Jackson v. Jackson

Jackson v. Jackson. 1. Although, by the common law, the money which the wife has at the time of her marriage, not secured to her by a settlement or contract, and that which she subsequently earns, belong to the husband, it is competent and lawful for him to allow its investment in the purchase and improvement of real property for her separate use, if the rights of existing creditors are., not thereby impaired. 2. The doctrine of resulting trusts has no application to an investment of this kind: it constitutes a voluntary settlement upon the wife, whether made through the husband, or directly by the wife with his consent. 3. A divorce granted to the wife for cruel treatment by the husband is not of itself sufficient reason for awarding to him any portion of the property thus settled upon her. Appeal from, tbe Supreme Court of tbe District of Columbia. This is a case of divorce. Tbe parties were married on tbe 25tb of November, 1856, in tbe District of- Columbia, where theytben and ever since bave resided. Eacb prayed for á dissolution of tbe marriage-contract for tbe alleged misconduct óf tbe other. Tbe appellee, in bis- cross-bill, set up that tbe appellant held in her individual name the title to certain real estate in said District which bad been acquired and paid for since their marriage with bis money and earnings, and prayed that she be decreed to convey tbe same to him. - ; Tbe appellant’s answer to tbe cross-bill alleged- that the land bad been purchased with money .received from her father’s estate, and from tbe proceeds of her own industry and savings. Tbe cause being set down- for bearing, tbe court found, as a matter of fact, that tbe appellee was guilty of cruel treatment, as charged in tbe appellant’s bill; that tbe cause of. divorce in tbe cross-bill mentioned wa§. not made out; and that tbe property was .in part acquired' and paid for with money belonging to tbe appellant at tbe time- of her marriage, and for tbe rest with moneys earned by tbe joint efforts, of said parties. Tbe court thereupon decreed that tbe married relations between tbe parties be dissolved; that tbe title to tbe property be held by tbe appellee' in trust for both parties; and that,.from tbe date of tbe decree, the' appellant should bold, as of .her. own absolute right, a specifically described portion thereof, and convey in fee-simple the remainder to tbe appellee. From so much of the decree as relates to the property the plaintiff- below appealed to the General Term of said Supreme Court. The decree being affirmed, an appeal was taken to this court. There is no conflict in the proofs as to the purchase of the real estate by the appellant with the money which she possessed at the time of her marriage. The rent of the house which was then standing on the property, and her earnings, were used in the erection of the additional buildings; but the evidence adduced by the appellee tended to show that a part of his earnings was applied to the same purpose. The appellant took the deed in her own name, paid taxes on the property, caused it to be insured, and managed and controlled it as her own separate estate, with the full knowledge and consent of the appellee. The common law as to the rights of a married woman to real or personal property belonging to her at the time of her marriage, or thereafter acquired, prevailed in said District until April 20,1869, when an act was- passed to regulaté such rights. 16 Stat. 45. The ninth section of the “ Act to authorize divorces in the District of Columbia, and for other purposes,” approved June' 19, 1860 (12 Stat. 59), provides “ that, in all cases where a divorce is granted, the court allowing the same shall have power, if it see fit, to award alimony to the wife, and to retain her right of dower, and to award to the wife such property, or the value thereof, as she had when she was married, or such part, or the value thereof, as the court may deem reasonable, having a regard to the circumstances of the husband at the time of the divorce.” The above provisions, except in so far as they relate to alimony and the right of dower, appear not to have been reenacted in the Kevised Statutes. ■ The case was argued by Mr. A. Cr. Riddle for the appellant, and by Mr. William A. Meloy and Mr. Francis Miller for the appellee. [MAJORITY — Me. Justice Field] Me. Justice Field delivered the opinion of the court. The land in controversy in this case was purchased by-the wife with money which she had previous to her marriage, given to her by her father. The buildings erected thereon were constructed partly with such mon.ey, and partly witb. ber subsequent earnings. Tbe deed óf tbe land was taken in ber name.; tbe contract for tbe bouses was made by ber alone witb tbe builder; tbe policy of insurance upon tbe buildings was executed to ber; and sbe paid tbe taxes upon tbe property. It is true, tbat at tbe date of tbe marriage, and when tbe land was purchased and tbe improvements were made, tbe common law governed in tbe District of Columbia as to tbe rights of married women- to tbe personal property possessed by them previous to their marriage, and 1. ot secured by a settlement or -contract to their separate use, and as to their subsequent earnings. By tbat law, tbe money which tbe wife then possessed and ber subsequent earnings belonged exclusively to ber husband. They vested as absolutely in him as though tbe money bad been originally bis, and tbe earnings were tbe proceeds of his own labor and industry. This harsh rule of tbe common law was founded upon tbe idea, that, as tbe husband was bound by tbe marriage to support the wife and tbe rest of tbe family, be was entitled to whatever sbe possessed, of subsequently acquired, which was available for tbat purpose, — a rule which would have bad some good ground for its existence, bad it only applied when tbe money or earnings of tbe wife were necessary for tbat purpose. , But, becoming absolutely tbe property- of tbe husband, they were subject to bis disposal without regard to tbe necessities of tbe. family, and might be taken from them at tbe suit of bis creditors. They partook of tbe condition, and were