Price v. Watkins

*Price v. Watkins. Vested legacy. Devise of land, after the decease of the wife of testator, to trustees, to sell, and to divide the proceeds among his children, afterwards named, when they attained severally the age of twenty-one, or married; A., one of the children, attained the age of twenty-one, and died in the lifetime of the widow, and before sale: Held, that the legacy was vested. Special verdict. The question arose on these words of a will. ‘■‘■Item— My will is, that after my wife Ruth Price’s decease, or if she shall alter her condition and marry, then, in such case, I devise and bequeath unto my loving friends, I. W. and M. K., or to any one of them, in case the other should die, in trust, and for the intent to sell and convey, all that messuage, &c., to any person or persons that shall purchase the same, and the money arising from the sale of the premises shall be divided between my children hereinafter named, when they attain severally to the age of twenty-one years, or be married, which shall first happen.” Samuel Price, one of the children, attained the age of twenty-one years and married, and afterwards died intestate and without issue, in the lifetime of the testator’s widow Ruth Price, who did never marry again. Then the widow died, and after her death, the trustees sold, and the administratrix of Samuel brings this suit for Samuel’s proportionable part of the money arising from the sale of the house. And the question was, whether this was a vested legacy to Samuel, or whether it was lapsed, by Ms dying before the trustees had power to sell, to wit, in the lifetime of the testator’s widow ? For the plaintiff.\ it was urged, that land ordered to be sold and converted into money, was to be considered as personal estate. That this land was to be sold at all events, so there was no contingency. That both events to make a vesting in Samuel had happened, to wit, attaining the age of twenty-one and marrying ; and that this case was exactly similar to the case of King v. Wilkes, Talbot’s Cas. 117. Besides which, many other cases were cited for the plaintiff, viz., 2 Vern. 536; 1 P. Wms. 109; 2 Id. 320; 2 Abr. Cas. Eq. 548; 2 Vent. 347; 2 Vern. 758, 766; 4 Bac. Abr. 308; 2 Vent. 366; 2 Vern. 72, 348, 424; 2 Abr. Cas. Eq. 654. For the defendant, it was said, that in legacies to be raised out of land, the time of payment is the time of vesting. That in this case, the land could not he considered as personal estate, till the trustees had power to sell it, which was not until after the widow’s death, and that Samuel dying before, his legacy was lapsed and would merge for the benefit of the heirs. And the ease of Oads v. Ferry was much relied on, Vin., Devise, 383. The other eases cited for the defendant, were 2 Vern. 92, 416, 208; 2 P. Wms. 276, 610, 484; 3 Id. 20. [MAJORITY] But the Court were clearly of opinion, that it was a vested legacy, and judgment was given for the plaintiff, Patterson v. Hawthorn, 12 S. & R. 112, accordant. And see Stone v. Massey, 2 Yeates 363. McClure’s Appeal, 72 Penn. St. 414; McCall’s Appeal, 86 Id. 254; Pechin’s Estate, 8 W. N. C. 505; Linnard’s Estate, Id. 536. And see Chess’s Appeal, 87 Penn. St. 362.