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VOGUE CO. v. VOGUE HAT CO. et al., 1925 â 6 F.2d 875 · caselaw · US
Property · MBE-tested
VOGUE CO. v. VOGUE HAT CO. et al.
6 F.2d 875·United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit·1925
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Opinion
VOGUE CO. v. VOGUE HAT CO. et al.
(Circuit Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.
July 20, 1925.)
No. 4066.
1. Trade-marks and -trade-names and unfair competition. <§=3(4) â Name- âVogue Hatsâ held substantially descriptive.
Name âVogue Hatsâ held substantially descriptive.
2. Trade-marks and trade-names and unfair competition <$=>70(3) â Intentional fraud in original adoption of plaintiffâs trade-mark held to preclude it from using words of label, except under certain conditions.
Defendantâs intentional fraud in adoption of its label âVogue Hatsâ or âVogue Hats, Fifth Avenue, New York,â in connection with the trade-mark of Vogue Magazine, held to so taint its right to use such label as to require it to discontinue use of words âFifth Avenue, New York,â or âNew York,â unless modified by a proper manufacturing name (not including the word âVogueâ), but not to require it to abandon entirely the use of the words âVogue Hats,â or accompany them with a disclaimer.
Suit by the Vogue Company against the Vogue Hat Company and others. From an adverse decree, plaintiff appeals. On motion to direct form of mandate.
Motion granted.
Harry D. Nims, of New York City (E. J. Marshall, of Toledo, Ohio, and MacDonald De Witt and Minturn De S. Verdi, all of New York City, on the brief), for appellant.
Samuel W. Banning, of Chicago, Ill. (Ephraim Banning, Thos. A. Banning and Thos. A. Banning, Jr., all of Chicago, Ill., Chas. H. Studin, of New York City, and Rathbun Fuller, of Toledo, Ohio, on the brief), for appellees.
Before DENISON, MACK, and DONAHUE, Circuit Judges.
[MAJORITY â PER CURIAM.]
PER CURIAM.
Upon a motion to direet a form of mandate we have further considered the nature and extent of the permissible relief. Plaintiff asks that the word âVogueâ be entirely forbidden upon the hat linings or labels, unless it is sterilized by the warning, ânot connected with Vogue Magazine.â Defendant Hat Company thinks that at most only the âV girlâ should be banned.
We are without the aid of specific precedent. We find a helpful principle in the one which we applied, perhaps somewhat obscurely, in Coca-Cola Co. v. Gay-ola Co., 200 F. 720, 723, 119 C. C. A. 164. Plaintiff in its drink used caramel for producing a peculiar reddish color. Defendant had the abstract right to use caramel as an ingredient, and so to get the same color. We held in effect that he had forfeited this abstract right by having used it as a part of his expressly fraudulent scheme, and so he must get his color some other way; he must not use caramel, though other makers might. So here we solve a difficult problem by concluding that this defendantâs otherwise clear enough right to use its complete label âVogue Hats,â or âVogue Hats, Fifth Avenue, New Yorkâ (without the plaintiffâs trade-mark), is tainted by its intentional fraud in the original adoption of the label with the trade-mark. This fraud permeates the whole label and plan under which it built its present business, and it cannot retain and carry on that business, and become immune by merely dropping the V girl and the dominant V.
We think it would be going too far to forbid entirely the name or label âVogue Hatsâ unless accompanied by the disclaimer. That name is substantially descriptive, and has no secondary meaning appurtenant to plaintiffâs business. A majority of the court think, that the words âFifth Avenue, New York,â or âNew York,â though they are abstractly lawful members of a proper label and business combination, yet by their suggestion of plaintiffâs location so emphasize the original and long-continued attempt to mislead that they are poisoned by the permeating fraud, and they must be discontinued, unless modified by a proper manufacturing name. This manufacturing defendant may sell any hats not called or marked as âVogue Hats.â It may use the name and label âVogue Hatsâ in connection with or without âNew York,â or âFifth Avenue, New York,â if accompanied by any prominently displayed manufacturing name it may select (not including the word âVogueâ). It may not use the name unless so accompanied.