The People, ex rel. Fulton and others, against Fulton and others

The People, ex rel. Fulton and others, against Fulton and others. The title to property acquired by a religious society incorporated under the general statute vests in the corporation. While its real estate is under the control of the trustees, the legal possession is in the corporate body. Proceedings under the statute for a forcible entry and detainer of a church owned by such society should be in the name of the corporation. Such proceedings cannot be sustained in the individual names of the trustees. Appeal from a judgment of the supreme court sitting in the county of Monroe. E. Fulton and the other relators, in February, 1847, made a complaint before the first judge of the county courts, against William B. Fulton and eleven other persons, under the provisions of the revised statutes relating to forcible entries and detainers. (2 R. S. 505.) The complaint stated that W. B. Fulton and the others, on the 5th day of the same month, at, &c. made a forcible entry into the land and tenements of the complainants, “ which they hold as trustees of the first congregational society of the towns of Parma and Greece, to wit, the church or meeting house and the appurtenances, about half an acre of landthat they forcibly expelled the complainants from said church or meeting house and appurtenances “ which they held quietly as the trustees of said religious societyand that said W. B. Fulton and the others still held and detained the premises from the complainants. The judge issued a precept for a jury, and directed notice to be given to the defendants according to the statute. An inquisition was made, by which it was found that the complainants were in the possession of the meeting house as trustees of the religious corporation until the defendants forcibly and with a strong hand entered and expelled them; and that they still keep them out. The defendants sued out a certiorari, and the proceedings being returned to the supreme court, they severally traversed the inquisition. The cause was twice tried, the second trial being had before the Hon. Henry W. Taylor, in May, 1851. Upon this trial the plaintiffs offered to prove that the complainants, the relators, were five of the six trustees of the First Congregational Society of Greece and Parma, a religious society duly incorporated in 1824, under the statute providing for the incorporation of religious societies; that at the time of the entry by the defendants, the complainants as trustees of the society, were rightfully in the possession of the meeting house as fully and effectually as by the statute, trustees of religious societies could have the possession of the temporalities of a church; that the defendants forcibly entered the meeting house and ejected the complainants therefrom, and held and still continued to hold them out, though they had demanded the possession to be restored to them as such trustees; and that the other trustee was one of the disseizors.- The counsel for the defendants objected to the evidence thus offered, on the ground that proceedings of this character could only be instituted by the corporation, and that the trustees could not proceed in their own names: but if it could be done under any circumstances, it could only be done by or in the name of all the trustees, and not in the names of five out of six of them. The judge sustained the objection and nonsuited the plaintiffs; whereupon judgment was given against the relators for the costs, which was affirmed at a general term. An appeal was taken to this court. O. Hastings, for the appellants. H. R. Selden, for the respondents. [MAJORITY — Denio, J.] Denio, J. The court below was clearly right in the judgment it came to in this case. Incorporated religious societies are aggregate corporations, and whatever property they acquire, whether it be real or personal, is vested in interest in the body corporate; and while the officers have it under their control or dominion, whatever possession they have is the possession of the artificial person whose agents they are. Although called trustees, they do not hold the property in trust for the corporation or the religious society. The name is simply the title of their office; and their position respecting the corporate property would be the same if they were denominated directors, or managers. Their right to intermeddle is an authority, and not an estate or title. They have no other possession than the directors of a bank have of the banking house. This would be so upon general principles relating to the legal nature of corporations, apart from the particular language of the act concerning religious corporations. By the 4th section of that act, however, the trustees are in terms authorized by their corporate name and title, “to hold and enjoy,” among other things, all churches and meeting houses, and all estates, belonging to the society, as well as to sue and be sued. (3 R. S. 208, § 4, 2d ed.) It is the person who has the legal right to the possession who is to institute the proceedings in the case of a forcible entry and detainer. If such person has an estate of freehold or for a term of .years, that is to be stated in the complaint: if any other right of possession, that is to be stated. (2 R. S. 508, § 3.) If the complainants prevail upon the trial of the traverse, a precept is to issue to the sheriff commanding him to cause them to be restored and put into full possession of the premises, according as they were seised or possessed thereof before such entry. (Id. § 13.) These provisions are clearly inapplicable to the servants or agents of the owner of real estate, and to the officers and agents of a corporation where it is the proprietor. Although the proceeding is not a regular action, but partakes rather of the nature of criminal proceedings, it is still to be prosecuted by and in the name of the party whose legal right of possession has been invaded, and not by the individuals who may have been charged with authorities or duties respecting it. The judgment must be affirmed. Allen, J. also delivered an opinion for affirmance. Judgment affirmed.