ARNOLD and others v. THE UNITED STATES

ARNOLD and others v. THE UNITED STATES. The double dufeimposed by the act of 'accrued up™ goocts which aloUectiondistrjet.oo that day- • an importation, -so as to rightto duties, it is npcessaty ’there°'sLiiWt k*ran Arrival "'¡thin the li- ■ collection disal?.° within the limit& of some port of entry. oomb. That il’the condition ofabomibetQ pay 1700 dol- * ties winch may j)®has“,et^'ied ¿4nue5 imported; it is-Soh of the ob-to dis-. fll® - ment rf the” daollaiS¿e^may/at" taw;, recover “^tyof the bond. ■ ERROR to the Circuit Court, for the district of Rhode Island, ill an action of debt, upon á bond in the penalty of 3400 dollars, given July 2d, 1812, 'for duties at the Custom hbuse. The cause was decided below upon démurer to the pleas of ttie Defendants who were the prinpipal and sureties in the bond’. If wasmii action of debt on a bond,dated July 2,1812, given to. the United States for $3406.* Thp condition of the bond, is as follows, viz. “The condition of this “ obligation is such, that if the''above bminden, S. G-. .ii Arnold,'&c. shall and do,, on or before the 2d day of “ October next, well and truly pay or cause to be paid “ unto the collector of the customs for the district of Pro- « vidence for the titne being, the sum of $1700,' or. the « amount of duties to be ascertained as due, and arising on « certain goods,- wares and merchandize entered, by the « above kounden S. U-. Arnold, as imported in the brig « Dover, R. Fenner, master, from Hav.anna, as per en«.try dated this day, then the above obligation to be void, « &c.” The following indorsement is on the bo.nd, viz. combination0;?: tiT'be made* an ?ot ^ whittle act is done, is m<duded’ « Amount of duties ascertained as due-, 1708 dollars , «38 Cents. THOMAS PECKHAM, Junr. Deputy Collector.w The Defendants pleaded; that, as to 1708 dollars and 38 cents, part and parcel of said sum of 3400 dollars demanded by the Plaintiffs, with the interest thereon.from the day wlierebu the same was payable,.to the time of the plea, being 13 dollars and 38 cents, they owe the Plaintiffs the same, being in the whole the sum 1721 dollars and 76 cents ; and that as to the whole residue of the sum demanded, the Oefendantssay,thátth'-refor the Plaintiffs, their said action ought not to have and maintain, because they say, «that the brig Dover in the « condition of the said bond mentioned, sailed from Ha- « vanna, on the 16th day of June, A. D. 1812, bound to the « said district of Providence, and that she arrived within «the United States, ori the 30th day of June, 1812; and « within the said district of Providence, on the 1st day of «July, A. D. 1812, having on board the said goods, « mentioned in the condition which said goods; &c. were « imported into the said United States, on the said 30th « day of June, 1812, and into the said district of «on the said 1st day of July, T812, in the brig Dover, « &c. that Providence is the sole port of entry in the «said district of Providence, and that on the-said 2d of «July, 1812, the said goods, &c. were duly entered at the custom house in the said district of Providence,- as im- « ported in the said brig Dover, Sec. the Defendants «further aver, that the bond aforesaid, was made; «executed and given by them to the Plaintiffs as «aforesaid, for securing the duties ■ due on the said «goods, so imported as aforesaid, in conformity with, and by virtue ami in pursuance of, the act of « the congress; &c. passed on the 10th day of August, “ 1799, cut'tied “ an act making further provision fol* the “ p y.tu-nt of the debts ot the united .‘slates,” and also “ a cer,am other act of congress, passed on the 7th day “ of J um, 1794, entitled “ an act laying additional duties “ on goods, &c. imported into the United States.” The “ Defendants also aver, that the duties due by the acts “ aforesaid, on the importation of Miid goods;, &c. in “ manner aforesaid, amounted at the time of the importation of the same asafo esaid, to the aforesaid suna of “ 1708 dollars and 38 cents, and no more, and were then «and there ascertained by the said deputy collector, to “ that suin and no more, according to the condition of said « bond, and in pursuance of the provisions ot said statutes. “They also aver, that at the time of the entering ofthe said “ goods, &c. at the custom house, as aforesaid, on the said 2d pay of July, 1812, neither they, the-Defendants, nor “ the collector of the customs for said'district of Proyi- “ dence, had any knowledge of the act,, entitled “ an act “for imposing additional duties upon all goods,„&c. imported from any foreign port or place, and for other “purposes,” passed on the. 1st day of July, 1812; nor “ was the said last mentioned act promulgated, publish- “ ed and made known, at the district of Providence a®. “ aforesaid, at the time of making the said entry, as “aforesaid, and this the Defendants are ready.to “ verify, &c. To this idea, the Plaintiffs demurred. In the Circuit Court, judgment was rendered for tlic Plaintiffs', for 3428 dollars and 90 cents. 1 Pitkin, On, the part of the- Plaintiffs in error, contended, . 