Bird Savage and Bird against Pierpoint

Bird Savage and Bird against Pierpoint. NEW-YORK, May, 1805. Though the sum for which a verdict is rendered be due, the court will not after a case made and an order to stay proceedings, permit judgment to be entered up for the pm-pose of binding the lands of the defendant. A CASE having been made, after a verdict in this cause for a very considerable sum, the justice of the demand to which was not so much questioned, as whether it should be paid to the plaintiffs, or the assignee of one of them. Radcliff, on an affidavit shewing that the debt was actually due, moved’ for liberty to enter up judgment, in order to bind the lands of the defendant. Riggs & Hoffman, contra. It is only by statute, that real estate is subjected to judgments. The present application is, for the court to make a new law, and render it liable for ver-diets. Admitting the debt to be due to one man, it is no reason for giving a judgment to another. It may as well be asked on suing out the writ. It is in effect requiring the court to decide that the defendant should give a mortgage, before it is determined the plaintiff has any right. The real creditor may be satisfied with personal security, or without any. Benson, in reply, urged the possible lapse of time before a decision, and that granting the motion would be of no inconvenience, as it did not take any thing out of the pocket of the defendant, and this consideration would sufficiently distinguish this case from those where it was asked to order the amount of the verdict to be brought into court in money. [MAJORITY — Per curiam.] Per curiam. We are all of opinion that you can take nothing by your motion. There would be no limitation to this kind of practice. It would be asked in every cause, and in every stage. A verdict is no evidence of right; in many cases no more than filing the declaration. To the country at large such a principle would operate very injuriously. In the English courts such a measure has never been attempted, though from the practice of directing, in important cases, two and even three arguments, the delay must sometimes be very great. It is a mere matter of possibility where t he justice of the case is. To make a rule here, we mu-.t do so in all cases, and the result would be, that wherever there was a certificate to stay proceedings, it would be followed by a judgment. The plaintiffs shew no right to the debt, though it may be due, and as to the sum, 100 dollars to some persons, are of as much importance as 1000 dollars to others. We therefore deny the application, with costs for resisting.