O’KESON against BARCLAY.
The compromise of an action of slander, in which the words laid in the declaration were not actionable, is a good consideration for a note for the payment of money.
ERROR to the Special Court of Mifflin county.
Nicholas O’Neson brought an action of slander against William Barclay, and his counsel filed a declaration, in which the words, alleged to have been spoken, were not actionable at all. When the suit had been pending for a time, the parties met and compromised it, by Barclay giving his note to O’Kesoji for one hundred dollars; it was upon this note that this suit was brought. The ground of defence in the court below was, that, although the compromise of a doubtful claim, affecting the rights of parties, is always a good consideration, without regard to the question, of who might have the right side of the controversy; yet that is not this case; this was not the compromise of a doubtful claim, for there could have been no doubt about it, that the plaintiff, from his own showing, never could have recovered a farthing. The court being of this opinion so instructed the jury, who found a verdict accordingly.
Hale for plaintiff in error; and Potter contra.
[MAJORITY]
Judgment reversed, and venire de novo awarded.