1. That the act imposing double duties could .nót, on principles of lave, or justice, be considered as in operation until the 2d day of July. The words of that act are: that “ an additional duty, &o. shall be levied and “collected upon all goods, &c. which shall,from and af•‘■ter tfie passing of this act, be imported into the United “ States, &c.” The act was approved by the president on the 1st day of July, 1812. BV the sound construction of the. words. «from ^nd after the passing of this act,” it is contended that the first day of July, must be excluded ; that the meaning is the same, as if the words used had been from and after the 1st day of J< ly, in which case the 1st day of July wotfid certainly be excluded, and the act not be in force until after that day. « From and after the passing this act,” have also the same meaning, as from and after the time, of passing the act. The question would then occur, as it now does, when or at what, time was the act passed, the answer is oh the 1st day of July, and of course, unless there are fractions of a day, the duties could not be levied and collected until after that day. The act, repealing the duty on salt passed in 1807, declares, «that from and after the 3,1st day of December « next, so much of any act as lays a duty on imported «salt, be and the same is hereby repealed, and from and « after the day last aforesaid, salt shall be imported, &c. « duty free.” JNo one has ever pretended, that salt could be imparted duty .free, until the 1st day of January', because it could pot be so imparted, until from and after the day preceding. The Court must undoubtedly give such a construction to the act, as that no.citizen can, by possibility be subjected to its operation before it had actually passed, in order to prevent this, the Court must either exclude the 1st day Of July altogether, or they must admit fractions of a day, and suffer an enquiry into the very moment of time on that day, when the act received the signature of the president, and was lodged in the office of the secretary of state. If a vessel had arrived in the morning of the 1st day of July, and the act was not in fact approved by the president, until the afternoon of that day, it cannot be pretended, that the goods brought in such vessel, ‘were imported «/rom and after the passing of the act'.” It is well known, that acts are not generally presented to the president for his approbation, until about the middle of the day, and on the last day of the session, frequently not until nearly the last hour of the day. The difficulties however, attending an enquiry of th.s nature, as well as the impropriety of calling on the president for information, as to the moment when a law received his sanction, may perhaps be sufficient inducements fop the Court to say, that when the rights and interests of the citizens are so materially involved, arid when by the. express words of the act, it is not to take effect, until from and after1 the passing of the same, they will, as a rule exclude, the day on which it passed. The authorities, which Have a bearing on this question are various and contradictory. In the case of Pugh <$• wife v. Duke of Leeds, Cowper 714, these authorities are referred to and commented upon by lord Mansfield. with his usual ability and sound sense. Much more subtlety than argument lias been used to prove a difference in the meaning of words made use'of, in instruments, to siiew the time, when they should take.! effect. When the words have been “ from'the date,” the Court have sometimes said, it should include the day, and where the words have been “ from the day of the date,”. It should exclude the day.. In some cases the Courts have entirely rejected .this distinction, and have said, that they do or may mean the same thing. In the case of Heliosis v. Iínler, 1 Lent Raymond, 280, on a bill of exchange, payable 10 days after sight, the Court, two judges against one, decided,' that the day on which the bill: was presented for'payment was included. This opinion, however, was against the custom and practice of merchants. In the case of 7latter v„ Ash, 1 Lord Raymond, v. 85, the following distinction is made by counsel, and is admitted by one of the judges, and not contradicted by the others, “ that the words” from the date “ when used to pass on interest included the day, aliters “ when used by way of computation on matters of ac- “ count;” Tins distinction is ir, some measure recognized by lord Mansfield, in the above caseof Pugh <§' Leeds, in Cowper. in this last case lord Mansfield says, that-the words “from ti>e date,” or “from the day of the “ date.” may be either inclusive or exclusive, according to the subject matter, and may be construed either way, to give effect to the "transaction, or for the furtherance of justice between parties. In the case now before the Court, it is not necessary to include the day, for the purpose. of'giving effect anil"validity to the law; and in case thc'day is included, manifest injustice may, arid in all probability will happen- to the citizens of the United States, For, if there can he no fractions óf a day, the act must in legal contemplation be considered as in. force, from the first moment of the day, On which it. received the sanction of the president. It is understood, that by the construction- at the treasury, the 1st day of July, is excluded, and that the accounts of the collectors of the customs are all'sattled, excluding double duties, on which arrived on that day. . 