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RUBY LEE MINAR, Inc., et al. v. HAMMETT, 1931 — 53 F.2d 149 · caselaw · US
General
RUBY LEE MINAR, Inc., et al. v. HAMMETT
53 F.2d 149·United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit·1931
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Opinion
RUBY LEE MINAR, Inc., et al. v. HAMMETT.
No. 5096.
Court of Appeals of District of Columbia.
Argued April 15, 1931.
Decided June 29, 1931.
Petition for Rehearing Denied Oct. 31, 1931.
John S. Barbour, of Washington, D. C., for appellants.
T ,. T . n/r-ij. cu. i. Julius I. Peyser and Milton Strasbnrger, both of Washington, D. C., for appellee.
. Before MARTIN, Chief Justice, and ROBB, HITZ, and GRONER, Associate Justices.
[MAJORITY — HITZ, Associate Justice.]
HITZ, Associate Justice.
This is a cross-appeal taken by the defendants below in Hammett v. Minar et al., 60 App. D. C. 286, 53 F.(2d) 144, just decided.
The only question presented for decision is based upon the allowance of costs to the plaintiff while dismissing her bill of complaint, which question was presented by brief and argument at the bar.
-d . ,, ,, o , . .. But the allowance of costs m equity is ,, , , a matter of discretion with the court, not usually reviewa.ble on appeal, and the court below twice considered the question of these costs, and twice came to the same eonclusion regarding them; on the second occasion saying, “The adjudication of costs against the defendants in my former memorandum was not a clerical error, but intentional. I think that the Court is fully justified under the facts of this ease in so adjudging costs.”
And in our disposition of the main ease on its merits, we have directed that the costs be paid by the defendants.
So much of the decree appealed from in this cross-appeal awarding costs to plaintiff is affirmed, with costs.