in the United States to pool and damage the Plaintiffs’ lands, but that means that it is not waters flowing across the boundary that is causing the damage; it is waters in the United States that are not flowing north across the boundary.
[38] The French language version of s 4(1) of the IBWTA reads as follows:
4 (1) Toute altération, notamment par détournement, des voies navigables du Canada, dont le cours naturel coupe la frontière entre le Canada et les États-Unis ou se jette dans des eaux limitrophes, au sens du traité, qui cause un préjudice du côté de la frontière des États-Unis, confère les mêmes droits et accorde les mêmes recours judiciaires aux parties lésées que si le préjudice avait été causé dans la partie du Canada où est survenue l’altération.
(2) Les cas survenus jusqu’au 11 janvier 1909 inclusivement et ceux qui sont expressément régis par la convention spéciale intervenue entre Sa Majesté et le gouvernement des États-Unis sont soustraits à l’application du paragraphe (1).
[39] It is immediately apparent that the French version is somewhat different from the English version. It seems to me that the following distinctions can be made:
a) The French version refers to “des voies navigable du Canada,” while the English version refers to “any waters in Canada”;
b) Within the first distinction, it is also notable that the French version uses “du Canada,” while the English version uses “in Canada”;
c) The operate verbs in French are in the present tense (“coupe” and “se jette”) while the English version says “would flow”;
d) The English version uses “any interference or diversion” while the French version refers to “toute altération,” but also particularizes with “notamment par détournement.”
[40] I see no dispute between the parties regarding the governing rules and legal principles that are applicable when comparing the French and English versions of a statute.
[41] Section 13 of the Official Languages Act, RSC, 1985, c 31 (4th Supp) makes it clear that both versions are equally authoritative expressions of the law.
[42] Where discrepancies occur between the different versions they must be reconciled in accordance with the “common meaning” principle established in R v Daoust, 2004 SCC 6 at paras 26-31 [Daoust]. In R v Quesnelle, 2014 SCC 46 at para 53, the Supreme Court of Canada also referred to this as the “shared meaning” principle. As I understand this principle, the Court must – in the event of any discordance between the two versions – attempt to discover a shared or common meaning. As the Supreme Court of Canada put it in Daoust, above:
28 We must determine whether there is an ambiguity, that is, whether one or both versions of the statute are “reasonably capable of more than one meaning”: Bell ExpressVu, supra, at para. 29. If there is an ambiguity in one version but not the other, the two versions must be reconciled, that is, we must look for the meaning that is common to both versions: Côté, supra, at p. 327. The common meaning is the version that is plain and not ambiguous: Côté, supra, at p. 327; see Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co. of Canada v. T. Eaton Co., [1956] S.C.R. 610, at p. 614; Kwiatkowsky v. Minister of Employment and Immigration, [1982] 2 S.C.R. 856, at p. 863.
[43] Daoust also teaches (at para 29) that if neither version is ambiguous, or if they both are, then the common meaning will normally be the narrower of the two versions.
[44] It also seems clear that in testing the shared or common meaning, or in deciding which version to prefer if there is no shared or common meaning, the Court can rely upon the usual interpretive techniques to conduct a textual, purposive and consequential analysis which will reference admissible extrinsic aids in order to determine legislative intent. See Sullivan on the Construction of Statutes (6th ed.) at para 5.55.
[45] If I apply these principles to the present case, it seems to me that while there are clear distinct