2. Even if the act went into operation on the 1st day of July,, then was this case a complete importation, before that time. The vessel and c-Argo arrived within the U. States, and within the limits of the state of R. Island, on the 30th day of June, and the importation was then per-c fected. Importation does not imply a. bringing into any. particular port, to which the vessel may be destined; a. bringing within the jurisdictional limits of the U. States, •either on land or water,' is an importation. • Importing and bringing into the U. States, are used sytlonimously in various sections of the collection law, and the fair interpretation of both expressions is, that an importation is no more than voluntarily introducing property within the jurisdiction Of the United States generally, And does not-require its actual arrival at the port of its destination. The moment a cargo so arrives within the .United States', and before it reaches its part of destination, the right of the United States, attaches to it. A manifest of the cargo must be delivered to their officers, and the cargo subjected in some degree to , their control. The U. States then have, at least, an inchoate right to duties, of-which the-owner, cannot deprive them except by exportation, without unlading; the right-to the duties accrues, on thy first entry of the vessel into the waters of the United States, and not after her arri val.at her port of destination; and no new right, on such arrival, accrues,, except the secondary right of ascertaining the amount of duties to be paid, and the extent of the security required for them, which could not be ascertained, till after an Actual entry at the custom house. The coming in of the vessel to the waters of the United States, her proceeding to her destined port, her entry there, is one transaction, and is one act in relation to duties; and when she reaches her destined port and enters there, the right of the-United States attaches as from the first moment of her coining within the jurisdictional limits of the United States, and the responsibilities of the owner cannot be increased or varied to his injury, by subsequent acts of tbe government. Tbe 36th section of the law clearly discriminates between importation arid entry. By the collection law, and all the forms of manifest, entry, &c. it is clearly evinced that importation precedes entry. To Constitute an importation, there must be á Voluntary bringing of goods into the United States; the vessel must bo bound to the United States, with an intent there to unlade her cargo, or to-enter the same for exportation without unlading.' Coming in by stress of weather or other necessity is not a legal importation. . By a construction given to the navigation acts of Great Britain, coming into a port, with an mtent.to unlade, although bulk be not broken, is an importation, but a mere comjng within the limits of a port, without any intent to break bulk, or unlade, is not an importation, either to make the customs becomp due, or to subject the ship or goods to forfeiture, or to oblige the, master to report. or make entry, &c. f Reeve’s History of the law of shipping, 260, J So goods siezed in a ship 20 miles below the Hope, but within the limits of the port of London,' are considered as an importation-, f Reeves, p. 261.J It is believed also, that, under cur non-importation law, arrival at any particular port of destination* is«not necessary to constitute an offence under that act, but that if tbe vessel is bound to the United States with an intent there to unlade her carero, the forfeiture is incurred the moment the vessel voluntarily enters the limits oí the United State?. The words in the collection law and non-importation act, are the'same, viz. “ Imported into “ the United States,” &c. 3. If, however, the importation was not so complete, as that, the duties accrued, on the. arrival of ihe .vessel within the jurisdictional limits of the United States ; it is contended, that the importation was p- rfected, and the right of the United States to duties complete,- on her arrival within the limits of any district of the customs of .the United States, The vessel, in the case before the Court, as is con fes» sod by the pleadings, arrived within the limits of the district of Providence, which is about 26 miles, within the jurisdictional limits of the United States, on the 1st day of Julyy and if, in the fiscal sense of the term* cqnstituted an importation, arid the law did not, take effect. until the- 2d day of J uly, the goods so imported, cannot be subject to the duties imposed by tháthct. We are aware of the decision of the Court, in 181ÓÍ in the case of the United^States v. VowHISf M‘Clean, in 6 Crunch. The