General

Joseph CROCKE, Defendant-Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee; Harry EVANS, Defendant-Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee; William MEARS, Defendant-Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee; Charles SMITH, Defendant-Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee; John LUVENDORE and Adam Carlow, Defendants-Appellants, v. UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiffs-Appellee; Abe POLLICK, Defendant-Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee

57 F.2d 1074·United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit·1932

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Opinion

Joseph CROCKE, Defendant-Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee. Harry EVANS, Defendant-Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee. William MEARS, Defendant-Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee. Charles SMITH, Defendant-Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee. John LUVENDORE and Adam Carlow, Defendants-Appellants, v. UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiffs-Appellee. Abe POLLICK, Defendant-Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee. Nos. 4724, 4729, 4730, 4731, 4758, 4770. Circuit Court of Appeals, Third Circuit. May 7, 1932. Jacob S. Glickenhaus and’ Richard M. Glassner, both of Newark, N. J., for appellants Crocke and Smith. Harry Grossman, of Elizabeth, N. J., for appellants Evans and Mears. Harry Heher, of Trenton, N. J., for appellants Luvendore and Carlow. Jacob S. Glickenhaus, of Newark, N. J., for appellant Polliek. Phillip S. Forman, U. S. Atty., and Walter B. Petry, Asst. U. S. Atty., both of Trenton, N. J. Before BUFFINGTON, DAYIS, and THOMPSON, Circuit Judges. [MAJORITY — PER CURIAM.] PER CURIAM. In these cases we are of opinion that, however strong the case against the defendants was, the court, instead of leaving to the jury to decide the question whether the crimes had been committed, used language from which the jury might well infer that the underlying question whether the crimes had been committed was withdrawn from them and decided by the judge. Accordingly, we reverse the cases and remand them for retrial.