Study aid, not legal advice. caselaw is not a law firm and does not provide legal advice or engage in the unauthorized practice of law (UPL). All briefs, outlines, and citation tools on these pages are educational summaries for law students; they are not a substitute for advice from a licensed attorney admitted in your jurisdiction. Bar-admission rules vary by state. For court filings or client matters, verify every authority against the official reporter and your court's local rules. Use of caselaw does not create an attorney-client relationship.
Dukes v. Waitkevitch et al., 1976 ā 429 U.S. 932 Ā· caselaw Ā· US
Civil Procedure Ā· MBE-tested
Dukes v. Waitkevitch et al.
429 U.S. 932Ā·Supreme Court of the United StatesĀ·1976
with whom Mr. Justice Brennan joins,
Brief incoming
Hand-reviewed Bluebook brief (procedural posture, facts, issue, holding, reasoning, dissent) ships once the AI generation pipeline runs through this case. Join the waitlist to get notified when 1L briefs go live.
Opinion
No. 76-5326.
Dukes v. Waitkevitch et al.
[MAJORITY]
C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied.,
[DISSENT ā Mr. Justice Marshall,]
Mr. Justice Marshall,
with whom Mr. Justice Brennan joins,
dissenting.
The Court today refuses to review the Court of Appealsā conclusion that a black male charged with raping a white female in the racially troubled city of Boston is not entitled to have prospective jurors questioned about racial prejudice. I do not believe that the Court of Appealsā holding is justified by last Termās decision in Ristaino v. Ross, 424 U. S. 589 (1976).
Charges of interracial rape have long played a major role in the mythology of racial prejudice. See, e. g., Powell v. Alabama, 287 U. S. 45 (1932); G. Allport, The Nature of Prejudice 349-355 (1958). When such a charge is made, especially in a city where racial conflict is close to the surface, it blinks reality to conclude, as the Court was able to find in Ristaino, that ā[t]he circumstances . . . did not suggest a significant likelihood that racial prejudice might infect [petitionerās] trial.ā 424 U. S., at 598. Thus, under the standard set forth in Ristaino, this defendant was entitled to assure himself that the jury would consider only the evidence, not his race and the race of the alleged victim, when it determined his fate.
By refusing to review this conviction the Court does not, of course, endorse the Court of Appealsā understanding of Ristaino. It does, however, add to the lengthening ā āepitaph for those āessential demands of fairnessā recognized by this Court 40 years ago in Aldridge [v. United States, 283 U. S. 308 (1931)].ā ā Id., at 599 (Marshall, J., dissenting), quoting Ross v. Massachusetts, 414 U. S. 1080, 1085 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari). By failing to respond to those demands, the Court empties of meaning the promise of Aldridge and of our recent decision in Ham v. South Carolina, 409 U. S. 524 (1973). That promise is the fundamental guaranty of a fair trial before an impartial jury.
I respectfully dissent.