distinction there taken by the counsel for the Defendants, between a district and & port of entry, is recognized by the Court as correct. The Court say,. “ the “ duties did not accrue, in the fiscal sense of the term, ■** until the vessel arrived at the port of entry.” But with great deference we contend that the time of importation, even in tire fiscal sense of the term, is not ascertained merely by the .entry of the master, or of the owner or consignee at the custom house, but by the arrival of the vessel in the United States, or within the limits of some place in the United States, designated by law. Whether this-place be apart of entry, strictly so called* or a district, the master and ownef have time given them by law, within which, after such arrival, they are. allowed to make their entries at the custom house. Suppose the vessel, in this very case,-had arrived at the port of Providence, on the 30th day of Juné, at twelve o’clock the master would be allowed, until twelve o’clock the next day, to make ids first report to the collector, and he would not be obliged to exhibit a manifest of his cargo, before 48 hours after his arrival,, which would not be, until the 2d day of July $ and the owner or consignee is allowed 16 days, after the final report of the master, to make- his entry, for the purpose of paying or securing the duties. As this vessel would then have arrived, before the law passed, she could not be subject to double' duties* although she might not have entered at the custom house, until after the passage of the law. There is, therefore, a material distinction between importation and, entry. When a vessel, bound to the United States, with a cargo, has once arrived within certain known and specified limits ; when she. has onc-e passed the line of demarcation fixed by law, then, at least:, if iiot before, must the. goods iii such vessel be considered as legally and fiscally imported, and subject to all the provisions of law, relative to the.-security of duties upon them.The limits of a collection district are particularly designáted by law. In every district, there is one, and but one port of entry,, but in many of them, there are several ports of delivery. These ports, however, whether of .entry or delivery, have no limits fixed or designated by law. When a vessel has arrived,« within the limits of any «district of the United States,” she is under the'complete control of the government, and she cannot depart from such district, « unless,to proceed to some more in- « terior district,” before a report or entry shall be made by the master, with the collector of some district, under the penalty of giOO, and the custom house officers and commanders of the revenue cutters; are authorized to arrest and bring back, any vessel attempting to depart from such district, &c. (Laws- United States, vol. 4, § 39. p. 326. J The provisions of the next succeeding section, viz. section SQth/.p. 337, are, « that within 24 hours « after the arrival of any ship or vessel, &c. at any port «ofthe United States, established by law, at which an « officer of the customs resides, the master is to make « a report of Ids arrival,” and within 48 hours, is to make a further report in writing, with a manifest, of the cargo, &c. It is certain, that the word “port” mentioned in this section, must be applicable to a port of delivery, at winch a surveyor of the customs resides, as W’ell as to a port of entry, at which the collector of the district resides. And, whelhoE lhe master, according to this section, is obliged ’ within 48 hours, after his arrival within the limits of a district, to make report and entry to the collector of such district, or within 48 hours, after..his arrival at some particular port. in such district; still after the arrival of a vessel within the limits of such district, she cannot depart from the same, unless to an interior district, until the master has made a report, and exhibited a manifest bf her cargo, to the collector of. such district. And after such manifest has been exhibited.to the collector, she is not permitted, to depart from such district, with the whole or any part of her cargo, eitheij to a foreign port, or tb any other district, until bonds are given for the due entry and delivery of the goods, which are destined for another district, or if the goods are destined for a foreign port, that they " shall not be landed " in the United States, unless due entry thereof shall " have been first made, and the duties thereupon paid " secured to be paid, according to law.” ( Vide 32, 33 34 sections, pages 331 — 2—3 8f 4.y) If the goods are intended for exportation, they must be so reported in the manifests, and then the vessel importing them, may proceed " from the district, within which such ship or " vessel shall first arrive,” Ac. on giving b»r¡d, as above stated (sect. 32.J If the goods or any. part of them are destined to any other district, the vessel, in which they were brought, may proceed to such other district, on such conditions, as are specified in the 34th section. 