Study aid, not legal advice. caselaw is not a law firm and does not provide legal advice or engage in the unauthorized practice of law (UPL). All briefs, outlines, and citation tools on these pages are educational summaries for law students; they are not a substitute for advice from a licensed attorney admitted in your jurisdiction. Bar-admission rules vary by state. For court filings or client matters, verify every authority against the official reporter and your court's local rules. Use of caselaw does not create an attorney-client relationship.
BUSHEY v. HURON STEVEDORING CO., 1932 — 56 F.2d 604 · caselaw · US
Property · MBE-tested
BUSHEY v. HURON STEVEDORING CO.
56 F.2d 604·United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit·1932
Brief incoming
Hand-reviewed Bluebook brief (procedural posture, facts, issue, holding, reasoning, dissent) ships once the AI generation pipeline runs through this case. Join the waitlist to get notified when 1L briefs go live.
Opinion
BUSHEY v. HURON STEVEDORING CO.
No. 257.
Circuit Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
March 7, 1932.
Kirlin, Campbell, Hickox, Keating & Mcgrann, of New York City (L. De Grove Potter, of New York City, of counsel), for appellant.
Foley & Martin, of New York City (James A. Martin, of New York City, of counsel), for appellee.
Before L. HAND, SWAN, and CHASE, Circuit Judges.
[MAJORITY — PER CURIAM.]
PER CURIAM.
The appeal presents no question but of the credibility of witnesses, as to which we have often declared ourselves. The libelant’s ease depended, it is true, upon the testimony of a single bargee, but he made fresh complaint, and, though he was contradicted by several others, we cannot decide cases by counting heads. Indeed, when analyzed, the actual contradiction comes from fewer witnesses than the appellant believes. That the draught of copper may not have fallen four feet we can well believe, but that the winch got somewhat out of hand the judge has found, and we cannot gainsay him. How far the imperfect design of the scow may have contributed to the injury is not before us; when the damages are computed, the question may arise whether the injury was greater for that reason and whether the recovery must be limited to what a seaworthy seow would have suffered. Neither point do we now decide; the evidence does not justify the conclusion that a seaworthy seow would not have been injured at all.
The decree must be affirmed, but in view of the extravagant delay in prosecuting the cause, the libelant must bear a deduction of four years from the period during which interest is allowed.
Decree affirmed.