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BERKOWITZ v. UNITED STATES, 1925 — 5 F.2d 967 · caselaw · US
Contracts · MBE-tested
BERKOWITZ v. UNITED STATES
5 F.2d 967·United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit·1925
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Opinion
BERKOWITZ v. UNITED STATES.
(Circuit Court of Appeals, Third Circuit.
May 2, 1925.)
No. 3257.
Criminal law @=>789(2) — Instruction defining “reasonable doubt” held correct.
Instruction that “reasonable doubt” means a doubt founded in reason and arising from evidence, and that if, after fair, impartial consideration of facts and circumstances, jurors have abiding conviction of accused’s guilt to a moral certainty, they have no reasonable doubt, held correct.
[Ed. Note. — For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, First and Second Series, Reasonable Doubt.]
In Error to the District Court of the United States for the District of New Jersey; Charles F. Lynch, Judge.
Criminal proceeding by the United States against Isadore Berkowitz. Judgment against defendant, and he brings error.
Affirmed, and remanded for due procedure.
Joseph F. S. Fitzpatrick, of Jersey City, N. J. (Thomas J. Armstrong, of Jersey City, N. J., of counsel), for plaintiff in error.
Walter G. Winne, of Hackensack, N. J., for the United States.
Before BUFFINGTON, WOOLLEY, and DAVIS, Circuit Judges.
[MAJORITY — PER CURIAM.]
PER CURIAM.
The sole question in this ease is the alleged error of the court wherein it said: .“Reasonable doubt means, first, what the words themselves indicate, a doubt founded in reason and must arise from the evidence. If, after a fair, impartial consideration of all the facts and circumstances of the case, you have'an abiding conviction of the guilt of the accused, to a moral certainty, then of course, you have no reasonable doubt.”
This involved no error. It stated in different words, but in substance, what was approved in Agnew v. U. S., 165 U. S. 36, 17 S. Ct. 235, 41 L. Ed. 624, viz.: “By a reasonable doubt is not meant a possible doubt, but such a doubt arising from the evidence that leaves the minds of the jury in such a state that they cannot say, after having reviewed all the evidence, that they have an abiding conviction, to a moral certainty, of the guilt of the accused.”
The judgment below is therefore affirmed, and the cause remanded for due procedure.