'This section declares, “ that before any ship or vessel " shall depart from the district, in which she shall first "arrive, for ¡another1 district, (provided such, departure "b,e n-s,t within 48 hours after her arrival within such " district) with goods', Ac. brought in such ship from a " foreign port or place, Ac. the master, Ac. shall obtain “ from the collector of the district,', from which she shall "be about to depart, a copy of the report and manifest ".made by such, master,” Ac. ' .Then the.word district is used, and not port; and the proviso seems to shew, pretty clearly, that within 48 hours after the arrival of a Vessel, within-a district, a. report and manifest must be. made, to tbe collector of such district. . And when a vessel departs with goods from one district to any other-district, the master is obliged within " twenty-four 'hours after the arrival of such ship within " any other district, so to make report or entry, to or « with the collector of such, other district,” Ac. Ac. (See page. 335,-sect. 34. J. The condition of the bonds, in both cases, shew that the goods are considered as imported into the district, and not into particular ports, and that the ■•bonds are given to secure the payment of the . duties upon them,- in case they' should be1 landed in hoy other port of the United States. With regard to impor- ■ tation, the' words of the condition are, “ whereas the « following goods, Ac. imported into the district of.” Ac. In' the case of the United States v. Vowel and M-lCean, the Court say, the vessel must arrive at the port-of entry, before the. duties accrued. If by an arrival at a port of entry, is meaiit that a vessel must actually go to a pott of entry as established by law, before a right to the duties can attach or an entry can be made by the master or owner, the position is believed to be incorrect; as by the 19th section'of the collection lawr, a vessel destined to a port of delivery, in many of the districts, may go directly to such a port of delivery, without even touching at a port of entry, and the master and owner, may afterwards enter the vessel and carero, and pay or secure the duties, with the collector at the port of entry in. such district, without taking the vessel, or cargo to such port of entry. The provisions of all the sections of the law from the 2Sd to the 35th inclusive, relate principally, if not solely, to the conduct of the master, or person having charge of the vessel, with a cargo bound to the United States; and that the object of ail the provisions in these sections, is to ascertain the amount and kind of goods, which ho has imported, is to prevent their being unladen, without the assent of the government. If the vessel'be owned in whole or ín part by a citizen Of the United Stat s, the master is to have a manifest of the cargo oh board ; a cbpy of this mahifest, must be delivered, to an officer of the customs, if within four leagues of the coast; a like copy must be delivered to-an officér of the customs, after his ar rival within the limits of any district, and a certificate of such officer is to be entered on the original manifest; the last copy is, to be sent to the collector of the district in which such vessel has arrived, and the original manifest certified by such officer, must be delivered to such collector by the mas? ter, or lie must make oath, that no such copy had been applied for, &c. (See 2Bth~sectim, page 3.21-2) and the master is finally to deliver to the collector of the district' under oath, a manifest containing the particulars of the cargo on board; and after this lias been done by the master, the owners or consignees of goods thus imported, are tó, Come forward and pay or secure the duties upart them; and for this purpose are to make a particular, entry of such parts of the cargo, as áre owned by or consigned to them. The form of this entry is given in the 36th sec. of the law. and is headed, by the words— “ entry QÍiriftchaiulize imported by” &c« The complete control of the government over, the vessel* from the moment of her arrival within any district, is shewn by the S3d section of the law, page -345. This section provides « that it shall be lawful for the collec- “ tor of any district in which any ship or vessel may “ rive and immediately on her Jirst coming within such “ district, &c. “to put on hoard'such ship or vessel, “ whilst remaining within such district, or in going i(from one district to another, one or more inspector, to “ examine the'cargo, &c. and to. perform such'other du- “ ties,” &c, for the better securing the collection of “ the duties.” 