subject to tbe fate, of bis: separate property. But though tbe money which tbe wife in tbe present case bad at ber marriage, and ber subsequent earnings, must be. regarded as. tbe property of tbe husband, it was competent and lawful for him to allow ber to invest them for ber own use, so as to be beyond bis reach and control. ' Being at tbe time free from debt, be could have taken whatever money sbe bad, whether. given to her or earned by ber own labor, and purchased witb it tbe land in controversy, and received the deed in ber name. Tbe investment would then have been an advancement for ber benefit, — a voluntary settlement upon ber; and tbe subsequent application of ber earnings to tbe construction of improvements would have equally been a legal disposition of them. Tbe improvement of property settled upon tbe wife is not forbidden to tbe husband, if not made with a fraudulent intent; and the moneys used for that purpose do not interfere with any rights of existing creditors. The law on the subject of post-nuptial settlements of this character is well settled, and will be found stated in numerous adjudications of the American courts. Picquet v. Swan, 4 Mas. 444; Haskell v. Bakewell, 10 B. Mon. 206. The doctrine of resulting trusts, arising where a conveyance is taken in the name of one person and the consideration is advanced by another,’has no application to investments.of this kind. Such trusts are raised by the law from the presumed intention of the parties, and the natural equity that he who furnishes the means for the acquisition of property should enjoy its benefits. But no presumption that a personal benefit was intended to the party advancing the funds for a purchase in the name of another can arise where an obligation exists on his part, legal or moral, to provide for the grantee, as in the case of a husband fór his wife, or a father for his child. The circumstance that the grantee stands in one. of these relations to the party is of itself sufficient evidence to rebut the presumption of a resulting trust, and to create a contrary presumption of an advancement for the grantee’s benefit. Murless v. Franklin, 1 Swans. 17; Grey v. Grey, 2 id. 597; Finch v. Finch, 15 Ves. 50; Guthrie v. Gardner, 19 Wend. 414; Perry on Trusts, sects. 143, 144. The case of Sexton v. Wheaton, 8 Wheat. 229, which arose in the District of Columbia, is a determination of this court upon the points here presented. There the husband had purchased a house and lot within the District, and taken the conveyance in the name of his wife, and afterwards improvements were made upon the property. Subsequent creditors, having obtained judgment against him, filed a bill to subject the property to its payment, contending that the conveyance to the wife was fraudulent and void as to them, and praying, that, if the conveyance was sustained, the wife might be compelled to account for the value of the improvements. But the court held, Mr. Chief Justice Marshall delivering its opinion, that, the husband at the time being free from debt, the conveyance to the wife was to be deemed a voluntary settlement upon her, which, hot being made with any fraudulent intent, was operative and binding against subsequent creditors; and that the improvements upon tne property stood upon the same footing as the conveyance itself, they being made before the debts were contracted. The Chief Justice observed that it would seem to be a consequence of that absolute power which a man possesses over his own property, that he might make any disposition of it which did not interfere with the existing rights of others; that such disposition, if it were fair and real, would be valid; and that the limitations upon this power were those only which were prescribed by law. The Chief Justice then proceeded to show that the law only limited this power when its exercise impaired the rights of existing creditors; and that a voluntary settlement by a husband in favor of hip wife could not be impeached by subsequent creditors, unless it was made to defraud them. The present case is one much stronger than the case cited; for here there are no creditors complaining. It differs from the one cited in this, that the investment was made directly by the wife, instead of being made through the husband; but we do not perceive in this fact any valid objection to the legality of the transaction. There can be no doubt that she acted with his approval. Fifteen years of acquiescence in her holding the land in her name, and in making improvements thereon with her earnings, ought to be deemed satisfactory evidence of his original authorization of the investments. The amount paid for the land was only $800 (less than one-sixth of the sum received from her father), and the whole cost of the improvements for the fifteen years was only about $2,000; and it does. not appear that any third parties have been in any respect prejudiced by the investments, or have ever questioned their validity. The divorce decreed was not of itself a sufficient reason for restoring to the husband any rights to the property thus settled upon the wife. That was granted for cruel treatment; and, whatever may be the power of the court over the property of parties upon the dissolution of the marriage relation, there was no call for its exercise in a case like the present. The decree of the Supreme Court of the District, so far as it awards any portion of the property in controversy to the husband, and directs a conveyance by the wife to him, must be reversed ; and it is so ordered. [DISSENT — Mr. Justice Davis] Mr. Justice Davis dissenting. , I agree to the legal propositions advanced by tbe court; but, in my opinion, the- evidence in tbis case does not warrant tbe application tbat bas been made of them. It would serve no useful purpose to discuss tbe evidence, in ■ order to show tbat it is so; and I shall, therefore, content myself with saying, tbat it justified tbe conclusion reached by tbe court below, tbat tbe property should be divided between tbe parties. As the appeal only brought up tbe question of prop-erty rights, I am not at liberty to consider tbe merits of tbe decree for divorce. •