HUDSON AND SMITH v. GUESTIER

HUDSON AND SMITH v. GUESTIER. The jurisdiction of the French courts as to seizured, is not confined to seizures made within two leagues of the coast. A seizure, beyond the limits of the territorial jurisdiction, for breach of a municipal regulation, is warranted by the law of nations. When the reversal is in favour of the defendant upon a bill of exceptions, a new trail must be a warded by the court below. ERROR to the circuit court for the district of Maryland; in an action of trover for coffee and logwood, the cargo of. the brig Sea Flower, which had been captured by the French, for trading to the revolted ports of the island of Hispaniola, contrary to the ordinances of France, and carried into the Spanish port of Baracop, but condemned by a.French tribunal at Guadaloupe, and sold for the benefit of the captors, and purchased by the defendant Guesfier. . ~ ■ ,• r . . Upon the former trial of this case in the court below, a statement of certain facts was agreed to by the counsel for the parties, and read m evidence to the jury, who then found a verdict for the plaintiffs. One of the facts so admitted, and which was then deemed wholly immaterial by both parties, was, that the Sea-Flower was captured within one league■ of ,the coast of the island of Hispaniola. Upon this fact, wjiich was the only fact in which this case differed from that of Rose v. Himely, (ante, vol. 4,p. 241.) the supreme court rever'aed the first judgment of the court below, (see ante, vol. 4. p. 293.) which had been for the plaintiffs, and remanded the cause for further proceedings. Upon the second trial in the court below; the verdict mid judgment were for the defendant. The.plaintiffs took A bill of exceptions to the opinion of the court, vvho directed the jury “ that if they find from the evidence produced, that the hrig Sea Flower had traded with the. insurgents at Port au Prince, in the island of St. Domingo, and had there purchased' a cargo of- coffee and logwood, and, having cleared at the said port, and coming from the same, Was'captured by a French privateer, duly commissioned as such, within six leagues of the island of St. Heneague, a dependency of St. Domingo, for a breach of said municipal regulations, that in such case the capture of the Sea Flower was legal, although such capture was mcide at the distance of six leagues from tfie said island of St. Domingo, pr St. Heneague, its dependency, and beyond the territorial limits or jurisdiction of said island, and that the said capture» possession, subsequent condemnation and sale of the said Sea Flower, with her cargo, devested the said cargo out of the plaintiffs, and the property therein became vested in the purchaser,’! Harper, for the plaintiffs in error. The main question in this case is, whether the French tribunal at Guadaloupe had jurisdiction of a seizure, tinder the municipal law of St. Domingo, of a -vessel seized more than two leagues distant from the coast. This question was decided by this court in this cause when it was here before;. In the case of Rose v. Himely, (ante, vol. 4. p.241.) this court decided; that the French tribunal had not jurisdiction because the seizure was made more than two leagues distance from the coast; and in this case, (ante, vol. 4. p. 293.) this court decided that the French tribunal had jurisdiction» because it appeared by the státement of facts that the vessel was seized within one league from ' the coast. So also the cases of Palmer Higgins v. Dutilli, and Hargous v. The Brig Ceres, (ante, vol. 4. p. 298. in noteij were, remanded for further proceedings, because it did not appear whether- the seizures in those cases re made within two leagues of the coast. P. B. Key and Martin, contra. A nation has a ylght to usé all the means necessary to enforce obedience to its municipal regulations and laws. It has a right to enforce its municipal laws of trade beyond its territorial jurisdiction. This right is exercised, both by Great Britain and America, to enforce their respective revenue laws. The only limit to this right is the principle that you do not thereby invade the exclusive rights of other nations. The arretes relative to the trade of $t. Domingo, do not limit the jurisdiction of their tribunals to seizures made within two leagues of the coast. The French ordonnanceS, referred to-in the sentence of condemnation, embrace four distinct descriptions of vessels; . x. Those found at anchor, See. 2. Those cleared for ports.in possession of the reyoltera. . 