4, The bond was taken, under the former impost lav as stated in the plea, and accordingly was an explicit contract for such duties as that Zeno imposed and no other * and whatever claim the Plaintiffs may have for double duties, no more than the single duties ought tp be recovered on thiá bond, . If any duties are to be paid, on account of the imported articles, beyond the tariff established by the former impost law, they are not recoverable in this action on the bond given, under that law* but recourse musí be had to some other process for the recovery of such further duties. The sureties (and- in this case "two of the Defendants are sureties) will not be made liable beyond the responsibility which they expected on entering into the obligation. They expected to be holden for no moré than the duties under the former impost law ; and the proceedings on the part of government warranted that expectation, The time of giving the bond, the district where it is taken and the.penal sum, being rather less than the amount of double duties, as now demanded, evince conclusively, that the bondj with its condition was not' for double duties* but for the single duties, Every argument, which can be urged for a demand of double duties, may - be urged with equal force, and far more apparent equity to sustain some other process, in which the sureties would not be subjected to the peculiar hardship of being compelled to pay double duties, for which they could have no idea of being responsible» ,vhen the bond was given. This view of the case is according to tire essential admitted by the pleadings. On the 2d of July, 1812, after the imported articles had been properly inspected, the amount of duties was ascertained and indorsed on the bond in tire collector’s office. The indorsement was expressed in these terms <f amount of *« duties ascertained as due, 1708 doll. 38 cents.” Bond for securing the duties being required before granting a permit to land the articles from the importing vessel, a «toss estimate of the amount of duties only, could be made .at the moment of taking the bond, f see section 49, page 359-60J and that estimate was 1700. dollars as mentioned in the condition. When the articles had been duly inspected, after the permit to land, and after return of such inspection, (see ■page 361-2J but not before, the duties could be and were ascertained in the regular course at the collector’s office. The precise amóunt of duties was then ascertained according to the former, impost law, and found to be 17p8 dollars and 38 cents, and was so indorsed oh the bond according to known provisions of law. Shall that indorsed amount be the measure of the demand ort the bond?. After the duties had been so ascertained and indorsed on the 2d of July, if a deposit of goods, (according to sec. 42, page 382-3J had been made for securing the amount of the duties for which the bond had been given, what would have been the measure for determining the sufficiency of such security ? it was lawful for the collector, in lieu of sureties to accept of a deposit of so much of the goods, as should in his judgment, be sufficient. • And this deposit, from the nature of the case, was to. be received only after the articles had been landed, and consequently after the amount of duties was regularly ascertained. The deposit, therefore, must have been for securing the specific sum of 1708 dolls, abd 38 cents, and only that suni when due could, by law, be charged for duties to be paid from the proceeds of the deposited goods. In the present case, there is no question about the fairness of the proceedings at the custom house; The whole transaction was according to the regular course. s>f business. Whatever w&s uncertain in the condition of the bond, was reduced to - certainty hy the indorsement; and the full extent of the obligation Was then set-tied by fair agreement of the proper agent on the of the United States. That extent of course would be the measure of pledges to sureties. Such extent would measure the charge for duties on the part of a consignee, who might be principal in a bond., And if the consignee were ordered oy an owner, who made the shipments abroad, to sell promptly and pay over the proceeds of sales, the whole might be completed and all accounts between them closed at a place remote from the seat of government, such as New Orleans, before any knowledge could there be had, of the act .for imposing double duties. All the official information and proceedings within tl>e district jiad united to assure him of freedom from all duties or customs, on paying the amount required according to the former impost law. In such a case, to exact double duties from a consignee, who had entered the goods at the custom house, would he manifest injustice. It would operate as fraud or extortion or both. Is it for, this Court to believe the legislature, capable of intending such wrong ? But where is the difference in principle between such a case and the case now before the Court. New Orleans is not the only district where imported articles might be sold by a consignee, or by the owner himself, under such a full conviction of being liable to single duties only, and without a possibility of just compensation or redress, if the government may afterwards surprize 1dm by exacting double duties. If a liability to double duties were known to an owner, at the time of making entry, he might choose to have the articles entered for exportation according to the terms allowed by the general law relative to the collection of duties on imposts. But this privilege might be taken away, hy the construction, under which the double duties are demanded in the present case. The