Morgan v. Eckart et al.; Morgan v. Bower

Morgan v. Eckart et al. Morgan v. Bower. Privilege from a/t'rest. The sheriff-elect of a county, who came to Philadelphia to solicit his commission and give the usual security, was held not to be privileged from arrest on civil process. So, of the lieutenant of a county, who came to Philadelphia to obtain commissions for officers of the militia. On a rule to show cause, why the arrest in these actions, should not be set aside, it appeared, that Eekart, being the lieutenant of Berks county, came to Philadelphia, in order to obtain from the Executive Council, the commissions of some officers of the militia, within his department; that Bower, being one of the sheriffs elect of the same county, came for the purpose of soliciting his commission, and giving the usual security; and that while here for these respective purposes, they were both arrested at the suit of the plaintiff. Tilghman, in support of the rule, contended, that the defendants were privileged from arrest, on account of the public nature of the business which brought them to Philadelphia; and stated, as the great principle upon which privilege and protection are founded, that the rights and interest of the commonwealth must, in many cases, be preferred to those of individuals. Vin. tit. Priv. 84, pl. 1. He then classed the cases of privilege under two general positions : 1st. That where by law it is a man’s duty to attend at a particular place or court, he shall be sued there only ; and no one shall be compelled to undertake anything inconsistent with such duty, or with his profession, in particular cases. Vin. tit. Priv. 509, pl. 1; Cro. Car. 585; Sir W. Jones, 462; Str. 1107; 3 Leon. 149; Vin. tit. Priv. 513, pl. 8; Barn. Notes, 200, 378. And 2d. That where a man is under a legal obligation to attend, or where he goes to demand justice, he shall not be arrested at all. Vin. tit. Priv. 515, pl. 6; Com. 446; 1 Browul. 15; 2 W. Black. 1113; 1 Atk. 54; Str. 1094; Vin. tit. Priv. 512, pl. 18; Id. 514, pl. 12, 13; Id. 515, pl. 6. In the present instances, he urged, that it was incumbent upon the sheriff to wait on the Executive Council, as the law required him to give such security, as they should approve ; and, with respect to the ■ lieutenant of the county, he alleged, if the court now doubtecl, they would be satisfied upon inquiry, that he likewise was in the prosecution of his official duty, on the above-mentioned occasion. He then adverted to the impolicy of increasing the jealousy that seemed to subsist already too much, between the city and the remote parts of the state; but this, he predicted as an inevitable and ruinous consequence, if, whenever a countryman came hither upon public business, he was liable to be arrested and detained. The city would soon be likened to the lion’s don, towards which innumerable tracks of feet might be traced, sed nulla vestigia retrorsum. * Sergeant and J. B. McKean, for the plaintiff, stated, that the cases [*296 of privilege in England, were limited to an attendance upon parlia- L ment, or upon courts, as a party, juror, witness or officer ; and that all the authorities which had been cited for the defendants, were fully comprehended within these bounds. They admitted, that reasonable privilege had, likewise, been allowed in Pennsylvania, but denied that, in either country, the doctrine had been extended to the object of the present rule. For, they insisted, that the sheriff’s attendance upon the Executive Council, was voluntary, in order to solicit an appointment, which, notwithstanding his being on the return, the council might, at pleasure, grant or refuse. Neither was he bound to give security, until he was appointed ; and, even then, it was not noccssary to be given in the city of Philadelphia. With respect to the lieutenant of the county, nothing, they said, could be more evident, than that his visit to Philadelphia was an act of supererogation, to perform what no law required him to do, and what might as well have been performed through the agency of a post-rider. If, indeed, the attendance of the sheriff or of the lieutenant of the county had been required by the Executive Council; or, if they had been brought before that board by any legal process ; they might then have claimed the advantage of the general rule of privilege. But there can be no pretence in reason, or law, to exempt from an arrest either a man who voluntarily comes to solicit an office ; or one who undertakes a journey merely to oblige his neighbors, by bringing them their commissions. [MAJORITY] At an adjourned sitting held on the 6th of September, the President delivered the clear and unanimous opinion of the Court, that the defendants were not protected from arrests, for any cause that had been shown. He observed, that they had not been required by the Executi ve Council to attend them, but evidently came to Philadelphia on their own private business; and that it was the duty of the court, to be careful not to extend the doctrine of privilege to the injury of honest creditors. The rule discharged. See note to the next succeeding case.