3«, Those coming out of the interdicted ports, with' or without a cargo j and, .4. Yessels sailing in the territorial extent of the island, found within two leagues of the coast. The distance of two leagues expressed in the ordonnance, is limited to the last description, and does not apply to either of the three firsti It is tantamount to the hovering acts of Great Britain and the United States. Neither the object nor the policy of the law would admit such a construction. If a vessel had seen trading with the blacks, she had only to wait for "ft fair wind, slip out of port, and in half an hour be beyond the line of the jurisdiction. March 17. [MAJORITY — Livingston, J. Marshall, Ch. J.] Livingston, J. Considering it, then, as settled that the French tribu* nal had jurisdiction of property.seized under a muni* cipal regulation, within the territorial jurisdiction of the government of St. Domingo, it only remains for me to say whether it will make any difference if, as now appears to have been the case, the vessel were taken on the high seas, or more than two leagues from the coast. If the res can be proceeded-against when not in the possession or under the fontrol of the court, I am not able to perceive how it can be material whether the capture were made within or beyond the jurisdictional limits of France; or in the exercise of a belligerent or municipal right. By a seizure on .the high seas, she interfered with ,the jurisdiction of no other nation, the authority of each bging there concurrent. It would seem also that, if jurisdiction be at all permitted where the thing is elsewhere, the court exercising it must necessarily decide, and that ultimately, or subject only to the review, of a superior tribunal of its own state, whether, in the partii Jar case, she had jurisdiction, if any objection be made to it.. And, although it be now stated, as a réason why we should examine whether a jurisdiction was rightfully exercised ové'r the Sea Flower, that she was captured more than two leagues at sea, who can say that this very allegation, if it had been essential, may not have been urged before the French court, and the fact decided in the negative ? And, if so, why should not its decision‘be as conclusive on this as on any other point? The judge must have had a right to dispose of every question which was made on behalf of the owner of the property, whether it related to his own jurisdiction, or arose out of the law of nations, or out of the French decrees, or in any other way: and, even if the reasons of his judgment should nbt appear satisfactory, it would be no reason for a foreign court to review his proceedings, or not to consider his sentence as conclusive on the property. In this case, when here before, S from the opinion of the court, because I did not think that the condemnation of a French court at Guadaloupe, of a vessel and cargo lying in the port of anothernation,had changed the property: but this ground, ■which was the only one taken by two of the judges in this case, and by three, in that of Himely v. Rose, and was principally and almost solely relied on at bar, was overruled by a majority of the court, as will appear by examining those two cases, which were decided the same day. I am not, therefore, in determining this cause, as it now, comes up, at liberty to proceed upon it; and such must have been .the opinion, of Judge Chase, on the trial of it, who was one of the court who had proceeded on that principle. Believing, therefore, that this property was chánged by its condemnation at Guadaloupe, the original owner can have no right to pursue it in the hands of any .vendee under that sentence, and the judgment below must, therefore, be affirmed. The other judges (except the Chief Justice) concurred. Marshall, Ch. J. observed, that, he had supposed , that the former opinion delivered in these cases upon this point had been concurred in by four judges. But in this he was mistaken. The, opinion was concurred in by one judge. He was still of opinion that the construction then given was correct. . He understood the expression en sortant, in the arrete, as confining the case of vessels coming out, to vessels taken in the act of coming out. If it included vessels captured on the return voyage, he should concur in the opinion now delivered. However, the principle of that case (Rose v. Himely) is notv overruled. Judgment affirmed. Todd, J. stated that in the case of Rose v. Himely, at February term, 1808, he concurred in opinion with Judge Johv.soiu Harper staled that one of the judges of the.court below had doubted whether, when a case is reversed upon a bill of exceptions and remanded, the court below-ought to grant a new trial. Marshall, Ch. J. If it be upon a special verdict, or case agreed, the court above will proceed to give judgment. But when a verdict in favour of a plaintiff is reversed, on a bill of exceptions to instructions given to the jury, títere must be a new it i»! awarded by the court below.