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Augustus W. Doll, Appellant, v. William P. Earle et al., Executors, etc., Respondents, 1874 — 59 N.Y. 638 · caselaw · US
Contracts · MBE-tested
Augustus W. Doll, Appellant, v. William P. Earle et al., Executors, etc., Respondents
59 N.Y. 638·New York Court of Appeals·1874·NY
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Opinion
Augustus W. Doll, Appellant, v. William P. Earle et al., Executors, etc., Respondents.
(Argued November 18, 1874;
decided December 1, 1874.)
This was the submission of a controversy without action under section 372 of the Code.
The facts submitted, in substance, were these: Defendants held a bond and mortgage executed in 1860, the latter covering certain premises of which plaintiff was seized at the time of the submission. On the 14th April, 1870, the parties entered into a contract by which it was agreed that plaintiff should pay, and defendants receive, the principal and interest in legal tender currency, and the latter should execute a satisfaction-piece, the former at the same time depositing in the Union Trust Company, in the name of both parties, the sum of $985, agreed upon as the difference in value between the amount of the principal and interest in legal tender and in gold; that it should be forthwith submitted to the Supreme Court to determine the qúestion as to whether defendant was entitled to payment in gold or in legal tender, and in case it was finally determined that he was entitled to gold, that the ■ money deposited should belong to him; if not, then to plaintiff. This agreement was carried out save as to the submission. It was subsequently agreed that the submission should be delayed until after the decision of' the Supreme Court of the United States in. the so called legal tender cases; and in ease such decision should reverse Hepburn v. Griswold (8 Wallace, 603), that plaintiff should forthwith be entitled to the money. After the decision of the United States Supreme Court in the cases referred to, which followed Hepburn v. Griswold, holding the legal tender act void as to contracts executed prior to its passage, plaintiff, upon application, delivered to defendants an order upon the Union Trust Company for the money deposited, which was paid to them, and the question submitted was as to whether plaintiff could recover back the same. Held, that the payment was voluntarily made on a claim of right under no mistake of fact and could not be recovered back; although by the subsequent decision of the United States Supreme Court (Knox v. Lee, 12 Wall., 457), it appeared the payment was made under a mistake of law.
Amasa J. Parker for the appellant.
B. F. Lee for the respondents.
[MAJORITY — Folger, J.,]
Folger, J.,
reads for affirmance.
All concur.
Judgment affirmed.