Semple v. Hagar

Semple v. Hagar. 1. When a want of jurisdiction is patent, or can be readily ascertained by an examination of the record in advance of an examination of the questions on the argument of the merits, this court will entertain and act upon a motion to dismiss for want of jurisdiction. 2. Where two parties held patents for land from the United States, under Mexican grants, both of which included the same lands in part, and one of the parties brought a suit in a State court to vacate the patent of the other, to the extent of the conflict of title, and the State court refused to entertain jurisdiction of the question, and dismissed the complaint, this court has no jurisdiction, under the twenty-fifth section of the Judiciary Act, to review the judgments. Semple filed a bill against llagar in one of tlie State courts of California. The bill alleged that he, the complainant Semple, bad obtained a patent from tbe United States for a tract of land, based upon a Mexican grant for tbe same land, known as tbe “ Coins” grant; that tbe land so granted bad been surveyed by the United States, and included certain lands enumerated; that tbe defendants claimed part of tbe same land under a Mexican grant known as tbe “ Jimeno” grant, for which a patent had also been issued by tbe United States to tbe defendants; that tbe surveys of tbe said grants overlapped; that the grant of tbe “ Jimeno” tract bad been obtained by fraud and was a cloud on tbe complainant’s title. The prayer of tbe bill was that tbe court might declare “ tbe said fraudulent grant, commonly called tbe ‘ Ji-meno Rancho,’ void, and of no effect, as issued upon false suggestions, and without authority of law.” Tbe defendant demurred to this bill, setting forth nine several grounds of demurrer, and among them these: 1st. That tbe court bad no jurisdiction of tbe subject of tbe action. 2d. That there was a defect of parties plaintiff. 3d. That there was a defect of parties defendant. Tbe court below made a decree dismissing tbe bill; a decree which on appeal the Supreme Court of California, the highest court of equity of the State, affirmed. Tbe case was then brought here as being within the twenty-fifth section of tbe Judiciary Act, which enacts that the final decree in tbe highest court of law or equity of a State, &c., where there is drawn in question the validity of an authority'exercised under the United States and the decision is against the validity, or drawn in question the construction of any clause of a statute or commission held under the United States, and the decision is against the title specially set up by either party under such statute or commission, may be reviewed in this court. Mr. Wills, for the defendant in error, now, and in advance of the case being regularly called, moved — the record being a short one, and of but ten pages — to dismiss the writ of error for want of jurisdiction. He thus argued: 1. The State courts of California had no jurisdiction of the subject of the action. This court has held, in Field v. Seabury, that the question of the validity of a patent for land is “a question exclusively between the sovereignty making the grant and the grantee.” The courts of California, carrying out this doctrine, have held, that “ a patent imports absolute verity, and that it can only be vacated and set aside by direct proceedings instituted by the government, or by parties acting in the name and by the authority of the government.” 2. It has been decided by the court, in Moreland v. Page, that this court has not jurisdiction, under the twenty-fifth section of the Judiciary Act, to review the judgment of a State court, when the question involved relates to the proper boundary between two tracts of land, although the owners of both had valid grants from the United States. Mr. Reverdy Johnson, for the plaintiff in error, contra, argued in support of the jurisdiction; contending, also, that the question, whether the jurisdiction did or did not exist, was one which the court would not settle in this preliminary way; that the question could not be settled without a thorough examination of the record; and that this could not be made until the case came up in regular order; that then, when the court would understand the whole matter, it could better decide the delicate matter of jurisdiction. 19 Howard, 332. Leese v. Clarke, 18 California, 571; Same v. Same, 20 Id. 423. See, also, Beard v. Federy, 3 Wallace, 479. 20 Howard, 522. [MAJORITY — Mr. Justice GRIER,] Mr. Justice GRIER, delivered the opinion of the court. In all cases of a motion to dismiss the writ of error for want of jurisdiction, the court must necessarily examine the record to find the questions decided by the State court. But in many cases the question of jurisdiction is so involved with the other questions decided in the case, that this court cannot eliminate it without the examination of a voluminous record, and passing on the whole merits of the case. In such instances, the court will reserve the question of jurisdiction till the case is heard on the final argument on the merits. In the case before us, the want of jurisdiction is patent; it requires no investigation of a long bill of exceptions. It was not decided by the court below on its merits, if it had any. It furnishes no reason for a postponement of our decision of the question. If, in such cases, the court would postpone the consideration of the question of jurisdiction, we would put it in the power of every litigant in a State court to obtain a stay of execution for three years, or more, by a frivolous pretence that it comes within the provisions of the twenty-fifth section of the Judiciary Act. In many States, all the land titles originated in patents from the United States; and if every question of boundary, of descent, of construction of wills, of contracts, &c., and which may arise in State coui’ts, may be brought here on the mere suggestion that the- party, against whom the State court gave their judgment, derived title under a patent from the United States, we should enlarge our jurisdiction to thousands of cases, and increase, unnecessarily, the burdens of this court, with no corresponding benefit to the litigant. It is plain that, in such cases, there is not “ drawn in question the validity of a treaty, or statute of, or an authority exercised under, the United States.” "We have here a very brief record, and, on the facts of the case, we cannot shut our eyes to the total want of jurisdiction, under the twenty-fifth section, or any other section of the Judiciary Act. It is plain, that if the court had assumed jurisdiction, and had declared the defendant’s patent void, for the reason alleged in the bill, the defendant would have had a case which might have been reviewed by this court, under the twenty-fifth section, and one on which there might have been a question and difference of opinion. But it is hard to perceive how the twenty-fifth section could apply to a judgment of a State court, which did NOT decide that question, and refused to take jurisdiction of the cay matter is too plain for argument. Motion grant