intent of the parties gives a rule for decision in cases of contract. At the date of this bond, was it m»~ tqally intended to secure the payment of'double duties ? No such allegation is found in the pleadings; nor is such intention to be fairly inferred from the admitted facts. On the contrary, the -intention fairly understood on each side, was to decure the payment of the single duties only as required under the former impost law. And this intention is apparent from "the penal sum of the bond, with the gross estimate of duties as mentioned in the condition, and the ascertained amount of duties indorsed on the bond. As the whole transaction at the collector’s office is agreed to have been, fair, the fact of that indorsement js decisive to prove, that with reference to the district where the goods were .entered and. delivered, no rule of duties on imposts, had been made known, other than the former impost law. > And the general principle of all law requires the rule to be prescribed or made known before it can be obligatory, To this principle Blackstonb has reference in the first and fourth volumes of his commentaries. It is true, he has said, Ignoraiitia juris quod "quisque tenetur scire, neminem excusaL And this he has stated; as a maxim of the Roman, as well as of the English law. But, according to him, the possibility of knowledge is essential to the obligation of knowing the law. To enforce any positiv. rule as a law, before the individual could be presumed to know it, would he alike incorisfsent with public justice and civil right. Indeed, this qualification relative to the opportunity and consequent presumption of knowledge, is so essential that the statement might otherwise be questioned as deficient in accuracy. For the maxim, in terms as stated by Blackstonb, is not found in the text of the Pandests indicated by his note of reference, (i< Jlacksione Com. page 27,) nor does that text warrant the position stated by Blackst ,no as a maxim, unless it be considered as applicable to the case of a law, which might be known by every one, and. which, therefore, every one is holdcn to know, and this may be deemed the fair import of the Latin terms, in which the position is stated. If so considered, and not otherwise, it agrees with the general doctrine of the Roman law, and is a principle of universal jurisprudence. In relation to positive law, that principle iríipíieg the necessity of its being» made known, before .it can imposts any obligation. Positive law is a manifestation of the legislative will; and although there may bea legislative will, it does not become a law, where it is not mauifested. There was no argument on the part of the United States. Feb. 23d. -.absent....Toan, J. [MAJORITY — Stoky, J.] Stoky, J. delivered the Opinion. of the Court as follows: The United States brought an action of debt against the Defendants on a bond given for'the payment of dUr ties on goods imported in the brig Dover into the port of Providence. Upon the pleadings in the Court below, judgment was given in favor of the United States, and tiie Defendants have brought the present wTrit of error to reverse that judgment, The material facts are, that the brig arrived within tjie limits of the United States on the 30th day of June, 1812; and within the collection district of Providence, on the first day of July, 1812. On the second day of July, an entry was duly made at the custom house and the present bond was then executed. The principal question which has been argued is, whether on these facts the goods are liable to the pay-. ment of the double duties imposed by the act of the first day of July, 1812, ch~..i±2. That act-provides “that an “ additional duty of 100 per cent, upon the permanentdu«ties now imposed by law, &c. shall be levied and collected “ upon all goods, wares and merchandizes which shall, “from and after the passing of this act, be imported iptp “ the United States from any foreign port or place.” It is contended that this statute did not take effect untit the secondday of July; nor indeed until it was formally promulgated and published. We cannot yield assent to this construction. The statute w as to take effect from its passage; and. it is a general rule that where the computation is to be made from art act done, the, day on which the act is done is to be included. It is further contended that the importation was complete. by the arrival of the vessel within the jurisdictional limits of the United States, on the thirtieth day of June. We have no difficulty in overruling this argument. To constitute an importation so as .to attach the right to duties, it is necessary not only that there should be an arrival within the limits of the United States, and of a collection district hut also within the limits'of some port of entry. Thié was expressly decided in the case of the United States v. Vowell, 5 Crunch, 368. Without therefore adverting to the consideration of the regularity or sufficiency of the pleadings we are all of opinion that on the merits .the judgment must be - affirmed. Judgment affirmed with six per cent, damages and costs-.